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Abstract 
 
 
The credit rating agencies (CRAs) have become major players in the financial 
markets yet their reputations have been tarnished by certain assessments issued 
during the 2007-2009 financial crisis. There is therefore a clear need to regulate 
the practice of the highly influential, though at times inaccurate, ratings of these 
agencies. The overriding proposition is that CRAs should be liable for the 
issuance of inaccurate ratings. The analysis maps the contours of the legal aspects 
of the credit ratings market before addressing the major questions regarding a 
CRA’s modus operandi. It is argued that CRAs are capable of bringing about 
potential distortions in the financial sector, thereby resulting in a reduction in 
market confidence which, in turn, influences negotiations and expectations. In this 
regard, a civil liability regime for CRAs could constitute a system of investor 
protection over and above traditional regulation.  
The purpose of this thesis is to demonstrate that the present system for 
regulating CRAs in the US, the UK and the EU is defective in terms of 
information asymmetries, an absence of transparency, conflicts of interest and 
limited competition. The thesis considers whether an effective liability regime 
through the ‘estoppel rule’ could be a valid option in the case of CRAs. In this 
light, the thesis attempts to demonstrate that CRAs should be regulated having 
due regard to their potential systemic threat. Further, the thesis suggests that 
CRAs should be subject to professional standards similar to those applicable to 
other information intermediaries such as auditors and financial analysts. The idea 
is that CRAs should be made responsible for their investment certification 
because of their fundamental role in the evaluation of credit risk and their 
influence on confidence and decisions in the market. The research brings forth a 
range of recommendations aimed at reforming the current regulatory framework. 
 
Andrea Miglionico 
London, 2 December 2014 
 
Keywords: Credit rating agencies, securities regulation, civil liability regime, 
estoppel, conflicts of interest, over-reliance, reputational capital. 
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 1 
Chapter One 
Introduction 
 
 
“The pronouncements of these high priests of finance…affect the costs of 
funds for issuers of debt…ratings can single-handedly create or render 
obsolete particular kinds of securities. A downgrade can even tip countries 
towards recession or companies towards bankruptcy”. 
 
Richard Beales, Saskia Scholtes and Gillian Tett, FT, London 17 May 20071 
 
 
1.1 Overview and terms of reference 
Nowadays, it is commonly considered that credit rating agencies (CRAs) play 
a key role in the financial markets because of their general perception as an 
information intermediary between investors and issuers.2  
CRAs are private companies which provide public opinions as to the 
creditworthiness of debt instruments (bonds and commercial paper) and are 
mainly financed by commission fees.3  
Ratings are based on issuers’ public information and are taken into account in 
determining matters such as trends and investment decisions. In fact, ratings 
estimate the risk in relative rank order, but they do not predict credit risks of a 
specific frequency of default or loss.4 As Reisberg observed ‘ratings are forward-
looking statements which represent the raters’ judgement of the creditworthiness 
of an entity’.5 
                                                 
1 Richard Beales, Saskia Scholtes and Gillian Tett, ‘Failing grades? Why Regulators Fear Credit 
Rating Agencies May Be Out of Their Depth’ Financial Times (London, 17 May 2007). 
2 Arturo Estrella et al., ‘Credit Ratings and Complementary Sources of Credit Quality 
Information’, BCBS Working Papers No 3, 11, where it is pointed out that ‘credit rating agencies 
play a useful role by collecting information about a firm and sharing it with a large number of 
investors’. 
3 As defined by Section 3(a) (60) of the US Credit Rating Agency Reform Act 2006, credit rating 
means ‘an assessment of the creditworthiness of an obligor as an entity or with respect to specific 
securities or money market instruments’. See also Article 3 of Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 on credit rating agencies (OJ 
2009 L 302, p. 1): (a) ‘credit rating’ means an opinion regarding the creditworthiness of an entity, 
a debt or financial obligation, debt security, preferred share or other financial instrument, or of an 
issuer of such a debt or financial obligation, debt security, preferred share or other financial 
instrument, issued using an established and defined ranking system of rating categories; (b) ‘credit 
rating agency’ means a legal person whose occupation includes the issuing of credit ratings on a 
professional basis. 
4 Damien Fennel and Andrei Medvedev, ‘An economic analysis of credit rating agency business 
models and ratings accuracy’ (November 2011) Financial Services Authority, Occasional Paper 
Series No 41, 9-10. 
5 Arad Reisberg, ‘The future role of credit rating agencies in contemporary financial markets – A 
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CRAs provide an assessment of the ability of issuers to meet their debt 
obligations through information monitoring services that promote liquid markets.6 
In academic circles, CRAs are classed as ‘certification intermediaries’7 or 
‘reputational intermediaries’.8 It can be said that CRAs are reputational 
intermediaries providing certification services to investors. These services 
regularly consist of monitoring and assessing a company’s creditworthiness.  
Above all, CRAs provide two essential services: (1) solicited ratings, where 
the issuer requests a rating for its securities in return for a fee; and (2) unsolicited 
ratings, which are based only on publicly available information and no fee is paid.  
The CRAs’ business model, whereby the rating agencies are paid by the self-
same entities whose products they are rating, is often referred to as the ‘issuer-
pays’ model. This system was adopted by the main CRAs (Moody’s, Standard & 
Poor’s (S&P’s), Fitch IBCA, Duff and Phelps Credit Rating Co.) in the early 
1970s. Consequently, the main credit-rating firms changed their business models 
from the ‘investor-pays’ model established by John Moody in 1909 to an ‘issuer-
pays’ model.9 Indeed, it is instructive that the entities whose products are being 
rated are the very parties who are actually paying for their products to be rated. 
The CRA is paid by the party wishing to be assessed but ‘its relative 
credibility stems from the fact that it is in effect pledging a reputational capital 
that it has built up over many years of performing similar services for numerous 
clients’10. 
                                                 
theoretical perspective’ in Dan Prentice and Arad Reisberg (eds.), Corporate Finance Law in the 
UK and EU (Oxford: OUP 2011) 173.  
6 John Kiff, Allison Holland, Michael Kisser, Sylwia Nowak, Samer Saab, Liliana Schumacher, 
Han van der Hoorn and Ann-Margret Westin, ‘The Uses and Abuses of Sovereign Credit Ratings’ 
in IMF World Economic and Financial Surveys. Global Financial Stability Report. Sovereigns, 
Funding and Systemic Liquidity (October 2010) 88-89. 
7 Stephen Choi, ‘Market Lessons for Gatekeepers’ (1998) 92 Northwestern University Law Review 
3, 924. See also Jonathan Macey, ‘Wall Street Versus Main Street: How Ignorance, Hyperbole, 
and Fear Lead to Regulation’ (1998) 65 University of Chicago Law Review 4, 1500.  
8 Reiner H. Kraakman, ‘Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls’ (1984) 93 
Yale Law Journal 5, 895-896; see also Reiner H. Kraakman, ‘Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a 
Third-Party Enforcement Strategy’ (1986) 2 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 1, 54. 
From this perspective, the CRAs are repeat intermediaries who provide certification or verification 
services to investors. The issuer uses the reputational intermediary to send a credible signal that its 
securities are of above average quality in order that it can pay a below average interest rate. See on 
this point John C. Coffee Jr., Gatekeepers: The Professions and Corporate Governance (Oxford: 
OUP 2006) 288. 
9 The main CRAs nowadays are Moody’s Investor Service, Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services 
and Fitch Ratings. 
10 John C. Coffee Jr., ‘Understanding Enron: “It’s About the Gatekeepers, Stupid” (2002) 57 The 
Business Lawyer 4, 1405. 
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The International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) defines a 
credit rating as ‘an opinion regarding the creditworthiness of an entity, a credit 
commitment, a debt or debt-like security or an issuer of such obligations, 
expressed using an established and defined ranking system; they are not 
recommendations to purchase, sell, or hold any security’.11 According to this 
definition, credit rating opinions do not constitute recommendations for investors 
but simply opinions or views evaluating the likelihood of timely repayment.  
Nonetheless, ratings do provide valuable information regarding decisions 
made by investors and regulators. However, the exercise of freedom of expression 
carries with it duties and responsibilities which may be subject to restrictions such 
as liability for false and misleading misrepresentations or gross negligence 
prescribed by law as necessary for the prevention of market disorder.12 So the 
question is whether a ‘mere opinion’ can be considered to carry with it an 
exemption from any responsibilities. If this notion of CRAs as providers of ‘mere 
opinions’ is accepted, CRAs cannot be held liable for losses arising from 
detrimental reliance on their ratings.13 
A question that needs to be addressed is whether there is any scope for 
considering an opinion—on which investors and consumers have placed 
reliance—as carrying liability. In other words, whether CRAs can be liable for 
investors’ losses on the basis that the investors relied on the ratings.  
In 2009, the District Court of New York held that ‘ratings on notes sold 
privately to a select group of investors were not matters of public concern 
deserving of traditionally broad protection under the First Amendment of the US 
Constitution’.14 This ruling provided a new perspective on the accountability of 
CRAs because it held that ratings of securities that were distributed to a limited 
number of investors did not deserve the same free-speech protection as more 
                                                 
11 IOSCO Technical Committee, ‘Code of Conduct Fundamentals for Credit Rating Agencies’ 
(December 2004) 3. 
12 In such case, it is necessary to draw a parallel with the law of defamation, where the right to 
freedom of expression has to be balanced against the right to one’s reputation and family life 
(privacy) as well as data protection. Defences under English law include justification (i.e. what 
you are saying is true) and freedom of speech may be the subject to certain privileges in the public 
interest. Otherwise, damages may be payable. 
13 Gregory Husisian, ‘What Standard of Care should govern the world’s shortest editorials?: An 
analysis of Bond Rating Agency Liability’ (1990) 75 Cornell Law Review 2, 454-455. The author 
argues that ‘ratings are editorial opinions, published in letter form’. 
14 Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank et al. v Morgan Stanley & Co., et al. [2009] District Court of New 
York, No 08-7508. This is a relevant case in which a US Court has not held that agency ratings 
constitute protected commercial speech under the First Amendment. 
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general ratings of corporate bonds that were widely disseminated.15 In their 
defence, CRAs frequently argue that they are not party to any contractual 
relationship with investors but only with issuers. As a result, the main relationship 
is between the CRAs and the companies that request the security rating.  
A central theme of this research concerns responsibility; therefore it is 
necessary to take account of the CRAs’ liability regime. In particular, the 
scholarly debate about the liability system for the governance of CRAs is 
considered.  
In this chapter, an overview of the main questions surrounding the CRAs’ 
activities is provided, as well as a map of the role of the role of ratings in the 
financial markets. It explores the CRAs accountability by taking into account the 
importance of making the rating agencies liable when ratings are inaccurate or 
misleading. 
The chapter also considers the possibility of introducing internal controllers 
such as compliance officers to improve disclosure and transparency in the 
financial markets. This reflection identifies some key aspects, notably the extent 
to which the ratings industry can reduce conflicts of interest and investors’ over-
reliance. It further addresses the need to enhance the organizational and 
governance rules of CRAs. 
 
1.2 Credit rating agencies: how they work 
Generally speaking, CRAs play the role of a driver of the securities market 
and are ‘hardwired’ into the regulatory system. In particular, CRAs provide 
advice for investors, who are often subject to restrictions as to their ownership of 
debt of a certain grade.  
The 2007-2009 financial crisis has given rise to an expansion of the CRAs’ 
power worldwide and revealed not only market and regulatory failure, but also the 
failure of the current laws governing credit ratings.16  
                                                 
15 ibid 33. In particular, the Court held that ‘where a rating agency has disseminated their ratings to 
a select group of investors rather than to the public at large, the rating agency is not afforded the 
protection of the First Amendment’.  
16 Nicholas Dorn, ‘Policy stances in financial market regulation: Market rapture, club rules or 
democracy?’ in Kern Alexander and Niamh Moloney (eds.), Law Reform and Financial Markets 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 2011) 45-46. 
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Risk management failed to recognize the powerful function of ratings and their 
potential systemic effects on financial markets as the global crisis confirmed that 
there was an overdependence on CRAs.17 Specifically, CRAs created a systemic 
risk because of the scant incentive for them to perform their screening accurately, 
while policymakers, institutional investors and global regulators underestimated 
the functions of the risks stemming from CRAs. The magnitude of the systemic 
risk brought about by ratings in the banking and securities system represents a 
threat to financial stability. This is because it results in a distortion in the structure 
of the securities market (i.e. falls in market value driven by downgrades, lack of 
transparency and the capacity to cause herding among investors).18 
In essence, investors in securities misunderstood the key role played by credit 
ratings in the investment decisions of financial participants and the widespread 
use of ‘ratings triggers’ in private contracts as discussed in the next chapter.19  
The power of CRAs has more to do with moral suasion tools than with 
governmental influence because ‘this informal power becomes formal only when 
politicians make it so. Regulators naturally milk the agencies when things are 
going well and scapegoat them when things are bad’.20  
The securities market has also revealed that CRAs have led to tighter oversight 
of gatekeepers, i.e. ‘independent professionals who pledge their reputational 
capital to protect the interests of dispersed investors who cannot easily take 
collective action’21 (for instance, private parties which act to facilitate access to 
the securities market by providing financial services to investors) while also 
                                                 
17 Amadou N.R. Sy, ‘The Systemic Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies and Rated Markets’ 
(2009) IMF Working Paper 129, 29. 
18 Iain MacNeil, ‘Credit rating agencies: regulation and financial stability’ in Thomas Cottier, Rosa 
M. Lastra and Christian Tietje (eds), The Rule of Law in Monetary Affairs (Cambridge: CUP 2014) 
189. 
19 Rating triggers are contractual provisions that give counterparties and lenders the right to 
terminate the credit availability, accelerate credit obligations, or have the borrower post collateral 
in the event of specified rating actions, such as if the rating of the borrower’s fixed-income 
securities falls below a certain level. See Committee of European Securities Regulators, ‘CESR’s 
technical advice to the European Commission on possible measures concerning credit rating 
agencies’ (March 2005) 38 and 87-93. 
20 Christopher Caldwell, ‘An inconvenient truth: the power of moral suasion’ Financial Times 
(London, 9 December 2011). 
21 John C. Coffee Jr., ‘Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of Fashioning Relevant 
Reforms’ in Klaus J. Hopt, Eddy Wymeersch, Hideki Kanda and Harald Baum (eds.), Corporate 
Governance in Context: Corporations, States, and Markets in Europe, Japan and the US (Oxford: 
OUP 2005) 605-606; see also John C. Coffee Jr., ‘The Acquiescent Gatekeeper: Reputational 
Intermediaries, Auditor Independence and the Governance of Accounting’ (2001) Columbia Law 
School Working Paper No 191, 2. 
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revealing the limits of regulators’ power. The ratings had become essential to any 
transaction and regulatory intervention relied on the reputational capital of CRAs. 
For instance, buy-side firms such as pension funds, mutual funds and insurance 
companies have made huge use of ratings assessments in order to ensure 
compliance with statutory laws.22  
In this respect, ratings had become a valuable benchmark in the banking and 
securities markets because of their use in bank capital regulation for macro-
prudential supervision and the control of systemic risks.23 Indeed, the Financial 
Services Authority (FSA) noted24 that regulators placed significant reliance on 
external ratings as part of the calculation of capital requirements in accordance 
with the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD).25  
The ratings are involved in the regulatory standards of capital requirements 
(especially in the so-called pillar I ‘Minimum Capital Requirements’ of the Basel 
II Accord) and in setting capital models for credit risk.26 CRAs play an important 
role in the capital adequacy regulation of banks and in the determination of 
regulatory capital through the ‘standardised approach’.27 
The Basel III framework assessed measures to mitigate the reliance on 
external ratings of the Basel II regime. These measures included requirements for 
banks to perform their own internal assessments of externally-rated securitization 
                                                 
22 Securities and Exchange Commission, ‘Report on the Role and Function of Credit Rating 
Agencies in the Operation of the Securities Markets. As Required by Section 702(b) of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002’ (January 2003) 28. 
23 Kern Alexander, ‘The Risk of Ratings in Bank Capital Regulation’ (2014) 25 European 
Business Law Review 2, 295-296. It is observed that ‘central banks used credit ratings in their open 
market and liquidity operations to determine the type of bonds and other debt instruments they 
would take as collateral and the margin or haircut applied to such collateral when purchasing 
bonds or lending cash to participating financial institutions’ (at 298). 
24 Financial Services Authority, ‘A Regulatory Response to the Global Banking Crisis’, Discussion 
Paper No 09/2, March 2009, at para 1.57. 
25 Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to 
the activity and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms, amending 
Directive 2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC—Capital 
Requirements Directive IV (OJ 2013 L 176, p. 338). 
26 Howell E. Jackson, ‘The Role of Credit Rating Agencies in the Establishment of Capital 
Standards for Financial Institutions in a Global Economy’ in Eilís Ferran and Charles A.E. 
Goodhart (eds), Regulating Financial Services and Markets in the Twenty First Century (Oxford: 
Hart Publishing 2001) 315-322. See also Rolf H. Weber and Aline Darbellay, ‘The regulatory use 
of credit ratings in bank capital requirement regulations’ (2008) 10 Journal of Banking Regulation 
1, 4-5. 
27 Deniz Coskun, ‘Credit-rating agencies in the Basel II framework: why the standardized 
approach is inadequate for regulatory capital purposes’ (2010) 25 Journal of International Banking 
Law and Regulation 4, 157-158. 
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exposures.28 It has been rightly observed that ‘it seems paradoxical that the 
regulators, on the one hand, criticize credit rating agencies for their role in the 
financial crisis and subject them to regulatory control but, on the other hand, leave 
them the key to the financial markets’.29  
Chapter two elaborates on the increasing role of CRAs in the financial markets 
which, can be explained by the reputational incentives and regulatory license 
model.30 The former only works if the intermediary has gained sufficient 
reputational capital to be trusted by investors31, while the latter functions by 
reducing the issuer’s costs, or the costs of financial intermediaries, allowing 
CRAs to sell regulatory licenses to enable such persons to avoid these costs.32  
As Partnoy observed, ‘the rating agencies have evolved from information 
providers to purveyors of regulatory licenses’.33 Specifically, securities regulation 
has increasingly relied on credit ratings and the credit rating agencies sector.  
The regulators have used credit ratings in a variety of ways, for instance to 
assess the sovereign debt of countries and have conferred on CRAs some 
‘regulatory licenses’. Such ‘licenses’ granted to companies and financial 
institutions the right to be in compliance with regulation.34 In this regard, 
‘regulatory licenses, and the behavioural overdependence on ratings that followed 
them, ultimately led to the creation and growth of the financial instruments at the 
core of the recent crisis’.35 
The benefits associated with these regulatory licenses stem from securities 
laws, self-regulatory principles and uncertain court decisions.36 This scenario 
                                                 
28 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, ‘Basel III: A global regulatory framework for more 
resilient banks and banking systems’ (June 2011) 4. 
29 Jan Oster, ‘Who Rates the Raters? The Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies in the EU’ (2010) 
17 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 4, 374. 
30 Frank Partnoy, ‘Barbarians at the gatekeepers?: a proposal for a modified strict liability regime’ 
(2001) 79 Washington University Law Quarterly 2, 494. Partnoy observes that ‘a good reputation 
is valuable in transacting with other parties, and reputational capital enables parties to use trust to 
reduce the costs of transacting’. 
31 Douglas W. Diamond, ‘Reputation Acquisition in Debt Markets’ (1989) 97 Journal of Political 
Economy 4, 829-832. 
32 John C. Coffee Jr. (note 8) 288. 
33 Frank Partnoy, ‘Rethinking regulation of credit-rating agencies: an institutional investor 
perspective’ (2010) 25 Journal of International Banking Law and Regulation 4, 188. 
34 Arad Reisberg (note 5) 179. 
35 Frank Partnoy, ‘Historical Perspectives on the Financial Crisis: Ivar Kreuger, the Credit-Rating 
Agencies, and Two Theories about the Function, and Dysfunction, of Markets’ (2009) 26 Yale 
Journal on Regulation 2, 442-443. 
36 Frank Partnoy, ‘The Siskel and Ebert of Financial Markets?’ Two Thumbs Down for the Credit 
Rating Agencies’ (1999) 77 Washington University Law Quarterly 3, 623. The author argues that 
‘credit ratings are valuable not because they contain valuable information, but because they grant 
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allows CRAs to circumvent the rules and avoid liability for misrepresentations or 
misconduct and, most importantly, any monitoring of their assessments.37 Ratings 
downgrades can trigger sales of certain financial products, thus highlighting the 
agencies’ powerful role. Such regulatory licenses allow CRAs to engage in 
dubious practices including omissions and misleading opinions, as for instance in 
the Enron case.38 In sum, investors use ratings to make decisions on the credit risk 
of fixed-income securities and financial regulators use credit ratings to increase 
the monitoring of the risk of investments held by regulated entities.  
Ratings are, however, also used by regulators to determine when particular 
investment products can be sold to the public and as a diversification tool to 
manage institutional investment. This means that the market price is influenced by 
rating pronouncements and CRAs’ opinions that can affect financial confidence. It 
has been argued that ‘the success of debt-raising by an issuer depends on the 
rating of the debt, with the rating a prerequisite which determines the interest rate 
offered and the cost of capital’.39  
Notwithstanding this, as intermediaries, credit ratings should profit from 
protecting investors because they manage ‘market information’, which is 
generally considered to be a public good.40 In this light, ratings can be viewed as a 
public good because the provision of financial information can disclose 
                                                 
issuers regulatory licenses; a good rating entitles the issuer (and the investor in a particular issue) 
to certain advantages related to regulation’ (at 681). Partnoy also observes that rating agencies sell 
information and survive based on their ability to accumulate and retain reputational capital. But 
once regulation is passed that incorporates ratings, rating agencies begin to sell not only 
information but also the valuable property rights associated with compliance with that regulation 
(at 682). 
37 John C. Coffee Jr. (note 8) 288. Coffee points out that ‘the core idea behind the regulatory 
license is that regulation imposes costs which a favourable rating can reduce’. He states that ‘a 
rating enables issuers to escape costly regulatory burdens or prohibitions to which they would 
otherwise be subject; or portfolio managers and institutional investors gain legal protection by 
virtue of such a credit-rating, because it insulates them from potential claims that they breached 
their fiduciary duties to investors in buying or holding the security’.  
38 John C. Coffee Jr., ‘What caused Enron? A capsule social and economic history of the 1990s’ 
(2004) 89 Cornell Law Review 2, 287-297. Coffee observes that the failure of the gatekeepers to 
detect Enron’s collapse can be explained by the ‘general deterrence’ and ‘bubble market’ 
hypotheses. The first focuses ‘on the decline in the expected liability costs that faced auditors who 
were considering whether or not to acquiesce in aggressive accounting policies favoured by 
managers’. The second focuses on the fact that—in an atmosphere of market euphoria—
‘gatekeepers have less relevance and, consequently, reduced leverage with their clients’. See also 
Deniz Coskun, ‘Credit rating agencies in a post-Enron world: Congress revisits the NRSRO 
concept’ (2008) 9 Journal of Banking Regulation 4, 266-269. 
39 Niamh Moloney, EC Securities Regulation (2nd edn, Oxford: OUP 2008) 689. 
40 Stephen Choi, ‘A Framework for the Regulation of Securities Market Intermediaries’ (2004) 1 
Berkeley Business Law Journal 1, 48. 
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information that benefits the public.41 Consequently, CRAs are trusted fiduciaries 
and mainstays of the financial community. As Strier noted, ‘in bond ratings, the 
rating agencies are the key gatekeepers, in whom the trust of the investing public 
is reposed; public trust in any corporate gatekeeper is founded upon faith in its 
corporate governance apparatus’.42  
In the aftermath of the 2007-2009 financial crisis, confidence in the rating 
agencies to ‘get it right’ was shaken by a growing amount of criticism and 
controversy.43 At the same time, the integrity of the CRAs’ activity is threatened 
by the demands of winning and retaining clients in the more lucrative consultancy 
business.  
In this respect, the modus operandi of CRAs raises major questions. As stated 
earlier, the relevance of this lies in the fact that credit ratings affect market 
confidence and influence investors’ decisions and their expectations. For this 
reason, it is assumed that CRAs represent a potential distortion—in terms of 
market failure44—for the securities industry.  
In this way, this thesis aims to show the importance for CRAs in maintaining 
investors protection. Consequently, the analysis is based on the assumption that 
CRAs should improve the incentives to supply complete available information 
and promote fair competition. In other areas, CRAs should enhance financial 
stability for market participants. 
It is plain that if a financial market is stable, everybody benefits. However, 
Turner warned that ‘financial instability is driven by human myopia and imperfect 
                                                 
41 It is generally considered by the economic literature that ‘a public good is one where the 
consumption of the good by one individual in no way prevents others consuming the good or 
diminishes their enjoyment of it’. In other terms, a public good is one where there is no rivalry and 
non-exclusion in consumption. See David M. Kreps, A Course in Microeconomic Theory (London: 
Harvester Wheatsheaf 1990) 168. 
42 Franklin Strier, ‘Rating the Raters: Conflicts of Interest in the Credit Rating Firms’ (2008) 113 
Business and Society Review 4, 539. 
43 John Patrick Hunt, ‘Credit rating agencies and the “worldwide credit crisis”: the limits of 
reputation, the insufficiency of reform, and a proposal for improvement’ (2009) Columbia 
Business Law Review 1, 112-114. See also Efraim Benmelech and Jennifer Dlugosz, ‘The alchemy 
of CDO credit ratings’ (2009) 56 Journal of Monetary Economics 5, 630-633. 
44 Francis M. Bator, ‘The Anatomy of Market Failure’ (1958) 72 The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 3, 351, where market failure is defined as ‘the failure of a more or less idealized 
system of price-market institutions to sustain “desirable” activities or to estop “undesirable” 
activities’.     
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rationality as well as by poor incentives, and because any financial system will 
mutate to create new risks in the face of any finite and permanent set of rules’.45  
In light of these considerations, this research intends to explore the major 
issues concerning the internal governance of CRAs. It analyses the development 
of CRAs and how their influence on the decisions and expectations of financial 
participants has increased in recent years. Above all, this research highlights the 
CRAs’ role in building market confidence and investors’ belief in financial 
products. 
The next section provides an overview of the nature and extent of regulatory 
reliance on ratings. It places particular emphasis on the powerful role of CRAs in 
financial markets. This section also addresses the initial shortcomings associated 
with CRAs’ activities. 
 
1.3 The problems 
This research assumes that CRAs play the role of ‘financial gatekeepers’ by 
giving an evaluation of the creditworthiness of securities products. This means 
that CRAs are entities established to measure the relative risk that a borrower will 
fail to meet its financial commitments, such as interest payments and repayment 
of principal on a timely basis.46  
CRAs aspire to act as ‘forecasters’ with regard to the debt liability of the 
issuer and its probability of default. However, accuracy of forecasting is the key 
question of credit rating.47 However, the gatekeeper’s function begs the question 
of what kind of liability should be attached to ratings.  
It is instructive to observe that despite the criticism that has been levelled in 
various quarters on account of the effects of the recent downgrades, investors 
continue to choose the same CRA players, namely Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s 
and Fitch. This raises an important concern about the significant reliance of 
                                                 
45 Adair Turner, ‘Reforming finance: are we being radical enough?’, 2011 Clare Distinguished 
Lecture in Economics and Public Policy, Clare College, Cambridge, 18 February 2011. 
46 John Kiff, Allison Holland, Michael Kisser, Sylwia Nowak, Samer Saab, Liliana Schumacher, 
Han van der Hoorn and Ann-Margret Westin (note 6) 88. 
47 According to Coffee, ‘the accuracy of a credit rating is only demonstrated over the long-run, but 
the payment for it is made in the short-run. This mismatch can create agency problems, as the 
managers who determine the rating may expect (or intend) to be around at the end of the ratings 
cycle’. See John C. Coffee Jr., ‘Ratings Reform: The Good, The Bad, and The Ugly’ (2010) 
European Corporate Governance Institute, Law Working Paper No 145, 29. 
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investors and the weakness of ‘reputational incentive theory’.48 Another relevant 
question is how to deal with the ‘issuer-pays’ business model of CRAs. This is, 
undoubtedly, the most critical aspect of the ratings industry because of the 
inherent risk of conflicts of interest.49 
CRAs’ knowledge of the consequences of inaccurate prediction might be 
considered to be morally equivalent to knowingly publishing a misleading 
assessment.50 To eliminate or reduce this kind of risk there is a need for investors 
to refer to CRAs that are set up only for genuine insight or for customized 
analysis.   
This research shows that the potential damage of publishing misleading 
assessments is inextricably intertwined with the problem of consumer protection 
and market confidence.51  
The accuracy of CRAs’ forecasting creates their reputation and provides a 
clear pattern for understanding predictions. Issuers pay for an objective prediction 
while investors (or consumers) rely on an independent assessment. However, the 
predictions are only very rarely subjected to empirical verification, and when such 
verification is attempted, some of the predictions are shown to be unreliable.52 
It is generally asserted that the inaccuracy of rating is due to the existence of: 
(1) conflicts of interest; (2) the lack of proper competition; and (3) reluctance to 
make a disclosure, since a key feature of ratings is the provision of information.53 
                                                 
48 Tom Hurst, ‘The role of credit rating agencies in the current worldwide financial crisis’ (2009) 
30 Company Lawyer 2, 64. 
49 As indicated, CRAs operate under an ‘issuer-pays’ model under which issuers request agencies 
to provide ratings which are a prerequisite for external debt financing. 
50 Rolf Weber and Simone Baumann, ‘Conflicts of Interest and Risk Management Practices in the 
CRA Industry’ in Jan Kleineman, Lars Gorton and Verständig (eds), Perspectives on Credit 
Rating Agencies (Stockholm: Författarna, Stockholm Centre for Commercial Law Jure Förlag AB 
2013) 290. The authors argue that in the ratings industry ‘the issuer-pay business model is not 
considered to be problematic because the CRA would have much more to lose by endangering 
their reputation for objectivity than they would have to gain if they favor one single customer’. See 
also Steven L. Schwarcz, ‘Private Ordering of Public Markets: The Rating Agency Paradox’ 
(2002) University of Illinois Law Review 1, 17-18. 
51 In this context, market confidence means that ‘it is safe’ for investors to participate in a certain 
financial market. The importance of market confidence is fundamental in order to design a 
rationale for the regulation of CRAs. 
52 Joshua D. Coval, Jakub W. Jurek and Erik Stafford, ‘Economic Catastrophe Bonds’ (2009) 99 
American Economic Review 3, 628-629. The authors observe that ‘credit ratings describe a 
security’s expected payoffs in the form of its default likelihood and anticipated recovery value 
given default. However, because they contain no information about the state of the economy in 
which default occurs, they are insufficient for pricing’. See also Joshua D. Coval, Jakub W. Jurek 
and Erik Stafford, ‘The Economics of Structured Finance’ (2009) 23 Journal of Economic 
Perspective 1, 4-5. 
53 Choi observes that ‘conflicts of interest and agency cost problems within securities 
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The central role of ratings is to increase transparency in the financial markets by 
reducing the information asymmetry between issuers and investors. These 
concerns could determine a market failure if they are not adequately corrected by 
intervention on the part of the regulators.  
The first reason provided above for the inaccuracy of ratings, namely 
‘conflicts of interest’ can be explained as a species of strategic behaviour in the 
issuer-credit ratings relationship and clearly emerges in the mechanism of the 
‘issuer-pays’ model. The issuer fees characterize the compensation system. Thus, 
the most common conflict of interest is in the revenue received by CRAs from the 
issuers that they rate.54 This scheme inevitably fosters an incentive to over-rate in 
order to secure a high fee and inflated ratings.  
A possible solution to this practice would rely on constraining rating fees. In 
order to mitigate this problem, it would be necessary to divorce issuer payment of 
the CRA from issuer selection of the CRA or encourage an alternative subscriber-
pays market for ratings.55 In other words, a system of standardized revenues could 
be put in place in order to reduce reliance on the ‘issuer-pays’ business model. 
This research seeks to show that an ‘investor-pays’ model or ‘subscriber-pays’ 
model could be set up to address the question of conflicts of interest. 
The second area that adversely affects the accuracy of ratings is better 
described by the fact that it can be argued that only three main CRAs (S&P’s, 
Moody’s and Fitch) operate in the entire financial market. It is enough for one 
agency to become lax and unscrupulous in its rating activities for this to have 
negative consequences on the prediction of default events. Most investors rely 
heavily on these agencies, which makes for a de facto oligopoly and increases the 
chances of inaccuracy of forecasting.  
This problem is closely connected with the position and role of consumers 
(usually considered the weaker party to the transaction) because they are 
disadvantaged by the trading practices of suppliers.56 In academic circles, a 
                                                 
intermediaries are examples of problems with potential market-based solutions’. See Stephen Choi 
(note 40) 72. 
54 Steven L. Schwarcz, ‘Protecting Financial Markets: Lessons from the Subprime Mortgage 
Meltdown’ (2008) 93 Minnesota Law Review 2, 401. The author observes that ‘rating agencies are 
customarily paid by the issuer of securities, but investors rely heavily on their ratings. This is 
technically a conflict, but it is not usually a material conflict because ratings are made 
independently of the fee received’.   
55 John C. Coffee Jr. (note 47) 49. 
56 Joanna Benjamin, Financial Law (Oxford: OUP 2007) 563. The author argues that consumers 
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proposal has been made that competition should be encouraged by enacting an 
‘equal access’ rule under which issuers would be required to disclose their data 
publicly.57 Chapter two discusses whether the equal access approach would ensure 
greater competition among the main CRAs and incentivize smaller credit rating 
agencies to enter the US Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization 
(NRSRO), a special designation body with functions of authorization, registration 
and control of CRAs. 
However, fair competition contains the prices that suppliers can charge and 
therefore restricts their profits. It exerts pressure on them to reduce costs, thereby 
rendering the enterprise productively more efficient. It also obliges the suppliers 
to respond to consumer expectations about quality.  
The third aspect, namely reluctance to make disclosure, was the third reason 
mentioned in connection with the inaccuracy of ratings. It is related to the 
‘appropriate’ information disclosed by CRAs on their rating methodologies. This 
concern involves the risk of informational asymmetries between issuers and 
consumers. 
It is generally considered that this lack of equality in information disclosure—
one of the principal causes of market failure58—brings about an imbalance of 
information between parties to trade (one so severe that exchange is impeded) and 
that its effects justify regulatory intervention by the institutions. In economic 
literature, informational asymmetries represent a situation where the capital 
receivers are in the position of having more knowledge about the prospects and 
condition of the corporation than the capital suppliers, and are thus in a position to 
abuse this advantage.59 There is an ensuing market failure in enhancing rating 
quality. This is due to a lack of competition and hence effective reputational 
discipline for getting it wrong.  
                                                 
are ‘classes of person deemed to be economically weak’.  
57 John C. Coffee Jr. (note 47) 5. 
58 Francis M. Bator (note 44) 351-352. 
59 George Akerlof, ‘Market for Lemons: Quantitative Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism’ 
(1970) 84 Quarterly Journal of Economics 3, 490; Hayne E. Leland and David H. Pyle, 
‘Informational Asymmetries, Financial Structure, and Financial Intermediation’ (1977) 32 The 
Journal of Finance 2, 371; Michael Rothschild and Joseph E. Stiglitz, ‘Equilibrium in Competitive 
Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information’ (1976) 90 Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 4, 648; Joseph Stiglitz, ‘Incentives, Risk and Information: Notes Toward a 
Theory of Hierarchy’ (1975) 6 Bell Journal of Economics 2, 552. 
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It is manifest that the party with superior information about the probability of 
default can opportunistically use it to induce the other party (issuer) into 
unexpected and undesired outcomes. However, ‘once the oligopolists’ grip is 
loosened, there will be no shortage of analysts ready to take their place. Clients 
may hesitate to use unknown newcomers, but veterans of the big three should 
capture business’.60 
After providing a critical analysis of the main issues associated with the 
CRAs’ activities, the next section advances a set of reforms for improving the 
transparency of credit rating agencies’ assessments. 
 
1.4 Suggested proposals 
As discussed in the previous section, adequacy of disclosure is a gauge to 
determine what an investor knew or should have known, based on the information 
available to it. Public disclosure of rating procedures and historical performance 
data on accuracy should enhance transparency and comparability of ratings. As 
MacNeil observed, ‘enhancing transparency of rating information would permit 
investors to look more closely into the “black box” of the rating process, thereby 
assisting them in understanding the ratings and facilitating due diligence on their 
own part’.61 In order to improve due diligence (for instance, investigations as to 
the suitability of rating models), independent experts, such as compliance officers, 
could be appointed. This type of third party services could prove to be a strong 
incentive to issue accurate ratings.  
A compliance department tasked with measuring the historic performance of 
ratings and verifying their methodologies could check the impartiality and 
independent approach of rating agencies and disclose all information about rating 
procedures. In addition, the compliance officer could provide enhanced internal 
control mechanisms by ensuring that developments in the business and specific 
obligations meet the required standards of legality and integrity.62    
In this regard, the establishment of an internal control mechanism for the 
ratings procedures could encourage companies to operate under market incentives 
                                                 
60 ‘Redeeming ratings’ Financial Times (London, 10 November 2011). 
61 Iain MacNeil (note 19) 200. 
62 Caitlin M. Mulligan, ‘From AAA to F: How the Credit Rating Agencies Failed America and 
What Can Be Done to Protect Investors’ (2009) 50 Boston College Law Review 4, 1300-1301. 
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such as transparency and fairness. In particular, an on-going compliance 
programme may solve the monitoring problems (e.g, when agents cannot verify a 
firm’s monitoring ex ante).63 This type of regulatory approach should improve the 
governance of the CRAs and their legal duties to avoid and interdict the offences. 
This concept raises once again the thorny question of gatekeepers’ liability in 
relation to their duties.64  
In order to consider this concept, it is necessary to investigate the opportunistic 
behaviour of CRAs in respect of issuers because of their potential collusive 
actions. Further, this analysis aims to verify whether this collusive behaviour 
faces a problem of cooperation, and whether this cooperation produces mutual 
gains for those who participate therein.65 
The opportunistic behaviour of rating agencies and issuers may be exacerbated 
by CRAs’ governance where there are different parties with different interests in 
the outcomes of transactions. In order to tackle these issues, the research considers 
the implications of the principal-agent theory so as to investigate the extent to 
which conflicts of interest and information asymmetries exist between the issuer, 
the ratings agency and investors.66  
Assuming the principal-agent theory67, this research explains how to recast the 
rating agencies-investors relationship. However, the issuer-agency relationship 
that exists between the issuer and the CRA raises questions from regulators and 
                                                 
63 Jennifer Arlen and Reiner H. Kraakman, ‘Controlling corporate misconduct: an analysis of 
corporate liability regime’ (1997) 72 New York University Law Review 4, 766-767. 
64 It has been observed that ‘its enforcement potential depends not only on the offense and the 
level of culpability that triggers personal liability, but also on the choice of gatekeepers and upon 
the design of their duties’. On this point see Reiner H. Kraakman (note 8) 892. 
65 This cooperative behaviour is addressed by the ‘repeated game theory’ in which it is explained 
why people engage in actions which produce joint benefits greater than private costs in two-person 
relationships. See Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms (Boston: Harvard University Press 2000) 
18. 
66 Tony Van Gestel and Bart Baesens, Credit Risk Management (Oxford: OUP 2009) 124. In 
particular, the authors point out that ‘the issuer credit rating is an overall judgement of the 
obligor’s ability to meet his financial commitments. Issuer credit ratings reflect the issuer’s 
fundamental credit risk, hereby making abstraction of security-specific differences related, e.g., to 
seniority, collateral, and/or guarantees’.  
67 According to the economic literature, a principal-agent problem occurs when one individual 
engages a skilled person to undertake some profit-making, or other utility-conferring activity. 
Typically, because of the principal’s lack of expertise, a significant incentive to interact in 
imperfectly competitive environments is conferred on the agent, with the risk that the latter may 
opportunistically exercize that discretion in a way which maximizes his or her own interests, rather 
than those of the principal. The regulation can constrain the relationship between principal and 
agent, but fails to prevent opportunistic behaviour. In other words, the principal-agent problem is 
intended as ‘a contract that gives the agent the incentives to manage the asset in the best way for 
the principal’. See Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen, Law & Economics (5th edn, Pearson 
International Education 2008) 147. 
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investors.68 In particular, issuers (principals) without sufficient information or 
expertise to implement their preferences employ agents (CRAs) who possess such 
expertise. Unless constrained (for example, by more focused regulation), agents 
may be able to exploit their discretion so as to advance their own interests, rather 
than those of their principal. Indeed, the agent may sacrifice the best interests of 
both investors and issuers for the agent’s own personal self-interest. In this 
context, criticisms have arisen over the inability of CRAs to assess the market risk 
of structured financial products.69 
A closer examination of the issuer-agency relationship will enable some 
proposals to be advanced regarding the need of protection for consumers: the most 
effective way of solving the principal-agent problem in the credit rating sphere 
might be to realign the interests of the issuers and agencies.  
CRAs may be concerned to further their interests not only in relation to issuers 
but also to investors. The agency problem facing credit ratings is connected with 
the need of issuers to develop a reputation for credibility. Fully-informed 
investors should provide a natural disciplining influence on poorly-performing 
credit ratings. 
Some commentators have argued that ‘gatekeepers [like CRAs] have an 
incentive to disappoint buyers only when the resulting gains exceed the costs of 
building a reputation. However, if sellers often find “cheating” to be profitable, 
buyers will discount the value of the reputational signal accordingly—and in 
extreme cases, the reciprocal expectations that support reputation will collapse 
under the weight of moral hazard’.70 Through their individual reputations, 
gatekeepers have the power to influence the product value and pressure the 
expectations of market participants. On this view, gatekeepers should be directly 
responsible to investors for their performance.  
According to Coffee, the gatekeepers fail to report to a principal, which results 
in a situation of conflict of interests.71 In substance, the issuer wants the inflated 
                                                 
68 Gillian Tett, ‘E-mails throw light on murky world of credit’ Financial Times (London, 25 April 
2010). 
69 Committee on the Global Financial System, ‘Ratings in structured finance: what went wrong 
and what can be done to address shortcomings?’ (July 2008) Committee on the Global Financial 
System Papers No 32, 3-5. 
70 According to Reiner H. Kraakman (note 8) 97. The author observes that ‘reputations are 
particularly important where buyers cannot verify the quality of goods or services prior to their 
purchases, and enforceable warranties prove costly or ineffective’. 
71 John C. Coffee Jr. (note 8) 335-337. 
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rating less for its impact on the market than for its ability to reduce its regulatory 
costs. However, the issuer may misrepresent the information supply to the 
gatekeeper, but this misconduct could be detected or prevented by an internal 
supervisory body. In this way, the involvement of independent controllers should 
address the inaccuracy of ratings and limit the scope of conflicts of interest 
between issuers and raters. 
The introduction of a strong ‘principal’ to monitor the ‘agent’ should cost little 
and produce quantifiable benefits.72 Under this regime, liability rules could 
furnish a powerful incentive to strengthen the screening accuracy of CRAs.73 
In order to deal with these questions, this research seeks to argue that an 
adequate compliance function could certify both the accuracy of ratings 
assessments and the high quality of the financial product. Through the compliance 
function, CRAs may signal their value to investors because the reputational value 
of CRAs depends on the level of their screening accuracy. Consequently, the 
compliance officer could play the role of a new ‘agent’ for the purposes of 
monitoring ratings. In addition, the compliance function would have the incentive 
to control its agent (CRA) on the grounds of consumer protection. This would 
realign the principal-agent relationship. Investors should become the principal 
who hires and fires the gatekeeper.  
In order to address these concerns, this research also provides an analysis of 
the governance of CRAs.74 In particular, the concept of ‘efficiency’75 is 
considered in order to explain the legal questions of CRA accountability.  
                                                 
72 ibid 338.  
73 John C. Coffee Jr., ‘Enhancing Investor Protection and The Regulation of Securities Markets’ 
(2009) Columbia Law and Economics Working Paper No 348, 69. In particular, ‘credit rating 
agencies must be compelled either to conduct reasonable verification of the key facts that they are 
assuming in their ratings methodology or to obtain such verification from professionals 
independent of the issuer’. For this obligation to be meaningful, it must be backstopped by a 
standard liability specifically designed to apply to credit rating agencies.  
74 This research uses simple concepts of law and economics to explain the strategic behaviour of 
CRAs and to address the major questions facing the issuer-agency relationship.  
75 In this research, the term ‘efficiency’ is identified in the sense of ‘allocative efficiency’ (i.e. the 
Kaldor-Hicks criterion). In the economic literature, the concept of efficiency can be regarded as 
the maximization of wealth of society (‘distributional efficiency’) or ‘allocative efficiency’ (or 
‘Pareto efficiency’) concerning with the amount of welfare within a given society and an efficient 
policy is one which maximizes that amount (the satisfaction of individual preferences). A 
particular situation is ‘Pareto efficient’ where the benefit of one individual cannot be improved 
without reducing the benefit of any other member of society. See Richard A. Posner, Economic 
Analysis of Law (Wolters Kluwer Aspen Publisher 2007) 11-15. 
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After providing and discussing proposals to ameliorate the major deficiencies 
of CRAs’ governance, the following section focuses on the issues regarding the 
failures of CRAs.  
 
1.5 Rating agencies’ failures and remedies 
CRAs have been accused of giving more weight to political rather than 
economic factors. They have also been accused of getting their timing wrong (for 
example, the warnings of downgrading of members of the Eurozone in the 2007-
2009 financial turmoil).76 In other words, CRAs have often been more successful 
at confirming risk but less good at risk prognosis. Policymakers’ reliance on credit 
ratings increased during the current sovereign debt crisis (particularly during the 
Greek crisis in 2011-2012), where rating downgrades led to market losses for 
countries, together with adverse effects such as the rapid drying up of liquidity.77  
Credit rating firms have been criticized, not only for issuing inaccurate ratings 
to subprime mortgages78 leading up to the financial crisis, but also for weaknesses 
in their internal controls and procedures for managing conflicts of interest, 
including firm policies on securities trading.79 
Empirical studies have shown internal control weaknesses in respect of 
corporate debt ratings.80 In this regard, a proposal has been made ‘to establish an 
independent assessment institution to assess the accuracy of CRA estimates of 
probability of default, and to publish comparative studies of such accuracy’.81 
                                                 
76 ‘S&P credit warning provokes outrage’ Financial Times (London, 7 December 2011) 7. 
77 The current financial crisis has revealed the huge role played by CRAs in the rapid growth of 
structured products markets. In fact, structured products require a targeted rating that considerably 
involves the assessment process of credit agencies. 
78 A subprime mortgage can be defined as a loan made to a borrower who has poor credit and 
would be disqualified from prime or near-prime mortgages. During the 2007-2009 financial crisis, 
subprime mortgages assumed a significant role because the loans were bundled and sold as 
structured products called collateralized debt obligations. See Markus K. Brunnermeier, 
‘Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch 2007-2008’ (2009) 23 Journal of Economic 
Perspective 1, 82-83. 
79 Kara Scannell, ‘SEC critical of rating agency’s controls’ Financial Times (London, 30 
September 2011). 
80 Samir M. El-Gazzar, Kwang-Hyun Chung and Rudolph A. Jacob, ‘Reporting of Internal Control 
Weaknesses and Debt Rating Changes’ (2011) 17 International Advances in Economic Research 
4, 421-425. 
81 Charles A.E. Goodhart, ‘How, if at all, should Credit Ratings Agencies (CRAs) be Regulated?’ 
(June 2008) LSE Financial Markets Group Paper Series, Special Paper No 181, 25-26. See also 
Charles A.E. Goodhart, The Regulatory Response to the Financial Crisis (Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar 2009) 129. In particular, the author suggests the establishment of a small independent body, 
a CRA Assessment Centre. 
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Notwithstanding some obvious benefits, a separately established independent 
authority would perhaps be too costly for the financial industry and would be less 
credible if it were to be directly controlled by the industry itself.  
In the well-known corporate scandals that engulfed Enron, WorldCom and 
Lehman Brothers, these companies were given high ratings and investors relied on 
them. For instance, the Enron case clearly illustrates the dangers of such 
reliance.82 The CRAs belatedly downgraded them but only after holding off for a 
time. Coffee observed that ‘this pattern in which a ratings downgrade resembles 
more an obituary than a prophecy again suggests the absence of real 
competition’.83 Investors piled into these seemingly high-growth companies; the 
CRAs downgraded their ratings, red-flagging them as increasingly high-risk.84 
This concern was considered to be negative by market participants because ratings 
changes appeared to be sluggish, inaccurate and with few incentives to be 
responsive to investors.85  
CRAs have no incentives to screen the accuracy of their assessment 
methodologies.86 This stems from their performance with regard to the evaluation 
of financial-sector creditworthiness. The point is that rating agencies should 
establish a direct relationship with investors.  
These corporate scandals underlined the need for improving the working 
methodology of CRAs. They also drew attention to the fallibility of the CRAs’ 
assessments, on which investors typically rely for protection without being 
conscious of disregarding the fact that a rating changes over time.87 For instance, 
                                                 
82 Jeffrey N. Gordon, ‘What Enron Means for the Management and Control of the Modern 
Business Corporation: Some Initial Reflections’ (2002) 69 University of Chicago Law Review 3, 
1234-1235. See also John C. Coffee Jr. (note 11) 1409-1412. 
83 John C. Coffee Jr. (note 8) 285. The author observes that ‘rationally, the nominal competitors 
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financial decline before it becomes public knowledge’. 
84 Andrew Hill, ‘Enron: see no evil, hear no evil, speak no evil’ Financial Times (London, 2 
December 2011) 19. The author observes that ‘when the rating agencies downgraded Enron’s debt 
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85 William H. Beaver, Catherine Shakespeare and Mark T. Soliman, ‘Differential Properties in the 
Ratings of Certified vs. Non-Certified Bond Rating Agencies’ (2006) 42 Journal of Accounting 
and Economics 3, 310-312. 
86 John C. Coffee Jr. (note 73) 66-67. 
87 ibid 10-15. Coffee argues that two factors represent persuasive explanations for gatekeeper 
deterioration: (1) the rise of structured finance and the change in relationships that it produced 
between the rating agencies and their clients; and (2) the appearance of serious competition within 
the ratings industry that challenged the long stable duopoly of Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s 
and that appears to have resulted in ratings inflation. 
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in the Enron failure, gatekeepers certified the issuer’s compliance with an 
inventory of highly technical rules—without the auditor necessarily taking 
responsibility for the overall accuracy of the issuer’s statement of its financial 
position.88 It has been argued that ‘the gatekeeper’s services have value only if the 
gatekeeper is certifying compliance with a meaningful substantive standard’.89  
In addition, the aforementioned corporate collapses (Enron, WorldCom, 
Lehman Brothers) raised questions about the conflict of interests of the CRAs that 
perform consultancy work for their clients.90 In this regard, the securities industry 
has not settled the question as to whether CRAs should be liable for 
misrepresentations or fraud to issuers and investors.  
The government initiatives (at the EU and US level)91 have sought only to 
improve the transparency and fairness of CRAs by creating a rigorous system of 
regulation and supervision that enables the ratings industry to deliver services 
considered indispensable while, as far as possible, preventing them from pursuing 
activities that are deemed detrimental to consumers.92  
The legal system set in place by the global regulators93—IOSCO, Financial 
Stability Board (FSB), Group of Twenty (G-20) and Securities Industry and 
Financial Markets Association (SIFMA)—failed to create a proper normative 
framework for CRAs. This ‘light touch’ regime revealed weaknesses in 
addressing enforcement concerns.  
A further pertinent question is the scarce enforceability of the self-regulation 
regime governing the CRAs (in respect to principles, recommendations and codes 
of conduct delivered by global regulators). CRAs are like the gatekeepers of the 
                                                 
88 See John C. Coffee Jr. (note 11) 1416. 
89 ibid 1417. 
90 Stephanie Kirchgaessner and Kevin Sieff, ‘Moody’s chief admits failure over crisis’ Financial 
Times (London, 24 April 2010). 
91 At EU level, see Regulation (EU) No 462/2013 (OJ 2013 L 146 p. 1). At US level, see the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, P.L. 111-203 (Dodd-Frank Act 
2010). 
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the European Union’ (2012) 9 International and Comparative Corporate Law Journal 1, 1. 
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and bodies are involved in the process of setting international standards for financial markets 
commonly defined as a form of ‘soft law’. See Mario Giovanoli, ‘A New Architecture for the 
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capital markets, so it is very important to look for an appropriate regulatory 
response.94 
As indicated earlier, ratings were under fire because of their inaccuracy in 
evaluating companies’ creditworthiness and on account of the fact that the CRAs 
earned profits by selling regulatory licenses to issuers.95 Paradoxically, these 
profits did not reflect the informational value of the ratings. The problem was that 
the main CRAs had become more profitable even as the quality of their ratings 
has collapsed.  
From this perspective, ‘regulatory dependence on ratings created higher 
demand for ratings and increasingly higher profits for NRSROs (nationally 
recognized statistical rating organizations), even when their ratings proved 
spectacularly inaccurate’.96 For that reason legitimate concerns have been raised 
about the regulatory reliance on ratings because they increase the incentives to 
shop for ratings.  
In this context, it may be noted that the reliability of CRAs is principally 
motivated by their experience and the reputation of rating agencies among 
investors. In fact, the gatekeeper is trusted to the extent that it is a repeat player 
who possesses significant reputational capital and information that would be lost 
or depreciated if it were found to have been involved in misconduct. Thus, the 
ratings market looks like an oligopoly with a small number of high profitable 
agencies that earn a consistently high rate of return.  
This sort of oligopolistic market was increased by the NRSRO’s and the 
Securities and Exchange Commission’s policy of entitling only selected rating 
agencies to assess issuers’ bonds. However, this sort of oligopolistic position of 
the main CRAs ‘seems attributable instead to the high barriers to entry into this 
market, which require that a new firm acquire reputational capital before it can 
acquire clients’.97 As Coffee observed ‘this lack of competition permits these 
                                                 
94 Gilian Tett, Jennifer Hughes and Aline Van Duyn, ‘S&P unveils ratings overhaul’ Financial 
Times (London, 7 February 2008). 
95 John Gapper, ‘Let rating agencies have their say’ Financial Times (London, 8 December 2011) 
11, where it is observed that ‘the agencies remain a protected species because central banks use 
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96 Frank Partnoy (note 33) 190. 
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nominal competitors to shirk, engaging in less effort and research than if there 
were true active competition’.98 
The reputational capital of CRAs has constituted a wire fence with respect to 
investors and regulators creating a huge gap in the information supply process. 
The credibility of CRAs has progressively taken the place of regulatory 
interventions of financial institutions.99 
The lack of a proper liability regime facilitates misstatements and negligence. 
These considerations underline the question as to whether CRAs should be subject 
to a system of civil liability.100  
In the on-going debate, a model has been proposed which combines the better 
incentives of strict liability with a system that: (1) places a realistic ceiling on the 
gatekeeper’s aggregate liability; and (2) minimizes the transaction costs 
associated with enforcement.101 This proposal subordinates compensation to 
deterrence, but only with regard to litigation against gatekeepers, who are seldom 
in any event in a position to fund full compensation to the class of investors and 
consumers.102  
Another commentator has characterized ratings as a form of investment 
recommendations on the premise that ‘de facto they may perform a similar 
function to recommendations by influencing (through regulatory and contractual 
linkages) the financial instruments that are held by financial institutions’.103 On 
this view, ratings should be subject to an equivalent regulatory regime as 
investment recommendations. However, the disclaimers often used by the leading 
CRAs (namely S&P’s, Fitch and Moody’s) that ratings are merely simple 
opinions may constitute an obstacle to regulating the credit rating agencies as a 
purveyors of recommendations (see ‘Appendix IV’). 
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A viable suggestion has been proposed by Partnoy on the basis that strict 
liability could be imposed on gatekeepers, such as CRAs, for material 
misstatements and omissions in offering documents while removing any due 
diligence-based defences from securities regulation.104 According to Partnoy, the 
advantage of imposing strict liability on gatekeepers would be that it would 
incentivize transparency and fairness.105 However, this would not afford a solution 
in terms of responsibility to investors, i.e. customers. A strict liability regime 
would be effective only with respect to the issuer, leaving the question of losses 
incurred by the investor unresolved. In addition, strict liability could be a 
potentially costly was of inducing gatekeepers to clamp down on client 
misconduct.106 
According to Coffee’s view, ‘the gatekeeper could be held liable even when 
the issuer is not’.107 In particular, this perspective assumes that the gatekeeper has 
failed in his responsibility to unearth the irregularity and should not be absolved 
because the issuer’s conduct was only negligent, rather than fraudulent.  
What is central to Coffee’s position is the ‘adverse selection’ problem. This 
means that ‘if gatekeepers cannot distinguish ex ante the “honest” from the 
“dishonest” issuer, a lemons market developed under strict liability should 
logically drive the honest client from the market’.108 
In economic literature, the theory of the ‘lemons market’ was developed by 
Akerlof in the early 1970s to exemplify the interaction of quality differences and 
uncertainty, in particular the presence of markets in which buyers use market 
statistics to judge the quality of prospective purchases.109 By taking as an example 
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the model in automobile, this theory discusses the existence of the ‘incentive for 
sellers to market poor quality merchandise, since the returns for good quality 
accrue mainly to the entire group (whose statistic is affected) rather than to the 
individual seller’.110 As Akerlof noted, the automobiles’ market is preferred for its 
concreteness and ease in understanding rather than for its importance or 
realism.111 
Therefore, a strict liability regime is justified only if it can address the CRA-
investor relationship. Such a liability regime may go a long way to remedy 
perceived negligence and poor services.112 This type of liability system may 
contribute towards the preservation of the CRAs’ reputational capital: however, 
without specific legislation introducing such liability, it is hard to see how a case 
could be brought against the rating agencies for liability. In this light, the ratings 
assessment could be more effectively regulated both through internal controls and 
hard-law measures.113 
This research argues that a mixed regime that includes elements of both 
liability and compliance activities could be a favourable one for CRAs.114 Such a 
mixed liability regime could improve the credibility (i.e. reputation) of CRAs by 
implementing measures such as monitoring, investigating, and reporting 
misconduct. 
After examining the rating agencies’ failures in high-profile, recent corporate 
collapses and their inaccuracy in evaluating companies’ creditworthiness, the next 
section outlines the CRAs’ regulatory reforms at the European level. In doing so it 
takes account of the major concerns associated with the CRAs’ assessment 
activity. 
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1.6 The regulatory reforms  
The key to a successful deal for a corporate issuer is securing the right credit 
rating. It is evident that companies and investment banks are not simply market-
makers, or disinterested parties acting on behalf of clients. The interest to promote 
risky products and complicated financial schemes is the core business of 
securities’ issuers. 
In the US, an SEC investigation revealed that prominent investment banks had 
bundled ‘toxic mortgages into complex financial instruments, managed to 
persuade the credit rating agencies to label them as “AAA” securities, and sold 
them to investors, magnifying and spreading risk throughout the financial system, 
and all too often betting against the instruments they sold and profiting at the 
expense of their clients’.115 What is more, one of the main players in the credit 
rating market was notified by the SEC that it could face civil charges on the 
ground that it had violated Federal securities laws in connection with its rating of 
a structured finance vehicle before the crisis.116 
In substance, CRAs were accused of having made unrealistic assumptions 
about structured finance products in order to issue “AAA” ratings.117 CRAs 
claimed that their assessment does not explicitly address market pricing or trading 
liquidity for the security in question, but rather focuses on the likelihood of a 
default.  
Another question is the fact that the few main CRAs provide ratings that have 
become too deeply embedded in the regulatory capital assessment system. Ratings 
are considered to be a measure of risk for regulatory capital, i.e. credit and market 
risk under the Basel framework, and their use influences the determination of 
capital requirements of financial firms. It is argued that ‘the greater the leverage 
within those firms, the greater will be the effect of changes to ratings on capital 
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requirements’.118 Many investors have mandates that only allow them to invest in 
securities that have a certain rating such as ‘AAA’. It should be reiterated that the 
raison d’être of CRAs is to offer an opinion on the likelihood of debt instruments 
being repaid, which is a legitimate activity. Issuers pay for ratings because, in the 
long run, this deepens the pool of investors.  
The underlying problem is how well CRAs fulfil their responsibilities. Rating 
agencies’ activities suggest a clear degree of independence from issuers. The crux 
of the matter is ‘because rating agencies make their rating determinations based 
primarily on information provided by the issuer of securities, a rating is no more 
reliable than that information’.119  
It is clear that the ‘certification’ role of CRAs underlines the reliance which is 
placed in their gatekeeper function. Because CRAs’ influence market prices, not 
only in terms of disclosure information, but also in terms of outlooks, reviews and 
watches/warnings, CRA views have impacted on investment grades.  
An option to prevent CRAs exerting such power could be to stop promoting 
them or to motivate institutional investors to look for alternative sources of credit 
information. Such an option stems from the fact that ‘the increased reliance on 
ratings reduced the reputational constraints on credit-rating agencies’.120 The 
prospect of this option coming to fruition could help to open the ratings market 
and stimulate the leading CRAs to improve their performances.  
This research sets out to demonstrate that ‘reputational capital’ and reputation 
alone are not a workable constraint on gatekeeper certification. It further 
postulates that it is necessary to bolster the ratings service with an independent 
oversight regime in order to help manage the complex global regulatory landscape 
and improve dialogue with investors, regulators and the public.121 
Consumers are often unable to draw inferences about the reputation and 
reliability of the rating agency when an assessment takes place. CRAs should 
enhance the quality (and volume) of the information available to consumers. In 
other words, investors should be ensured of the appropriate level of information 
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on which to base their decisions. Notwithstanding the quality of information, it is 
evident that some individual investors are unskilled and take poor decisions about 
risk even when they have full information about the products at their disposal.  
As a result, the question of the reliability of credit ratings and the influence of 
the main rating agencies constitute major areas of concern in the financial sector. 
The CRAs fail to give a convincing answer to fundamental questions: to what 
extent do their activities contribute to market confidence and are indispensable to 
the growth of the financial sector? This latter question is a central one that this 
work addresses. The 2007-2009 financial turmoil has provided much ammunition 
for opponents of the CRAs, but looking at the evolution of credit ratings the only 
surprise is that it took so long before any serious concern materialized.  
As noted earlier in this chapter, securities regulation has recently sought to 
restore confidence in CRAs by striving to fill the major gaps in ratings’ 
governance. The regulation centres chiefly on the conflicts of interest arising from 
the ‘issuer-pays’ model and the methodology and data sources used by CRAs.  
At the EU level, the European Commission set out a vast programme to re-
regulate the CRAs in which it sought to address the major concerns, such as the 
limited competition in the market for credit ratings, rating agency independence 
and the agencies’ activities.122 As Moloney noted ‘rating agencies can be regarded 
as pathfinders in terms of operational harmonization, substantive harmonization, 
and the centralization of supervision’.123 
The Commission proposed that issuers should be required to rotate the 
agencies that rate government bonds.124 The idea was to prevent the incumbent 
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agency’s analysts from becoming too ‘overfamiliar’ with issuers and therefore too 
lenient. In addition, the Commission proposed that issuers of financial products 
should be forced to change the rating agency they are using more regularly. This 
aimed to open up competition and avoid conflicts of interest.125  
This research discusses in Chapter three the reforms proposed giving wide-
ranging powers to the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) to 
approve ratings methods and ban sovereign ratings in ‘exceptional situations’ (or 
in ‘inappropriate moments’).126 Specifically, the ESMA is empowered to suspend 
the credit ratings of countries receiving emergency financial assistance.127 
However, it was claimed that ‘any ability for ESMA to suspend sovereign ratings 
may damage the independence of the credit rating agencies in the eyes of the 
financial markets’.128 
By the same token, it was proposed at the EU level that credit rating agencies 
could be barred from downgrading countries in the Eurozone bailout scheme.129 In 
this respect, if a CRA is described as a thermometer of financial crisis ‘it is not the 
thermometer that causes the fever, but the thermometer has to work properly to 
ensure you do not exaggerate the fever’.130 However, the CRA issues ratings that 
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are an ordinal measure of the creditworthiness of a debtor this means that ‘ratings 
are not temperature readings but weather forecasts’.131  
Some European countries have been extremely critical of the manner and 
timing of certain sovereign debt rating decisions taken during the 2010-2012 
Eurozone crisis, although the CRAs have defended their conduct.132 Other 
proposals included the establishment of a new independent ratings agency and 
different models to mitigate conflicts of interest in the current ‘issuer pays’ model. 
However, these proposals will more likely prove to be ineffectual because rating 
methods necessarily evolve over time to reflect innovations by underwriters, new 
legislation and changes in the financial market.  
These proposals constituted the ground for the adoption of Regulation (EU) 
No 462/2013.133 This legislation addressed two of the major concerns of the 
ratings industry firstly, the near-total domination of the market by the main three 
rating agencies; and, secondly, the dubious issuers-rating agencies relationship. 
In this context, it should be noted that members of the European Parliament 
called on the European Commission to establish a public European CRA that 
would produce impartial ratings without being constrained by commercial 
considerations.134 The European Parliament also suggested looking at the 
possibility of establishing a network of smaller European rating agencies, in an 
effort to bring more competition into the industry.135 But this proposal had already 
been greeted with a considerable amount of scepticism, not least because of the 
perceived lack of independence of such an agency.  
Concerns about rating ‘downgrading’ have made CRAs unpopular, in 
particular on account of the inconvenient timing of their published opinions.136 
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Financial institutions are still searching for an appropriate solution for a modus 
operandi of CRAs. However, criticisms of rating agencies are entirely legitimate 
where their predictions seem to suggest that they may be motivated by some 
speculative intent.137  
Moreover, speculation about rating agency downgrades of countries’ 
sovereign debt influences trading on the markets. Notwithstanding this, the main 
rating agencies claim that this is an inevitable consequence of issuing independent 
opinions, and that opinions are only one measure of risk. 
This research sets out to show that downgrades are not only a reflection of 
reality but also a provision of ground-breaking new information about the 
speculative effects of the downgrades on the markets. CRAs should face a lagging 
indicator rather than a leading one. They should verify the market’s judgement 
rather than lead it.  
Cantor and Mann have argued that there is a trade-off between rating 
evaluations and market stability.138 Empirical studies have identified that the 
focus of agencies on long investment horizons explains only part of the relative 
stability of agency ratings.139 Further, other academic studies have shown a 
possible balance between rating stability, rating timeliness and default prediction 
performance.140  
If the role of CRAs is solely to forecast the creditworthiness of financial 
instruments, it is possible to point to an imbalance between downgrade 
evaluations and market confidence. As Coffee observed ‘as gatekeepers, the credit 
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rating agencies did not monitor clients closely after the point of their initial rating. 
Thereafter, rating downgrades generally followed the market, rather than led it’.141 
One key concern is whether rating downgrades may destabilize financial 
markets, particularly when downgrades cross into non-investment grade 
categories. As indicated earlier, the information provided by CRAs is regarded as 
being a public good. Consequently, CRAs should supply information freely, not 
only to issuers who have paid for it (and can benefit from this information), but 
also to investors that rely on it.  
By keeping a record of the outcome of their rated instruments, CRAs provide a 
public service. In this regard, it has been argued that ‘a rating is valuable only if 
everybody knows it, and you cannot get an investor to pay for information he 
already has. Ratings are a public good that have two possible paymasters: 
government or issuers’.142 Since regulators use them, regulators could pay for the 
use of CRAs’ information. Investors—as market participants—should be made 
aware of the uncertainties surrounding future predictions of default events. So 
there is a public interest in generating accountability for this publication of results.  
After considering the regulatory reforms proposed at the EU level and the 
relevant issues related to CRAs’ judgements, the following section illustrates the 
purpose of the research indicating some remedies intended to enhance the 
normative framework for CRAs.   
 
1.7 Aim of the research 
The aim of the research is to underline the weakness of the present regulatory 
regime for CRAs and to posit some viable changes designed to enhance the 
accuracy of ratings and encourage the disclosure of information. In this regard, it 
argues that the lack of care shown in the CRAs’ activities is such as to cause 
damage to the financial market whenever their ‘predictions’ are not accurate. 
Indeed, the CRAs seem to respond more receptively to political concerns and to 
those of lobbies.143  
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This research also attempts to demonstrate that there is a need for an 
independent body with the function of monitoring the accuracy of CRAs’ 
opinions of default events.144 CRAs usually rate the credit default risk of the 
assets to which they give a particular rating. This aspect has been misinterpreted 
because a rating covers market and liquidity risk as well. Regulators could require 
the financial industry to standardize what ratings mean, instead of every ratings 
agency having its own particular interpretation of ratings.   
In order to address these questions, this research assumes that a structural 
reform of CRAs’ internal governance is required. Thus, the investigation seeks to 
demonstrate that reform of the CRAs is to be preferred over free market solutions 
that permit anyone to issue credit ratings and anyone to rely on them.145 In 
particular, the research analysis proposes a new accountability approach in which 
CRAs are subject to closer regulation and a liability regime. Consequently, this 
research aims to define a regulatory environment in which credit rating agencies 
can play a useful and efficient role as informational intermediaries.  
Additionally, the research provides an analysis of the CRAs’ role in financial 
markets through the study of decided cases. Deeper CRA analysis can be expected 
to show the nature of the interaction (or cooperation) between rating agencies and 
issuers. This would ascertain whether these groups cooperate to maximize their 
joint profits regardless of consumers.  
The aim is to provide suggestions for keeping the effectiveness of the CRAs’ 
work and the protection of investors aligned. The ultimate aspiration is that people 
who pursue profits at the same time benefit the public.  
The analysis of the role of CRAs is designed to facilitate understanding of 
what kind of regulatory tools are needed for CRAs. Once again, incomplete 
information is the central problem of the rating agencies/investors relationship.  
However, another question is to understand how these parties bargain with one 
another and the way in which they allocate the information. It is important to note 
that adequate investor protection against market distortions requires 
trustworthiness and reliability.146   
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In order to avoid failures on the part of CRAs, it is necessary that those 
agencies should perform their role of promoting financial awareness by being 
accountable for their opinions. This is especially the case as they indeed are more 
than simple opinion providers. 
After explaining the aim and purpose of the research—with particular 
attention on current problems in the CRAs’ sector—the next section illustrates the 
methodology of the research.  
 
1.8 Methodology of the research 
The research methodology concentrates on scholarly opinion and case law. 
The thesis relies strongly upon US law on the one hand (with numerous references 
to the securities laws which have been influential for the development of credit 
rating agencies) and European law on the other hand (with references to the 
various pieces of legislation that regulates the credit rating sector) as well as 
specific UK and Australian law. The approach is theoretical and provides a 
rigorous analysis from the legal perspective of market participants. 
In the first part, the focus is on the regulatory framework of CRAs with 
particular attention being paid to the existing legislation in the US, the UK and the 
EU. These securities markets designate specific rules that are intended to improve 
disclosure and set forth a stringent regime for CRAs.  
It considers how harmonized rules could eliminate differential treatment under 
the law and introduce on-going supervision with accountable responsibility for 
rating agencies. However, methods for securing more cooperation among global 
regulators, with a system of integrated controls, are also considered. Such 
methods could require the disclosure of all aspects of the ratings activity, with an 
emphasis on the evaluation methods and enhancing the transparency of 
information.  
In the second part, an investigation is conducted in terms of the observable 
differences in the rating agencies’ characteristics. A probable development of 
regulation draws on this investigation.  
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The evidence emanating from the investigation provides material for further 
research into aspects such as (1) the motivation of CRAs to issue solicited or 
unsolicited ratings; (2) the discretion of CRAs to bring into play evaluation 
models and to control the treatment of information; and (3) the assessment of 
rating agencies’ responsibility. The results are interpreted with regard to the 
standard of rating activity, evaluating positive and negative effects of adopted 
regulation. This analysis should provide significant implications with regard to an 
applicable normative framework. 
The original contribution of this research is the design of a regulatory 
framework to make CRAs accountable while proposing concrete solutions to the 
problems of information asymmetries and conflicts of interest between issuers and 
investors. The idea is that CRAs should be made responsible for their investment 
certification because of their fundamental role in the evaluation of credit risk in 
influencing investors’ confidence. 
 
1.9 Structure of the thesis 
Chapter one of the thesis provides an overview of the ratings environment and 
describes the role of CRAs in the securities markets. The increasing influence of 
CRAs in the securities sector and their operations—with particular emphasis on 
certain drawbacks in the current regulatory framework—as well as the 
longstanding problems associated with the CRAs’ activities, is taken into account.   
Chapter two focuses on the reliability of CRAs since this has been questioned 
following the mis-evaluation of the default risk attaching to certain financial 
products—such as subprime mortgages and derivatives—that adversely affected 
the stability of securities markets. It is discussed how CRAs’ activities have 
exhibited a lack of due diligence and a deficiency in their assessment of 
corporations’ creditworthiness. 
This chapter argues that CRAs exhibit potential conflicts of interest because 
they have a financial incentive to accommodate the preferences of bond issuers 
owing to the fact that they are selected and paid for by them. This chapter also 
focuses on the ‘certification role’ of CRAs, with particular attention given to 
criticisms of the ratings market. In this context, account is taken of the function of 
‘rating triggers’ and the major problems regarding their use in financial contracts. 
The role of rating triggers in financial transactions is examined by considering the 
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main criticisms of the effects of such clauses on market participants (such as the 
lack of disclosure of the triggers in contracts). The problem of over-reliance on 
credit ratings is considered by taking into account the possible presence of 
‘unhelpful’ incentives in the CRA industry. The question of free-market 
interference is discussed in terms of facilitating a systematic dependence on 
ratings and favouring an artificially high demand for highly rated financial 
instruments. 
Chapter three focuses on the CRAs’ regulatory reforms relating to CRAs that 
have been adopted in the US, the UK and the EU. It imparts the major concerns 
associated with the CRAs’ assessment activity. It is contended that government 
initiatives have restored the transparency and fairness of CRAs by creating a 
rigorous system of regulation and supervision. However, the success of these 
regulatory measures is disputed.  
It is argued that the legal system set in place by the global regulators147 namely 
FSB, G-20, IOSCO and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) 
failed to establish an adequate regulatory framework for CRAs.  
Chapter four outlines generic grounds of liability such as contract, tort, 
fiduciary duty, estoppel and statutory right of action. In particular, this chapter 
focuses on the legal reasoning by which liability might attach to a CRA and 
identifies the parties who might have a claim and the nature of the damages that 
might be recovered. The doctrine of ‘equitable estoppel’ is considered as a 
possible option to hold CRAs liable for inaccurate ratings together with an 
analysis of the liability scenario under the law of tort.  
Chapter five considers the implementation of the generic grounds of liability 
in the US, the UK, the EU and Australia. This chapter explains why and how each 
system arrived at its own solution. In this regard, the chapter provides critical 
reflections of Australian case law, namely the Bathurst judgment and, an 
assessment of the civil liability regime for CRAs established by the EU regulatory 
framework.  
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Chapter six sets out some concluding remarks and provides a summary of 
some policy and regulatory recommendations for reform. 
The thesis aims to state the law and major policy developments as at 1st 
August 2014. 
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Chapter Two  
Credit Rating Agencies: Activities and Business Model 
 
 
2.1 Background of the credit ratings industry 
This chapter deals with the structure of the CRAs’ market. It takes into 
consideration the business relationship of CRAs and the main concerns arising 
from it, namely (1) conflicts of interest; (2) inadequate disclosure; (3) limited 
competition; and (4) lack of transparency. 
The role of a CRA is not to measure a security’s potential for price 
appreciation. Rather CRAs collect dispersed information on the financial situation 
of borrowers and the default risk of certain financial products, and with this 
information they condense it into a single measure of relative credit risk.148 In 
other words, the key function of CRAs is to assess the quality of a company’s 
credit by issuing a rating indicating a liability or the quality of a specific liability 
issue. CRAs undoubtedly perform a public duty in the financial markets because 
of the reputational capital they can provide.  
The usefulness of a CRA is dependent upon both its reliability in making 
predictions as well as its public acceptability. These two elements reflect the fact 
that market participants use the ratings of leading CRAs because they trust their 
ratings and market participants know that others will also accept their evaluation. 
It is important that financial markets place trust in the CRAs’ activities and the 
relevant processes that lead up to a rating evaluation. For instance, a low rating 
can drive up an issuer’s borrowing costs or even put it out of business. 
CRAs have played a long and established role in financial markets in 
providing investors with an assessment of the relative probability of default of 
debt instruments. In this regard, ‘credit rating agencies and their output play a 
unique, indeed important, role in overcoming the information asymmetries that 
are endemic to the capital market’.149 This worthy function has changed into a 
sophisticated and complex technique for measuring financial soundness.  
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As indicated in Chapter three, the regulatory background of credit ratings 
began in the US by approving the use of certain CRAs as a NRSRO. The growth 
of the credit rating agencies industry took place in the early 1900s when the 
investment banks started to require evaluations of their issuances and because of 
the presence of economies of scale associated with spreading credit information. 
The first CRA was founded by John Moody in 1909 (and was a rating system for 
railroad bonds) after the establishment of mercantile credit agencies and debt 
manual publishers. In the early 1900s, Moody’s produced manuals of performance 
statistics related to stocks and bonds. The bond ratings agencies drew their 
revenue exclusively from subscribers.150 
CRAs developed from market surveillance mechanisms, particularly with the 
onset of burgeoning volume of financial information. The bond rating services 
increased in the early 1930s with the Banking Act of 1933 (Glass-Steagall Act)151 
and the focus of bond rating activity in the US was railroads, corporations and 
financial institutions. From these origins, pension funds and banking investments 
incorporated rating standards into their rules. 
In a further development, the SEC and other regulatory institutions enacted 
normative tools to regulate the rating process. The ‘certification’ system of ratings 
introduced by the NRSRO granted to the leading CRAs the benefit of the ‘issuer-
pays’ business model. The latter compensation model replaced the ‘investor-paid’ 
scheme (based on subscription fees from investors to rate third parties) which 
exhibited some shortcomings owing to free-rider problems (for example, the 
printed ratings manuals were easily copied by non-subscribers with the 
development of photocopying machines).152  
Indeed, with the ‘issuer-pays’ model, CRAs solved the ‘free-rider question’ of 
the supply of a public good in the investors’ community by way of the public 
availability of ratings manuals. This rating system was based on subscription fees 
paid by investors. The symbols of the main CRAs were synthesised in letters, 
numbers and positive and negative symbols. The letter ‘A’ signified the highest 
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grade, all the way down to the letter ‘D’ signifying the lowest grade (see 
‘Appendix I’). The higher the rating, according to the agency, the less is the risk 
of default on repayment to the creditor. Investors use ratings to reduce the risks of 
credit loss. Once issued, CRAs maintain scrutiny over issuers and their securities 
and investors are informed through the rating assessment when changes affect 
issuers and financial products.  
Each CRA depends for its livelihood on its credibility for independence and 
accuracy. In particular, CRAs operate through their valuable ‘opinions’, thereby 
making public the information on the credit risks of borrowers. Nonetheless, 
opinions have varying effects in the same way that ‘the impact of a self-
proclaimed messiah on a soap-box at Speaker’s Corner may differ from the 
impact of a newspaper that prejudges a suspect as being guilty in a murder 
case’.153 
Investors rely on ratings evaluations about the likelihood of receiving timely 
payments on bonds. The rating certification of a bond quality has developed into a 
pre-requisite of the debt issue’s credit value. CRAs capitalise on their reputational 
capital, thereby obtaining huge market power over investors, while exploiting the 
information asymmetry between issuers and investors.  
However, there is a link between the certification activity and the signalling 
purpose of ratings. As Partnoy noted, ‘CRAs exist in a competitive market of 
information providers and live or die based on their reputational capital’.154   
The ‘reputational capital’ view considers that credit ratings are important parts 
of credit information and therefore constitute sound proxies for changes in the 
credit quality of the underlying bond. CRAs increased their degree of 
trustworthiness by publishing rating manuals and analysis.155  
Reputational capital, built up by the expertise and authority an agency 
possesses, can and often does, trump certain examples of poor or misjudged 
assessments. Sinclair argued that ‘market and government actors take account of 
rating agencies, not because the agencies are right but because they are thought to 
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be an authoritative source of judgements, thereby making the agencies key 
organizations controlling access to capital markets’.156 
Although the reputational capital theory explains why CRAs have enormously 
increased their profile and power over recent decades, it does not explain why 
regulators and investors have become so reliant on ratings when financial markets 
have evolved into a complex structure involving the usage of high leverage and 
structured finance. As Partnoy observed, the inconsistency of the reputational 
capital view may be explained by three concerns: (1) inaccuracies in credit spread 
estimation; (2) increases in ratings-driven transactions; and (3) the growth of 
credit derivatives.157  
In a similar vein, ‘the reputational capital view is contradicted by the notion 
that there were systematic inefficiencies in the non-investment-grade bond market 
allowing the owner of a diversified portfolio of corporate high-yield bonds to 
outperform, on a risk-adjusted basis, other fixed income investments’.158 The 
exponential rise of CRAs in the 1900s could be explained by the development of 
structured finance, the spread of complex financial instruments (such as credit 
derivatives159, asset-backed securities160, financial guarantees161, arbitrage 
vehicles162 and others).  
Generally, CRAs have strong reasons to avoid inaccuracy because of the 
potential effect on their reputational capital. A central feature in the current rating 
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system is regulators’ over-reliance on wide market acceptance of a rating 
assessment. CRAs can influence, through ‘downgrades’, the capacity of borrowers 
to obtain funds. In this regard, the most important factor is the limited competition 
among CRAs. This factor allows for the accumulation of reputational capital and 
the imposition of market power over investors. If the information sold does not 
reflect the credit spreads, CRAs sell other values such as the right to reduce 
regulatory costs or the right to obtain the benefits of entering in the securities 
market with a valuable rating.  
The credit spread represents the market’s estimate of the riskiness of the bond 
compared to its risk-free counterpart, based on both the probability of default and 
the expected recovery in the event of default. Put in another way, the credit spread 
is the difference between the yield on the bond and the yield on a risk-free bond of 
comparable structure and maturity. It also represents one of the most important 
measures of credit risk.163 The credit spread is a reflection of all available 
information in the market, including the rating.  
The credit rating should reflect the estimation of credit spread, but the 
evidence does not always support the conclusion that ratings reflect valuable and 
accurate information.164 Therefore, announcements signalling a rating change 
provide no new information to the capital markets.165 
Regulatory protection confers credibility and reputational capital on CRAs. 
This allows for the circumventing of rules and supervision because of regulatory 
permission to incorporate the rights of providing valuable certification. Such 
protection has reduced the incentive to maintain quality ratings.  
There are plenty of reasons to believe that CRAs’ activity has been changed by 
the regulators as result of regulatory activity. Global regulators have altered the 
nature of the CRAs’ core business from that of ‘informational intermediary’ to 
that of a ‘regulatory intermediary’. Issuers have started to pay rating fees, not only 
to purchase credibility with the investor, but also, and in particular, to purchase a 
‘license’ from the regulators.  
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It can be argued that credit ratings act as an instrument for regulatory 
purposes. This argument is evidenced by the fact that CRAs are so powerful, 
despite their failure to always supply valuable and accurate information. The 
ratings authority is underlined by daily statements of issuers’ creditworthiness, 
followed by an investment grade assessment. Owing to the status granted by 
government legislation and global regulators, CRAs act as profitable arbiters of 
the financial markets. In sum, the development of credit ratings shows that ‘the 
important point is not what rating you have, but whether or not you have a 
rating’.166 In other words, issuers utilise the rating ‘as a mirror for larks’ to attract 
investors and market participants. 
After providing a brief overview of the background of credit ratings industry, 
the next section considers the ‘gatekeeper function’ of CRAs taking into account 
the characteristics of ratings services and their relevance in the securities market. 
 
2.2 The ‘gatekeeper’ function: solicited and unsolicited ratings 
The increasing role of the ratings industry in the financial sector has attracted 
much attention, particularly on account of the private and public purposes of 
CRAs. The involvement of ratings in global institutions underlines the fact that 
‘the use of raters’ activities by national and international regulatory bodies 
constitutes a form of delegation of governance tasks and (quasi-) regulatory 
authority from public to private actors’.167  
Ratings can be assigned under a quantitative (based on quantitative 
information only) or a qualitative approach (characterised by a process of human 
expert analysis). Usually, CRAs set their ratings on the basis of both quantitative 
and qualitative assessments of the borrowing issuer’s condition. 
In the case of solicited ratings, ratings are directly requested and paid for by 
the issuer of the rated product. This system is based on the close issuer-credit 
rating relationship because of confidential participation by the issuer in the ratings 
process. CRAs have recourse to non-public information to assess a financial 
product.168  
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Non-public information is often provided pursuant to a confidentiality 
agreement between the CRA and the issuer, or is provided premised upon the 
rating agency’s policy to keep such information confidential.169 However, in this 
type of rating services authors contend that there is a deep and persistent conflict 
of interests between issuers and raters which results in information asymmetries to 
the disbenefit of investors.170 
Solicited ratings characterise the ‘issuer-pays’ business model in which CRAs 
are directly paid by their principals, e.g. companies, investment banks, etc. Within 
this model, potential conflicts of interest arise because of possible collusive 
actions in the agencies’ relationship. Since the rating fee is paid by the principal, 
the issuer may be able to influence the rating obtained by threatening to use 
another agency or none at all if the rating assigned by the agency is deemed by the 
principal to be too low.171 
In conducting their analysis, CRAs may obtain information from issuers that 
might not otherwise be available to the public and factor this information into 
their ratings opinion. In this business model, managers and raters are often 
involved in the ratings process and participate, inevitably, in discussions 
concerning the fees to be paid for the rating services. Such a model has the 
potential for conflicts of interest since the entities are paying for the rating.  
Solicited ratings are subject to other concerns too. One is referred to as 
‘shopping for raters’, which is the practice of issuers choosing the best ratings 
from among a set of possible rating agencies and the quality of the disclosed 
information. These concerns are related to the strategic behaviour between 
principal and agent. In cases of ‘rating shopping’, issuers move from one rating 
agency to another until they receive a favourable rating.172 It has been claimed 
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that ‘rating agencies that give out lower ratings risk their ratings not being 
selected and thus losing revenue to their less honest peers’.173  
The largest multinational companies have the capacity to shop for the highest 
ratings on their lucrative issuance deals, including playing one CRA against 
another when informally consulting them on structures to achieve high ratings.174 
The upshot is a lack of competition, huge barriers for new entrants, higher 
conflicts of interest and low transparency. In the case of a new CRA, a single fee-
paying issuer may constitute a large portion of the CRA’s overall revenue, thereby 
creating a potential conflict of interest that may influence its rating decisions 
should the new entrant fear a loss of this business.175 One can argue that the 
ratings business model can affect CRAs’ reputational capital because of the 
dubious relationship between raters and issuers: this potential for collusive 
behaviour may influence the ratings process through biased assessment. 
The second service, unsolicited ratings, i.e. ratings that credit rating agencies 
conduct without being formally engaged to do so by the issuer, is based on public-
rated activity. In this case, CRAs are not paid by the issuer and conduct their 
assessments using publicly available information about the financial product. In 
the words of S&P’s, ‘unsolicited ratings are those credit ratings assigned at the 
initiative of S&P’s and not at the request of the issuer or its agents’.176 
Public information reviewed in the ratings process typically includes filings 
such as news reports, industry reports, bond and stock price trends and data from 
central banks. This type of rating is the subject of some controversy in the 
associated literature177, although it seems clear that unsolicited ratings influence 
the markets and do at least reflect the level of public disclosure of the firms rated. 
The major questions regard the opacity of the rating process behind an unsolicited 
rating (in the absence of issuer input) and unclear access to public information.  
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CRAs may issue unsolicited ratings in order to force issuers to pay for ratings 
that they did not request.178 Further, unsolicited ratings are used as a way of 
establishing a track record before breaking into a new market.179 
Unsolicited ratings have been described as simplistic and opportunistic. In 
particular, ‘rating agencies have been accused of running an operation akin to a 
classic protection racket in summarily issuing unsolicited ratings to various 
entities that are perceived as vulnerable to paying rating fees’.180 
Empirical evidence has shown that unsolicited ratings tend to be lower than 
solicited ratings because of self-selection among issuers and the strategic 
conservatism of rating agencies.181  
Specifically, when issuing unsolicited ratings, CRAs tend to assign lower 
ratings than when hired and paid to do so. This may happen because there is no 
direct cooperation between issuers and raters and because of the incomplete and 
low quality of information available to the CRAs. Although some empirical 
studies have shown that unsolicited ratings tend to be lower than solicited 
ratings182, the assumption that lower unsolicited ratings relative to solicited ratings 
reflects the bias of unsolicited ratings is still debatable.183 
In contrast, some commentators argue that unsolicited ratings provide a 
powerful check against rating shopping and can affect the yield paid at 
issuance.184 Other scholars observe that unsolicited ratings are characterised by a 
downward trend in contrast to solicited ratings. This difference in ratings comes 
from the significant self-selection bias (unsolicited ratings are still lower than 
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solicited ratings after controlling differences in sovereign risk and key financial 
characteristics).185  
In this context, instructive research has demonstrated that public disclosure not 
only appears to have a positive effect on credit ratings, but it also seems to 
eliminate the downward bias of unsolicited ratings.186 Such research considers 
that unsolicited ratings are lower so as to ‘punish’ issuers who otherwise would 
not purchase ratings coverage or that unsolicited ratings are lower because they 
are based only on public information and, as argued in academic circles, tend to 
be more conservative than solicited ratings.187 Further empirical studies find that 
there is a significant difference in the distributions of ratings because banks that 
have received shadow ratings are smaller and have weaker financial profiles than 
banks that have other ratings.188  
A further area for analysis is whether unsolicited ratings are used to increase 
the market share and extract payment from an unwilling issuer. CRAs tend to 
force companies to purchase their services with the purpose of making a profit. In 
addition, ‘an unsolicited rating is “feared” because it might put an issuer’s credit 
risk in a worse light than it actually is with the justification that it only reflects 
publicly available information’.189 
By making unsolicited ratings, CRAs operate as an unfair and anticompetitive 
market participant because of speculative actions and abusive practices.190 
Unsolicited ratings may discourage new entrants from trying to build up a niche 
position because CRAs have traditionally been able to take advantage of 
economies of scale in ways that may inhibit entry for smaller competitors.191  
The 2004 IOSCO Code of Conduct stated that ‘for each rating, the CRA 
should disclose whether the issuer participated in the rating process. Each rating 
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not initiated at the request of the issuer should be clearly identified as such. The 
IOSCO Code also held that the CRA should also disclose its policies and 
procedures regarding unsolicited ratings’.192  
The 2011 IOSCO Report affirmed in its “CRA Principle Transparency and 
timeliness of ratings disclosure” that ‘CRAs should make disclosure and 
transparency an objective of their ratings activities’.193 This principle intends to 
promote the distribution of sufficient information regarding ratings procedures 
and methodologies because there is risk of investor confusion in the issuance of 
unsolicited ratings.  
Consumer confusion arises when ratings do not merely represent additional 
valuable information about the financial products but lead to investor uncertainty 
and force companies to purchase their services.194  
The consequences of unsolicited ratings are important because of the 
increasing market share and low accuracy. At the European level, the Commission 
recommended that disclosure requirements for solicited and unsolicited ratings 
should be strengthened by requiring CRAs to inform issuers for which they are in 
the process of issuing a rating sufficiently in advance of the publication of the 
rating.195 It also included a requirement to elaborate on the main assumptions 
which justify the change of rating.  
In conclusion, the significant increase over time of references to credit ratings 
in rules and regulations—combined with scarce competition—has affected the 
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business model of CRAs by creating a more or less ‘guaranteed market’ with few 
incentives to compete on the basis of rating quality.196 
After providing a critical appraisal of the ratings services, the following 
section examines the rating methodologies taking into account the controversial 
aspects of ratings criteria. 
 
2.3 The rating methodologies  
It is generally considered that rating methodology refers to the methods and 
processes that govern CRAs’ application of criteria to a particular rating or 
practice (e.g. corporate, public finance, asset-backed securities).197 Rating 
methodology is designed to measure the creditworthiness (or likelihood of 
default) of an issuer or an obligation. But beyond the likelihood of default other 
important factors are: (1) the payment priority of an obligation following default; 
(2) the projected recovery that an investor would expect to receive if an obligation 
defaults; and (3) credit stability. 
Rating systems represent a validation process consisting of a formal set of 
activities, instruments and procedures aimed at ensuring that the design of a 
model is conceptually sound.198 Therefore, a credit rating is the result of a credit 
rating process. A credit rating process involves a subjective assessment of both 
the qualitative and quantitative factors of a financial instrument. This process 
begins with an application by the issuer to the rating agencies.  
CRAs are dependent on ratings criteria, analyst and committee views, and 
surveillance processes, which can vary over time and across ratings systems. 
S&P’s has affirmed that ‘creditworthiness is complex and while there is no 
formula for combining the different factors into an overall assessment, the criteria 
provide a guide in considering these factors’.199  The key objective is rank 
ordering the relative creditworthiness of issuers and obligations.  
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When assigning and monitoring ratings, CRAs consider whether they believe 
an issuer or security has a high likelihood of experiencing unusually large, 
adverse changes in credit quality under conditions of moderate stress.200 
Rating methodologies are detailed processes for applying criteria to develop a 
rating. An example would be the specific quantitative measures that CRAs use to 
assess current and future cash flows and the ability to cover expected interest 
expense for issuers in specific industry sectors.201 For instance, the sovereign 
rating methodology addresses the factors that affect a sovereign government’s 
willingness and ability to service its debt on time and in full. CRAs determine 
sovereign ratings based on a range of quantitative and qualitative factors by which 
they gauge a country’s ability and willingness to repay its debt.202 
There are three types of credit rating ‘scales’: (1) the fundamental ordinal 
scale which is used by CRAs to position the creditworthiness of an issuer or 
instrument; (2) financial market credit spreads, which result from the investment 
decisions of bond investors; and (3) market-implied credit ratings, which are 
derived from a combination of mathematical modelling of the arbitrage 
equilibrium prices of an issuer’s equity and assets, probability theories and 
empirical observations of past defaults.203 
The CRA’s criteria are a significant part of the rating outcome because they 
identify the specific factors that agencies consider during the rating and 
surveillance processes. Rating criteria reports describe the methodology used in 
assigning ratings.204 According to Fitch, the criteria and methodology used to 
determine a rating action are those in effect at the time the rating action is taken, 
which is the date of the related rating action commentary.205  
Rating methodologies and criteria can be subjected to some form of objective 
validation based on historical experience. CRAs’ methodologies regard country-
specific risks, industry and economic data, historical and projected financial 
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statements, the history of defaults, management policies, and the features of the 
specific financial product.  
In forming their opinions of credit risk, CRAs primarily use analysts or 
mathematical models, or a combination of the two. S&P’s claims that in the case 
of ‘model driven ratings’ a small number of credit rating agencies focus almost 
exclusively on quantitative data, which they incorporate into a mathematical 
model.206 An agency using this approach to assess the creditworthiness of a bank 
or another financial institution might evaluate that entity’s asset quality, funding, 
and profitability based primarily on data from the institution’s public financial 
statements and regulatory filings. 
Credit ratings express risk in relative rank order, which is to say they are 
ordinal measures of credit risk and are not predictive of a specific frequency of 
default or loss. Elaborating credit analysis, CRAs use the terms ‘investment 
grade’ and ‘speculative grade’ to describe the categories. ‘AAA’ to ‘BBB’ is 
considered investment grade and ‘BB’ to ‘D’ is considered speculative grade (see 
‘Appendix I’).  
In the words of S&P’s, the term ‘investment grade’ historically referred to 
bonds and other debt securities that bank regulators and market participants 
viewed as suitable investments for financial institutions.207 The term is broadly 
used to describe issuers and issues with relatively high levels of creditworthiness 
and credit quality. In addition, the term ‘non-investment grade’ or ‘speculative 
grade’ generally refers to debt securities where the issuer currently has the ability 
to repay but faces significant uncertainties, such as adverse business or financial 
circumstances that could affect credit risk. As such, the terms ‘investment grade’ 
and ‘speculative grade’ are used as market conventions. Investment grade 
categories indicate a relatively low to moderate credit risk, while ratings in the 
‘speculative’ categories either signal a higher level of credit risk or, indeed, that a 
default has already occurred.208 
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As discussed earlier, rating methodology represents an important part of the 
rating process because of its impact on the credit quality of financial products (the 
cost of issuing debt).  
The rating process often incorporates information about background data, 
forecasts, risk reports, or factual feedback on proposed analytical research and 
other communications. At the start of the rating process, each rated entity or 
transaction is assigned to a primary analyst who works with the support of a 
secondary analyst. Ratings are formulated and reviewed using a committee 
process. Primary analysts incorporate the information from their research into 
their rating recommendation and supporting committee package.209 Key analytical 
factors are discussed in the rating report, while the credit analyst provides a 
recommendation for a credit rating to a rating committee.  
Rating decisions are based on a simple majority vote by the committee and 
represent the CRA’s opinion as to the likelihood that the issuer will honour its 
financial obligations. By voting, the committee assigns the rating, for which it 
takes collective responsibility.210 The rating process is characterised by rating 
outlooks that indicate the potential direction of a rating over the intermediate term 
and rating reviews that give a stronger indication of future rate changes.211 
In the case of collateralised debt obligations ratings, assets rated by the rating 
agency are counted at face value, while assets rated by a different rating agency 
are typically graded downwards. Continuous and active surveillance is provided 
by rating analysts in order to ensure that rated notes are performing within the 
initial parameters and assumptions.212 
It is reasonable to describe a credit rating as an overall financial statement in 
the form of an opinion delivered at the end of an internal process conducted by 
rating analysts and highly skilled professionals. However, no formal training or 
educational certificate, legal background, or degree qualification is required in 
order to work as a rating analyst. Nonetheless, their statements have legal 
implications for the financial markets as a whole. As Fight observed, ‘rating 
analysts do not have any formal qualifications, they do not sign off on statements, 
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and they do not have a legal responsibility to stand behind the opinions they 
proffer’.213 
The different methods and approaches of rating raise questions about the 
underlying independence of rating agencies and the objectivity of rating 
assessment. CRAs refer to financial statements, information about the issuer, 
industry and market level factors. However, the exact factors and related weights 
of these factors utilised in determining a credit rating are not publicly disclosed by 
the rating agencies. 
CRAs contact the issuer’s management before starting the analysis of financial 
products. The involvement of the issuer in the rating analysis, particularly in the 
agency’s meeting, could result in potentially collusive behaviour between the 
issuer and the rating committee. Internal ratings are based on economic and 
mathematical models that provide a score or rating range and this is used to 
determine the final internal rating as decided by a committee of experts.214  
Overriding the mathematical rating is subject to written internal rules and 
policies to ensure the objectivity of the internal rating. The difficulty is, however, 
how to determine the accuracy of these models because of the subjectivity of the 
credit rating process. The lifetime of a rating, terminology and qualifiers represent 
an important part of the rating process because they provide additional 
information about the specific meaning of the rating.  
In terms of a rating’s lifetime, a rating is called ‘new’ when it is assigned for 
the first time to an issuer. Then, the rating is reviewed on a regular basis and is 
downgraded or upgraded when it has been lowered or raised in the scale. A rating 
can be removed for any reason that involves the credit agency and it can be 
stopped when the issue is paid in full, when the issue reaches maturity and when 
the issue is called ‘early’ or ‘refinanced’.215 
Rating methodologies use the terms ‘point-in-time’ and ‘through-the-cycle’. 
More precisely, ‘point-in-time’ systems attempt to produce ratings that are 
responsive to changes in current business conditions while ‘through-the-cycle’ 
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systems attempt to produce ordinal rankings of obligors that tend not to change 
over the business cycle.216  
A ‘point-in-time’ rating system uses all currently available obligor-specific 
and aggregate information to assign obligors to risk brackets. For its part, a 
‘through-the-cycle’ rating system uses static and dynamic obligor characteristics 
but tends not to adjust ratings in response to changes in macroeconomic 
conditions. It should be noted that CRAs have recently started to develop new 
methodologies that shift the criteria from a ‘through-the-cycle’ to a ‘through-a-
crisis’ focus.217  
A range of substantial studies have shown that ‘analysis of a stylised model of 
rating systems indicates that the default probability assigned to each obligor rating 
grade and its dynamics strongly depends on the type of rating methodology and 
quantification techniques employed’.218 Other commentators have attempted to 
demonstrate the validity of the different measures of structured finance ratings 
performance, namely ‘default or impairment studies’ and ‘ratings transition 
analysis’.219 
For CRAs, the key element in credit risk models is the measure of the 
‘probability of default’, but exposure is also determined by the expected timing of 
default and by the ‘recovery rate’ after default has occurred.220 The myriad of 
ways in which ratings drive investment decisions and collateral eligibility 
standards have attracted the attention of regulators, particularly in the wake of the 
recent financial crisis. In terms of rating methodology, CRAs claim that they do 
not target their ratings to specific credit risk metrics, such as default probabilities 
or expected losses, but only to ordinal rankings of credit risk.  
Rating methodologies evolve over time and continue to be adjusted in 
response to new information and economic developments.  
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At EU level, Regulation (EU) No 462/2013 attempts to ensure that 
‘modifications to the rating methodologies do not result in less rigorous 
methodologies’.221 Article 8(2) of the 2013 CRA Regulation aims to overcome the 
opacity in the management and operation of CRAs by requiring that ‘the credit 
ratings and the rating outlooks it issues are based on a thorough analysis of all the 
information that is available to it and that is relevant to its analysis according to 
the applicable rating methodologies’.222 It is important that rating activities ensure 
ongoing transparency, disclosure of information, monitoring and fairness of their 
methodologies. The quality of the rating process should be oriented to the investor 
perspective.  
After providing an overview of the ratings methodologies and ratings process, 
the next section analyses the discipline of conflicts of interest taking into account 
the major concerns of the business models of CRAs. 
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Diagram 1: The Credit Ratings Process 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Compiled by the author using data from Fitch Ratings, ‘The Ratings Process’, Special 
Report (2 December 2011) 8; S&P’s, ‘Guide to Credit Rating Essentials. What are credit ratings 
and how do they work?’ (2011) 8; and, ‘Guide to Credit Ratings Criteria. Why criteria are 
important and how they are applied’ (2010) 11. 
 
 
 
2.4 Conflicts of interest 
One of the most important aspects of the governance of CRAs is how conflicts 
of interest are regulated. It is inevitable that the ‘issuer-pays’ business model 
raises the possibility that an issuer may use, or the credit rating agency may 
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perceive, monetary pressure to improve the rating.223  
Nonetheless, CRAs exhibit potential conflicts of interest because they have a 
financial incentive to accommodate the preferences of bond issuers owing to the 
fact that they are selected and paid by the issuers.224 This heavy dependence is 
bound to result in both ratings inflation and inaccuracy. In fact, issuers place a 
higher premium on rather than on accurate ratings.225  
The higher the securities rating, the less concern investors will have about 
payment default, the greater the liquidity and the lower the issuers’ cost of capital. 
As a result, any investor who relies to any extent on ratings may be unknowingly 
bearing a risk for which he is not being compensated.226 
It is generally recognised that conflicts of interest arise at both an individual 
rating analyst level and a rating agency level. However, debate is concentrated on 
whether the agencies can adequately manage these conflicts.227  
Global regulators have affirmed that independence and conflicts of interest are 
the major concerns of rating procedures.228 In particular, CRA ratings decisions 
should be independent and free from political or economic pressures and from 
conflicts of interest arising due to the CRA’s ownership structure, business or 
financial activities, or the financial interests of the CRA’s employees.  
The 2003 SEC Report noted that potential conflicts of interest arise as a result 
of the dependence of rating agencies on revenues from the companies they rate 
and the rating agencies’ practice of charging fees based on the size of the 
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issuance.229 More precisely, the 2003 SEC Report stressed that reliance by rating 
agencies on issuer fees leads to significant conflicts of interest or otherwise calls 
into question the overall objectivity of credit ratings.  
A related potential conflict arises in the context of underwriters attempting to 
influence the credit rating process. In this regard, a large amount of bond offerings 
are underwritten by a few large firms, and a potential conflict exists for rating 
agencies to rate a particular underwriter’s clients more favourably in return for 
future business.230 
The main points of the 2003 SEC Report are the CRAs’ reliance on the issuers 
of securities and the ratings inflation of those securities. It has been observed that 
‘rating an issuer’s product increases the likelihood of an issuance being successful 
and therefore of the issuer continuing to thrive and therefore of future issuances 
with their associated fee payments taking place in the future’.231 
The development of ancillary businesses (rating assessment, risk management 
and consulting services) provided by CRAs has increased the catalogue of 
conflicts. For instance, prior to being issued with a public rating, issuers can 
purchase an ‘indicative’ or private rating, along with ‘advice’ regarding how the 
company might improve their rating.232 Therefore, the purchase of ancillary 
services could affect the credit rating decision and issuers may be pressured into 
using them out of fear that their failure to do so could adversely impact their 
credit rating.233  
The growth of the credit derivatives market created the possibility that the use 
of credit ratings in counterparty collateral arrangements could produce a strongly 
procyclical effect (this possibility was evident in the case of American 
International Group, Inc.).234 As a result, the boom of structured finance produced 
very significant and abrupt rating downgrades that determined the phenomenon of 
‘rating inflation’.235  
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Such ‘ratings inflation’ was facilitated by the limited understanding of the risk 
of structured debt and by inaccurate information about the risk characteristics of 
the underlying assets.236 In other words, CRAs knew little or nothing about the 
underlying assets backing the securitised structures they were rating. Indeed, 
‘structured products are designed to take advantage of different investor risk 
preferences; they are typically structured for each tranche to achieve a particular 
credit rating’.237 
The conflicts are exacerbated when CRAs involve the executive officers of 
companies to discuss the rating methodology or when CRAs permit issuers to 
submit the details of a proposed structure to them and then advise the issuer of 
their likely ratings.238  
It is generally considered that CRAs demonstrated the presence of conflicts of 
interest during the sub-prime mortgage crisis not only by giving their highest 
rating to most of the collateralised debt obligations (CDOs), but also by allowing 
issuers to consult raters on designing the CDOs.239  
As just indicated, the underlying cause of these conflicts is located in the 
‘issuer-pays’ business model. It is certainly the case that the agency compensation 
arrangement constitutes, on the face of it, a conflict of interest per se. Another 
reason could be found in the manifest shortcomings of the CRAs’ internal 
controls. With the huge expansion of structured finance (particularly derivative 
products), came a need for expert gatekeepers to evaluate them. The result has 
been the enormous profitability of credit rating agencies.240 It has been noted that 
a central difference between the ratings approach for traditional debt instruments 
and that for structured products is that the rating assessment for structured 
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products necessarily takes place ex ante.241 
The central question is the issuer-agency relationship that characterises the 
ratings business model. This relationship is confronted with major conflicts of 
interest questions because the interests of issuers in respect of their ratings do not 
often align with the needs of investors to receive reliable ratings information.242  
In particular, conflicts arise when: (1) the issuer pays the CRA evaluating the 
issuer’s bonds; (2) CRAs put in place consulting arrangements with the issuers of 
the bonds they rate; and (3) CRAs take up the incentive of issuing high fees and 
granting correspondingly high ratings to their clients as well as a corresponding 
disincentive to downgrade. Consequently, ‘the rating agencies have a direct hand 
in defining the structure that a corporation must adhere to in order to have the 
lowest possible cost of funding’.243 
Conflicts of interest take place when CRAs work closely with issuers in 
designing structured products that the same agency will later rate. Specifically, 
companies often use software and documents distributed by the rating agencies 
that provide in-house assistance as to how to satisfy the requirements for highest 
ratings.244 In other words, conflicts arise when agencies help their clients design 
structured products that they will later rate.245 For this reason, ‘ratings became 
almost a matter of negotiation rather than one arm’s length commercial 
judgement’.246 
It is noteworthy that a rating downgrade provokes negative consequences in 
terms of loss of confidence in both the issuer and the rating agency. The 
consequences of a downgrade can be severe in cases when bonds do default. In 
the same way, a tardy downgrade can be less severe because the effects of 
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imminent bonds failure can be better absorbed by issuers, for instance in the case 
of Enron.247 Covitz and Harrison observed that ‘the delay incentive should also be 
larger when the downgrade itself is particularly costly to the issuer’.248 Therefore, 
the desire to generate revenue alongside the explicit or implicit pressure from 
issuers increases rating inaccuracies.  
In order to address the area of conflicts of interest the transparency of CRAs’ 
governance needs to be enhanced. This means stringent controls, greater 
disclosure, a balanced agency-client relationship, and independence from issuers. 
A full and thorough disclosure of rating services is not sufficient to ensure 
transparency in the bond ratings industry. To increase CRAs’ independence from 
the issuers whose instruments are being rated, an independent compliance body is 
needed. Such a compliance body could monitor the relationship with the client’s 
rating agency and evaluate the desirability of publishing a particular rating grade. 
Such an approach could favour the accuracy of the financial statement and realign 
the agency-client relationship. 
In order to secure investor protection, a simple switch from the ‘issuer-pays’ 
model to a ‘subscriber compensation’ model is not a workable option. The 
problem with the ‘subscriber model’ is the loss of compensation from ‘free riders’ 
(i.e. all those who receive the information free of charge from the paying 
subscriber), who benefit from a free rating. 
An option that could constitute a workable solution for managing conflicts 
could be using the compliance function. Using the compliance function rather 
than individuals to check ratings decisions and assigning a surveillance team—
separate from the initial monitoring team—to track credit ratings after their initial 
issuance.249 
The compliance function in CRAs governance could stop the ratings from 
being a precondition for the sale of structured securities and reduce the CRAs’ 
influence in advising issuers about how to structure securities in order to achieve 
the rating desired. It is undeniable that conflicts of interest have greater potential 
market implications and should be managed by appropriate regulatory oversight.  
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The establishment of an independent compliance department should foster 
ratings stability as it would be objective, consistent, replicable, and removed from 
potential conflicts of interest. A compliance function would be separated from 
‘modelling staff’ and would be responsible for the integrity of reporting lines. For 
instance, compliance officers may detect whether employees of rating agencies 
are involved in possibly inappropriate rating actions. 
Inevitably, of course, the intent to reduce the risk of analyst conflicts of 
interest and ensure the objectivity and quality of analyst ratings represents the 
major challenge of regulators.250 The US Credit Rating Agency Reform Act 2006 
introduced a new Section, namely 15E that requires a NRSRO to establish, 
maintain, and enforce written policies and procedures to address conflicts of 
interest.251 Section 15E requires a NRSRO to provide information, including any 
conflict of interest relating to the issuance of a credit rating by the rating agency, 
to the SEC upon filing the registration statement by the rating agency for its 
NRSRO recognition (Section 15E(a)(1)(B)(vi) of the Exchange Act). In addition, 
Section 15E(h) of the Exchange Act requires ‘applicants for NRSRO and existing 
NRSROs to establish, maintain, and enforce procedures to address and manage 
conflicts of interest’. 
In the EU, Regulation (EU) No 462/2013 introduces specific rules aiming to 
reduce long-lasting relationships between rated entities and CRAs. Above all, it 
seeks to restore the impartiality and independence of CRAs.252 Recital 22 in the 
preamble to Regulation (EU) No 462/2013 states that ‘credit rating agencies 
should establish, maintain, enforce and document an effective internal control 
structure [such as] Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) relating to corporate 
governance, organisational matters, and the management of conflicts of 
interest’.253 
Article 6(1) of the 2013 CRA Regulation places an obligation on registered 
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CRAs to ensure that credit ratings are not affected by any existing or potential 
conflicts of interest.254 Annex I, section B (1), to Regulation (EU) No 462/2013, 
requires CRAs to identify and eliminate or, where appropriate, manage and 
subsequently disclose, any actual or potential conflicts of interest which may 
influence the analyses and judgements of their analysts or employees when 
determining or approving credit ratings and rating outlooks. 
At international level, IOSCO issued a set of principles regarding CRAs’ 
independence and the avoidance of conflicts of interest.255 In particular, greater 
attention is paid to CRAs’ internal procedures and policies. 
However, public regulators tend to delegate governance tasks and regulatory 
authority to specialised agents—the gatekeepers—for measuring financial risks. 
This kind of delegation occurs ‘if the perceived benefits of making use of credit 
rating agencies’ resources through delegation are greater than the perceived 
agency losses’.256  
At this point, the root of the question is the degree of independence of the 
agents from the principals. Generally, agents follow the principal’s instructions or 
adopt the principal’s decisions. The major concern is that the principals are 
investors. In this context, it can be claimed that the ‘principal-agent theory’ 
confirms that the principal-agent arrangement occurs when the agent has 
incentives to manage the asset in the best way for the principal.257 This is because 
such opportunistic behaviours arise as the agent exercises his or her expertise, i.e. 
discretion, in a way which maximises his or her own interests, rather than those of 
the principal. These elements are clearly applicable to the rating agencies’ 
activities.  
It is clear that conflicts of interest in the issuer-agency relationship increase 
and favour rating shopping. It also reveals collusive or strategic behaviour in 
respect of investors.258 Therefore, ‘regulatory intervention is needed to eliminate 
or at least minimise rating agencies’ incentives to engage in inappropriate rating 
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actions and to maximize the investing public’s awareness of risks that arise from 
such conflicts of interest’.259 A viable solution for avoiding conflicts of interest in 
rating would be to establish internal operating procedures and analyst 
compensation policies that reduce the link between salary and fee revenue.260 As 
Sinclair has noted, ‘making issuers pay introduces the potential for issuers to 
influence the agencies’ judgements and undermine their commitment to giving 
investors a true account’.261  
In academic circles, another option has been proposed to regulate conflicts of 
interest. This is to establish a ‘winner-take-all bonus scheme’, a funding 
mechanism that should augment the issuer-pay business model. In this way, ‘a 
small, recurring portion of revenue earned by the largest rating agencies should be 
ceded to fund a pay-for-performance bonus, and that the agencies should compete 
for this bonus on a periodic winner-take-all basis’.262 However, this option does 
not seem workable because rating agency employees might not be sufficiently 
encouraged to perform better simply by the prospect that their agency might win a 
bonus pool.263 CRAs might well argue that ‘keeping the client happy is a better 
use of effort than trying to get ratings right’.264 
After providing an analysis of CRAs’ conflicts of interest, the following 
section focuses on the question of compensation for CRAs taking into account 
suggestions for reform designed to implement an alternative business model for 
CRAs. 
 
2.4.1 Alternative methods of compensation for CRAs  
In recent decades, it has become questionable whether CRAs act in the 
interests of market participants or in the interests of those who provide their high 
fees.265 It is also debatable whether CRAs form an independent assessment of a 
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borrower’s relative creditworthiness and whether they are still considered a 
valuable benchmark of financial products as CRAs use publicly available data to 
assess the default risk of debt instruments.266  
These uncertainties question whether CRAs contribute towards financial 
stability267. After all, as intermediaries, they should provide correct information 
about the market value and creditworthiness of debt securities.  
Ratings do not provide any information as to whether a particular debt is 
repayable at a future date (e.g. the default of the rated debtor) and whether the 
obligation is suitable for investors.268 By contrast, CRAs issue ratings at the 
issuer’s request and are then monitored by internal methodologies that provide an 
evaluation of the default risk of financial products.  
The rise of CRAs as leading actors in the financial community leads to the 
consideration that credit ratings have assumed the status of financial institutions 
and occupy a privileged regulatory position. This status has been primarily 
determined by the weakness of global regulators (and supervisory authorities) to 
oversee the capital markets, an environment that runs the risk that the ordinary 
centres of financial regulation are being replaced by private decision-making 
mechanisms.269 
Although the securities markets relied on the ‘issuer-pays’ fee model, 
empirical studies have found that investor-paid ratings created a stronger incentive 
for CRAs to publish changes in ratings faster than the issuer-paid remuneration 
structure.270  
According to these findings, it seems appropriate that CRAs should receive 
fees in proportion to the value of the information they provide to the investors (i.e. 
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subscribers) but, since they act as intermediaries by supplying a public good to the 
financial markets, their informational service should be remunerated through a 
fixed system of revenues.271 This method of compensation may reduce the 
discretionary and extensive use of ratings as a contractual signal of a borrower’s 
creditworthiness. What is more, it may avoid an increased dependence on the 
issuer fees model or the bond’s ability to receive a desired rating.  
As a result, revenues should no longer be viewed as compensation for the 
CRAs’ ‘seals of approval’ for those companies needing access to the capital 
markets. Instead, revenue should be regarded as the remuneration for the financial 
intermediary service provided to issuers.272 
The increasing reliance on CRAs’ performances has led to ‘deluded’ processes 
to calculate the risks of asset-backed securities and exacerbated the systemic risk 
in the financial markets.273 In particular, it has been observed that ‘rating agencies 
are “glossing over” risks when assigning ratings to asset-backed securities by 
failing to take into account adequate counterparty risk’.274  
The 2007-2009 financial crisis highlighted the failures of ratings 
methodologies for securities. They tended to be too focused on whether the 
underlying asset pool was profitable and not enough on the quality of the 
underlying pool.275 The catalogue of recent CRAs’ shortcomings highlighted the 
point that credit ratings should not affect issuers’ access to capital or the decisions 
of investors. Conversely, they should provide independent assessments of 
financial instruments. 
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After providing a brief analysis of the possible alternative methods of 
compensation for CRAs, the next section offers a critical appraisal of the ratings 
information system, taking into account the potential risks of disclosure failure. 
 
2.4.2 The disclosure regime  
Information disclosure represents a key aspect of CRA governance. CRAs 
publicly disclose some of the core methodology and the basic rationale used to 
conduct their credit analyse. In theory, credit ratings provide valuable information 
to those investors who have relatively limited information—gathering or analysis 
capacity and therefore cannot make credit evaluations as effectively as the 
agencies themselves. In particular, CRAs can be of particular benefit to investors 
who do not have a direct negotiating relationship with the issuer.  
The ratings industry was largely unregulated in terms of mandatory due 
diligence and informational accuracy for their analysis.276 Global regulators have 
shown a manifest reluctance to provide mandatory rules that require rating 
agencies to check the quality and integrity of the information with which they are 
provided by the issuing firms.277 Poor due diligence, a lack of research resources 
(or lack of analytical resources) as well as bona fide mistakes are the major 
criticisms levelled against the activities of the CRAs.  
Corporate financial scandals (e.g. Enron, WorldCom and Lehman Brothers) 
have illustrated a lack of due diligence and deficiency in the evaluation of 
corporations’ creditworthiness. The scandals referred to above revealed the 
CRAs’ abuses in respect of investor reliance. Further, rating governance appeared 
to be defective in terms of investor protection. This problem is made worse by 
inadequate internal control rules.278  
While the purpose of a CRA is to reflect the creditworthiness of an issue or 
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issuer, the CRAs have some discretion in their rating system and are not required 
to make their rating methodology public.279  
The current regulatory framework for NRSROs requires mandatory 
disclosures be made by CRAs as to their rating policies and methodology.280 
However, it involves very little direct oversight of the performance of a NRSRO 
for the purpose of preventing or punishing poor performance.  
The SEC rules require only disclosure of the rating agencies’ policies 
regarding verification of underlying assets and information. The usefulness of 
such general disclosure is likely to be limited because they could be written in a 
way that would allow a significant amount of deviation in the use of information 
and the extent of verification among similarly situated asset backed securities.281 
The SEC regulation introduced some disclosure requirements for CRAs. The 
purposes of these rules are predicated on the fact that they enhance the 
reputational cost to rating agencies that engage in inappropriate rating actions, and 
that they help to break the entry barrier for smaller rating agencies with strong 
performance records in a market that is dominated by the main CRAs.282 It has 
been argued that a major function of CRAs is to certify to relatively uninformed 
traders that they do not face a significant informational disadvantage, though most 
‘customers’ of CRAs are sophisticated (such as investment banks, alternative 
investments and sovereign wealth funds).283  
The desired end product is that the principal role of reputational intermediaries 
is to guarantee disclosure quality and thereby reduce information asymmetry in 
securities markets. However, information asymmetry in the market for 
reputational intermediaries hampers their ability to play this role.284 
At EU level, Regulation (EU) No 462/2013 establishes a set of rules imposing 
obligations on issuers, originators and sponsors in connection with structured 
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finance instruments.285 Article 8b(1) of the 2013 CRA Regulation requires the 
issuer, the sponsor and the originator of a structured finance instrument 
established in the Union to publish on the website set up by ESMA286 extensive 
information on the credit quality and performance of the underlying assets of the 
structured finance instrument.287 
The law seeks to establish some safeguards. Article 8c(1) of the 2013 CRA 
Regulation requires that the issuer that intends to solicit a credit rating of a 
structured finance instrument has to select at least two CRAs to provide credit 
ratings independently of each other.288 These provisions aim to enhance disclosure 
of information on structured finance instruments and address the potential 
collusive behaviour in the CRA-issuer business relationship. As Darbellay has 
observed, ‘the structured finance segment highlights how the rating industry 
became very profitable without providing investors with valuable information’.289  
In addition, Article 10(1) of the 2013 CRA Regulation requires the credit 
rating agency to disclose ‘any credit rating or rating outlook, as well as any 
decision to discontinue a credit rating, on a non-selective basis and in a timely 
manner’.290 
Policymakers are primarily relying on disclosure of the potential conflicts of 
interest and of the procedures a CRA has in place for managing the issuers’ 
information. Disclosure per se is not a guarantee that investors will necessarily be 
able to take full advantage. As Darcy noted ‘even if CRAs are fully and fairly 
making mandatory disclosures on the issuer pays conflict, investors must 
adequately perceive and evaluate that information and must penalize CRAs via 
the market mechanism if disclosure is to adequately deter the agencies from 
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reaping the gains of compromised ratings’.291 
When CRAs review and examine financial statements, it has the effect of 
renting out CRAs’ reputations for conducting a careful evaluation that can locate 
fraud and discourage any attempts of fraud, and for painting a tolerably accurate 
picture of a company’s performance. In this way, liability risk reinforces the 
rating firm’s concern for reputation and can persuade the CRA to establish 
internal procedures to ensure the transparency of the financial statements. 
Reputation markets require a mechanism for distributing information about the 
performance of companies and reputational intermediaries. Disclosure rules could 
help, as do reputational intermediaries’ incentives to advertise their successes. 
Predictably, however, intermediaries will not publicise their own failures, and 
investors will discount competitors’ complaints because they come from a biased 
source.  
The securities regulator’s role in adopting disclosure rules is undoubtedly 
important but it is only one pillar within the wider scheme which needs to be 
complemented by other rules and regulations. The core regulatory role is that of 
enforcing standards of conduct against issuers and reputational intermediaries 
who flagrantly violate the disclosure rules. Tweaking those rules at the margin is 
no substitute for the core role. 
After considering the CRAs’ disclosure system, the ensuing sections provide 
an analysis of the key aspects of CRAs’ governance, namely transparency and 
market competition, emphasizing the response of regulators and bringing forth 
proposals to enhance the ratings fairness. 
 
2.5 Transparency and fairness of CRAs       
In assessing corporate default risk, creditors and financial analysts have a need 
to access transparent financial information. Transparency is essential to clear up 
not only the opacity involving the agencies’ methodologies, but also both the 
perceptions and misconceptions surrounding unsolicited ratings activity.  
The SEC adopted a series of rules further to enhance the transparency of rating 
methodologies and performances and to strengthen NRSROs’ recordkeeping and 
reporting obligations, in order to assist the SEC in monitoring NRSROs’ 
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compliance with regulation.292  
The US normative framework requires each CRA registered as an NRSRO to 
disclose its rating performance in terms of historical default rates and rating 
transitions.293 An important component of the CRA regulation is the requirement 
that CRAs disclose statistics that measure the accuracy of their ratings and their 
historical rating assessments. 
The normative US schemes for CRAs sought to fulfil the transparency gap in 
relation to the ratings process, as well as the rigour and consistency of the 
methodologies used by CRAs. However, the process of obtaining NRSRO status 
has been criticised for its lack of transparency regarding qualifications and for 
effectively limiting the number of certified CRAs.294  
At EU level, CRAs are required to complete and publish an annual 
‘transparency report’. This contains detailed information about a CRA’s legal 
structure and ownership, internal quality control systems, record-keeping policies, 
description of its management and rating analyst rotation policy.295  
A rating agency’s reputation would tend to be bolstered if it avoided conflicts 
of interest when the rating agency is owned, managed, or influenced by the 
institutions being rated. In this respect, the Council of the European Union 
published a general position to mitigate the risk of conflicts of interest.296 
Regulation (EU) No 462/2013 introduced specific provisions to address conflicts 
of interest concerning investment in CRAs.297 It should be underlined that the task 
force launched by Community regulations aimed to reinforce ESMA’s power of 
supervision.298  
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Regulation (EU) No 462/2013 provides detailed provisions for implementing 
measures aimed at increasing the transparency of CRAs’ internal governance.299 
Article 11a(1) of the 2013 CRA Regulation established the European Rating 
Platform where ‘a registered or certified credit rating agency shall, when issuing a 
credit rating or a rating outlook, submit to ESMA rating information including the 
credit rating and rating outlook of the rated instrument, information on the type of 
credit rating, the type of rating action, and date and hour of publication’.300 
In addition, CRAs are required to disclose the outcome of the annual internal 
review of its independent compliance function and financial information on the 
revenue of the credit rating agency.301 Most importantly, CRAs must disclose the 
details of their ownership structure and clients in order to facilitate transparency. 
After all, disclosure per se is a manifestation of control over informational assets 
such as ratings.302  
It is noteworthy that the main CRAs do not have independent ownership 
structures. Fitch IBCA is jointly owned by Hearst Corporation, a US multinational 
mass media group based in New York and FIMALAC S.A., a French financial 
conglomerate. Similarly, S&P’s is a unit of McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., an 
influential publishing and media company while Moody’s Investors Service has 
been managed for several decades by Dun & Bradstreet303, a leading US business 
information company.  
The ownership composition of the main CRAs casts considerable doubt as to 
the outright independence of rating activities. The aforementioned owners of 
CRAs are powerful companies listed in the securities markets. This means that 
they play an active role in the financial sectors and may put pressure on financial 
transactions. In particular, McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. and FIMALAC S.A. are 
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dominant firms in the information network, providing business services (i.e. 
business information reports) and publishing financial magazines. The worldwide 
business information group Dun & Bradstreet (Moody’s main shareholder) has set 
up subsidiaries in every European country and generally has a large stake in the 
local markets for business information.  
These factors can be significant in respect to the type of claim rated by the 
main CRAs. For instance, Fitch has expertise in the areas of debt, preferred stock 
of corporations, sovereigns, governments and structured financing. Moody’s has 
experience in handling bonds (sovereigns, corporations, financial institutions, 
pooled investment vehicles, structured finance, thrifts, public finance), bank 
deposits and commercial paper. S&P’s has experience in managing bonds from 
corporations, financial institutions, infrastructure finance, insurance, managed 
funds, public finance, sovereigns and structured finance.  
Other sources of credit risk assessment, particularly in the banking system, 
such as Central Credit Registers (CCRs)304 and Central Financial Statements 
Databases (CFSDs),305 are owned and managed by the National Central Banks 
(NCBs) of the EU Member States. They are mainly influenced by the banking 
industry and their management is shared by the NCBs. These rating institutions 
play a significant role for credit institutions because they offer banks a useful 
instrument for monitoring customers’ exposure and comparing their lending 
policy with that of competitors.306  
Devine suggested that the most effective approach in arriving at a more 
transparent rating system could be a two-step due diligence requirement by which 
professionals employed by issuers and underwriters provide complete and verified 
data to the rating agencies.307 In essence, transparent financial information and 
disclosures can be achieved by adopting effective, internal control systems and by 
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promoting the value policies of the firm.308  
 
2.6 The question of market competition 
The maintenance of accuracy of a CRA’s ratings is incentivised by its need to 
preserve its reputation and by competition. However, it is generally considered 
that competition can both aid and hinder reputational commitments for quality.309 
Limited competition creates barriers to entry for additional competitors for two 
main reasons: (1) investor demand for global coverage with consistency in 
ratings; and (2) the ‘regulatory licence’ enjoyed by a limited number of CRAs. 
The lack of competition in the ratings industry brings with it a number of 
problems. These include inflated issuance fee levels, limiting innovation in ratings 
methodologies, and the heightened chance that, with so few significant players, 
major occurrences in the market can be missed.310 Competition from investors’ 
perspectives could reduce bias because of the pressure to be accurate. However, 
competition need not reduce, and indeed may increase bias, if consumers want to 
hear reports that conform to their perceptions.311  
Merely enhancing more NRSROs does not mean there will be more 
competition.312 Smaller firms and new entrants face the significant problem of 
developing the very reputational capital that the current NRSROs claim is so 
central to their continued operation and success. Some commentators observe that 
increasing the number of CRAs would, in fact, worsen the shopping problem and 
reduce welfare.313 Following this view, the fostering of new entries into the 
ratings business may not necessarily make it more efficient in terms of rating 
quality.314 
The reward for maintaining a sound reputation would be lower because 
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competition implies that the market is shared between larger numbers of CRAs.315 
Consequently, there is no particular reason to believe that new CRA entries would 
improve the quality of ratings. Goodhart has contested this, arguing that ‘a new 
entrant could establish a track record for greater accuracy—independently 
assessed—in a particular niche by exploiting a comparative advantage, say in 
rating one particular product line, with a small staff, and then build from that’.316 
Others, for their part, have observed that competition among specialised 
financial intermediaries can lead to full and credible information disclosure, even 
in the presence of only small reputation costs.317 On this view, this is predicated 
on the fact that competition fosters the provision of information and reduces 
conflicts of interest. Competition should be encouraged so that all agencies which 
are recognised and used by the market operate on a level playing field. That 
means the markets must also open their processes to new or specialist agencies 
and not rely on the main CRAs.  
At EU level, Regulation (EU) No 462/2013 seeks to encourage the use of 
smaller CRAs in order to increase competition in the credit ratings industry. 
Recital 11 in the preamble to the 2013 CRA Regulation provides that ‘…where 
two or more credit ratings are sought, the issuer or a related third party should 
consider appointing at least one credit rating agency which does not have more 
than 10 % of the total market share’.318 
Article 6b of the 2013 CRA Regulation sets out a maximum duration of the 
contractual relationship between the rated entity and the CRA. It requires a 
rotation mechanism to mitigate the risk of entering a dynamic whereby an issuer 
refrains from changing credit rating agency as this could raise the concerns of 
investors regarding the issuer’s creditworthiness (‘lock-in effect’).319  
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In addition, the 2013 CRA Regulation requires that where a CRA enters into a 
contract for the issuing of credit ratings on re-securitisations, it shall not issue 
credit ratings on new re-securitisations with underlying assets from the same 
originator for a period exceeding four years.320 Clearly, the EU legislator aims to 
increase competition on the credit rating market for re-securitisations321, a 
segment of the financial markets that betrayed serious failures during the 2007-
2009 crisis on the part of the main CRA players. The rotation mechanism should 
facilitate new market entries and offer existing credit rating agencies the 
opportunity to extend their business to new areas. 
In this regard, the EU Commission adopted a Report ‘on the feasibility of a 
network of smaller credit rating agencies’ which assesses how the establishment 
of such a network could contribute to the strengthening of smaller CRAs, 
facilitating their growth so as to become more competitive market players.322 
Above all, it seems clear that without competitive pressure, rating agencies are 
unlikely to change their methodologies. The regulators should focus their efforts 
on increasing the number of players (i.e. the ‘inside pressure’).323 More new 
CRAs mean more competition, but more established and reputable CRAs are a 
safer bet for high quality ratings because they have more to lose from a 
recognition withdrawal.324 Since such competition could hardly do any harm from 
the allocation perspective, it is certainly sensible for the regulators to take up the 
cause of competition increasing measures. However, are CRAs truly essential in 
order to secure investor confidence? As Darbellay has noted, ‘lack of competition 
in the ratings market persists as long as market participants have little alternative 
but to rely on credit rating agencies despite their poor performance’.325   
Several potential problems of efficiency and anticompetitive behaviour would 
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at best’ (at 138). 
324 ibid 141. 
325 Aline Darbellay, ‘Competition and Credit Rating Agencies’ in Jan Kleineman, Lars Gorton and 
Aron Verständig (eds), Perspectives on Credit Rating Agencies (Stockholm: Författarna, 
Stockholm Centre for Commercial Law Jure Förlag AB 2013) 159. 
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be ameliorated by more competition. However, the principal fear of increased 
competition is a breakdown of the reputation mechanism that could lead to a 
deteriorating quality of ratings in the system.326 Hunt observed that ‘in the rating 
market, where quality presumably cannot be determined in advance, quality is 
rewarded because high-quality producers amass reputational capital’.327 More 
competition per se is not a solution because: (1) new CRAs do not have 
reputational capital; and (2) this can lead to rating inflation by the new CRAs in 
order to build their reputational capital. 
The next section addresses the main questions relating to the use of rating 
triggers in financial transactions and the ‘certification’ role of CRAs. 
 
2.7 The widespread use of ‘rating triggers’ in financial contracts  
The regulatory use of references to credit ratings in legislation and the 
incorporation of credit ratings into private contracts increase the reliance placed 
upon them and show up the inadequacy of CRAs to promote the stability of credit 
markets.328 The reference to ratings in bilateral credit transactions purportedly 
makes it easier for the lender to estimate the creditworthiness of the borrower, and 
act accordingly. All this raises concerns about the usefulness of CRAs’ 
evaluations and their ability to provide accurate information about the credit 
quality of borrowers and, generally, to maintain market efficiency.329 
However, as has been observed, ‘in modern credit markets, both debtors and 
creditors are embedded in complex networks of obligations, and so their solvency 
depends on multilateral interactions. Such systemic dependencies cannot be fully 
captured using a bilateral device, no matter how well-calibrated’.330  
                                                 
326 Milosz Gudzowski, ‘Mortgage Credit Ratings and the Financial Crisis: The Need for a State-
Run Mortgage Security Credit Rating Agency’ (2010) Columbia Business Law Review 1, 274-275.  
327 John Patrick Hunt, ‘Credit Rating Agencies and the “Worldwide Credit Crisis”: The Limits of 
Reputation, the Insufficiency of Reform, and a Proposal for Improvement’ (2009) Columbia 
Business Law Review 1, 138. 
328 Tracy Alloway, ‘MBS deal shelved after rift over ratings’ Financial Times (London, 12 May 
2014), where it is observed that ‘since the financial crisis, regulators have encouraged credit rating 
agencies to give “unsolicited” opinions on deals that they are not hired to evaluate, as part of an 
effort to avoid the ratings shopping that proliferated before 2008’. Further, it is noted that ‘rating 
agencies have also been keen to criticise each other’s opinions as they seek to fight the perception 
that they failed to properly evaluate the risks embedded in mortgage bonds before the crisis’. 
329 Mark Carl Rom, ‘The Credit Rating Agencies and the Subprime Mess: Greedy, Ignorant, and 
Stressed?’ (2009) 69 Public Administration Review 4, 644-645. 
330 Bruce G. Carruthers, ‘From uncertainty toward risk: the case of credit ratings’ (2013) 11 Socio-
Economic Review, 545-546.  
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The rapid growth of CRAs’ activities brought to light a controversial aspect of 
the corporate debt market: the use of ‘rating triggers’ in financial contracts. At 
first sight, a ‘rating trigger’ can be defined as a particular contractual clause 
included in private bond indentures that ensures a required credit rating threshold 
of the borrower’s liquidity risk.331 
Generally, the use of rating triggers falls within the category of debt covenants 
on account of their role in monitoring the performance and creditworthiness of 
companies. As the SEC has stated, rating triggers are ‘contractual provisions that 
terminate credit availability or accelerate credit obligations in the event of 
specified rating actions, with the result that a rating downgrade could lead to an 
escalating liquidity crisis for issuers subject to ratings triggers’.332 
The function of rating triggers underlines the varying effects that they may 
have for credit rating agencies’ assessments and, generally, for financial stability. 
The fairness of these contractual provisions has been called into question 
following the well-known scandals which occurred in the corporate sector (e.g. 
Enron, AIG and Pacific Gas and Electric Company).333  
Such clauses were adopted by parties to verify the solvency of borrowers and 
to ensure the enforceability of the lender’s claim in case of a downgrading of the 
borrower’s rating. As Nicholls has observed ‘the widespread use of credit ratings 
                                                 
331 SEC, ‘Report on the Role and Function of Credit Rating Agencies in the Operation of the 
Securities Market’ (January 2003) 30. See also Federico Parmeggiani, ‘Rating Triggers, Market 
Risk and the Need for More Regulation’ (2013) 14 European Business Organization Law Review 
3, 428. The author provides an analysis of rating triggers by identifying some basic types of 
clauses: (1) ‘rating-based collateral and bonding provisions’, usually included in bank loan 
agreements ‘they require the borrower either to post more collateral, or to provide a specific letter 
of credit, or to secure, in other ways, the claim of the lenders put at stake by the rating 
downgrade’; (2) ‘rating step-up triggers’ (or ‘rating-based pricing grids’), ‘when incorporated into 
bond indentures, they require the issuer to increase the interest paid to bondholders as its rating 
falls below the thresholds set in the contract’; (3) ‘acceleration trigger’ which requires that, ‘in the 
event of the designated downgrade, the borrower has the duty to accelerate the payment of the 
loaned capital to the lender or the payment of the bond’s principal to bondholders’; (4) ‘rating-
based put provision’ which requires ‘the borrower whose rating has been downgraded below the 
designated threshold to buy back the issued debt from the lenders’; and (5) ‘rating-based default 
trigger’ that ‘allows the lender to regard the borrower’s designated downgrade as an event of 
default on the obligation protected by the trigger, turning the increase in the counterparty risk into 
the failure of the latter to fulfil the obligation set in the contract’. 
332 SEC (note 331) 30. See also Karan Bhanot and Antonio S. Mello, ‘Should corporate debt 
include a rating trigger?’ (2006) 79 Journal of Financial Economics 1, 69-70. 
333 SEC (note 331) 29. See also Diane Mage Roberts, ‘Credit Rating Agencies: Is Additional 
Regulation Inevitable?’ (2004) 19 Journal of International Banking and Financial Law 5, 178. 
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in private contracts has some causal connection to the enduring dominance of the 
largest CRAs and the potential for anti-competitive behaviour’.334 
On the one hand, rating triggers guarantee access to securities by lowering the 
cost of capital. On the other hand, they keep the borrower aware of its ability to 
repay the debt on time and full. Rating triggers look at the risk of borrower’s 
defaulting and at the capital structure of the firm and the value of the company’s 
assets.335 In substance, the important function of rating triggers is to force 
borrowers to pursue low risk strategies and to monitor the company’s liquidity 
risk. 
The payment of a rating trigger materializes when the value of the firm’s 
assets falls below a certain level. A closer examination of the aim of rating 
triggers in financial contracts suggests that parties intend to force borrowers to 
repay their debt through forms of negative pledge.336 This consideration comes 
from the objective of the ‘rating trigger’, essentially to maintain the equity and 
leverage firm value above a certain specified credit rating and to threaten 
borrowers when their credit risk is higher.337 Clearly, the adoption of these clauses 
is delegated to the freedom of parties in a contract, but the question is: is there a 
need for firms to incorporate rating triggers in their contractual arrangements? 
As a first approximation, firms use rating triggers to minimize agency 
conflicts and asymmetric information problems between managers and 
debtholders.338 Another explanation can be found by considering the incorporation 
of triggers as a solution for the ‘adverse selection’ problem.339 
                                                 
334 Christopher C. Nicholls, ‘Public and private uses of credit ratings’ (August 2005) Capital 
Markets Institute Policy Series, 4. 
335 Sérgio Silva and José Azevedo Pereira, ‘Optimal Debt, Asset Substitution and Coupon Rating-
Trigger Covenants’ (2008) <www6.fe.uc.pt/pfn2008/UserFiles/pdf/776.pdf> accessed 13 
November 2013, 25-26. 
336 Negative pledge is generally referred to a covenant in a loan agreement, where the main 
purpose is to ensure that other creditors do not obtain a preferred claim over the assets of the 
debtor in the event of insolvency. See Lee C. Buchheit, ‘Negative Pledge Clauses: The Games 
People Play’ (1990) 9 International Financial Law Review, 10-11; Carl S. Bjerre, ‘Secured 
Transactions Inside Out: Negative Pledge Covenants Property and Perfection’ (1999) 84 Cornell 
Law Review 2, 307; Michael Bradfield and Nancy R. Jacklin, ‘Problems Posed by Negative Pledge 
Covenants in International Loan Agreements’ (1984) 23 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 
1, 133-135; Morey W. McDaniel, ‘Are Negative Pledge Clauses in Public Debt Issues Obsolete?’ 
(1983) 38 The Business Lawyer 3, 867-868. 
337 Christian Koziol and Jochen Lawrenz, ‘Optimal design of rating-trigger step-up bonds: Agency 
conflicts versus asymmetric information’ (2010) 16 Journal of Corporate Finance 2, 182-183. The 
authors underline the agency conflicts and asymmetric information problems in using rating 
triggers contractual provisions. 
338 S&P’s, ‘Evaluating Liquidity Triggers in Insurance Enterprises’ (November 2008) 2-3.  
339 Federico Parmeggiani (note 331) 441. The adverse selection problem can occur when potential 
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It can be assumed that the monitoring information displayed by rating triggers 
measures the value of the firm and takes a picture of the firm’s position at a given 
moment in time. This means that rating triggers can be used as a ‘speculative 
monitor’ in order to evaluate the financial conditions of the firm, or most possibly 
to recommend or discourage investment in the firm to investors.340 
On this view, rating triggers act as market signalling by conveying information 
about the creditworthiness of the firm.341 This type of signalling helps to reduce 
informational asymmetries but if it is used to deteriorate the corporation’s 
liquidity (for example by aggravating the liquidity stress of issuers) it may 
destabilise the debt market and harm investors.  
Additionally, rating triggers may avoid the ‘adverse selection’ problem when 
the information provided reflects the actual risk profile of the firm.342 In contrast, 
reckless endorsement of triggers may distort the information signalled to investors 
with the result that the assessment of CRAs is altered and the value of the 
company affected.343 Further, the credit rating agencies could incentivise the use 
of rating triggers in financial contracts in order to enhance the reputation of the 
issuer or to threaten the borrower’s financial position.  
As already indicated, rating triggers constitute particular debt covenants: they 
tailor loans in order to protect lenders and, at the same time, they constrain 
borrowers to maintain their own duty to reduce the liquidity risk. However, the 
use of rating triggers may vary in terms of the purposes of parties in financial 
                                                 
lenders find it difficult to assess the risk profile of the companies in the market.  
340 Jean Tirole, The Theory of Corporate Finance (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 2006) 27-28. An analysis of the role of monitoring within the theory of firms is carried out 
by Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling, ‘Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure’ (1976) 3 Journal of Financial Economics 4, 337-338. 
341 On the concept of ‘market signalling’ see the classical contribution of Michael Spence, Market 
Signalling. Informational Transfer in Hiring and Related Screening Processes (Cambridge MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1974). 
342 The ‘adverse selection’ effect occurs when one party in a transaction has better information 
than the other party. It materializes before the transaction occurs. Generally, the potential 
borrowers most likely to produce adverse outcomes are the ones most likely to seek a loan and be 
selected. The ‘moral hazard’ effect occurs when one party has an incentive to behave differently 
once an agreement is made between parties. The hazard is that the borrower has incentives to 
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classic work of George A. Akerlof, ‘The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the 
Market Mechanism’ (1970) 84 The Quarterly Journal of Economics 3, 493-494. See also Mark V. 
Pauly, ‘Over insurance and Public Provision of Insurance: The Roles of Moral Hazard and 
Adverse Selection’ (1974) 88 The Quarterly Journal of Economics 1, 54-55. 
343 Keith J. Crocker and Arthur Snow, ‘The social value of hidden information in adverse selection 
economies’ (1992) 48 Journal of Public Economics 3, 317-318. 
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transactions. For instance, the ‘triggers’ can be used in merger operations—as a 
benchmark of the value of target companies—in order to attract investors and 
raise capital from the debt market.  
After analysing the functions of rating triggers in financial transactions 
underlying the reasons for their use as debt covenants, the next section considers 
the main criticisms of the effects of such clauses on market participants by 
considering the question of the lack of disclosure of the triggers in contracts. 
 
2.8 The main criticisms of rating triggers 
Rating triggers may influence investment decisions but, most importantly, may 
deteriorate the financial outlook of firms (e.g., in the case of the collapse of 
Enron).344 Then, rating triggers may determine a ‘credit cliff’ effect whereby once 
a company’s rating drops below a certain level, it is then likely to undergo a 
precipitous drop. In substance, the use of rating triggers may directly impact on a 
firm’s cash flows and may reveal the behaviour of CRAs with respect to their 
clients.345 
By exercising pressure on the borrower’s need for liquidity, rating triggers 
exacerbate the incentives to generate a demand for favourable ratings. For this 
reason, an unmonitored use of rating triggers could be transformed into unfair 
clauses for borrowers. Some of the most problematic controversial aspects have to 
do with the lack of disclosure of triggers in financial contracts: it can happen 
when the issuer does not want to display its creditworthiness to the market.346  
Likewise, the issuer can arrange rating trigger provisions so as to force 
borrowers to drain liquidity and facilitate the access to capital (even if there is a 
                                                 
344 In particular, the Enron default was caused by the uncontrolled use of rating triggers that 
conferred on counterparties the right to demand cash collateral, and lenders the right to demand 
repayment of outstanding loans, once Enron’s credit rating lowered. See Moody’s, ‘The 
Unintended Consequences of Rating Triggers’ Moody’s Global Credit Research, Special 
Comment (December 2001). The report observes that ‘such triggers create the potential for a rapid 
decline in a company’s credit ratings and may even lead directly to a default or bankruptcy filing, 
which otherwise would not have occurred’.  
345 Pepa Kraft, ‘The Impact of the Contractual Use of Ratings on the Rating Process - Evidence 
from Rating Agency Adjustments’ (2010) <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1570776> accessed 14 
November 2013, 27-28. In particular, the author argues that ‘rating agencies provide more 
favourable adjustments to issuers with rating-based contracts relative to issuers with similar 
contracts based on accounting ratios and other issuers with private loan agreements’. 
346 Monica M. Coppola and Pamela M. Stumpp, ‘Moody’s Analysis of US Corporate Rating 
Triggers Heightens Need for Increased Disclosure’, Special Comment, Moody’s Investors Service 
(July 2002) 1-2. 
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high probability of a downgrade). Another hypothesis of absence of disclosure 
exists where the firm uses rating triggers to give a positive signal of its financial 
performance (even if there is a high probability of default). 
However, these effects can determine a phenomenon of ‘procyclicality’ 
whereby by adopting rating triggers—as ‘make-up instruments’—the firm may 
enter into liquidity stress and, consequently, fall into an insolvency spiral.347 
Therefore, it is possible to argue that rating triggers are provisions developed to 
disclose a company’s creditworthiness: on the one hand they influence the 
performance of firms by signalling the liquidity of the corporation, on the other 
hand they measure the risk of default of the issuers by pressuring the company’s 
cost of debt.348 
Clearly, the existence of rating triggers affects the CRAs’ assessment as to 
whether to downgrade a rating of an issuer’s debt. The CRAs’ knowledge of the 
existence of rating triggers in a rated issuer’s loan agreements inevitably has an 
impact on their decisions (for instance, CRAs can decline to issue a rating in order 
to gain the favour of firms). It has been claimed that ‘to the extent that CRAs are 
thought to be reluctant to downgrade issuers (…) such reticence would appear to 
be at odds with a view elsewhere expressed by CRA critics that the significant 
market power of the major CRAs allows them, in effect, to extract economic rents 
and provides temptations for market power abuse’.349 
On this view, the use of rating triggers could represent an important 
benchmark for CRAs for evaluating the quality (and stability) of an issuer’s credit 
risk. As a result of the incorporation of such clauses in commercial and financial 
agreements, the relationship between issuers and rating agencies would suffer 
from inaccurate statements about the convenience to assess the ‘acquiescent 
company’.  
The adoption of rating triggers could be fatal for companies with high default 
risk grade and could turn into a ‘boomerang’ if the loan structure is not adequately 
capitalized. In other words, these kinds of clauses are ‘time-bombs’ in a 
                                                 
347 Jeffery D. Amato and Craig H. Furfine, ‘Are credit ratings procyclical?’ (2004) 28 Journal of 
Banking & Finance 11, 2642-2643. 
348 Moody’s Investor Services, ‘Special Comment:  2008 Rating Trigger Trends in the U.S. Life 
(Re)Insurance Industry’ (January 2009) 1-2; Moody’s Investor Services, ‘Rating Triggers in the 
Asset Management Industry 2008 Update’ (January 2009) 1, where it is pointed out that ‘Rating 
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by a rating downgrade’. 
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company’s financial capacity because they exacerbate liquidity runs that can 
easily turn into insolvency.350 
Furthermore, rating triggers could bring about instability in the securities 
market on the account of their negative effects.351 For this reason, it is questioned 
whether rating triggers show the genuine creditworthiness of issuer and the 
candour of financial transactions, since the company can be astute enough to draw 
the money in case of imminent downgrading.  
The use of rating triggers can reflect the CRAs’ assessments with the result 
that they cause the ‘death’ of corporations.352 Consequently, rating triggers used 
to forecast an issuer’s default can hide negative biases and increase moral hazard 
as well as adverse selection effects. These outcomes may stimulate the investor’s 
demand for weaker-quality debt and, plainly, result in credit deterioration. 
In addition, the widespread use of rating triggers in private contracts could 
intensify the mechanistic reliance on credit ratings on the part of market 
participants instead of mitigating counterparty risk.353 From this point of view, the 
problem is the accuracy of a rating announcement (and the reliability of CRAs’ 
assessment) that can be influenced by the need of issuer to raise capital in the 
market.  
In the light of these considerations, rating triggers can be considered perilous 
clauses for the stability of financial markets on the account of their capacity to 
have a ‘domino-effect’ in the event of an unexpected downgrade followed by 
default. 
After considering the controversial aspects of using rating triggers in financial 
agreements, the next section focuses on the systemic importance of CRAs and the 
implications of credit ratings in the sovereign debt structure.  
 
                                                 
350 Claire A. Hill, ‘Regulating the Rating Agencies’ (2004) 82 Washington University Law 
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352 Tim Reason, ‘Not Trigger Happy. Credit-rating firms are taking a closer look at how corporate 
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2.9 The impact of credit ratings on the EU sovereign debt crisis 
The 2010-2012 EU debt crisis showed the significant role of sovereign ratings 
and the evident reliance of countries on bond financing.354 In this respect, the 
over-reliance on the main CRAs increased the systemic risk in the financial 
markets by raising alarm about States.355 
In particular, statements by CRAs have given rise to criticism in the Eurozone 
on account of the surprising downgrades in the creditworthiness of some EU 
members in 2012-2013, namely Austria, France, the Netherlands and the UK that 
alarmed the sovereign debt market and affected the cost of funding.356 Between 1 
January 2009 and 1 January 2014, CRAs downgraded countries such as Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain where the economic outlook had already been 
hit by the events of the 2007-2009 financial crisis.357  
The powerful role of credit ratings influences not only private finances but 
also a country’s finances, budget, economic policies and politics, and, in the case 
of the Eurozone, it can be claimed that credit ratings are shaping the whole EU 
structure and institutional development.358 As ESMA has stated, ‘sovereign credit 
ratings play a crucial role from a credit market and financial stability perspective 
by informing investors about the quality of sovereign debt and the credit risk 
associated with holding government securities’.359  
                                                 
354 Francesco Capriglione, ‘Financial Crisis and Sovereign Debt. The European Union Between 
Risks and Opportunities’ (2012) 1 Law and Economics Yearly Review 1, 31-32. 
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Crisis: An Ethical Approach’ (2013) 6 Journal of International Business Ethics 1-2, 27. 
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In this context, the publication of sovereign ratings for EU countries generated 
high attention for CRAs’ announcements with the result that they spread the risk 
of sovereign default among Member States.360 In academic writings, sovereign 
ratings are defined as ‘assessments of the relative likelihood that a borrower will 
default on its obligations’.361 It should be noted that rating announcements may 
create spillover effects in the securities markets because of sluggishness to 
downgrade the creditworthiness of sovereign debt.362  
As has been observed, ratings provided an arbitrary evaluation of government 
bonds in the Euro area when the sovereign debt crisis erupted.363 In this respect, a 
leading CRA has been censured by ESMA for an erroneous downgrade alert when 
the EU securities authority found evident failures in managing market-sensitive 
data for assigning ratings to sovereign debt.364   
One can argue that CRAs should regulate the flow of market-sensitive 
information and provide valuable risk assessments for investors. However, the 
leading CRAs act as ‘raptor-capitalist businesses’ by accumulating fees and their 
performance is poor.365  
Sovereign ratings seem speculative instruments in the hands of CRAs rather 
than a useful benchmark of information about the obligations of central 
governments.366 However, the central aspect to be assessed is the passive role of 
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States when it comes to the consistency and rationale of sovereign ratings. It is 
paradoxical that simple opinions may destabilize the economic policies and 
jeopardize the financial trends of sovereign States.367 
Sovereign credit risk assessments may have a huge impact on the ratings 
assigned to domestic banks or companies (by determining the capacity to repay 
the debt) because ‘they involve an exercise of private decision-making power 
which has the potential both to undermine the State and to ‘topple’ it’.368 For this 
reason they may constitute harmful statements for the international financial 
markets.369  
Among scholars and policymakers there is scepticism about the genuine 
intention of sovereign ratings having regard to aggressive, i.e. speculative, 
announcements about European debt and EU-IMF bailout plans.370 The sovereign 
ratings have become the key determinant in the financial assistance programmes 
for the Eurozone (European Stability Mechanism371, European Financial 
Stabilisation Mechanism372 and European Financial Stability Facility373) and an 
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important benchmark of the fiscal policy framework in the European Monetary 
Union.374 
For example, in the Greek crisis the ratings performed by the leading CRAs 
brought about a significant increase in interest rates and, as a consequence, had a 
negative impact on the securities market.375 The above considerations led to a first 
preliminary conclusion: ratings announcements have a significant impact on 
States’ economies because of the huge reliance on CRAs.376 This happens when 
market participants are dependent on only one source of information and place 
their confidence chiefly in the warnings of sovereign ratings.377  
It can be observed that sovereign ratings changed from providing a judgement 
about the capacity and willingness of governments to raise the necessary 
resources for the timely servicing of their debt obligations, into an evaluation of 
their management of fiscal and budgetary conducts.378 However, the sovereign 
ratings should help governments to convey CRAs’ information into stable policy 
                                                 
373 The European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) was created by the EU Member States in 
order to safeguard financial stability in Eurozone and to provide financial assistance to Member 
States within the framework of a macro-economic adjustment programme. The EFSF issues bonds 
or other debt instruments on the capital markets and may intervene in the primary and secondary 
bond markets, act on the basis of a precautionary programme and finance recapitalisations of 
financial institutions through loans to governments. See Rodrigo Olivares-Caminal (note 371) 7-9. 
374 Adrian Blundell-Wignall, ‘Solving the Financial and Sovereign Debt Crisis in Europe’ (2011) 
29 OECD Journal: Financial Market Trends 2, 9-10. By contrast see the considerations of House 
of Lords – European Union Committee, ‘Sovereign Credit Ratings: Shooting the Messenger?’, 21st 
Report of Session 2010-12, 21 July 2011, 20-21. 
375 Sovereign credit signals had a great impact in the case of Greece on account of the reliance 
placed on them by the financial markets and the foreign exchange market. The fact that ratings 
news induces a market reaction demonstrates the systemic relevance of CRAs and the over-
reliance of financial actors on ratings. Recently, the CRAs upgraded the credit outlook for Spain, 
boosting new confidence among analysts and investors in the Spanish economy. In particular, S&P 
stated ‘we see improvement in Spain’s external position as economic growth gradually resumes’; 
clearly this announcement determined a positive signal for sovereign debt markets and marked a 
shift in financial market sentiment. However, the question is: to what extent can sovereign ratings 
influence the economic policies of national states? The answer is not difficult to find so long as 
governments continue to rely solely on the credit rating agencies’ prophecies. See Tobias Buck, 
‘S&P upgrades credit outlook for Spain’ Financial Times (London 29 November 2013). 
376 The criticism of CRAs during the European sovereign debt crisis was more focused on the 
extent and timing of downgrades. See Rasha Alsakka and Owain ap Gwilym, ‘Rating agencies’ 
signals during the European sovereign debt crisis: Market impact and spillovers’ (2013) 85 
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 145. 
377 Gwion Williams, Rasha Alsakka and Owain ap Gwilym, ‘The impact of sovereign rating 
actions on bank ratings in emerging markets’ (2013) 37 Journal of Banking & Finance 2, 565, 
observe that ‘sovereign ratings represent assessments of the ability and willingness of governments 
to meet their financial obligations’. 
378 Gunther Tichy, ‘Did Rating Agencies Boost the Financial Crisis?’ (2011) 46 Intereconomics 
Forum 5, 245. 
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decisions. In essence, rating agencies have evolved from being watchdogs of 
financial markets to guardians of fiscal discipline.379 
After providing a critical view of sovereign ratings by stressing their role in 
the 2010-2012 EU debt crisis, the next section considers regulatory intervention 
with regard to sovereign ratings activities by taking into account the main reforms 
adopted at the EU and US level for addressing the shortcomings of the sovereign 
ratings process. 
 
2.10 The regulatory intervention on sovereign ratings activities 
 
The shortcomings of sovereign ratings triggered the intervention of regulators 
at the EU level and in the US in order to address the gaps in existing legislation. 
In particular, the enacted provisions attempt to enhance transparency in the 
preparation of sovereign ratings, strengthen the review of those ratings and 
increase the quality of information used to assess the creditworthiness of States.380 
In this regard, the regulatory reforms intend to replace the CRAs’ ad hoc 
ratings by marking credit according to bond yield spreads, rather than the 
converse.381 In so far as over-reliance on credit ratings is the main target of 
criticisms, financial institutions and States should develop their own credit risk 
assessment in order to reduce the mechanistic influence of CRAs.382 
At EU level, Regulation No 462/2013383 introduced significant obligations for 
sovereign ratings in order to address the huge role they came to play during the 
Euro debt crisis. According to recital 45 in the preamble to the 2013 CRA 
Regulation, ‘when publishing their sovereign ratings, credit rating agencies should 
explain in their press releases or reports the key elements underlying those credit 
                                                 
379 Marek Hanusch and Paul M. Vaaler, ‘Credit Rating Agencies in Emerging Democracies. 
Guardians of Fiscal Discipline? (2013) The World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No 
6379, 8, where the authors argue that ‘CRAs play a positive role in emerging democracies around 
the world as private guardians of public fiscal discipline’. 
380 It is generally considered that rating announcements often provide information that the market 
has already taken into account, causing alarm among market participants and exacerbating reliance 
on credit ratings.  
381 Bartholomew Paudyn, ‘Credit rating agencies and the sovereign debt crisis: Performing the 
politics of creditworthiness through risk and uncertainty’ (2013) 20 Review of International 
Political Economy 4, 793-794. 
382 Gillian Tett, ‘Beware the consequences of reassessing sovereign risk’ Financial Times (London 
4 November 2011). 
383 Regulation (EU) No 462/2013.  
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ratings’ and, most importantly, ‘credit rating agencies should refrain from any 
direct or explicit policy recommendations on policies of sovereign entities’.  
Although these provisions aim to reduce the risk of inaccurate assessments by 
imposing certain restrictions, CRAs are not forced to verify the correctness of 
their data and the appropriateness of their announcements.384 As a result, the 
demand for sovereign credit ratings (in particular, foreign currency ratings) 
remains prevalent and relevant in the international bond markets.385 
Article 8a(2) of the 2013 CRA Regulation improves the quality of ratings of 
sovereign debt of EU Member States by providing that CRAs cannot issue any 
rating outlooks ‘without the consent of the rated entity, unless [the relevant 
information] is available from generally accessible sources’.386 Also, Article 8a(3) 
of the 2013 CRA Regulation requires CRAs to set a calendar indicating when they 
will rate Member States, limited to three dates per year for unsolicited sovereign 
ratings.387 
This rule focuses on transparency by providing that sovereign ratings should 
take into consideration the individual country reports and be made publicly 
available. In addition, the above rule states that potential changes in sovereign 
outlook should not be based on information provided by the rated entity without 
its consent and the publication of those ratings should take place only at the end of 
business of the trading venues and at least one hour before their opening. 
At first glance, this rule is designed to mitigate the risk of volatility of 
government debt that may harm the financial stability of the Eurozone and the 
economic policies of Member States in distress. However, the EU legislator 
                                                 
384 On 18 July 2014, ESMA published ‘Technical advice to the European Commission on the 
development of an EU creditworthiness assessment for sovereign debt’. In this report, ESMA 
underlined the need to ensure that (1) the rating process should be fully independent; (2) the 
review function responsible for the annual review of rating methodologies must be independent of 
the business lines which are responsible for credit rating agencies; (3) the access to pre-rating 
information should only be available to people involved in rating activities and all necessary steps 
should be taken to ensure this information is adequately protected; and (4) the sufficient resources 
should be available for the conduct of both a rigorous rating process as well as ongoing 
monitoring. 
385 The activities of CRAs with regard to sovereign credit risk assessments have been strongly 
questioned for their bad timing and for the fact that they lagged behind markets in their judgement. 
This means that CRAs provide a measure of risk rather than prognosis of the probability of 
default. See on this view Nicolas Véron and Guntram B. Wolff, ‘Rating Agencies and Sovereign 
Credit Risk Assessment’ in European Parliament, Directorate General for Internal Policies, Rating 
Agencies - Role and Influence of their Sovereign Credit Risk Assessment in the Euro Area, 
Monetary Dialogue December 2011, December 2011, 64. 
386 Article 8a(2) of Regulation (EU) No 462/2013. 
387 Article 8a(3) of Regulation (EU) No 462/2013. 
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missed the opportunity to reduce the powerful influence of CRAs by banning 
unsolicited sovereign ratings for EU Member States. It seems that the legislator 
adopted a ‘light touch approach’ instead of enacting strict rules to act as a 
constraint on rating agencies’ watch statements. The EU Regulation does not 
address the possibility of holding CRAs accountable for the consequences of their 
outlooks on sovereign bonds.388 
ESMA issued a report in which rating agencies were accused of exacerbating 
the sovereign debt crisis by publishing debt-rating downgrades of periphery and 
core EU States.389 In particular, ESMA revealed shortcomings in CRAs’ controls 
and resources and found deficiencies in the way that they manage the highly 
market-sensitive task of assigning ratings to government debt.390 The ESMA 
report can be considered a first attempt to restore the transparency of sovereign 
assessments and to address the weaknesses in the sovereign ratings process. 
Admittedly, the assessment of likelihood of government default is a 
challenging task for CRAs basically because sovereign debt contracts cannot be 
enforced by a third party and it is complicated to predict the willingness to pay in 
sovereign borrowing.391  
In point of fact, the sovereign entity cannot be dissolved, a forced liquidation 
of its assets is impossible, and its creditors cannot assume ownership.392 This 
implies that the instruments to deal with sovereign-debt crises in an orderly way 
are limited. In the case of private debt, the ultimate solution remains liquidating 
the borrower’s assets and, in the case of corporations, dissolving the organisation. 
In the case of sovereign debt, a procedure should be found to restructure the debt 
                                                 
388 For an academic commentary see Anil K Kashyapy and Natalia Kovrijnykh, ‘Who Should Pay 
for Credit Ratings and How?’ (2013) National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No 
18923. 
389 ESMA, ‘Credit Rating Agencies. Sovereign Ratings Investigation’, 2 December 2013, 3. 
390 Sam Fleming, ‘Rating agencies face fines threat after EU sovereign debt probe’ Financial 
Times (London, 2 December 2013).  
391 Rawi Abdelal, Capital Rules. The Construction of Global Finance (Cambridge MA: Harvard 
University Press 2007) 162-163. 
392 Lee C. Buchheit and G. Mitu Gulati, ‘Responsible Sovereign Lending and Borrowing’, 
UNCTAD Discussion Papers No 198, April 2010, 1. The authors argue that ‘the word sovereign 
connotes an entity that is not subject to external constraints, least of all the tiresome constraint of 
repaying borrowed money. Yet sovereigns borrow money all of the time and they pay it back most 
of the time’. 
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in an orderly fashion through negotiations with the creditors given that it is 
impossible to liquidate the debtor.393 
In the US, the Dodd-Frank Act recognizes the systemic importance of credit 
ratings and the reliance placed on CRAs activities as matters of national public 
interest.394 In particular, the Dodd-Frank Act imposes new rules with respect to 
CRAs’ public disclosure and, generally, to over-reliance on the credit ratings 
industry (by removing statutory references to credit ratings).395  
Section 931(5) of the Dodd-Frank Act states that the inaccuracy of credit 
ratings on the structured finance market ‘contributed significantly to the 
mismanagement of risks by financial institutions and investors, which in turn 
adversely impacted the health of the economy in the United States’.396 
Closer examination of the text suggests that, on the one hand, the Act does not 
provide any specific provisions on the regulation of sovereign ratings. On the 
other hand, it leaves the function of monitoring these ratings completely to the 
SEC. However, a more explicit reference to the accountability of sovereign 
ratings and to the disclosure of their methodologies’ criteria would have been 
desirable.  
It seems clear that the reforms implemented in the US securities markets do 
not attach great importance to the CRAs’ government credit risk assessment 
owing to the fact that the latter had less impact on US public debt during the 
2007-2009 financial crisis.397 
                                                 
393 Sovereign debt remains difficult to enforce because creditors’ ability to collect is limited by the 
fact that only assets located outside the sovereigns’ borders can be legally attached and countries 
tend to hold most of their assets within their borders. These elements imply that the instruments to 
deal with sovereign-debt crises in an orderly way are more limited than in the case of private debt, 
where the ultimate solution remains liquidating the borrower’s assets and, in the case of 
corporations, dissolving the organisation. See Rodrigo Olivares-Caminal, ‘Statutory Sovereign 
Debt Resolution Mechanisms’ in Rosa M. Lastra and Lee Bucheit (eds), Sovereign Debt 
Management (Oxford: OUP 2014) 333-335; Rodrigo Olivares-Caminal, ‘Litigation Aspects of 
Sovereign Debt’ in Rodrigo Olivares-Caminal, John Douglas, Randall Guynn, Alan Kornberg, 
Sarah Paterson, Dalvinder Singh and Hilary Stonefrost (eds), Debt Restructuring (Oxford: OUP 
2011) 389-391. 
394 Section 931(1), Title IX, Subtitle C of the Dodd-Frank Act “Improvements to the Regulation of 
Credit Rating Agencies”. 
395 Section 939, Title IX, Subtitle C of the Dodd-Frank Act “Removal of statutory references to 
credit ratings”. 
396 Section 931(4) of the Dodd-Frank Act states that ‘in certain activities, particularly in advising 
arrangers of structured financial products on potential ratings of such products, credit rating 
agencies face conflicts of interest that need to be carefully monitored and that therefore should be 
addressed explicitly in legislation in order to give clearer authority to the Securities and Exchange 
Commission’. 
397 S&P’s, ‘Special Report on the U.S. Rating Downgrade and its Global Effects’ (2011) 31 Credit 
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With these considerations in mind, it possible to argue that sovereign ratings 
play a useful role in fostering the stability and efficiency of the worldwide 
sovereign debt market. However, their use may have a dangerous influence on 
fragile economic policies—exacerbating the risk of volatility and facilitating the 
‘alarm effect’—that may turn into speculative attacks on the securities markets.398  
After considering the regulatory reforms on sovereign ratings activities 
introduced in the EU and US legislation and the main steps adopted for 
implementing the quality, independence, and transparency of the sovereign ratings 
process, the next section investigates the phenomenon of over-reliance on ratings 
and ventures proposals to make CRAs responsible for misrepresentation or 
detrimental reliance.  
 
2.11 Over-reliance on CRA ratings  
 
A primary source of over-reliance may be a misperception of what ratings 
represent. The observation that ‘the finance industry is grappling with the 
detrimental effects of the ratings regulation it already has’399 has to be seen in this 
context. 
Excessive reliance on inaccurate credit ratings of financial products 
(particularly structured finance instruments) has facilitated the spread of the recent 
financial turmoil. More specifically, the regulatory use of credit ratings 
increasingly depends on government acceptance rather than on the extent to which 
they provide real value to market participants. This means that ‘market discipline 
increasingly is being replaced by government discipline’.400  
                                                 
Week 31, 18-19. See also The Economist, ‘Wakey, wakey. Standard & Poor’s may not have said 
anything new. That’s no reason for American politicians to ignore it’, 20 April 2011. 
398 Joshua Aizenman, Mahir Binici and Michael M. Hutchison, ‘Credit Ratings and the Pricing of 
Sovereign Debt during the Euro Crisis’ (2013) National Bureau of Economic Research Working 
Paper No 19125, 2-3. 
399 Harold Furchtgott-Roth, Robert W. Hahn and Anne Layne-Farrar, ‘The law and economics of 
regulating ratings firms’ (2007) 3 Journal of Competition Law & Economics 1, 77-79. It is argued 
that in credit and bond ratings there is a clear market failure such as limited access to information 
or externalities; and the proposed legislative solution for bond ratings may not go far enough in 
removing previous regulatory failures, but would at least be a step in the right direction (at 92). 
400 Philippe Bergevin, ‘Addicted to Ratings: The Case for Reducing Governments’ Reliance on 
Credit Ratings’ (2010) C.D. Howe Institute Backgrounder Issue No 130 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1657881> accessed 22 May 2012, 1. 
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An example of government reliance on CRAs can be found in the ‘Talf 
Initiative’—the US Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility program401—in 
which rating agencies play the role of arbiters in determining eligible assets. 
Under the Talf Initiative, ‘regulators have given the rating agencies (…) the 
authority to determine to which category a particular bond belongs, by whatever 
method they see fit’.402 
Government use of CRAs has increased the practice of relying blindly on 
credit ratings’ internal models to assess credit risks. One scholar has noted that if 
credit ratings’ value rested only on their unique informational input and the 
reliability of this information, the failure of CRAs to provide accurate, up-to-date 
ratings would be sanctioned by market forces, acting on reputational 
incentives’.403 However, this is not the case because regulators have empowered 
CRAs by making it a requirement in many cases to securities transactions. The 
lower transparency and greater complexity in the securities markets ensured a 
heavy reliance by financial participants on rating agencies.404  
Governmental intrusion in rating activities could exacerbate excessive reliance 
on ratings particularly in cases where market participants can believe that these 
carry a governmental ‘seal of approval’. Many investors did rely on these ratings 
and considered them not only to be expert opinions but authorized seals of 
approval. The problem that regulatory intervention runs the risk of exacerbating 
excessive reliance on ratings seems evident—particularly because of the high 
incentives for investors to rely uncritically on ratings as a substitute for 
independent evaluation.405 Regulatory reliance on CRAs transformed these ‘media 
                                                 
401 On 25 November 2008, the Federal Reserve Board launched a credit facility programme (‘Talf 
initiative’). The ‘Talf’ was intended to assist the credit markets in accommodating the credit needs 
of consumers and small businesses by facilitating the issuance of asset-backed securities (ABS) 
and improving the market conditions for ABS more generally. 
402 Arturo Cifuentes, ‘Insight: Time we rated the bond graders’ Financial Times (London, 27 July 
2009). 
403 Amélie Champsaur, ‘The regulation of credit rating agencies in the US and the EU: recent 
initiatives and proposals’ (May 2005) Harvard Law School, Seminar in International Finance, 
LL.M. Paper, 30. It is explained that ‘in view of the discrepancy between reliance and reliability 
(what credit ratings are and what they should be or what the marketplace expect them to be) and 
the dangers of reliance per se, two concurring policy options would seem to make sense: 
increasing reliability of and decreasing reliance on credit ratings’ (at 35).  
404 Jonathan Katz, Emanuel Salinas and Constantinos Stephanou, ‘Credit Rating Agencies’ 
(October 2009) The World Bank Group Note No 8, 3. 
405 Sarah Pei Woo, ‘Stress before Consumption: A Proposal to Reform Agency Ratings’ (2012) 18 
European Law Journal 1, 77. The author observes that ‘it is difficult to reduce reliance on ratings 
by market participants generally, as references to ratings and ratings triggers pervade investment 
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opinions’ into a sort of official approval for companies needing access to the 
capital markets.  
The Basel Committee argues that a key concern in the financial crisis was the 
fact that market participants relied excessively on external ratings instead of 
conducting the necessary due diligence in order to understand the risks underlying 
the rated instrument.406 In this light, Basel II explicitly allowed banking regulators 
to permit banks to use credit ratings from approved CRAs in calculating their net 
capital reserve requirements.  
Reliance on external ratings could undermine incentives to conduct 
independent internal assessments of the credit quality of exposures. Such reliance 
on the ratings of the main rating firms—crystallised by the SEC and NRSROs—
raises barriers to entry and discourages innovation in the provision of bond 
creditworthiness information.  
The powerful effect of the regulators’ reliance on the judgements of CRAs is 
shown by the importance of their pronouncements in bond markets.407 It is worth 
considering that eliminating the regulatory dependence on credit ratings may be 
the best way to foster a competitive environment for the credit rating industry.408 
Regulators should simply stimulate investors not to use the same ratings and 
analysis. 
An issuer may demand a rating because investors need the rating to fulfil 
regulatory or other requirements, even if neither party believes that the rating is a 
high quality assessment of creditworthiness. In this respect, overdependence on 
ratings was a central component of the credit crisis.409 It is considered, however, 
that this shifts the emphasis away from the major failures of the credit ratings 
agencies in terms of the lax and opaque way they addressed the information 
asymmetries and conflicts of interests as between issuers and investors.  
                                                 
guidelines, swap documentation, loan agreements, collateral triggers, and other important 
counterparty documents’ (at 78). 
406 BCBS, ‘Strengthening the Resilience of the Banking Sector’ (2009) Consultative Document 
<http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs164.htm> accessed 24 May 2012, 55. 
407 Lawrence J. White, ‘The Credit Rating Agencies’ (2010) 24 Journal of Economic Perspectives 
2, 214. 
408 Rolf H. Weber and Aline Darbellay, ‘The regulatory use of credit ratings in bank capital 
requirement regulations’ (2008) 10 Journal of Banking Regulation 1, 10. 
409 Frank Partnoy, ‘Overdependence on Credit Ratings was a Primary Cause of the Crisis’ (2009) 
University of San Diego School of Law, Legal Studies Research Paper Series No 09-015, 17. 
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Further, these failures need to be seen in terms of ‘reputational value’ on 
financial markets, particularly when the misrepresentations in signalling default 
risks are taken into account. This emerged in previous corporate scandals such as 
Enron, Arthur Andersen, etc., the subprime defaults and most recently in 
connection with the EU sovereign debt crisis. A way to impose a restriction on 
rating agencies’ reliance is to expose them to liability for careless services.  
From a regulatory perspective, the FSB published a set of ‘Principles for 
Reducing Reliance on CRA Ratings’.410 This report applies the principles not only 
to the regulatory use of ratings, but also to a wider range of financial market 
activities and market participants—including central bank operations, investment 
mandates and private sector margin agreements.  
As stated by the FSB, ‘the CRA ratings in standards and regulations contribute 
significantly to market reliance on ratings. This is a cause of the ‘cliff effects’ 
during the recent financial crisis, through which CRA rating downgrades can 
amplify procyclicality and cause systemic disruptions’.411 In this respect, the 
phenomenon of ‘cliff effects’ is determined ‘when regulatory capital and 
investment portfolios are adjusted in response to rating downgrades’.412 
The FSB’s principles aim to reduce ‘mechanistic’ reliance on CRA ratings and 
establish stronger internal credit risk assessment practices instead. Specifically, 
the reliance on CRA ratings should be reduced in ‘standards, laws and 
regulations’ and in markets more generally.413 The FSB issued a report entitled 
‘Thematic Review on FSB Principles for Reducing Reliance on CRA Ratings’ 
where it is recommended that the key challenge to reduce reliance on CRA ratings 
is to develop alternative standards of creditworthiness and processes so that CRA 
ratings are no more than an input to credit risk assessment.414 In particular, the 
report underlines that ‘the FSB Principles do not imply that market participants 
                                                 
410 FSB, ‘Principles for Reducing Reliance on CRA Ratings’, 27 October 2010.   
411 ibid 1. 
412 Iain MacNeil, ‘Credit rating agencies: regulation and financial stability’ in Thomas Cottier, 
Rosa M. Lastra and Christian Tietje (eds), The Rule of Law in Monetary Affairs (Cambridge: CUP 
2014) 178. 
413 Pragyan Deb, Mark Manning, Gareth Murphy, Adrian Penalver and Aron Toth, ‘Whither the 
credit ratings industry?’ (March 2011) Bank of England, Financial Stability Paper No 9, 13-14. 
The authors observe that ‘any efforts to reduce reliance on CRA ratings should be supported by 
adequate transparency of issuer information, so as to permit private credit assessment by a wider 
range of market participants’ (at 17). 
414 FSB, ‘Thematic Review on FSB Principles for Reducing Reliance on CRA Ratings. Peer 
Review Report’, 12 May 2014, 5. 
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should avoid all use of CRA ratings, but that the use of CRA ratings is combined 
with exercise of their own judgement on creditworthiness’.415 
In this context, the UK Treasury Committee Report pointed out that ‘one 
possible way to decrease over-reliance is to increase investors’ knowledge about 
credit ratings’.416 Particularly, the Committee suggests that more information 
about the scope of ratings, how they are formulated and what information they use 
may better equip individuals to make their own judgments about the quality of a 
rating. 
At the European level, Regulation (EU) No 462/2013 introduced detailed rules 
in order to: (1) reduce financial institutions’ over-reliance on credit ratings417; (2) 
reduce European Supervisory Authorities’ and the European Systemic Risk 
Board’s over-reliance on credit ratings418; and (3) reduce Union law’s over-
reliance on credit ratings.419 These rules aim to reduce over-reliance on credit 
ratings by requiring financial institutions to strengthen their own credit risk 
assessment and not to rely ‘solely and mechanistically’ on external credit 
ratings.420 
In this context, the Commission published the Paper ‘EU Response to the 
Financial Stability Board (FSB) – EU Action Plan to reduce reliance on Credit 
                                                 
415 ibid 10. 
416 House of Commons Treasury Committee (note 239) 73. In a similar vein, see Nicolas Véron, 
‘Rating Agencies: An Information Privilege Whose Time Has Passed’ (2009) Bruegel Policy 
Contribution 2009/01, Briefing Paper for the European Parliament’s ECON Committee, 6. 
417 Article 5a of Regulation (EU) No 462/2013 where it is stated that credit institutions, investment 
firms and insurance undertakings, reinsurance undertakings, institutions for occupational 
retirement provision, management companies, investment companies, alternative investment fund 
managers and central counterparties ‘shall make their own credit risk assessment and shall not 
solely or mechanistically rely on credit ratings for assessing the creditworthiness of an entity or 
financial instrument’. 
418 Article 5b of Regulation (EU) No 462/2013 where it is provided that the European Supervisory 
Authorities (European Securities and Markets Authority, European Banking Authority and 
European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority) ‘shall not refer to credit ratings in their 
guidelines, recommendations and draft technical standards where such references have the 
potential to trigger sole or mechanistic reliance on credit ratings by the competent authorities, the 
sectoral competent authorities, the entities referred to in the first subparagraph of Article 4(1) or 
other financial market participants’. 
419 Article 5c of Regulation (EU) No 462/2013 where it is stated that ‘without prejudice to its right 
of initiative, the Commission shall continue to review whether references to credit ratings in Union 
law trigger or have the potential to trigger sole or mechanistic reliance on credit ratings by the 
competent authorities, the sectoral competent authorities, the entities referred to in the first 
subparagraph of Article 4(1) or other financial market participants with a view to deleting all 
references to credit ratings in Union law for regulatory purposes by 1 January 2020, provided that 
appropriate alternatives to credit risk assessment have been identified and implemented’. 
420 Article 5c of Regulation (EU) No 462/2013 provides, inter alia, for the removal of any 
reference to credit ratings for regulatory purposes by 1 January 2020. 
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Rating Agency (CRA) Ratings’421, which adopts a multi-layer approach involving 
EU regulation on credit rating agencies, sectoral legislation in financial services, 
and actions by European Supervisory Authorities (ESMA, EBA and EIOPA) and 
by national competent authorities.  
In the US, the Dodd-Frank Act has increased accountability for CRAs while 
attempting to improve SEC oversight and make it easier for investors to sue rating 
agencies in private litigation.422 The Act reduces over-reliance on credit ratings 
but it does not eliminate regulatory uses of credit ratings. It has been noted that 
‘the SEC and federal regulators, as well as state and local lawmakers, have the 
ratings embedded in many of their rules—effectively requiring investors to trust 
the ratings’.423  
Consequently, reliance always involves some risk to the relying party. The 
reliance measure puts the injured party in as good a position as if the contract had 
never been made. Reliance in ratings decisions may turn out to be a wise decision, 
if nothing goes wrong and the transaction is executed, but it will turn out to be 
unwise if something prevents the deal from going through.424 Similarly, reliance 
on a CRA’s evaluation will bind the CRA only if the evaluation is one for which 
the CRA should induce reliance on the part of the issuer.425  
In this context, the US case law seems more inclined to treat the issuer’s 
reliance as binding if its reliance appeared to increase the expected value of the 
transaction, so that even the CRA would have wanted to be committed.426 A court 
could reject expectation damages unless it can estimate them with reasonable 
accuracy. This will be the case where there is insufficient evidence or where the 
expectation damages are too indefinite to provide an estimate of how much loss 
the claimant has suffered. In assessing damages, ‘courts should balance deterrence 
                                                 
421 European Commission, Directorate General Internal Market and Services, ‘EU Response to the 
Financial Stability Board (FSB) – EU Action Plan to reduce reliance on Credit Rating Agency 
(CRA) Ratings’, Staff Working Paper, 16 May 2014, 4. 
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424 ibid 502.  
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factors against the financial burden imposed on CRAs and the risk of market 
failure in the market for CRA services’.427  
It can be claimed that the market’s reliance on a small number of CRAs 
presents a difficult policy problem. In these terms, it seems better to increase the 
disclosure process and transparency in the ratings activities. In this context, in 
Europe a positive response has been provided by the regulatory framework 
established at the EU level. 
After providing an analysis of the major problems of over-reliance on credit 
ratings, the next section considers the question of wrong incentives in the CRA 
market. 
 
2.12 The question of wrong incentives in the CRA market 
CRAs depend to a large extent on the ‘issuer-pays’ business model, i.e. on 
revenues provided by their clients. Such dependence constitutes a wrong incentive 
for CRAs. To explain the expansion of this business relationship, there are, on the 
one hand, the interests of issuers in obtaining high ratings (in order to lower the 
cost of capital and render marketable debt instruments) and, on the other, the 
interests of CRAs to accumulate reputational capital in the financial markets. 
If CRAs provide a public good to the financial market (ratings), investors 
should be considered ‘free-riders’ in respect of that information, so that the wrong 
incentive springs in principle from the intention of rating agencies to make profits 
by selling valuable ratings to unscrupulous issuers.428 This problem could be in 
evidence in the structured finance sector where CRAs have an interest in 
maintaining their market share while companies have an interest in ensuring their 
access to capital. In particular, ratings of structured products involve ancillary 
services such as joint assessment of the composition of financial instruments and 
close collaboration with CRAs’ staff in the risk analysis. However, as Frost has 
observed, it is very difficult to prove inappropriate behaviour between credit 
                                                 
427 Stephen Harper (note 422) 1971. The author argues that ‘this tier-based system with liability 
caps should be adopted because it offers an appropriate model for deterring CRA misconduct 
without bankrupting CRAs’.  
428 The concept of ‘free-riding’ was elaborated within the theory of public goods and it is defined 
as a situation in which an individual may be able to obtain the benefits of a good without 
contributing to the cost. See the classical work of James M. Buchanan, The Demand and Supply of 
Public Goods (Chicago: Rand-McNally, 1968). See also E.C. Pasour Jr., ‘The Free Rider as a 
Basis for Government Intervention’ (1981) 5 The Journal of Libertarian Studies 4, 453.  
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agencies and issuers on the account of discretional rating methodologies used by 
CRAs.429 
Although the practice of offering ancillary services raises many concerns, the 
real problem is the quality of the ratings process and the ongoing review of 
outcomes.430 This aspect is relevant because the perception of market participants 
that ratings are used to generate lucrative business could represent a wrong 
incentive for the CRA industry. The interference as between CRAs and issuers 
underlines the lack of independency of agencies in the formulation of ratings and 
casts doubt on the accuracy of rating models.431  
Reliance on CRAs’ evaluations is determined by two main factors: (1) the 
limited competition in the ratings market, and (2) the absence of reputational 
deterrence. These factors constitute negative incentives for credit rating agencies 
in so far as they are not under any pressure to devote more effort (i.e. care) to their 
activities.  
It should be noted that investors place great reliance on credit ratings not only 
because they trust leading CRAs but also because they lack the competence to 
understand the quality of ratings.432 Of course, investors find it difficult to monitor 
the ratings methodologies—or the criteria used by CRAs—and they also find it 
difficult to constrain the agencies to update their models.  
The subprime mortgage crisis revealed that CRAs were reluctant to 
incorporate new information (e.g. changes in the track records) in their 
quantitative models, while they followed the market by assessing outdated 
historical data.433  
                                                 
429 Carol Ann Frost, ‘Credit Rating Agencies in Capital Markets: A Review of Research Evidence 
on Selected Criticisms of the Agencies’ (2007) 22 Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance 3, 
480.  
430 Kee H. Chung, Carol Ann Frost and Myungsun Kim, ‘Characteristics and Information Value of 
Credit Watches’ (2012) 41 Financial Management 1, 120-121.  
431 John Flood, ‘Rating, Dating, and the Informal Regulation and the Formal Ordering of Financial 
Transactions: Securitisations and Credit Rating Agencies’ in Michael B. Likosky (ed.), Privatising 
Development (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2005) 161. 
432 Angus Duff and Sandra Einig, ‘Understanding credit ratings quality: Evidence from UK debt 
market participants’ (2009) 41 The British Accounting Review 2, 110. The authors argue that 
‘ratings quality could be similarly described as reliant on two matters: the competence of the CRA 
(i.e., their ability to accurately assess the probability of default on a security); and second their 
independence (i.e., willingness to downgrade an issuer’s security, or issue a lower rating than the 
issuer anticipated)’. 
433 Gerard Caprio Jr., Aslı Demirgüç-Kunt and Edward J. Kane, ‘The 2007 Meltdown in 
Structured Securitization: Searching for Lessons, not Scapegoats’ (2010) 25 The World Bank 
Research Observer 1, 134-135. 
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Paradoxically, the market relied on rating models for structured finance 
valuation mainly because of the complexity of financial instruments and on 
account of the high profits that well-rated products may secure for issuers.434 By 
contrast, CRAs are aware that market participants are not able to assess for 
themselves the value of the debt securities and use ratings as a universally 
accepted benchmark. For this reason, the CRAs tend to ignore the risks of 
financial losses of third counterparties.435  
Whilst, on the one hand firms have strong incentives to maintain or improve 
their ratings, on the other hand, CRAs have strong incentives to adjust for bond 
issuers’ opportunistic behaviours owing to their reputation concerns.436 As a 
result, the insufficient loan-level disclosure by originators and information 
asymmetries caused the over-reliance on CRAs that played a crucial role in the 
2007-2009 financial crisis.437 
At this point, it is possible to draw a first conclusion: misalignment of interests 
between investors and issuers, insufficient disclosure of rating agencies and 
insufficient attention to the quality of ratings have created the ideal ground for 
spreading blind reliance on CRAs. 
It can be observed that market discipline—with its weak constraints favours 
the conditions for the increasing role of rating agencies. Further, regulatory over-
reliance leads CRAs to give incorrect and biased credit ratings in the debt 
securities segment. However, the main problem stems from the wrong incentives 
provided by regulators and market participants that follow passively the practices 
of credit rating agencies.438  
Having provided an analysis of market incentives in the CRA industry and the 
opportunistic behaviours of rating agencies, the next section deals with the 
                                                 
434 Michael J. Brennan, Julia Hein and Ser-Huang Poon, ‘Tranching and Rating’ (2009) 15 
European Financial Management 5, 892. 
435 Gary Gorton, ‘The subprime panic’ (2009) 15 European Financial Management 1, 38. 
436 Boochun Jung, Naomi Soderstrom and Yanhua Sunny Yang, ‘Earnings Smoothing Activities of 
Firms to Manage Credit Ratings’ (2013) 30 Contemporary Accounting Research 2, 649. In 
particular, the authors observe that ‘because credit ratings have significant cost implications for 
companies, including the cost of future borrowing and stock and bond valuations, managers have 
incentives to improve or maintain their credit ratings’. 
437 Hans von Reden, ‘Regulation of securitised products post the financial crisis’ (2013) 2 UCL 
Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 1,116.  
438 Vasiliki Skreta and Laura Veldkamp, ‘Ratings shopping and asset complexity: A theory of 
ratings inflation’ (2009) 56 Journal of Monetary Economics 5, 691. The authors argue that ‘not 
only does the nature of the good being sold affect the information available about it, but also that 
the nature of the evaluated products may change to game the ratings system, possibly to disastrous 
effect’. 
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question of free-market interference in terms of facilitating a systematic 
dependence in ratings and favouring the artificially high demand for highly rated 
financial instruments. 
 
2.13 Considerations about the free-market interference on the part of credit 
ratings 
 
Ratings are mainly considered value tools for their purpose of labelling the 
risk of financial products whether their use ensures high profits or gains the access 
to the capital. Otherwise they can be considered speculative or aggressive tools in 
case of the inefficient signalling of the risk of default of firms.439 
It is curious that, on the one hand, financial markets blame the activities of 
CRAs for their recent failures and, on the other, encourage those actors to play the 
role of arbiters of debt securities by endorsing rating references in the regulations. 
A possible reason lies in the direct impact of ratings in the structure of the 
financial system and in the capacity of CRAs to control access to funding. 
Ratings have direct implications for the level of risk of securities as well as a 
direct involvement ‘with the assessment of the capital charge imposed on 
financial institutions’.440 Another reason lies in the CRAs’ ability to exacerbate 
the sensitivity of market participants to changes in credit ratings. It seems 
contradictory to identify the credit rating agencies as one of the most significant 
contributors to the 2007-2009 financial crisis when market behaviour amplified 
their role by recognising them as one of the most important forecasters in the 
capital markets.441 It can be argued that the CRAs’ shortcomings are determined 
by the need of market participants to certify the quality of their financial products.  
It does not matter whether the raters—in conflicts of interests—assess the 
securities positively, upgrade the creditworthiness of sovereign debt or ensure 
high ratings for the assets of issuers. However, what are the effects if the raters in 
conflicts of interest react too slowly, neglect relevant information or provide 
negative assessments of the profitability of the financial assets, downgrade the 
soundness of government debt or exacerbate the risk of default of financial firms? 
                                                 
439 Horatio M. Morgan, ‘Credit rating agencies and regulatory reform: the case of Moody’s 
Investors Services’ (2011) 26 Journal of International Banking Law and Regulation 8, 389-390. 
440 Niamh Moloney, EU Securities and Financial Markets Regulation (3rd edn, Oxford: OUP 
2014) 634. 
441 European Central Bank, ‘Credit Rating Agencies: Developments and Policy Issues’ (May 2009) 
Monthly Bulletin, 107.  
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In this case, market participants could raise concerns about the inaccuracy of the 
ratings process, the lack of timeliness in issuing ratings and the lax assessments of 
credit risk.442 It can be claimed that the credit market crisis was not generated by 
independent ratings errors or by involuntary inflated ratings.443 
The assumption behind the above considerations is as follows: the possibility 
of flawed ratings is more likely when CRAs are pressured by the market’s need to 
have reliable information about the riskiness of investments.444 In addition, the 
possibility of distorted ratings is more likely when CRAs are pushed by the 
issuers’ high fees. This means that CRAs cannot be depicted as ‘angels’ in the 
securities markets but also cannot be described as ‘devils’ among investors.445 
The rating agency reforms, the Dodd-Franck Act and the EU Regulations, 
have attempted to solve these issues but fail to give a convincing answer to the 
following fundamental question: to what extent does market behaviour contribute 
to CRAs’ reliability and is it the real shortcoming in the ratings industry?  
The important point is that market discipline has proved unable to reduce 
over-reliance on ratings activities.446 In particular, market forces alone have failed 
to reduce the regulatory use of credit ratings and this has contributed to investors’ 
undue reliance on ratings and favoured artificially high demand for highly rated 
financial instruments.447 Market incentives alone seem to be inadequate to foster 
the accuracy of ratings and to keep the effectiveness of CRAs’ action aligned with 
investor protection.  
The crux of matter is that CRAs activities could face potential systemic risk 
because of the scant incentive to perform their screening accurately and because 
of the equally scant incentive for policymakers, institutional investors and global 
                                                 
442 Paula Hill and Robert Faff, ‘The Market Impact of Relative Agency Activity in the Sovereign 
Ratings Market’ (2010) 37 Journal of Business Finance & Accounting 9-10, 1310. 
443 Emily Lee, ‘Basel III: post-financial crisis international financial regulatory reform’ (2013) 28 
Journal of International Banking Law and Regulation 11, 441. 
444 Glen Biglaiser, Karl De Rouen Jr. and Candace C. Archer, ‘Politics, Early Warning Systems, 
and Credit Rating Agencies’ (2011) 7 Foreign Policy Analysis 1, 72. The authors observe that 
‘from a government’s point of view, obtaining a rating is a way to assure international investors 
about the safety of their investments’. 
445 Carlo R. W. de Meijer and Michelle H. W. Saaf, ‘The credit crunch and credit rating agencies: 
Are they really striving towards more transparency?’ (2008) 1 Journal of Securities Law, 
Regulation & Compliance 4, 332. The authors pointed out that ‘while credit ratings can be good 
indicators as to the performance, risk and relative safety of products over a period of time, they 
must not be considered to be the sole guide for selecting one’s investments’. 
446 FSB, ‘Thematic Review on FSB Principles for Reducing Reliance on Credit Rating Agency 
Ratings. Interim Report’, 29 August 2013. 6. 
447 Mark Zelmer, ‘Reforming the Credit-Rating Process’ (2007) Financial System Review 2, 56.  
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regulators to address the threats stemming from credit rating agencies.448 
However, there is no consensus that CRAs have gained a ‘special position’ in the 
financial markets because of wrong incentives owing to free-market 
interference.449  
CRAs have the power to influence a product’s value and pressure the 
expectations of market participants, but this power finds fertile ground in the 
over-reliance, i.e. overdependence, of investors. As Manns observed, ‘the ongoing 
influence of the leading rating agencies underscores the fact that markets continue 
to value their opinions’.450 This scenario leads to the following conclusion: in 
order to avoid failures on the part of CRAs, it is necessary that these agencies 
should resume their role of promoting financial awareness, but this can become a 
difficult task if market participants do not stop to rely to ratings.451 In this way, 
credit rating agencies will continue to be criticized for their actions that are 
fundamentally convenient for issuers and investors. 
After providing an analysis of the governance of the ratings industry by 
examining the problems of conflicts of interest, the disclosure regime and the 
limited competition of CRAs, and discussing the role of market discipline for 
reducing the systemic role of CRAs by considering its potential threat for the 
stability of securities markets, the next chapter examines the regulatory 
framework of CRAs. 
 
 
 
                                                 
448 Steven Dreibelbis and Jonathan Breazeale, ‘Rating the analysis in the current recession: a 
review of Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s’ (2012) 11 Academy of Banking Studies Journal 1, 67 
where it is noted that the US government protects the main CRAs by reducing the regulation even 
though CRAs were accused of issuing faulty ratings. 
449 Amy K. Rodhes, ‘The role of the SEC in the regulation of the rating agencies: well-placed 
reliance or free-market interference?’ (1996) 20 Seton Hall Legislative Journal 2, 295-296. The 
author argues that ‘…in facing competition from other rating agencies and security analysts, a 
rating agency has strong market incentives to assign credible ratings in order to maintain its 
reputation’ (at 296).  
450 Jeffrey Manns, ‘Downgrading Rating Agency Reform’ (2013) 81 George Washington Law 
Review 3, 756. 
451 Tracy Alloway and Anjli Raval, ‘Blackstone rental bond gets triple A rating’ Financial Times 
(London, 23 October 2013), where an unexpected triple A credit rating was reported for a new 
bond deal and it was stated that ‘rating agencies had been slow to back the new rental bonds given 
there is little data to demonstrate historical cash flows and costs’. 
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Chapter Three  
The Regulatory Framework of Credit Rating Agencies 
           
 
3.1 The International approach 
This chapter examines the legal framework of CRAs, in particular the 
intervention of global regulators and the legislative reforms adopted in the US, the 
UK and the EU in the aftermath of the sub-prime mortgage crisis and the 
subsequent credit crunch. It also considers the major weaknesses of these reforms 
and suggests proposals aimed at enhancing the current regulatory system.  
The focus on rating agencies reflects long-standing difficulties in controlling 
conflicts-of-interest risk in the financial markets, and particularly in ‘gatekeeping’ 
sectors. Over the past decades, CRAs were criticized for their failure to foresee 
the difficulties of the Asian debt crisis in 1997 and to anticipate the collapses of 
big companies such as Enron, WorldCom and Parmalat at the beginning of the 
2000s. These corporate scandals put the rating agencies and other ‘gatekeepers’ 
notably, auditors, in the spotlight of international debate and raised serious 
concerns about their performance in the financial markets.  
Several initiatives have been undertaken as a result of the global consensus 
about the need to establish an adequate normative framework for CRAs.452 The 
shortcomings of CRAs raised questions as to whether their lack of accountability 
could lead to persistent gaps in capital markets.453 During the 2007-2009 financial 
crisis and sovereign debt crisis (in particular the 2011-2012 Greek crisis) CRAs 
failed to provide adequate disclosure and transparency of their ratings 
methodologies. This led to the perception of CRAs as being virtually immune 
from responsibility to market participants. 
                                                 
452 European Securities Markets Expert Group, ‘Role of Credit Rating Agencies’, ESME’s Report 
to the European Commission, June 2008. See also Bank for International Settlements, Committee 
on the Global Financial System, ‘The role of ratings in structured finance: issues and 
implications’, January 2005. 
453 It should be noted that ‘accountability can be defined as an obligation owed by one person (the 
accountable) to another (the accountee) according to which the former must give account of, 
explain and justify his actions or decisions against criteria of some kind, and take responsibility for 
any fault or damage’. See Rosa M. Lastra and Heba Shams, ‘Public Accountability in the Financial 
Sector’, in Eilis Ferran and Charles Goodhart (eds), Regulating Financial Services and Markets in 
the Twenty First Century (Oxford: Oxford Hart Publishing 2001) 165-188.   
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The regulatory response to these failures was to consider the rating agencies as 
influential players in the financial sectors. Initial steps towards global attention on 
CRAs were taken in the direction of heightening the importance of CRAs as 
reputational gatekeepers and sources of quality control. As a result, CRAs were 
incorporated into the regulatory agenda of governments and legislators.454  
In this respect, among the G-20 leaders there was a strong consensus that ‘all 
CRAs whose ratings are used for regulatory purposes should be subject to a 
regulatory monitoring regime’.455 However, the international approach at that time 
was characterized by soft regulatory measures, such as guidelines and 
recommendations, and by ‘pass the parcel’ policies.456 For instance, IOSCO 
initiated its regulatory efforts by assessing the quality and integrity of the rating 
process and by developing a set of principles that helped regulators to improve 
CRAs’ activity.  
Rating agencies have come under close scrutiny owing to concern about their 
failure to convey risks in structured finance products, and related concerns as to 
the competence and conflict-of-interest risks to which rating agencies are 
exposed.457 In this context, ‘the regulatory and oversight programmes that have 
emerged worldwide as a result of the financial crisis have a degree of convergence 
that is unique in financial regulation’.458 The attention that regulators have 
dedicated to the ratings’ market was stepped up in the aftermath of the 2007-2009 
financial crisis.  
                                                 
454 Group of Twenty (G-20), ‘Communiqué Meeting of Ministers and Governors’, São Paulo, 
Brazil, 8-9 November 2008, 2. It was stated that the credit rating agencies should be recognized as 
systemically important institutions and should be covered by proper oversight. This statement was 
reinforced in the 2008 Washington Summit, where G-20 leaders stressed the importance of taking 
action with respect to the governance of CRAs and in order to ensure that they meet the highest 
standards of the international organization of securities regulators. At the 2010 Toronto Summit, 
G-20 leaders underlined the need to work on reducing the reliance on external ratings, while at the 
Seoul Summit held in November 2010 the leaders firmly recommitted to work in an internationally 
consistent and non-discriminatory manner to strengthen the regulation and supervision of CRAs. 
455 See the G-20 Declaration on Strengthening the Financial System, London Summit, 2 April 
2009, 6. The leaders declared that they had ‘agreed on more effective oversight of the activities of 
Credit Rating Agencies, as they are essential market participants’. 
456 Julia Black, ‘Gatekeepers’, Lecture presented at the London School of Economics and Political 
Science during the LL.M. course in Regulation of Financial Markets, 27 February 2009.  
457 Niamh Moloney, ‘Reform or revolution? The financial crisis, EU financial markets law, and the 
European Securities and Markets Authority’ (2011) 60 International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 2, 525. 
458 Raquel García Alcubilla and Javier Ruiz del Pozo, Credit Rating Agencies on the Watch List: 
Analysis of European Regulation (Oxford: OUP 2012) 259. 
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A relevant regulatory initiative taken at a global level was the publication in 
2008 of a report prepared by the former Financial Stability Forum (today known 
as the Financial Stability Board)459 in which a set of measures for assessing the 
role and uses of credit ratings was proposed.460 In particular, the report contained 
a set of recommendations designed to increase the quality of the rating process 
and manage conflicts of interest related to the ‘issuer-pays’ model. The report 
focused on the deficiencies of CRAs in the area of structured finance products. 
The weaknesses of the business model of rating agencies were implicated on the 
back of the poor performance showed by them during the subprime mortgage 
bubble.461  
Following this report, the FSF issued follow-up documents reviewing progress 
in the implementation of the recommendations and the ongoing efforts carried out 
by national authorities and international bodies in order to enhance the 
supervision of CRAs.462  
In 2010, the FSB published an important paper that fixed high-level principles 
for reducing reliance on CRAs ratings in standards, laws and regulations.463 This 
paper followed the report to G20 Finance Ministers and Governors issued to 
reinforce the need to work on reducing the reliance on external ratings.464 
The principles contained in the 2010 Report aim to: (1) work as a catalyst 
towards effecting a significant change in existing rating practices; (2) tend 
mechanistic reliance by market participants; and (3) establish stronger internal 
credit risk assessment practices instead. However, the principles set out broad 
objectives to be implemented by regulators through incisive and specific actions. 
                                                 
459 The FSB has been established to coordinate at the international level the work of national 
financial authorities and international standard setting bodies and to develop and promote the 
implementation of effective regulatory, supervisory financial policies. 
460 Financial Stability Forum, ‘Report on Enhancing Market and Institutional Resilience’, 7 April 
2008. 
461 ibid 4. The Report underlines the importance of supervision and oversight of CRAs’ activity 
and advises agencies to: (1) implement the revised IOSCO Code of Conduct Fundamentals for 
Credit Rating Agencies to manage conflicts of interest in rating structured products and improve 
the quality of the rating process; and (2) differentiate ratings on structured credit products from 
those on bonds and expand the information they provide.  
462 FSF, ‘Report of the Financial Stability Forum on Enhancing market and Institutional 
Resilience. Follow-up on Implementation’, 10 October 2008; ‘Report of the Financial Stability 
Forum on Enhancing market and Institutional Resilience. Update on Implementation’, 2 April 
2009. 
463 FSB, ‘Principles for Reducing Reliance on CRA Ratings’, 27 October 2010. 
464 FSB, ‘Reducing Reliance on CRA Ratings. Report to G20 Finance Ministers and Governors’, 
14 October 2010. 
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The principles were endorsed by the G-20 leaders in November 2010 and 
represent a significant step towards reducing over-reliance on CRAs’ ratings.465 
The 2010-2012 sovereign debt crisis has raised questions as to the role of 
credit rating agencies in the financial markets. As a result, the accuracy of credit 
outlook and sovereign ratings behaviour came under the microscope.466  
In 2012, the FSB published a far reaching document that contains proposals 
that are designed to: (1) reduce mechanistic reliance on CRA ratings through 
standards, laws and regulations; and (2) promote and, where needed, require that 
financial institutions strengthen and disclose information on their own credit risk 
assessment approaches as a replacement for mechanistic reliance on CRA 
ratings.467 At the same time, IOSCO issued two documents that focus on: (1) 
internal controls and safeguards against conflicts of interest468; and (2) 
establishing and operating supervisory colleges for rating agencies.469 The 
documents were published to address the existing risks that CRAs faced in terms 
of business operation and internal governance.  
The ‘soft law’ approach adopted for CRAs proved to be incapable of 
addressing the major problems of rating agencies.470 This means that the global 
actions undertaken by international regulators did not have the desired effects of 
ensuring the reliability and integrity of the rating business.  
It is paradoxical that ‘neither IOSCO nor any other international body is 
currently in a position to determine whether or not a given CRA does, in fact, 
comply with its own code of conduct in the manner in which its public statements 
indicate’.471  
                                                 
465 FSB, ‘Overview of Progress in the Implementation of the G20 Recommendations for 
Strengthening Financial Stability. Report of the Financial Stability Board to G20 Leaders’, 4 
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crucial importance in the financial markets, reflecting the interdependence of public and private 
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The system of best practices in the ratings market cannot be considered a valid 
option for regulating and supervising CRAs. Self-regulation and market discipline 
have not worked because they have proved to be unsatisfactory both prior and 
during the financial crisis.472 In this respect, it is easy to evoke Greenspan’s 
famous lament ‘[t]hose of us who have looked to the self-interest of lending 
institutions to protect shareholders’ equity, myself included, are in a state of 
shocked disbelief’.473 
If CRAs’ activities are global in nature, a comprehensive global rulebook and 
supervisory cooperation would, therefore, lead to more effective regulation with 
less risk of inaccurate ratings. It has been argued that ‘a global principles-based 
rulebook (preferably based on the IOSCO Code) would effectively address the 
issue of conflicts of interest in the rating of structured finance products’.474  
The adoption of a single set of rules for CRAs and common supervisory 
standards should help regulators to implement effective oversight and 
enforcement mechanisms.475 Although the task force launched by the global 
regulators produced significant results, the 2007-2009 global financial crisis has 
demonstrated that a more explicit reference to a hard law regime and legally 
binding measures would have been desirable. Hard law is binding in its coercive 
action and enforcement is the key element in distinguishing between hard and soft 
law. In order to promote accountability for CRAs, a robust legal and institutional 
framework, as well as a comprehensive and consistent approach, is needed. 
However, the powerful role of these market participants poses new challenges for 
regulators and supervisory authorities alike.  
After providing a brief analysis of the recent international regulatory approach 
towards CRAs, the next section illustrates the early initiatives adopted by IOSCO 
to enhance the regulation of ratings. 
                                                 
document affirms that ‘because the IOSCO CRA Code is viewed as the international consensus 
regarding the regulatory issues stemming from the activities of CRAs and the processes by which 
CRAs develop credit ratings, the IOSCO CRA Code can serve (and is serving) as a template for 
regulation of CRAs’. 
472 Piero Cinquegrana, ‘The Reform of the Credit Rating Agencies: A Comparative Perspective’, 
European Capital Markets Institute Policy Brief No 12, February 2009, 6.  
473 Alan Greenspan, Testimony delivered at the House Committee on Oversight and Government 
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474 Tobias Johansson, ‘Regulating credit rating agencies: The issue of conflicts of interest in the 
rating of structured finance products’ (2010) 12 Journal of Banking Regulation 1, 13. 
475 SIFMA, ‘Recommendations of the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association 
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 108 
3.1.1 The 2004 IOSCO Code: enforcement and ‘comply or explain’ model 
It is generally considered that IOSCO plays the role of both leader and 
follower with regard to the improved regulation of CRAs.476  
In the aftermath of the corporate governance scandals such as Enron and 
WorldCom, the IOSCO Technical Committee formed a Task Force to examine 
certain issues regarding the role CRAs play in securities markets.477 The working 
group evaluated the disclosure system of rating agencies taking into account the 
questions of conflicts of interests and limited competition. 
The outcomes of this activity were endorsed in the 2003 IOSCO Report. This 
contains a set of principles for securities regulators, rating agencies and others 
wishing to articulate the terms and conditions under which CRAs operate.478 The 
document focuses on the: (1) quality and integrity of the rating process; (2) 
independence and conflicts of interest; (3) transparency and timeliness of ratings 
disclosure; and (4) confidential information. 
This report is accompanied by a “Statement of Principles Regarding the 
Activities of Credit Rating Agencies” (‘Principles’), which sets out 
recommendations for CRAs with the purpose of fostering investor protection and 
market transparency.479 The Statement stresses that the Principles do not set forth 
a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach, but state high-level objectives which ratings 
agencies, regulators, issuers and other market participants should strive to achieve 
in order to improve the fairness, efficiency and transparency of the securities 
markets.480 
In 2004, IOSCO issued a consultation draft of the Code Fundamentals481, a 
first step towards the publication of more prescriptive final “Code of Conduct 
Fundamentals for Credit Rating Agencies” (‘2004 Code of Conduct’).482 This 
2004 Code of Conduct was conceived to provide a set of practical measures to be 
                                                 
476 Roberta S. Karmel, ‘IOSCO’s Response to the Financial Crisis’ (2012) 37 The Journal of 
Corporation Law 4, 874. The author observes that ‘when national interests are at stake, securities 
regulators follow those interests rather than IOSCO directives’. 
477 The Task Force drafted a questionnaire and circulated it among its members in order to obtain a 
better understanding of how CRAs operate in different IOSCO jurisdictions. 
478 IOSCO, ‘Report on the Activities of Credit Rating Agencies’, September 2003. 
479 IOSCO, ‘Statement of Principles Regarding the Activities of Credit Rating Agencies’, 25 
September 2003. 
480 ibid 1. 
481 IOSCO, ‘Code of Conduct Fundamentals for Credit Rating Agencies. A Consultation Report of 
the Chairmen’s Task Force of the Technical Committee’, October 2004. 
482 IOSCO, ‘Code of Conduct Fundamentals for Credit Rating Agencies’, December 2004, 2. 
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used as a guide to implementing the objectives underlying the Principles. The 
2004 Code of Conduct addresses the following areas: (1) the quality and integrity 
of rating process; (2) the independence of CRAs and avoidance of conflicts of 
interest; and (3) the responsibilities to the investing public and issuers.483 It 
includes rules of both a prohibiting and preventative nature as well as general 
requirements specifically intended to ensure either company or employee 
independence. 
In this respect, the 2004 Code of Conduct’s attractiveness has been said to lie 
in the fact that it is flexible and lends itself to adoption by CRAs varying in size, 
rating methodologies, and business models, and provides for moderate regulatory 
oversight without the employment of costly and burdensome formal regulatory 
oversight.484 
Despite the fact that the main objective of the 2004 Code of Conduct was to 
promote investor protection by safeguarding the integrity of the rating process, the 
rules were not designed to be rigid or formulaic.485 They were instead designed to 
offer CRAs a degree of flexibility as to how these measures are incorporated into 
the individual codes of conduct of the CRAs themselves.  
IOSCO allowed each jurisdiction to decide autonomously the means of giving 
effect to the Principles, without aiming to impose or endorse any particular 
regulatory requirements regarding CRAs.486  
The Principles and the 2004 Code of Conduct do not constitute legally binding 
obligations and are mainly based on soft law mechanisms and voluntary 
compliance. Nonetheless, one observer finds that ‘the Code is an exercise in 
prescriptive regulation that takes direct aim at CRAs and seeks to inform both its 
internal governance and measures to maintain objectivity of ratings’.487 
IOSCO requires CRAs to publish how each provision of the 2004 Code of 
Conduct has been implemented by the respective CRA, and disclose the reasons 
                                                 
483 The measure 2.5 of the IOSCO Code of Conduct advises that ‘the CRA should separate, 
operationally and legally, its credit-rating business and analysts from any other business of the 
CRA, including consulting businesses that may present a conflict of interest’. 
484 Peter Yeoh, ‘Self-Regulation, Regulation, Co-Regulation: The Credit Rating Industry Case’ 
(2013) Journal of Business Law 2, 192. 
485 IOSCO (note 482) 3. 
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Agencies’ (2012) 44 Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 3, 884. 
487 Chris Brummer and Rachel Loko, ‘The New Politics of Transatlantic Credit Rating Agency 
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for non-publication if this is not forthcoming. The 2004 Code of Conduct adopts 
the ‘comply or explain’ model in the sense that compliance is not mandatory and 
any deviations are not presumed to constitute non-implementation of the 2004 
Code of Conduct’s mandates.488 It has been noted that ‘the essence of comply or 
explain principle is that compliance with the codes is not mandatory, but that 
disclosure relating to compliance is’.489  
One can argue that this approach leaves market participants completely self-
regulated through principles and right behaviours. While the 2004 Code of 
Conduct can be considered to be an initial experiment with enforcement, the 
workability of its provisions depends on CRAs themselves implementing effective 
enforcement mechanisms. There is, of course, no guarantee that this will happen 
given the absence of a monitoring agent.  
It has been observed that ‘the effectiveness of soft laws, like the 2004 Code of 
Conduct, can be effectively enhanced when market users with good reasons to 
enforce deviations exert appropriate pressures by withdrawing business or support 
from those CRAs with serious ratings reputation problems’.490 
The failure of CRAs to prevent and effectively handle the 2007 subprime 
mortgage crisis, the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008, as well as the rapid 
spread of structured finance ratings (mortgage-backed securities and collateralised 
debt obligations) determined a radical change in the self-regulatory regime 
introduced by the 2004 Code of Conduct.491  
These factors raised many concerns about the conduct and efficacy of rating 
agencies but most importantly revealed the high reliance on the judgement of 
CRAs even when they were manifestly inaccurate and exhibited poor diligence. 
                                                 
488 Section 4.1 of the 2004 IOSCO Code of Conduct. 
489 Iain MacNeil and Xiao Li, ‘“Comply or Explain”: market discipline and non-compliance with 
the Combined Code’ (2006) 1 Corporate Governance 5, 486. The authors underline the disclosure 
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United Kingdom. See also Sridhar Arcot, Valentina Bruno and Antoine Faure-Grimaud, 
‘Corporate governance in the UK: Is the comply or explain approach working?’ (2010) 30 
International Review of Law and Economics 2, 198; Andrew Keay, ‘Comply or explain in 
corporate governance codes: in need of greater regulatory oversight?’ (2014) 34 Legal Studies 2, 
279.  
490 Peter Yeoh, ‘External Credit Assessment Institutions: Clash of Expectations and Accountability 
Issues’ (2012) 12 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 2, 427. 
491 David J. Matthews, ‘Ruined in a Conventional Way: Responses to Credit Ratings’ Role in 
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For this reason, IOSCO published in 2008 a revised version of the 2004 Code 
of Conduct (‘2008 Code of Conduct’).492 This revised version was published to 
fill the gaps of the 2004 Code of Conduct, particularly with respect to structured 
finance ratings. The major amendments introduced in the 2008 Code of Conduct 
are: (1) a prohibition of ‘opinions and recommendations’ concerning structured 
finance493; (2) the different labels for structured finance ratings494; (3) advice to 
assist investors in understanding limitations of ratings495; (4) advice for CRAs to 
define ancillary business496; and (5) advice to assess the rating methodologies.497  
In substance, CRAs are advised to discourage ‘ratings shopping’ and to 
disclose in their rating announcements all relevant information concerning the 
product being rated. To mitigate the practice of giving financial firms the most 
favourable evaluations, CRAs should reduce their efforts to gain more business 
with issuers and, instead, improve the disclosure of ratings methodologies. As 
discussed in Chapter three, the close relationship between CRAs and issuers may 
determine a selection bias that results in an acceleration in loosening underwriting 
standards and a deterioration in the quality of the loans that underpin the bonds.498   
The 2008 Code of Conduct addresses two main questions namely an 
‘overwhelming reliance’ by investors on CRAs and the issue of limited investor 
monitoring in investment decisions. However, the 2008 Code of Conduct adopted 
a non-binding regulatory approach that did not reduce the reliance by market 
participants on the ratings of CRAs. In particular, the 2008 Code of Conduct 
underlined the difficulties for investors to understand the rating label (i.e. different 
labels for structured finance ratings) and the methodologies used by CRAs to 
assess financial products. These difficulties were exacerbated by a ‘chronic lack 
of private sector discipline and competence...in the global financial regulatory 
framework’ does not come to evaluating the ratings process.499 
                                                 
492 IOSCO, ‘Code of Conduct Fundamentals for Credit Rating Agencies. Revised’, May 2008. 
493 Measure 1.14-1 of the 2008 IOSCO Code of Conduct. 
494 Measure 3.5(b) of the 2008 IOSCO Code of Conduct. 
495 Measure 3.5(a)(c) of the 2008 IOSCO Code of Conduct. 
496 Measure 2.5 of the 2008 IOSCO Code of Conduct. 
497 Measure 1.7 of the 2008 IOSCO Code of Conduct. 
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September 2014). 
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In response to this, in 2009 IOSCO published the “Review of Implementation 
of the IOSCO Code of Conduct Fundamentals for Credit Rating Agencies” 500 and 
launched a consultation report to address several regulatory initiatives that 
impacted CRAs in multiple jurisdictions.501 Consequently, in February 2011 the 
IOSCO Technical Committee issued the final report “Regulatory Implementation 
of the Statement of Principles Regarding the Activities of Credit Rating 
Agencies”.502 This document sets out the various ways in which CRAs regulatory 
programmes promote the objectives of the IOSCO CRAs principles. 
The 2015 IOSCO Code of Conduct Fundamentals for Credit Rating Agencies 
provided a set of guidelines and practical measures for implementing the 
governance of ratings industry aiming at enhancing transparency of 
information.503 The IOSCO measures intend to address the following objectives: 
(1) quality and integrity of the credit rating process; (2) CRA independence and 
the avoidance of conflicts of interest; (3) CRA responsibilities to the investing 
public, rated entities, obligors, underwriters and arrangers; (4) risk management 
and employee training; and (5) disclosure and communication with market 
participants.  
As mentioned, IOSCO Codes and Principles do not entail enforcement 
mechanisms, apart from peer pressure, and they do not oblige market participants 
to comply with them. This means that the implementation of the codes of conduct 
is to be enforced through market discipline. In this respect, the CRAs’ modus 
operandi is regulated by forms of ‘soft law’ i.e. rules that are not legally binding 
but which in practice are observed in a voluntary, self-imposed way.504 As a 
result, flexibility and informality are the main characteristics of the rules 
contained in the IOSCO Codes and Principles. 
It is evident that IOSCO was drawn up with the expectation that market 
pressures would induce CRAs fully to comply with the Codes, as failure to do so 
would have an adverse impact on the reputation of the CRA in the financial 
market. Nonetheless, the 2007-2009 global financial turmoil as well as the 2010-
                                                 
500 IOSCO, ‘A Review of Implementation of the IOSCO Code of Conduct Fundamentals for Credit 
Rating Agencies’, March 2009.   
501 IOSCO, ‘Regulatory Implementation of the Statement of Principles Regarding the Activities of 
Credit Rating Agencies. Consultation Report’, May 2010. 
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2012 EU sovereign debt crisis has demonstrated the incapacity of the market to 
regulate the systemic role of rating agencies. 
The Basel III Accord has confirmed that the 2008 Code of Conduct is the 
international benchmark for CRAs’ rules of conduct. According to the Basel III 
rules, national supervisors should refer to the 2008 Code of Conduct when 
determining External Credit Assessment Institution (ECAI) eligibility.505 This 
confirms the importance of 2008 Code of Conduct in setting a common 
framework to monitor CRAs’ activities in their own jurisdictions. 
It can be claimed that although IOSCO is devoted to establishing harmonized 
international standards for the regulation of securities, its interventions tend to be 
at a level of generality that may be considered insufficient to reform the 
regulatory framework of CRAs.  
After considering the role played by IOSCO on developing the regulatory 
tools for CRAs, the next section examines the function of ECAIs taking into 
account the debate about their accountability and integrity as financial 
gatekeepers. 
 
3.1.2 The function of external credit assessment institutions under the Basel 
Capital Accords 
The European Central Bank defined an external credit assessment institution 
(ECAI) as ‘an institution whose credit assessments may be used by credit 
institutions for determining the risk weight of exposures according to the Capital 
Requirements Directive’.506  
 The term ECAI was first used in the Basel II framework, although the text did 
not provide a clear definition.507 The Basel Committee states that ‘external ratings 
that can be used for the capital purposes, according to the Basel II framework, are 
limited to the ratings provided by recognized ECAIs’.508 
ECAIs play an important function in the regulatory standards of capital 
requirements (especially in the so-called pillar I ‘Minimum Capital Requirements’ 
                                                 
505 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, ‘Basel III: A global regulatory framework for more 
resilient banks and banking systems’, June 2011, 52. 
506 ECB, ‘The Implementation of Monetary Policy in the Euro Area’, September 2006, 45. 
507 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, ‘International Convergence of Capital Measurement 
and Capital Standards. A Revised Framework’, June 2004, Sections B and C, paras 90-108. 
508 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, ‘Stocktaking on the use of credit ratings’, The Joint 
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of Basel II)509 and in setting capital models for credit risk.510 The regulatory 
measures for ECAIs undertaken by Basel II can be considered as a typical 
example of ad hoc regulation; one in which CRAs are regulated by a system of 
principles and standards.511  
The Basel Committee affirmed that rating systems are a cornerstone for the 
calculation of banks’ regulatory capital charge. This is according to the ‘internal 
ratings-based approach’ of Basel II because they are the basis for the 
determination of a borrower’s probability of default.512 
The regulation of ECAIs under the Basel II Capital Accord was incorporated 
into EU legislation through the former CRD (today CRD IV).513 The CRD 
established for the first time a framework of recognition of CRAs as ECAIs by 
competent European authorities (a regime similar to the US NRSRO as explained 
in Chapter two).  
According to the CRD, an eligible ECAI is an entity that issues external credit 
assessments to be used for the determination of risk weights.514 The CRD set out 
the main criteria which CRAs must satisfy in order to be recognised as ECAIs and 
allows the use of credit ratings in the determination of capital requirements for 
banks and investment firms.515  
This recognition was granted only if the competent authorities were satisfied 
that the ECAI’s assessment methodology complied with the requirements of 
                                                 
509 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, ‘International Convergence of Capital Measurement 
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objectivity, independence, ongoing review and transparency, and that the resulting 
credit assessments met the requirements of credibility and transparency.516  
A set of guidelines for the recognition of eligible ECAIs was developed by the 
Committee of European Banking Supervisors (today referred to as the European 
Banking Authority).517 The guidelines were revised in response to the 
amendments to Articles 81(2) and 97(2) of the CRD.518 The amendments ensured 
that where an ECAI is registered as a CRA at EU level, there is no duplication of 
work required by the recognition processes of the CRD and the EU Regulation on 
CRAs. 
The CRD allowed institutions to use external credit assessments to determine 
the weight of risk of their exposures, provided that the ECAIs that produce those 
assessments have been recognised as eligible for that purpose by the competent 
supervisory authorities (the ‘mapping process’).519  
Where an ECAI was registered as a CRA in accordance with EU Regulation 
No 1060/2009, the competent authorities were to consider the requirements of 
                                                 
516 Article 81(2) of Directive 2006/48/EC. 
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objectivity, independence, ongoing review and transparency with respect to its 
assessment methodology.520 
The CRD permitted Member States to recognize an ECAI as eligible in two 
ways: (1) direct recognition, in which the competent authority carries out its own 
assessment of the ECAI’s compliance with the CRD’s eligibility criteria; and (2) 
indirect recognition, in which the competent authority recognizes the ECAI 
without carrying out its own evaluation, relying instead on the recognition of the 
ECAI by the competent authority of another Member State.521 
The Basel II Accord made clear that ECAI recognition provides a basis for 
risk-weighted capital requirements calculations under the ‘Standardized 
Approach’522 and ‘Securitisation Ratings Based Approaches’.523 Such approaches 
are designed to increase the risk sensitivity of capital requirements for banks. 
They also seek to ensure that institutions using these approaches have appropriate 
levels of regulatory capital to support their aggregate credit risk.524 
Under the CRD IV and Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR)525, approval 
as an ECAI is no longer required since registration or certification is the only 
requirement under CRA Regulation for EU financial institutions to rely on 
ratings.526 This means that a CRA registered under the CRA Regulation is directly 
recognized as an ECAI. However, the CRD IV does not reduce the reliance on 
ECAIs for financial institutions to use when lending in the loan markets.527 
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The ECAI recognition process aims to ensure that the ratings are appropriate 
for supervisory and capital purposes.528 An ECAI must demonstrate that its 
methodology incorporates factors known to be relevant in determining an entity’s 
creditworthiness. For their part, competent authorities have to verify that the 
methodology for assigning credit assessments is rigorous, systematic, continuous, 
and subject to validation based on historical experience.529  
The authorities assess the independence of the ECAI’s methodology according 
to: (1) the ownership and organisation structure of the ECAI; (2) the financial 
resources of the ECAI; (3) the staffing and expertise of the ECAI; and (4) the 
corporate governance of the ECAI. The ECAI’s methodology is evaluated for its 
capacity to ensure ongoing review responsibly and for its ability to maintain 
transparency and provide a disclosure of credit assessments.530  
As reputational gatekeepers, the credibility and reliability of ECAIs is 
measured by the user’s confidence in such credit assessments. The greater the 
market acceptance, the higher this level of confidence is likely to be. But an 
ECAI’s credibility can be determined on the basis of its market share, revenues, 
and whether there is any pricing on the basis of the rating.531  
ECAI’s activities raise the issue of ‘how important it is for external rating 
agencies to retain credibility by posting ratings for bank loans that will prove to be 
ex post accurate’.532 The ECAIs’ performance has come under fire for its handling 
of the 2007-2009 financial crisis when it failed adequately to assess the risk 
associated with securitisation exposures. The crisis has demonstrated that external 
credit ratings did not adequately reflect the risk of certain structured finance asset 
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classes such as mortgage backed securities and resecuritisation positions i.e. the 
pool contains at least one tranched exposure.533  
The growing demand for rating services, which has been driven by the advent 
of new structured finance product, has also contributed to the ECAIs being more 
in the spotlight. It has been noted that the banks, which were creating asset-
backed securities and products based on them, paid ratings agencies to rate the 
securitized products in order to improve their marketability to investors.534 For 
this reason, at the regulatory level, there was a large consensus in favour of 
revising the normative regime of external ratings.535 The legal framework was 
reviewed and provided with new measures that aimed to make capital 
requirements more prudent and risk sensitive and mitigate mechanistic reliance on 
external credit assessment.  
The inadequacy of Basel II provisions to prevent banks from reducing their 
capital charges by pooling loans in off-balance-sheet vehicles gave rise to 
significant changes through the new Basel III Accord.536 The latter modifies some 
rules concerning the activity of ECAIs. Paragraph 121 of the Accord now states 
that ‘banks will not be allowed to ‘cherry-pick’ the assessments provided by 
different ECAIs and arbitrarily change the use of ECAIs’.537  
These changes were introduced following the 2009 Basel Consultative 
Document.538  This paper underlines the need to: (1) reduce the excessive reliance 
by many market participants, including banks, on external ratings; and (2) 
enhance the necessary due diligence, in order more fully to understand the risks 
underlying the rated instrument.  
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Although regulators and lawmakers have developed some improvements, the 
complexity and difficulty of the ECAIs’ structure do not favour an effective 
implementation of new rules. Under the Basel II framework, banking regulators 
allowed banks to use credit ratings from approved ECAIs when setting their 
capital requirements.539 As has been argued, ‘by giving banks the flexibility to 
adjust their regulatory capital according to a mix of rating agency ratings and the 
respective banks’ internal models, Basel II outsources significant regulatory 
authority to the models of rating agencies and banks’.540 
As long as banks are permitted to make extensive use of ratings for capital 
adequacy purposes, their internal rating scales will continue to be dependent on 
the ECAIs’ ratings.541 In this light, the introduction of alternative sources of credit 
quality information could lead to and stimulate ECAIs to be accurate and 
transparent.542  
After providing an analysis of the regulatory framework of CRAs set out by 
national and global regulators, the following section provides an analysis of the 
US legal framework. In doing so it takes into account the authorization system for 
CRAs established by the NRSRO. 
 
3.2 The US Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization authorization 
system of granting licenses 
In terms of US legislation, CRAs are currently subject to regulation by the 
SEC. This section analyses the US system of authorization and recognition of 
CRAs as a NRSRO.543 The importance of this discussion lies in the significant 
role authorized by the NRSRO in allowing the use of ratings within the regulatory 
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framework. By conferring on ratings the power to determine the credit risk of 
assets, financial institutions incautiously placed much reliance on CRAs’ 
activities. This section also considers the major issues that the system of an 
NRSRO highlighted within the ratings industry. Amongst these, are barriers to 
entry, poor competition and overreliance by regulators. It is argued that the 
creation and development of an NRSRO system has provided ratings with the 
status of special label for the quality of debt instruments.  
As indicated in Chapter one, the SEC established the NRSRO, a designation 
body, to ensure that bank issuers would not simply be drawn towards credit rating 
agencies whose only purpose was to deliver high ratings on financial 
instruments.544 
The NRSRO was empowered by Rule 15c3-1 (the ‘Net Capital Rule’)545—
adopted by the SEC in 1973. This incorporated credit ratings but only those 
ratings promulgated by what it defined as an NRSRO.  
The ‘Net Capital Rule’ was essentially designed to ensure ‘that registered 
broker-dealers have adequate liquid assets to meet their obligations to their 
investors and creditors’.546 This rule encouraged securities regulators to increase 
their reliance on ratings. The regulatory dependence on ratings started in 1973 
when the SEC proposed amending broker-dealer ‘haircut’ requirements. These 
stipulated the percentage of a financial asset’s market value a broker-dealer was 
required to deduct for the purpose of calculating its net capital requirement.547 
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546 Michael P. Jamroz, ‘The Net Capital Rule’ (1992) 47 The Business Lawyer 3, 863. The author 
underlines the purpose of the Rule in protecting the customers and creditors of registered broker-
dealers from monetary losses and delays that can occur when a registered broker-dealer fails. 
547 Rule 15c3-1(c)(2)(vi)(F) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act permitted registered broker-
dealers to use ratings to value bond assets for the purposes of determining net capital requirements. 
See Steven L. Molinari and Nelson S. Kibler, ‘Broker-Dealers’ Financial Responsibility Under the 
Uniform Net Capital Rule—a Case for Liquidity’ (1983) 72 Georgetown Law Journal 1, 5-7.  
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At the same time, the SEC incorporated ‘rules that restricted the extent to 
which a firm could hold assets that fell below investment grade and provisions 
that linked capital requirements to the ratings on individual securities, with lower 
capital charges for high-rated securities’.548 
In particular, regulations required that ratings be issued from an NRSRO 
designated by the SEC. As a result, the rating agencies that did not possess 
‘NRSRO status’ were excluded from a significant portion of the market. A ‘Catch 
22’ scenario characterized the acquiring of NRSRO status. In essence, to attain 
such a designation, a CRA must be nationally recognised, but a CRA cannot 
become nationally recognized without first having the designation.549 One can 
argue that regulations encouraged investors to purchase financial instruments with 
high NRSRO credit ratings, rather than credit ratings with high informational 
value.  
Before the 1970s, credit ratings were regulated under the Securities Act of 
1933 (Rules 134 and 436), the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Section 17-H 
and Rule 10b-6), the Investment Company Act of 1940 (Rules 2a-7, 3a-7 and 10f-
3) and under the National Association of Insurance Commissioners Securities 
Valuation Office).550 Since the mid-1970s, statutes and regulations have 
increasingly come to depend explicitly on NRSRO ratings. In this way, SEC 
regulations established a de facto oligopoly of NRSRO-designated credit rating 
agencies and an opaque market demand for NRSRO CRAs’ ratings.551 
Institutional investors and many pension funds confined their investments to 
bonds rated by a NRSRO.552 
                                                 
548 Raquel García Alcubilla and Javier Ruiz del Pozo (note 458) 4. 
549 Lawrence J. White, ‘The Credit Rating Industry: An Industrial Organization Analysis’ in 
Richard M. Levich, Giovanni Majnoni, and Carmen Reinhart (eds), Ratings, Rating Agencies and 
the Global Financial System (Boston, Mass.: Kluwer Academic Publishing 2002) 305, where the 
author observes that ‘in essence, the “national recognition” criterion creates a “Catch 22” barrier to 
entry’; Lawrence J. White, ‘The SEC’s Other Problem’ (2002-2003) Regulation, 41. See also 
Richard Sylla, ‘An Historical Primer on the Business of Credit Rating’ in Richard M. Levich, 
Giovanni Majnoni, and Carmen Reinhart (eds), Ratings, Rating Agencies and the Global Financial 
System (Boston, Mass.: Kluwer Academic Publishing 2002) 36. 
550 In the 1930s the first regulator to take notice of credit ratings was the Federal Reserve System 
which implemented a scheme for evaluating a bank’s entire portfolio based on the credit ratings on 
the bonds in that portfolio. Subsequently, the US Treasury Department introduced credit ratings as 
the valuable measure of the quality of a national bank’s bond portfolio. 
551 Until the early 1970s, CRAs mainly earned their income by selling publications and other 
related materials to investors. 
552 Anno Stolper, ‘Regulation of credit rating agencies’ (2009) 33 Journal of Banking & Finance 
7, 1266. 
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In this context, ratings have been incorporated into government regulation and 
regulatory tools, but this policy trend had the effect of exacerbating the 
competitive barriers between rating agencies. The use of ratings in public 
regulation demonstrated that the ratings industry transcends the purely financial.  
These ‘regulatory licenses’ have enabled credit ratings to gain and generate 
reputational capital among market participants. Reputational capital is usually 
based on trust and credibility. It represents an essential element of the credit rating 
activity for two main reasons, namely the decision-making process and 
assessment accuracy.  
From the mid-1970s credit rating agencies switched from their subscriber-pays 
model to an ‘issuer-pays’ model, determining a substantial change in the core 
activity of these agencies. Similarly, NRSROs shifted the focus of their business 
model from investors to issuers and started charging the issuers for the debt they 
rated. The ‘subscriber-pays’ model relied heavily on the ability to enforce 
property rights to information that is very easy to disseminate.  
The shift from the ‘investor-pays’ to the ‘issuer-pays’ model was largely 
motivated by the developments in reproduction and distribution technologies that, 
simultaneously, gave rise to an exacerbation of the free-rider problem. However, 
the change was also driven by the increasing size and complexity of the securities 
markets.553 
Initially, the SEC’s Division of Market Regulation managed the designation of 
NRSROs through the issuance of ‘no-action letters’.554 If a rating agency wished 
to be designated as an NRSRO, it sent a letter to the SEC requesting that the SEC 
recommended no regulatory enforcement action against the rating agency (on the 
ground that it is designated an NRSRO).555 The SEC’s Division of Market 
Regulation did not develop formal standards for such designation, relying instead 
primarily on market acceptance of rating agencies in designating NRSROs. 
NRSRO status was conferred upon a select few agencies. Such status is 
important given that obtaining a favourable rating has definitively become a de 
facto prerequisite for any company seeking access to the US financial markets. 
                                                 
553 Lawrence J. White, ‘The Credit Rating Agencies’ (2010) 24 Journal of Economic Perspectives 
2, 214-215. 
554 The term ‘no-action letters’ indicates the designation process used by the SEC staff to grant 
NRSRO status.  
555 Francis A. Bottini Jr., ‘An Examination of the Current Status of Rating Agencies and Proposals 
for Limited Oversight of Such Agencies’ (1993) 30 San Diego Law Review 3, 611-612. 
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This means that the SEC used the NRSRO designation as its ‘seal of approval’ to 
select on an informal, ‘no-action letter’ basis only a few national credit-rating 
agencies namely S&P’s, Moody’s Investors Service and Fitch Ratings.556  
This sort of dependence on ratings favoured regulated financial institutions to 
engage in regulatory arbitrage. The NRSRO status became a powerful label in 
attaining reputational capital in the financial markets. The ‘AAA’ ratings became 
not only a sort of guarantee for investors and regulators, but also a means of 
exemption from any compliance of disclosure requirements. 
NRSRO designation was not a statutory requirement, but a regulatory 
initiative to specify which ratings could be used to calculate broker-dealers’ 
required capital.557 As has been noted, ‘NRSROs received their designations 
because of good past performance, not necessarily because of good future 
performance’.558 In this way, regulators insulated the largest NRSROs such as 
S&P’s, Moody’s and Fitch from competition. 
The NRSROs performance and the methodologies used to rate securities 
assumed great responsibility for regulating the riskiness of investments made by a 
large number of financial institutions.559 Therefore, CRAs were granted regulatory 
power by the SEC. This has had the effect of making an investment grade rating 
from a rating agency that was recognized by the SEC a virtual precondition for the 
purchase of debt securities by many institutional investors.560 On this point, it has 
been observed that ‘rather than government licensing, rating agencies have 
received market recognition’.561 
In 2005, the SEC published a proposal in which an NRSRO was defined as an 
entity that (1) issues publicly available credit ratings that are current assessments 
of the creditworthiness of obligors with respect to specific securities or money 
market instruments; (2) is generally accepted in the financial markets as an issuer 
                                                 
556 Lawrence J. White, ‘A New Law for the Bond Rating Industry-- For Better or For Worse?’, 
New York University School of Law, Law & Economics Research Paper Series Working Paper 
No. 07-09, February 2007, 5. 
557 Alex J. Pollock, ‘End the Government-Sponsored Cartel in Credit Ratings’, in American 
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, January 2005, 1. The author observes that the SEC 
limited new entry and competition by mandating demand for rating agency services and severely 
restricting supply. 
558 Emily McClintock Ekins and Mark A. Calabria (note 544) 10. 
559 Erik F. Gerding (note 540) 153.  
560 John Coffee Jr., ‘What went wrong? An initial inquiry into the causes of the 2008 financial 
crisis’ (2009) 9 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 1, 7. 
561 Jonathan Katz, Emanuel Salinas and Constantinos Stephanou, ‘Credit Rating Agencies’, The 
World Bank Group, October 2009, Note No 8, 2. 
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of credible and reliable ratings, including ratings for a particular industry or 
geographic segment, by the predominant users of securities ratings; and (3) uses 
systematic procedures designed to ensure credible and reliable ratings.562 
Although the term ‘NRSRO’ was used in several pieces of legislation563, it 
was defined for the first time in the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act 2006.564 
The statute provided authority for the SEC to implement rules regarding the 
registration, recordkeeping, financial reporting, and oversight of CRAs.565  
The US legislation does not regulate rating procedures and methodologies 
because of the imposition of wide disclosure requirements that allows the market 
to exercise its own judgement when it comes to the quality of credit analysis.566 It 
can be observed that the regulators have an interest in maintaining this regulatory 
status quo because of CRAs dependent regulation. NRSROs represent an 
important part of the regulatory process and a crucial determinant of investment 
strategies.   
Indeed, the relevant section of law is clear on regulation entitlement. Section 
15E(2) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act states that ‘notwithstanding any other 
provision of law, neither the Commission nor any State or political subdivision 
thereof may regulate the substance of credit ratings or the procedures and 
methodologies by which any nationally recognized statistical rating organization 
determines credit ratings’. 
In 2009, the SEC introduced further amendments to rules for NRSROs by 
prohibiting an NRSRO from issuing or maintaining a rating with respect to an 
obligor or security where it has made a recommendation to the obligor (or the 
                                                 
562 SEC, ‘Definition of Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization’, Release No. 34-
51572, 19 April 2005, 20-21.  
563 The term ‘NRSRO’ is mentioned in Rule 2a-7 and Rule 3a-7 of the Investment Company Act 
of 1940; in the definition of “mortgage related security” within the Secondary Mortgage Market 
Enhancement Act of 1984; in the Simplification of Registration Procedures for Primary Securities 
Offerings, Securities Act 1992; in Rule 10b-6 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; in the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Act of 1950, section 1831; in the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act of 1974; and in the Retirement Income Security Act of 1974. 
564 Section 3 of the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-291, 120 Stat. 
1327. 
565 SEC, ‘2012 Summary Report of Commission Staff’s Examinations of Each Nationally 
Recognized Statistical Rating Organization’, November 2012, 4. 
566 Committee of European Securities Regulators, ‘Technical Advice to the European Commission 
on the Equivalence between the US regulatory and supervisory framework and the EU regulatory 
regime for Credit Rating Agencies’, 21 May 2010, para 603.  
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issuer, underwriter or sponsor of the security) about the corporate or legal 
structure, assets, liabilities or activities of the obligor or issuer of the security.567 
At this stage, it is instructive to draw a comparative analysis between the 
regulatory systems of the EU and US. The relevance of such an analysis lies in the 
common objective implemented by the legislators of creating a centralized level 
of controls for CRAs, that is to say an institutional arrangement that seems in line 
with the need to establish a more intrusive oversight of the ratings industry. In 
essence, the strategy of designing specific organisms to deal with the 
accountability of CRAs can be viewed as a possible way towards coercive 
financial supervision. 
As examined later in this chapter, since 2009 lawmakers in the EU have given 
regulatory powers to the ESMA as the centralized body in charge of the 
registration and supervision of rating agencies. ESMA has jurisdiction over the 
rating agencies that conduct business in the EU, and even exercises regulatory and 
supervisory powers over the main rating agencies through the subsidiaries that 
these leading agencies have established in the Union.568 In this respect, Véron has 
observed that although ESMA has been delegated to guarantee regulatory 
consistency across all EU Member States, the risk of inconsistency or interference 
with regulatory regimes in non-EU jurisdictions still remains.569 
The US law adopted a ‘comply or explain’ model, an approach characterized 
by voluntary compliance and mandatory disclosure mechanisms. Accordingly, 
‘companies have the option either to follow the best practices or to explain to their 
shareholders why they considered that they were not appropriate in the company’s 
particular circumstances’.570 In contrast, European legislation required that 
information about CRAs should be available for the public at a ‘central 
repository’ established by ESMA.571 This ‘central repository’ is a mechanism 
                                                 
567 SEC, ‘Amendments to Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations’, 4 
December 2009, which introduced paragraph 5 of Rule 17-g-5 (c). 
568 Dorothe Fischer-Appelt, ‘The European Securities and Markets Authority: The Beginnings of a 
Powerful European Securities Authority?’ (2011) 5 Law and Financial Markets Review 1, 23. 
569 Nicolas Véron, ‘Rate Expectations: What Can and Cannot Be Done about Rating Agencies’ 
(2011) Bruegel Policy Contribution No 11, 4. 
570 Financial Reporting Council, ‘What constitutes an explanation under ‘comply or explain’. 
Report of discussions between companies and investors’, February 2012, 1. 
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whereby all registered and certified CRAs make available information on the 
historical performance of their ratings.572  
As Bai has observed, the SEC has followed Europe’s lead in establishing a 
publicly available central repository for standardized data on credit ratings and 
CRAs’ performances.573 It imposes standardization requirements of disclosure, 
particularly in terms of monitoring and ranking the performance of competing 
entities in the industry, and making this information available to the public. 
The EU and the US share the fundamental notion that by establishing a 
registration system for CRAs, credit ratings would be used as a valuable 
reference. This would be beneficial in terms of public regulation as well as 
provisions to prevent conflicts of interest, disclose information, and retain 
records.574 However, ‘further bilateral dialogue on the implementation of the EU 
regulations is necessary to eliminate the potentially adverse cross-border impact 
that differing regulatory approaches in the United States and European Union 
could have on global market participants’.575  
After considering the main role of the NRSRO system for registering and 
designating CRAs, the next section provides an analysis of the legislative reforms 
introduced by the US Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006. 
 
3.2.1 The Credit Rating Agency Reform Act 2006  
The Credit Rating Agency Reform Act 2006 constitutes the first statutory 
regulation for credit rating industry in US legislation.576 The great part of the Act 
                                                 
572 ESMA, ‘Annual report on the application of Regulation on credit rating agencies as provided 
by Article 21(5) and Article 39a of the Regulation (EU) No 1060/2009 as amended by Regulation 
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573 Lynn Bai, ‘The Performance Disclosures of Credit Rating Agencies: Are They Effective 
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devoted to CRAs seems, at first glance, to be prophetic in view of the fact that this 
legislative framework was introduced just before the 2007-2009 financial crisis. 
As stated in the preamble to the Act, the purpose of the legislation is ‘to 
improve ratings quality for the protection of investors and is in the public interest 
by fostering accountability, transparency, and competition in the credit rating 
agency industry’577. The statute mainly regulates conflicts of interest in the ratings 
industry and aims to improve ratings quality. It aimed to create an objective 
registration framework through which rating organizations may apply for NRSRO 
status. In addition, it aimed to facilitate the entry of legitimate agencies that were 
previously barred from qualification under the former NRSRO designation 
process.578 The legislation was supplemented by the rules on disclosure 
requirements introduced by the SEC in 2007579 and strengthened in 2009.580 
In 2008, the SEC proposed amendments for NRSROs that were designed to 
address the ‘opaqueness’ of CRA rating procedures and to reduce undue reliance 
on credit ratings in the SEC’s regulations and forms.581 
As already mentioned, the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act 2006 defines for 
the first time the term ‘NRSRO’, but also provides a complete definition of the 
term ‘credit rating’.582 The law provided the SEC with the authority to adopt rules 
concerning registration, recordkeeping, financial reporting and an oversight 
programme for credit rating agencies seeking to register as NRSROs.583  
One important component of the law was the performance disclosure 
requirements issued by the SEC. This set of rules was intended to achieve two 
main goals: (1) to attach reputational damage to CRAs whose ratings are driven 
by conflicts of interest; and (2) to promote competition by granting new 
                                                 
agency to register NRSROs based on new eligibility criteria, and eliminated the national 
recognition requirement. 
577 See the preamble to the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-291, 120 
Stat. 1327. 
578 Stephane Rousseau, ‘A Question of Credibility: Enhancing the Accountability and 
Effectiveness of Credit Rating Agencies’, C.D. Institute, Commentary No 356, July 2012, 4. 
579 SEC, ‘Oversight of Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations’, June 2007 
<http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2007/34-55857.pdf> accessed 19 March 2013. 
580 SEC, ‘Amendments to the Rules Relating to the Oversight of Nationally Recognized Statistical 
Rating Organizations’, 2 February 2009 <http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2009/34-59342-
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581 F. Phillip Hosp, ‘Problems and Reforms in Mortgage-Backed Securities: Handicapping the 
Credit Rating Agencies’ (2010) 79 Mississippi Law Journal 3, 559.  
582 Section 3(a) of the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act 2006. 
583 The Act gives the SEC ‘exclusive authority to enforce the provisions’ regarding NRSROs, and 
allows it to amend or review the regulations according to the objectives of the Act. 
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companies to the ratings industry the chance of building on their track records and 
ultimately of competing with the main CRAs.   
The statute introduced criteria for the NRSRO designation and authorised the 
SEC to conduct examinations of credit rating agencies, while at the same time 
prohibiting the SEC from regulating the substance, criteria, or methodologies used 
in credit rating models.584  
The Credit Rating Agency Reform Act 2006 added section 15E to the 
Exchange Act. This established SEC oversight of those credit rating agencies that 
register with the SEC as NRSROs.585 The Credit Rating Agency Reform Act 2006 
also amended section 17 of the Exchange Act to provide the SEC with 
recordkeeping, reporting, and examination authority over registered NRSROs.586 
Under section 15E, the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act 2006 offered CRAs 
the option of attaining NRSRO status by registering with the SEC and providing 
certain information (see ‘Appendix III’). 
In 2007, the SEC adopted Rules 17g-1 to 17g-6 to implement the registration 
and oversight programme created by the Rating Agency Reform Act.587 Under 
Rule 17g-1 a credit agency could establish eligibility to apply for registration as a 
NRSRO if the SEC considered it to have satisfied the definitions for CRA and 
‘NRSRO’ under the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act 2006.  
Under Rule 17g-2 an NRSRO is required to make and keep certain records 
relating to its business and to preserve those and other records for certain 
prescribed time periods. Rule 17g-3 requires each NRSRO to furnish audited 
annual financial statements and certain schedules to the SEC.  
Rule 17g-4 requires an NRSRO to establish, maintain and enforce written 
policies and procedures to prevent the misuse of material, non-public information 
in violation of the Exchange Act (policies designed to prevent the inappropriate 
dissemination both inside and outside the NRSRO of material non-public 
information obtained for the purpose of issuing a credit rating).  
                                                 
584 Sections 15E(c)(2) and 17(a)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended by the 
Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006. See also United States Senate Permanent 
Subcommittee on Investigations, ‘Wall Street and the Financial Crisis: Anatomy of a Financial 
Collapse’, 13 April 2011, 27-28. 
585 SEC, ‘Section 15E of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended by the Dodd-Frank 
Act’ <https://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/ratingagency.htm> accessed 17 March 2013. 
586 Sections 17(a) and 17(b) of the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act 2006.   
587 SEC (note 579). 
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Under Rule 17g-5 an NRSRO is required to establish and maintain an 
adequate structure of internal management in order to address any conflicts of 
interest in the CRAs’ business model. Finally, Rule 17g-6 addresses unfair, 
coercive, or abusive practices determined by the NRSRO and prohibits the 
NRSRO from issuing ‘unsolicited credit ratings’. 
The SEC provisions prohibited an NRSRO from having certain conflicts of 
interest and engaging in certain unfair, abusive, or otherwise coercive practices. 
Specifically, the rules addressed conflicts of interest at both the rating analyst 
level and the rating agency level.  
At the rating analyst level, the SEC put a stop to the conflicts that arise from 
certain arrangements. These include: analysts owning the securities subject to 
their rating; holding directorship or employment positions at the rated entities; 
maintaining special personal or business relationships with the rated entities; 
receiving gifts from the securities entities, and being compensated based on the 
rating fees that they help generate for the rating agencies that employ them. 
Similarly, at the rating agency level, the SEC regulated conflicts that arise 
from rating agencies’ receiving compensation for their ratings from the rated 
entities, providing consulting and other ancillary services to the rated entities, 
rating securities issued or underwritten by affiliated entities, and receiving 
subscription fees from financial institutions whose asset portfolios include 
securities subject to the rating agencies’ ratings.588 
The SEC amended several of these rules in 2009 with the purpose of further 
increasing the transparency of NRSRO rating methodologies, strengthening the 
disclosures of rating performance, prohibiting NRSROs from engaging in certain 
unfair, coercive, or abusive practices, and enhancing NRSRO record-keeping.589 
However, according to section 15E of the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act 
2006, the SEC does not have the power to regulate the substance of credit ratings 
or the procedures or methodologies by which an NRSRO determines credit 
ratings.590  
                                                 
588 Lynn Bai (note 293) 55. 
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Although the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act 2006 strengthened oversight 
of the CRAs by promoting transparency, the legislation only attempted to improve 
the designation process by replacing the artificial barriers created by the SEC 
approval system and by increasing investor confidence with high quality ratings 
and lower costs. 
Despite the fact that a primary result of the legislation was to reduce arbitrary 
SEC power to designate NRSROs and instead set timelines for SEC response, the 
statute can be considered to be a compromise in a number of ways. The SEC did 
not have the authority to regulate the substance of ratings or how NRSROs 
determine ratings. The Credit Rating Agency Reform Act 2006 did not attempt to 
register all credit rating agencies but instead, ‘sought only to convey special status 
on those credit rating agencies that are nationally recognized’.591 
In addition, the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act 2006 did not give 
secondary agency examination authority to federal banking agencies to verify the 
integrity of credit ratings assigned to investment-grade securities purchased by 
depository institutions.592 
The 2007-2009 financial crisis demonstrated the inadequacy of the SEC 
powers to regulate CRAs in order to improve the quality of ratings and underlined 
the essential weaknesses of 2006 legislation.  
With the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act 2006, the narrow structure of the 
credit rating industry has not changed significantly in the US. After the SEC 
revised its regulations for the designation of NRSROs in 2007 and 2009, the 
dominance of S&P’s, Moody’s and Fitch remained unaffected and made it 
difficult for new CRAs to qualify as NRSROs. While competition may improve 
the quality of ratings, it is doubtful that the entry of new CRAs alone will resolve 
the problem of poor ratings.593  
The US legislation proposed further reforms in response to the financial 
turmoil, namely the Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2009594, yet it 
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only sought to restore confidence in rating agencies.595 However, the recent 
legislation for CRAs revealed that Regulations’ use of NRSRO designations still 
remains the major issue with regard to ratings reliance. 
The next section examines the major regulatory developments introduced by 
the US legislature, and most particularly, the Dodd-Frank Act 2010. 
 
3.2.2 The Dodd-Frank Act 2010 
Following the subprime mortgage crisis, the US legislators enacted the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (‘Dodd-Frank 
Act’)596. This legislation introduced specific rules, sections 931-939H, aimed at 
improving the regulation of CRAs.597  
The Dodd-Frank Act broadened the powers of the SEC to oversee and regulate 
the credit rating industry and explicitly allowed investors, for the first time, to file 
civil suits against credit rating agencies. In particular, the statute imposes new 
self-executing requirements with respect to credit rating agencies registered with 
the SEC as NRSROs and requires that the Commission adopt rules applicable to 
NRSROs in a number of areas.598  
According to section 931(2) of the Dodd-Frank Act, credit rating agencies, 
including NRSROs, play a critical ‘gatekeeper’ role in the debt market that is 
functionally similar to that of securities analysts. The latter includes those who 
evaluate the quality of securities in the equity market, and auditors, who review 
the financial statements of firms. 
The main changes introduced by sections 931-939H of the Dodd-Frank Act 
focus on: (1) the new SEC Office of Credit Ratings charged with overseeing the 
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credit rating industry; (2) SEC authority to discipline, fine, and deregister a CRA 
and associated personnel for violating the law; (3) authority for investors to file 
private causes of action against credit rating agencies that knowingly or recklessly 
fail to conduct a reasonable investigation of a rated product; (4) requirements for 
credit rating agencies to establish internal controls to ensure high quality ratings 
and disclose information about their rating methodologies and about each issued 
rating; and (5) amendments to federal statutes removing references to credit 
ratings and credit rating agencies in order to reduce reliance on ratings. 
With respect to oversight, the legislation establishes a new regulatory body, 
namely the Office of Credit Ratings with the power to regulate rating agency 
activities including disclosure, conflicts of interest and rating criteria. The creation 
of this new body within the SEC conveys a strong message of following through 
more effective supervision of the ratings industry.599 
With respect to accountability, the Dodd-Frank Act includes limited 
provisions that would make rating agencies liable for their wrongdoings. In 
addition, the law requires the removal of many rating-based regulations in order to 
reduce an over-reliance on ratings for both regulatory and behavioural 
purposes.600 The statute seeks to reduce such over-reliance on CRAs by removing 
the statutory references to credit ratings and by removing the terms ‘investment 
grade’ and ‘non-investment grade’ in order to make clear the standards of 
creditworthiness.601 
It is hoped that the removal of regulatory reliance on ratings will stimulate 
legislators to find appropriate substitutes for ratings and to enhance due diligence 
by investors. Regulators should seek to find alternative measures to evaluate 
credit risk in order to reduce private reliance on ratings and stimulate the use of 
quantitative (credit spreads or Credit Default Swap spreads)602 and qualitative 
substitutes (based on professional judgement).  
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Some scholars argue that the ‘rolling averages of market prices at least 
potentially reflect a wider range of available information than ratings, and may be 
a more timely and accurate measure of credit risk’.603 Such a regulatory approach 
reflects the policy to address the systemic effects of ratings, particularly within the 
structured finance sector where CRAs have access to private information on their 
underlying assets.604  
In 2011, the SEC adopted Rule 17g-7, which requires NRSROs to include 
information regarding the representations, warranties and enforcement 
mechanisms available to investors in any asset-backed securities offering. This 
information should be included in any report accompanying a credit rating issued 
in connection with such an offering, including a preliminary credit rating.605 
The Dodd-Frank Act introduced under Section 939F a ‘Study’ on: (1) the 
credit rating process for structured finance products and the conflicts of interest 
associated with the issuer-pay and the subscriber-pay models; and (2) the 
feasibility of establishing a system in which a public or private utility or a self-
regulatory organization assigns NRSROs to determine the credit ratings of 
structured finance products. 
Although the feasibility of this study must be tested, the Dodd-Frank Act 
specifically calls for a system for the assignment of NRSROs to determine the 
initial credit ratings of structured finance products. This is to be done in a manner 
that prevents the issuer, sponsor, or underwriter of the structured finance product 
from selecting the NRSRO that will determine the initial credit ratings and 
monitor such credit ratings.606 
These measures are intended not only to avoid an over-reliance on ratings, but 
also to replace the NRSRO certification process and its regulatory privileges. 
However, behavioural reliance on ratings has been deeply anchored in the 
securities markets. Excluding references to ratings in regulations does not mean 
that ratings will not be used by private parties.607 
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The question at stake is whether investors stop relying on ratings even if 
regulatory reference to ratings is definitively removed. A possible answer lies in 
the implementation of credible alternative sources of credit information that 
investors can trust in and stimulate competitive pressure on CRAs.   
Most importantly, the Dodd-Frank Act empowers the SEC to bar NRSROs in 
the event of serious shortcomings in how they rate. According to section 
932(a)(3)(I) ‘the Commission may temporarily suspend or permanently revoke the 
registration of a NRSRO with respect to a particular class or subclass of securities, 
if the Commission finds, on the record after notice and opportunity for hearing, 
that the NRSRO does not have adequate financial and managerial resources to 
consistently produce credit ratings with integrity’. This rule marks a significant 
change in ratings governance because, for the first time, NRSROs have to disclose 
their rating performance through reports to the SEC that must be made available 
to the public as well. NRSROs are similarly required to establish effective internal 
control structures for the improvement of ratings procedures and 
methodologies.608  
Pursuant to section 932(q)(2) of the Dodd-Frank Act, the NRSRO is required 
to submit an attestation in which it is affirmed that no part of the rating was 
influenced by any other business activities. It must also confirm that the rating 
was based solely on the merits of the instruments being rated, and that such a 
rating was an independent evaluation of the risks and merits of the instrument. 
 Regarding the ratings’ symbols, section 938(a) of the Dodd-Frank Act states 
that NRSROs have to: (1) assess the probability of whether an issuer of a security 
or money market instrument will default, fail to make timely payments, or 
otherwise not make payments to investors in accordance with the terms of the 
security or money-market instrument; (2) define and disclose the meaning of any 
symbol used by the nationally recognised statistical rating organization to denote 
a credit rating; and (3) apply any symbol in a manner that is consistent for all 
types of securities and money-market instruments for which the symbol is used. 
Regarding civil liability, the Dodd-Frank Act creates a new regime in which 
issuers have to obtain permission from NRSROs to use their ratings in their 
                                                 
608 The Act reinforces the importance of the compliance function (provided in section 15E(j) of the 
2006 Credit Rating Agency Reform Act) in the NRSRO governance as a deterrence of misconduct 
and inflated ratings.  
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prospectuses and NRSROs are subject to the same standards as public accountants 
and securities analysts.609 
NRSROs are liable as experts under the Securities Act of 1933 when they 
consent to the disclosure of their ratings in a prospectus.610 This means that rating 
agencies are no longer exempt on First Amendment defences from the private 
right of action.611 It has been argued that ‘holding the NRSROs accountable for 
their errors introduces the notion of legal liability that imposes considerable costs 
on the system by frivolous and unfair lawsuits’.612 
Therefore, the major change brought in by the Dodd-Frank Act is that of 
viewing CRAs as financial gatekeepers with the same standards of accountability 
and liability as other intermediaries, such as security analysts, investment bankers 
and auditors.  
Although the Dodd-Frank Act provides a more stringent regulatory regime for 
CRAs, closer examination of the text reveals some gaps with respect to the 
problem of incentive misalignment in the ‘issuer-pays’ model. In addition, the Act 
does not provide any rules to address the thorny issue of conflicts of interest.613  
Under section 931(4) of the Dodd-Frank Act, the legislation merely alludes to 
conflict of interest concern. It states that in advising arrangers of structured 
financial products about the potential ratings of such products, credit rating 
agencies face conflicts of interest that need to be carefully monitored. Looking at 
section 932(a)(8) of the Dodd-Frank Act, the statute provides that the Office of 
Credit Ratings is entitled to ensure that NRSROs’ ratings are not unduly 
influenced by conflicts of interest. These rules demonstrate the ‘light touch’ 
                                                 
609 Stephane Rousseau (note 578) 12. 
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White, ‘Regulation of Rating Agencies’ in Viral V. Acharya, Thomas F. Cooley, Matthew 
Richardson and Ingo Walter (eds) Regulating Wall Street. The Dodd-Frank Act and the New 
Architecture of Global Finance (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 2011) 458. 
613 John C. Coffee Jr., ‘The political economy of Dodd-Frank: Why financial reform tends to be 
frustrated and systemic risk perpetuated’ in Eilís Ferran, Niamh Moloney, Jennifer G. Hill, John C. 
Coffee, Jr (eds), The Regulatory Aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis (Cambridge: CUP 2012) 
368 (footnote 250). 
 136 
approach of the Dodd-Frank Act in dealing with the regulation of the CRAs’ 
business model. The monitoring of conflicts of interest is mandated to the internal 
management of the NRSROs (i.e. the board of directors), which only has a duty to 
oversee the possible conflicts.614  
Another concern that arises from the legislation regards the lack of specific 
provisions on sovereign debt ratings. The 2011-2012 Greek crisis has shown how 
important it is to pay specific attention to sovereign debt assessment and the 
consistency of ratings.615 McNamara noted that ‘while the Dodd-Frank Act 
contains important reforms meant to reduce the likelihood of future ratings failure, 
it does not attempt to regulate the ratings process directly but instead relies on the 
traditional securities law strategies of disclosure and liability to incentivize the 
production of accurate ratings’.616 
On the one hand, the Dodd-Frank Act does introduce some significant 
improvements to the CRAs’ activities, on the other hand it seems to impose heavy 
oversight and burdensome rules in an attempt to reduce the NRSRO’s role and 
increase SEC supervision.617 In essence, the Dodd-Frank Act does not lay down a 
specific norm regarding enforcement. However, it does delegate this function to 
compliance, which has to monitor management behaviours and create strong 
incentives to reduce the risk of confidence failures. It is possible to conclude that 
the reform attempts to secure ratings transparency through strong supervisory 
measures, but completely leaves to the firm’s internal controls the role of 
monitoring CRAs’ activities. 
After providing an analysis of the Dodd-Frank Act, the next section considers 
the UK regulatory treatment of CRAs taking into account the main features of the 
UK approach to the role of CRAs. 
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3.3 The UK approach to the role of CRAs 
As has been already indicated, the regulatory system for CRAs has proved 
ineffective in addressing the shortcomings associated with rating activities.618 The 
normative measures adopted by regulators and lawmakers have raised a number 
of concerns when it comes to their actual capacity to oversee CRAs.619  
Although rating agencies have become the arbiters of government debt, being 
involved in securities regulation and investment decisions, they have still not been 
regulated effectively worldwide.620 It is remarkable, too, that ‘regulators have 
sought to harness the claimed informational value attached to ratings by enrolling 
CRAs as surrogate regulators’.621 Unlike other financial gatekeepers—such as 
auditors, accounting firms, and underwriters—CRAs are used for regulatory 
purposes because of their reputation as evaluators of the creditworthiness of 
financial products. This has enabled CRAs to become an integral part of capital 
markets ‘as both endogenous and exogenous actors’.622 
The 2007-2009 financial crisis revealed both the huge reliance that had been 
made on ratings performance and the substantial failure of regulatory schemes 
established at regional and international levels. On the one hand, financial 
regulation failed both to contain the systemic risk posed by inaccurate ratings and 
to avoid the persistent conflicts of interest arising between agencies and issuers. 
On the other hand, market discipline was not capable of reconciling private 
interests with the public good.623  
As discussed earlier in this chapter, the normative response adopted by many 
countries mainly followed the recommendations set out by the global regulatory 
network (IOSCO, FSB, G-20, BCBS and IMF). IOSCO provided soft-law 
mechanisms and self-regulatory measures in order to enhance the transparency of 
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CRAs.624 National regulators implemented various reforms in order to design an 
adequate legal framework for CRAs—reforms that were especially focused on 
registration, methodology disclosure, and supervision. However, the question at 
stake is whether these strategies provided an adequate response to the growing 
role of CRAs in the financial markets.  
In 2012, the House of Commons underlined the need for increased regulation 
of CRAs by affirming that effective supervision combined with adequate 
enforcement represents a viable route to strengthen the regulatory regime for 
rating agencies.625 The value of increasing regulation and improving the 
transparency of CRAs constitute major issues that legislators and policymakers 
have attempted to resolve in order to restore investors’ confidence in ratings.  
In the UK, regulators and legislators adopted a mixed system of principles and 
rules for CRAs. This regulatory approach has been mainly influenced by EU law 
and international initiatives.626  
The legislature passed the “Credit Rating Agencies Regulations 2010” in order 
to incorporate European Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 on CRAs627 into UK law 
and ensure that the European law was fully effective and enforceable within 
domestic legislation.628  
The “Credit Rating Regulations 2010” designated the former FSA—today the 
Financial Conduct Authority (FCA)—as the competent authority in the UK for the 
purposes of the European Regulation.629 More specifically, the ‘Credit Rating 
Regulations 2010’: (1) contained provisions relating to applications for 
certification and registration; (2) vested investigatory powers in the FSA; (3) 
provided enforcement powers for the FSA to take action where a CRA breaches 
obligations arising under the EU Regulation; (4) created penalties and offences 
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which may apply if a person breaches a requirement of the EU Regulation or the 
Credit Rating Regulations; (5) made provisions for appeals; (6) provided for 
notices; and (7) made consequential changes to the Capital Requirements 
Regulations 2006. 
Following the adoption of EU Regulation No 513/2011630, the UK 
Government issued the “Credit Rating Agencies (Amendment) Regulations 
2011”. The legislation reviewed the Credit Rating Agency Regulations 2010 in 
order to reflect the transfer of regulatory responsibility to the ESMA.631  
Consequently, Regulation (EU) No 462/2013632 has been implemented in the 
UK legislation by the “Credit Rating Agencies (Civil Liability) Regulations 
2013”633. The Act strengthens the responsibility regime of CRAs by implementing 
Article 35a of Regulation No 1060/2009 that provides for the civil liability of 
credit rating agencies ‘when an agency, either intentionally or with gross 
negligence, commits any of the infringements listed in Annex III to the EC 
Regulation’ (further discussion of the civil liability regime is provided in Chapter 
five).634 
Competent national authorities such as the FCA play a key role in the 
supervision of credit rating agencies and work collaboratively with ESMA.635 It 
should be noted that with the new financial supervisory structure introduced 
following the deliberations of the ‘de Larosière Group’636, the FSA’s role in 
relation to the supervision of CRAs was subordinated to ESMA.637 Although the 
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supervising of firms in the UK remains the responsibility of the FCA, CRAs are 
now supervised by ESMA. The FCA liaises closely with ESMA and the other 
Member States to monitor the risk of failures of CRAs and mitigate them 
appropriately.638  
As discussed, UK legislation for CRAs follows the regulatory schemes 
adopted at both European and international levels; in particular the UK follows 
the three CRA Regulations, which, when level 2 is considered, leave almost no 
discretion to the Member States. In this context it is useful to note that the Turner 
Review made a significant shift in the approach to the regulation of the UK 
financial and banking sector.639 The document was issued by the FSA in 2009 as a 
response to the widening financial crisis and the implications of bank collapses 
such as Northern Rock, Bear Stearns, Royal Bank of Scotland and Halifax Bank 
of Scotland.640  
The Turner Review was published to provide the first, in-depth response to the 
evident gaps in banking supervision. Its recommendations were based on a macro-
prudential approach rather than focusing solely on specific firms.641 
After providing a brief overview of the UK regulatory framework for CRAs, 
the following section analyses the Turner Review in detail and its effects on the 
ratings market. It takes into consideration the role of the supervisory authorities 
and the potential reforms for strengthening the CRAs’ activities.  
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3.3.1 The FSA 2009 Turner Review: the self-regulation regime 
The FSA’s Turner Review can be regarded as the first concrete regulatory 
response to the shortcomings of CRAs.642 The Review constituted an important 
contribution to the governance of CRAs and a significant step in the development 
of greater accountability of ratings. In the Review, the FSA made clear its 
conviction that regulatory change was required in order to improve the 
‘governance and conduct of rating agencies and the management of conflicts of 
interest’.643 It contains a set of recommendations regarding the transparency of 
rating methodologies and the integrity of CRAs.  
The former Chief Executive of the FSA, Hector Sants, affirmed that ‘credit 
ratings have become very deeply embedded in the regulatory architecture, so 
when they change they have knock-on effects across the board in terms of the way 
companies can fund themselves’.644  
In a scholarly commentary, it has been noted that the embodiment of ratings in 
regulation has automatic effects on the likelihood for securities and their issuers to 
find a sort of quasi-public licence that affects the success of an issue.645 
The Review called for closer supervision of credit rating agencies. In 
particular, it recommended that: (1) CRAs should be subject to registration and 
supervision to ensure good governance and management of conflicts of interest 
and to ensure that credit ratings are applied only to securities for which a 
consistent rating is possible; (2) CRAs and regulators should ensure that 
communications to investors about the appropriate use of ratings make it clear 
they are designed to carry inference for credit risk, not liquidity or market price; 
and (3) there should be a fundamental review of the use of structured finance 
ratings in the Basel II framework. 
The Review proposed a new type of regulatory regime, namely a principles-
based one.646 Such a regime was to be the cornerstone of the UK securities market 
and meant ‘moving away from reliance on detailed, prescriptive rules and relying 
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more on high-level, broadly stated rules or principles to set the standards by which 
regulated firms must conduct business’.647  
As affirmed in the Review, this regulatory regime involved: (1) a radical shift 
in supervisory style from focusing on systems and processes to focusing on key 
business outcomes and risks and on the sustainability of business models and 
strategies; (2) a different approach to the assessment of approved persons, with a 
focus on technical skills as well as probity; and (3) an outstanding increase in 
resources devoted to sectoral and firm comparator analysis, enabling the FSA to 
identify more effectively firms which are outliers in terms of risks and business 
strategies and to identify emerging sector-wide trends which may create systemic 
risk.648 
However, the principles-based regime as a pre-crisis approach proved to have 
limits and weaknesses.649 The most important aspect had to do with the legitimacy 
of this regime as a regulatory strategy. A principle in itself does not ensure a 
correct application of rules because, often, it is synonymous with escaping 
enforcement and a lack of certainty.650 In this respect, it has been observed that ‘a 
principles-based approach does not work with individuals who have no 
principles’.651 
The principles-based regime needs internal controls to strengthen its 
enforcement and must be accepted by market participants as a voluntary, yet 
binding, legal regime.652 It is arguable that principles represent a form of soft law, 
albeit not readily translatable into a legal paradigm of reference. 
Adopting principles-based regulation does not mean jettisoning the rules. It 
gives legislatures the power to set high-level regulatory goals and outcomes, and 
leaves the articulation of processes and details to front-line regulators in 
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collaboration with the industry itself.653 Therefore, a principles-based regime can 
be considered a form of self-regulation in which the markets can be regarded as 
rule-makers and governance rules as a surrogate for statutory norms.654  
In this context, the positive aspects of implementing self-regulatory measures 
in the ratings industry are speed, cost-efficiency and, more importantly, 
acceptance and cross-border application. However, to bring about these benefits, 
self-regulation needs to be properly integrated into the overall normative 
framework and must have adequate and effective enforcement regimes.655  
As Yeoh argued, ‘self-regulation in the credit rating industry evolved to 
forestall regulatory intervention, as a compromise for deregulatory weaknesses 
when quality or integrity issues pertaining to industry practices begin to surface in 
the early 1970s’.656  
As indicated above, the FSA’s Turner Report proposed a set of guidelines in 
order to reduce the inappropriate use of ratings and to secure financial soundness. 
But the regulatory improvements put forward in the FSA’s recommendations are 
debatable as to whether they indeed, are ‘improvements’. Government regulations 
often have the unintended and negative consequence of creating an insufficient 
normative framework for addressing the major concerns about the ratings 
industry. It has been a ‘game of cat and mouse’ between the rating agencies and 
regulators in a global context whereby regulators have pursued them for their role 
in the recent sovereign debt crisis.657  
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The FSA made it clear that any attempts by regulators to supervise CRAs’ 
methodologies would pose a number of complex challenges and that it did not see 
a case for pursuing such a form of intervention.658  
In addition, the FSA considered that there was no evidence to suggest that 
regulators would be more accurate in assessing the appropriateness of 
methodologies than the CRAs. While the Turner Review can be considered a first 
concrete attempt to provide measures as to how to regulate CRAs, even further, its 
impact on the ratings system was ultimately modest and above all needed to be 
implemented by more intrusive regulatory measures. 
After providing a critical appraisal of the FSA’s Turner Review, the next 
section considers the EU initiatives adopted for increasing CRAs’ accountability.  
 
3.3.2 The European legal system with regard to CRAs: overview of the regulatory 
landscape 
The European legal platform for CRAs had been justified mainly on the 
ground of the market regulating effects of the reputation of CRAs.659 In particular, 
the normative framework is constituted by the CRD660, the Market Abuse 
Directive (MAD)661 and the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive 
(MiFID).662  
The first, significant initiative was the European Commission’s 
Communication on CRAs of 2006.663 The Communication followed the European 
Parliament’s Resolution adopted in February 2004 on the role and methods of 
                                                 
658 FSA, ‘A Regulatory Response to the Global Banking Crisis’, Discussion Paper, March 2009, 
171. 
659 Mads Andenas, ‘Credit Rating Agencies, Their Regulation and Civil Liability in the European 
Union’ (2012) 1 Law and Economics Yearly Review, 268.  
660 Directive 2006/48/EC (note 513). 
661 Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2003 on 
insider dealing and market manipulation (market abuse) (OJ 2003 L 96, p. 16). The Market Abuse 
Directive applies to CRAs as far as there is market manipulation within the meaning of Article 1 
of the text, which is in the event that CRAs know or should know that their ratings are inaccurate. 
The Directive has been replaced by Directive 2014/57/EU on criminal sanctions for market abuse 
(OJ 2014 L 173, p. 179). 
662 Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on 
markets in financial instruments amending Council Directives 85/611/EEC and 93/6/EEC and 
Directive 2000/12/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council 
Directive 93/22/EEC (OJ 2004 L 145, p. 1). The Directive has been replaced by Directive 
2014/65/EU on markets in financial instruments (OJ 2014 L 173, p. 349). 
663 Communication from the Commission on Credit Rating Agencies (OJ 2006 C 59, p. 1).  
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CRAs.664 It concluded that the MAD and the CRD, combined with the IOSCO 
Code, could provide a satisfactory answer to the major issues of concern in 
relation to CRAs.665  
The EU initiative recognized the vital role played by CRAs in global securities 
and the banking sector and underlined the need to regulate ratings activity with 
some robust legislation. However, the European Securities Markets Expert Group 
(ESME) and the former Committee of European Securities Regulators (today 
ESMA) affirmed that closer supervision of CRAs would not be a valid option 
because of the high costs to be implemented in the securities regulation.666  
In the aftermath of the 2007-2009 financial crisis and following the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers, the EU institutions changed the regulatory landscape by 
proposing to establish a comprehensive legal framework for CRAs. In particular, 
the Commission argued that EU legislation appeared to be the only option left that 
could sufficiently protect investors and the European financial markets against the 
risk of malpractice by CRAs.667  
The Commission was aware of the deficiencies of the self-regulation system 
which existed in Europe and other jurisdictions and moved towards a strong 
regulatory regime for CRAs by proposing rules that were more robust and more 
enforceable.  
On 12 November 2008, the Commission formally published its proposal to 
regulate CRAs.668 The proposal was accompanied by an impact assessment that 
analysed the following policy strategies: (1) self-regulation that could be based on 
the IOSCO Code, on an industry ‘white paper’ or on initiatives by individual 
CRAs; (2) a voluntary European code of conduct for CRAs developed by the 
industry and based on the ‘comply or explain’ approach. This came with a 
monitoring body that would check compliance of that code; (3) a Commission 
                                                 
664 European Parliament, ‘Resolution on Role and Methods of Rating Agencies’ (2003/2081(INI)), 
January 2004. This resolution recognized the positive and active role of CRAs in the financial 
markets but also highlighted certain questions that warranted further action to ensure the CRAs 
performed their role in a responsible way. The Resolution called for an analysis of the convenience 
of setting a registration regime for CRAs in the EU. 
665 Raquel García Alcubilla and Javier Ruiz del Pozo (note 458) 48. 
666 European Securities Markets Expert Group (note 452); see also Committee of European 
Securities Regulators, ‘CESR’s Second Report to the European Commission on the compliance of 
credit rating agencies with the IOSCO code and the role of credit rating agencies in structured 
finance’, CESR/08-277, May 2008. 
667 European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on Credit Rating Agencies’, COM (2008) 704 final, November 2008, 4-5. 
668 ibid. 
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Recommendation setting standards that CRAs would have to comply with to 
operate in the EU but without an enforcement mechanism; and (4) EU legislation 
introducing a registration procedure and substantive requirements. 
The legislation was adopted in September 2009 (CRA Regulation No 
1060/2009).669 It set out a legally binding pan-European authorization regime for 
CRAs by targeting the problem of conflicts of interest and ratings quality. Some 
academics acknowledged that ‘the CRA Regulation introduces for the first time 
Community legislation on CRAs and this has meant incorporating a series of 
terms into Community law which until now were only used by the market’.670 
Other academics, however, argued that although the CRA Regulation introduced 
the essential checks on CRAs’ behaviour and that it seemed to be a well-balanced 
instrument, it did not adequately address the issues of rating competence, 
methodology, proprietary disclosure and accountability.671 Subsequently, it was 
proposed to amend the Regulation in order to appoint ESMA as the supervisory 
body for rating agencies. ESMA was designated to take over registration and 
approval, standard-setting, ongoing supervision and enforcement.672  
Regulation No 513/2011 (‘2011 CRA Regulation’)673 amended Regulation No 
1060/2009 by establishing specific rules to reinforce the public enforcement 
model, and introduce rules on a registration requirement, conflicts of interest, 
transparency requirements and the quality of the rating methodology, and civil 
liability of CRAs vis-à-vis their clients. 
Regulation No 1060/2009 (‘2009 CRA Regulation’) marked the first official 
regulatory measure of CRAs at EU level and was the first act explicitly to 
acknowledge the potential regulatory use of ratings by EU-based financial 
institutions. Under the 2009 CRA Regulation, competent national authorities were 
responsible for supervising CRAs, backed up by an operational network of 
national supervisory authorities.674  
                                                 
669 Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009. 
670 Raquel García Alcubilla and Javier Ruiz del Pozo (note 458) 58. 
671 Panagiotis K. Staikouras, ‘A Theoretical and Empirical Review of the EU Regulation on Credit 
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672 European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
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674 Niamh Moloney, ‘EU Financial Regulation after the Global Financial Crisis: “More Europe” or 
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Regulation No 513/2011 gave ESMA powers to manage supervision and 
registration procedures with the aim of ensuring a high level of consumer and 
investor protection. It no doubt improved cooperation between the centralized 
ESMA and national competent authorities and provided that a CRA established in 
the EU must be registered in order to conduct rating activities and distribute 
ratings to the public in the European Union.675 
Regulation No 1060/2009 has been amended by Regulation No 462/2013676—
a legislative act accompanied by Directive No 14/2013677—that imposes 
significant obligations on credit rating agencies. Although these measures attempt 
to establish a comprehensive normative framework for CRAs, it has been 
observed that ‘EU countries did not regulate CRAs through any coordinated 
regional or national efforts’.678  
The 2009 Regulation conceded that CRAs have failed. Firstly, there was the 
failure not to reflect the worsening market conditions early enough in their credit 
ratings, and secondly, the failure to adjust their credit ratings in time following the 
deepening market crisis.679 
The introduction of a new supervisory regime for CRAs constituted an 
important step for reforming the activity of rating agencies. However, the 
fundamental question is whether the EU legislation is capable of minimizing the 
negative consequences of ratings failures.680 
                                                 
Regulation imposes a comprehensive set of binding rules, which, by contrast with the US regime, 
address substantive operational and organizational rules in some detail, as well as disclosure-
related rules’.    
675 Niamh Moloney, EU Securities and Financial Markets Regulation (3rd edn, Oxford: Oxfrord 
University Press 2014) 638. The author observes that although ‘for the first time in EU securities 
and markets regulation, supervision and enforcement powers were centralized within ESMA (…) 
in terms of achieving outcomes, these measures might be regarded as the equivalent of ‘picking 
low-hanging fruit’. See also Iain MacNeil, An Introduction to the Law on Financial Investment 
(2nd edn, Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing 2012) 438. 
676 Regulation (EU) No 462/2013.  
677 Directive 2013/14/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 
amending Directive 2003/41/EC on the activities and supervision of institutions for occupational 
retirement provision, Directive 2009/65/EC on the coordination of laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions relating to undertakings for collective investment in transferable 
securities (UCITS) and Directive 2011/61/EU on Alternative Investment Fund Managers in 
respect of over-reliance on credit ratings (OJ 2013 L 145 p. 1).  
678 Chris Brummer and Rachel Loko (note 487) 15.  
679 Recital 10 in the preamble to Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009. 
680 Nina Dietz Legind and Camilla Hørby Jensen, ‘The European Regulation of Credit Rating 
Agencies’ (2014) 30 Law in Context 1, 114. The authors observe that ‘while credit rating agencies 
were prominent as one of the immediate causes of the crisis, clearly regulation of credit rating 
agencies by itself would not have prevented the crisis, nor can such regulation prevent a future 
financial crisis’. 
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After providing an overview of the EU regulatory scheme for CRAs, the next 
section examines Regulation Nos 1060/2009 and 513/2011 in greater detail, 
having regard to the major concerns of these normative measures.  
 
3.3.3 Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 and Regulation (EU) No 513/2011 
The adoption of Regulation No 1060/2009 represented the transition of the 
rules governing CRAs from a self-regulatory to a government-regulated 
framework. The Regulation was a response to the spreading of the 2008 financial 
crisis and to the ongoing turmoil in the securities market. Previously, CRAs opted 
for a soft law regime by adopting the IOSCO Code, which is designed on a 
voluntary basis and without legally binding mechanisms.  
One of the most important goals of the 2009 CRA Regulation has been an 
official recognition of the significant impact of CRAs on the operations of the 
markets and on the trust and confidence of investors and consumers.681 The EU 
legislation considered ratings as an important reference for investment and 
financing decisions, credit activities and financial instruments.  
However, the CRAs’ performances have displayed manifest shortcomings 
during the recent financial crisis, particularly as a result of inflated ratings issued 
for certain products.682 The 2010-2012 sovereign debt crisis has confirmed that 
the CRAs’ assessments have negatively affected the liquidity problems of 
troubled EU Member States and influenced the financial assistance to solve the 
crisis.683  
In simple terms, the 2009 CRA Regulation addresses the following aspects of 
the CRAs’ market: (1) limited competition; (2) conflicts of interest; (3) 
organizational and record-keeping requirements; (4) rating disclosure; (5) rating 
                                                 
681 Recital 1 in the preamble to Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009. 
682 Lynnette D. Purda, ‘Assessing Credit or Determining Quantity? The Evolving Role of Rating 
Agencies’ (2011) 21 Journal of Applied Finance 2, 20-21.  
683 Norbert Gaillard, ‘How and why credit rating agencies missed the Eurozone debt crisis’ (2014) 
9 Capital Markets Law Journal 2, 136, where it is argued that ‘when CRAs began to downgrade 
peripheral Eurozone countries, the agencies were vehemently blamed for exacerbating the crisis. 
Such attacks were not entirely fair, given that credit ratings turned out to be more lenient than 
market-based indicators’. See also John Ryan, ‘The negative impact of Credit Rating Agencies and 
proposals for better regulation’ (January 2012) Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) Working 
Paper No 1, Research Division EU Integration, German Institute for International and Security 
Affairs, Berlin, 5; Remi Van de Calseijde, ‘Quis custodiet ipsos custodies? The regulation of 
sovereign ratings by Regulation 462/2013’ (2014) 20 International Trade Law and Regulation 1, 
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accountability; and (6) transparency and market discipline. The measure 
introduced specific rules with regard to the management and supervision of 
registered CRAs. As is stated in the preamble, the Regulation aims to protect the 
stability of financial markets and investors.684 
According to Article 1 of the 2009 CRA Regulation, the law introduces a 
common regulatory approach in order to enhance the integrity, transparency, 
responsibility, good governance and reliability of credit rating activities. The 
Regulation addresses the issuance of ratings only when they are used for 
regulatory purposes by EU-based financial institutions and does not create a 
general obligation for financial instruments to be rated under the 2009 CRA 
Regulation. Regarding the registration and supervision of CRAs, the legislation 
provides that credit institutions may use only ratings which have been issued by 
recognised ECAIs to determine the risk weights and the resulting capital 
requirements applied to a bank or investment firm’s exposure.685  
Regarding the rules of conduct for registered CRAs, the 2009 Regulation 
introduces stringent requirements for the issuance of credit ratings for structured 
finance. It also provides that CRAs must distinguish, by way of a particular 
symbol, rating categories attributed to structured instruments from rating 
categories used for other entities, financial instruments or financial obligations.686  
The instrument requires CRAs to disclose, on an ongoing basis, information 
about all structured finance products submitted to them for their initial review or 
for preliminary rating, irrespective of whether their issuers contract them for a 
final rating.687  
Registered CRAs are also required to disclose to the public the methodologies, 
models and criteria employed in their credit rating activities.688 CRAs are obliged 
to review their ratings continually in order to improve past performance and the 
quality of assessment. However, the 2009 CRA Regulation does not specify to 
                                                 
684 Recital 7 in the preamble to Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009. 
685 Recital 44 in the preamble to Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009. 
686 This approach reflects to a large extent the recommendations of the IOSCO Code, where it is 
stated that a CRA should differentiate ratings of structured finance products from traditional 
corporate bond ratings, through a different rating symbology. 
687 Annex I-section D (II.4) to Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009. According to recital 41 in the 
preamble to Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009, CRAs should avoid situations in which issuers 
request a preliminary rating assessment from a number of CRAs in order to identify the one 
offering the best credit rating for the proposed structured finance instrument, and issuers should 
avoid engaging in such practices. 
688 Article 11 of Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009.  
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what extent CRAs have to reveal their methodologies.689 In this context, it has 
been pointed out that ‘while full disclosure of methodologies can contribute to a 
better understanding of the value of credit ratings, full disclosure could create 
strong disincentives to use the best available methodologies and to invest in better 
rating methodologies’.690 
Regarding the equivalence and endorsement regime, the 2009 CRA 
Regulation establishes a mechanism for recognizing ratings assigned by CRAs 
outside the Eurozone. Registered CRAs can endorse the ratings given by their 
affiliates outside the Eurozone on the basis of certain requirements.691 These 
provisions aim to ensure the efficient and effective supervision of the activities of 
CRAs located outside the EU. 
Articles 14 to 20 of the 2009 CRA Regulation impose the conditions and 
procedure for the granting or withdrawal of registration. The procedure is 
characterized by a complex system of authorization and agreements between the 
former CESR and the competent national authorities of the Member State.  
The authorization regime is based on three different types of registration: (1) 
registration system for CRAs established in the EU; (2) endorsement scheme for 
ratings issued in third countries; and (3) a certification procedure for ratings 
issued in third countries and related to entities or financial instruments issued in 
third countries.  
This regime was criticized for its ineffectivity in dealing with disagreements 
between national authorities and for its failure to make clear the division of 
responsibilities between the competent authority of the Member State and the 
other competent authorities.692  
The 2011 CRA Regulation sought to remedy these shortcomings. However, 
the dividing lines between national supervision authorities have still not been 
                                                 
689 Recital 25 in the preamble to Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009: ‘credit rating agencies should 
disclose information to the public on the methodologies, models and key rating assumptions which 
they use in their credit rating activities. The level of detail concerning the disclosure of 
information concerning models should be such as to give adequate information to the users of 
credit ratings in order to perform their own due diligence when assessing whether to rely or not on 
those credit ratings’. 
690 Jacob de Haan and Fabian Amtenbrink, ‘Credit Rating Agencies’, De Nederlandsche Bank 
Working Paper No 278, January 2011, 23. 
691 Articles 4 and 5 of Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009. 
692 Jacob de Haan and Fabian Amtenbrink (note 690) 21-22. 
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adequately addressed, which leads to negative consequences in terms of 
transparency and market stability. 
Academic commentators have observed how the 2009 Regulation has taken 
the approach of fostering competition by way of authorization and registration 
mechanisms, and rating disclosure through transparent credit assessment and by 
eliminating rating shopping.693 In essence, the main objectives of the 2009 
Regulation are: (1) addressing conflicts of interest; and, (2) ensuring market 
competition. Under the conflicts-of-interest heading, Article 6 of the 2009 CRA 
Regulation aims to ensure the independence of ratings by obliging CRAs to 
implement adequate internal controls so as to avoid collusive behaviour within the 
issuer-pays business model. This provision seeks to mitigate against dubious 
relationships between analysts, employees and other persons involved in the 
rating activities.694 Under the market competition head, the 2009 CRA Regulation 
does not enshrine specific rules for governing the high access barriers in the 
CRAs market.  
The registration system and the information disclosure regime do not seem 
sufficient in themselves to increase competition among S&P’s, Moody’s and 
Fitch. New rating firms could not easily fill the reputational gap of the most 
widely recognized CRAs because of their ‘consolidated names’. EU legislation 
should consider the option of introducing comparative measures to assess the 
accuracy of CRA estimates in order to ensure equal treatment for all rating 
agencies.    
It may be said that the 2009 CRA Regulation provides a catalogue of rules of 
conduct—inspired mainly by the 2008 IOSCO Code of Conduct—with which 
rating agencies must comply in order to foster market transparency and investor 
confidence. Nonetheless in 2010, the European Commission proposed 
amendments to Regulation No 1060/2009 in order to: (1) strengthen information 
disclosure for the rating of structured finance instruments; (2) establish a central 
                                                 
693 Panagiotis K. Staikouras (note 671) 89. 
694 Article 6 of Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009, which states that “a credit rating agency shall take 
all necessary steps to ensure that the issuing of a credit rating is not affected by any existing or 
potential conflict of interest or business relationship involving the credit rating agency issuing the 
credit rating, its managers, rating analysts, employees, any other natural person whose services are 
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single regulatory body; and (3) reduce over-reliance on CRAs.695 As a result of 
the new rules, issuers were required to provide the appointed CRA with access to 
a password-protected website to retrieve all information necessary for the CRA 
initially to determine or monitor the credit rating of a structured finance 
product.696 
One of the main shortcomings of the 2009 CRA Regulation concerns the 
supervision regime. Member States have to identify competent national authorities 
with the task of ensuring that CRAs comply with the Regulation. EU national 
legislators must equip competent authorities with a set of supervisory measures at 
their disposal to prohibit or suspend the use of credit ratings when a CRA 
breaches the obligations set out in the Regulation.697  
The authorities are obliged to lay down the rules on penalties, which may be 
criminal or administrative. Competent authorities must also impart all rules that 
are applicable to infringements of the provisions of the Regulation and should 
take all measures necessary to ensure that they are implemented. The penalties 
that authorities can issue should be effective, proportionate and dissuasive. They 
should also, at least, cover cases of gross professional misconduct and lack of due 
diligence.698  
However, such a regulatory system leaves room for discretion and 
unmonitored actions. The 2009 CRA Regulation does not provide either the legal 
resources to enforce the absence of cooperation between national authorities or 
legally binding mechanisms to enforce the inactivity of authorities. In this regard, 
the main criticism of 2009 CRA Regulation was that it did not empower a 
European body to oversee the CRA operations. In harsher terms, the 2009 CRA 
Regulation did not provide a single supervisory authority for rating agencies. 
After the adoption of Regulation No 513/2011, the supervision of CRAs 
became more centralized.699 The new legislation designated ESMA with 
                                                 
695 The amendments were approved and finally signed into law in June 2011. The new rules came 
into force in July 2011. 
696 A third-party CRA can request access to this website provided that it meets certain 
requirements. 
697 Article 24 of Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009. 
698 Article 36 of Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009. 
699 Niamh Moloney, ‘The European Securities and Markets Authority and Institutional Design for 
the EU Financial Market – A Tale of Two Competences: Part (2) Rules in Action’ (note 184) 205, 
where it is pointed out that ‘the transfer of direct supervisory power over rating agencies is a major 
development as it has required the EU legislative institutions to design an operational model which 
may support extensive transfers of direct power in the future’. 
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competence in matters relating to the ongoing supervision of registered CRAs.700 
ESMA is responsible for the registration and ongoing supervision of credit rating 
agencies, but not for oversight of the users of credit ratings. It has the competence 
to delegate specific supervisory tasks to national authorities, including powers to 
request information, to launch investigations, and to perform on-site inspections. 
ESMA is also responsible for the endorsement of the ‘as stringent as’ test for 
ratings produced by credit rating agencies outside the EU.701 However, the fact 
that ESMA is not an independent institution when it comes to monitoring rating 
performance may generate some doubts as to any objective improvements in the 
transparency of CRAs.  
Regulation No 1060/2009 and the 2011 CRA Regulation failed to make the 
division of responsibility among the authorities clear.702 The evidence now 
emerging as to ESMA’s supervisory powers and activities on CRAs703 suggests 
that the regulatory framework has been effective after the implementation of 2013 
CRA Regulation.  
In this context, ESMA adopted a risk-based approach to supervising CRAs in 
order to improve compliance with the provisions of the 2013 CRA Regulation. 
ESMA’s activities include formal requests for information, the conduct of 
inspections and investigations as well as the enforcement actions in appropriate 
cases (e.g. remedial action plan and the appointment of an Independent 
Investigating Officer).704 However, supervision of CRAs’ internal governance—
                                                 
700 According to recital 6 in the preamble to Regulation (EU) No 513/2011, ‘ESMA should be 
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clarity regarding staff roles and responsibilities, and the involvement of ratings 
analysts in business development—seems a difficult task for regulators.705  
As ESMA has claimed, ‘compliance with a number of these points could not 
be demonstrated, typically because policies and procedures did not describe in 
sufficient detail the different steps of the process followed or did not clearly 
allocate roles and responsibilities’.706 Closer examination of ESMA’s supervisory 
duties leaves the impression that rating methodologies are not supervised 
effectively. The task force launched by Community regulations aimed at 
reinforcing ESMA’s power of supervision may clash with the CRAs’ internal 
review and compliance procedures. The upshot is that CRAs can continue their 
activity largely unmonitored within the areas of conflicts of interest and market 
concentration. 
Unlike in the US, the European Commission reacted to the global crisis by 
supervising CRAs more closely, rather than by excluding references to their 
ratings in regulations. The EU legislative bodies are aware that new registration 
requirements may lead to a false sense of security as the US is at pains to state 
that ratings should be monitored thoroughly. However, ‘the fact that ratings are 
embedded in official EU regulation may be interpreted as implying a seal of 
approval and would thus further encourage excessive reliance on ratings by 
investors who should be conducting their own due diligence’.707 
After providing an analysis of the EU regulatory scheme for CRAs, the next 
section critically discusses the main features of Regulation No 462/2013 adopted 
to reform ratings governance. 
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3.3.4 Regulation No 462/2013 as a European response to the perceived 
shortcomings of CRAs  
It appears that EU legislation has not alleviated the major concerns about the 
rating business, which are principally limited competition, conflicts of interest and 
over-reliance. The EU’s regulatory policies have not managed to improve 
competition in the ratings industry or to avoid the opacity of the standards and 
methodologies used to produce the ratings. 
Although one of the driving forces behind the adoption of the EU 
authorization regime for CRAs has been the fostering of competition, closer 
examination of the 2009 CRA Regulation reveals that the word ‘competition’ is 
missing from the text and there is no explicit reference to the need to foster 
competitive forces in the ratings market.708  
It is instructive to note that a lack of competition in the ratings industry 
deprives the market from an effective control mechanism over product quality and 
pricing, while also removing incentives to innovate. On this point, it has been 
noted that ‘on the structure of the industry, the EU increases the barriers to entry, 
by introducing a license and setting tight regulation, rather than taking the 
oligopolistic nature as one of the fundamental reasons for the abuses’.709 
The 2009 CRA Regulation did not provide for a separate regulatory regime for 
CRAs and did not establish a system to enforce ratings activity. Instead, the 
legislation concentrated all the regulatory activity into the competent national 
authorities.710 In addition, the 2009 CRA Regulation did not provide specific rules 
about the regulation of the CRAs’ ownership composition.  
As indicated in Chapter one, the internal governance of the main rating 
agencies is generally considered a “grey area”. Internal governance activities of 
risk management raise a number of doubts about the actual independence of their 
conduct. The transparency of CRAs represents a pressing challenge for regulators 
and policymakers who find it difficult to determine a normative regime that will 
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encourage rating behaviour so as to provide all relevant information to the 
market.711 
The previous non-binding regulatory regime for CRAs favoured opaque 
ratings and ineffective due diligence with respect to ratings methodologies. 
Furthermore, ‘the acceptance of external credit assessment for the determining of 
capital requirements has effectively resulted in the ‘outsourcing of regulatory 
judgement’, whereby it is not the CRA that bears the final risk, but rather the 
taxpayer that may have to come to the rescue of a failing systemically relevant 
institution’.712 
Proposals to enhance more competition and diversity in rating agencies have 
been considered at EU level. The European Parliament presented a resolution that 
proposed the establishment of a new independent European Credit Rating 
Foundation713 with the possibility of launching ‘a network of smaller European 
rating agencies, in an effort to bring more competition into the industry’.714  
In this way, the creation of a new Europe-based rating agency that specialises 
in sovereign debt could represent a solution to the shortcomings.715 However, the 
prospect of a European rating agency remains a vague one, since the EU 
institutions have not yet reached a decision as to how such an entity would be 
founded or where it might be based. In addition, the proposed government-
sponsored rating agency would be likely to find it difficult to establish its 
credibility in a market dominated by S&P’s, Moody’s and Fitch.716 
The hypothesis that an external independent authority for rating agencies 
could be a viable option to build confidence in ratings of creditworthiness needs 
to be verified in practice. Ratings should be regulated under a single regulatory 
framework constituted by an internationally established code. This should be seen 
in conjunction with the idea of having a single independent authority.  
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35 The Journal of Corporation Law 1, 205-206.  
712 Jacob de Haan and Fabian Amtenbrink (note 690) 33. 
713 European Parliament, Resolution of 8 June 2011 on credit rating agencies: future perspectives 
(2010/2302(INI)). 
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Another challenge for regulators is how to increase the level of investor 
protection by reducing the moral hazard effects of inflated ratings.717 In this 
context, the EU enacted Regulation No 462/2013 (‘2013 CRA Regulation’) which 
is aimed at re-regulating the CRAs and in which it sought to address the major 
concerns such as the conflicts of interest in the market for credit ratings, rating 
agency behaviour and the agencies’ liability. Specifically, the 2013 CRA 
Regulation requires issuers to rotate regularly the agencies that rate government 
bonds and financial products. The rationale underpinning this policy is to open up 
competition and avoid conflicts of interest. According to these rules, CRAs may 
rate State debts under specific restrictions: unsolicited sovereign ratings may be 
published at least twice but no more than three times a year, on dates published by 
the rating agency at the end of the previous year. Also, these ratings may be 
published only after markets in the EU have closed and at least one hour before 
they reopen. 
As regards conflicts of interest, a CRA will have to refrain from issuing 
ratings, or disclose that its ratings may be affected, if a shareholder or member 
holding ten percent of the voting rights in that agency has invested in the rated 
entity. Then, it is provided that no one may simultaneously hold stakes of more 
than five percent in more than one CRA, unless the agencies concerned belong to 
the same group.718  
As far as the potential liability of CRAs is concerned, investors who rely on a 
credit rating could sue the agency that issued it for damages if it breaches the rules 
set out in this legislation either intentionally or by gross negligence, regardless 
whether there is any contractual relationship between the parties.719 As discussed 
in Chapter five, Article 35a of Regulation No 462/2013720 establishes the civil 
liability regime for CRAs by introducing specific provisions to the claimant’s 
standing. Detailed procedural aspects are required for investors who have 
reasonably relied on an incorrect rating, as well as the issuers who provided 
information that led to the inaccurate rating. 
                                                 
717 Mads Andenas (note 659) 273. 
718 Recital 23 in the preamble to Regulation (EU) No 462/2013 amending Regulation (EC) No 
1060/2009 on credit rating agencies. 
719 ibid recitals 32-33. 
720 Article 35a(1) of Regulation (EU) No 462/2013. 
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In this respect, two questions arise. The first is to what extent the 2013 CRA 
Regulation has provided for a level of enforcement such as to impose liability for 
misleading statements and misconduct during the ratings process, combined with 
the quantum of compensation to the investor for losses suffered. The second 
question concerns the minimum degree of financial knowledge that will exonerate 
CRAs from liability where evaluations have been supplied to the market.   
As third parties do not have close insight of the internal procedures of CRAs, a 
partial reversal of the burden of proof—with regard to the existence of an 
infringement—and the infringement’s impact on the rating outcome seems to be 
appropriate. However, the burden of proof as regards the existence of damage and 
the causality of the infringement for the damage, both being closer to the sphere 
of the third party, should be fully attached to the third party. 
Finally, with respect to the publication of ratings on the European rating 
platform, the new rules allow all available ratings to be published on this 
platform. This allowance will improve the comparability and visibility of all 
ratings for any financial instrument rated by rating agencies registered and 
authorized in the EU.721 
It is evident that the EU legislator has introduced a rules-based regime in 
which CRAs are subject to closer supervision and pervasive internal controls. The 
new regulatory approach aims to ensure accountability to investors through clarity 
of responsibility between the competent authorities. The 2013 CRA Regulation is 
designed to govern the conduct of CRAs and the market structure risks. In this 
light, the 2013 CRA Regulation represents a possible way of bringing back 
confidence within ratings’ activities. As Andenas has pointed out, ‘the regulatory 
regime in the EU seems to be pulling out all the stops to deal with rating accuracy 
in response to the recognized market failures in the credit rating industry’.722  
Above all, the accuracy of and the methods employed by CRAs will be a chief 
factor in enhancing market confidence. This is because it is only if there is clear 
accountability between participants that it will be possible to rebuild a fiduciary 
relationship in the financial markets. In other words, the credibility of CRAs can 
be measured in terms of intermediaries’ accountability, not only from the point of 
view of the suitability of market actors, but also of effective enforcement. One can 
                                                 
721 EU Focus, ‘New rules for credit ratings agencies agreed’ (2013) 18-19. 
722 Mads Andenas (note 659) 312. 
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argue that the road to achieving accuracy about CRAs’ modus operandi must 
presuppose a strong structure of self-regulation in terms of right behaviours and 
actions. However, the main task of the 2013 CRA Regulation is not only to 
address the weaknesses of the CRAs market but also to reduce the risks posed by 
ratings to financial stability. In addition, it seeks to reduce the procyclicality of 
ratings in the financial system.723 
The next chapter focuses on the accountability of the CRAs, in particular on 
generic grounds of liability such as contract, tort, fiduciary duty, estoppel and 
statutory right of action. It is considered whether the doctrine of estoppel 
constitutes a viable solution to hold credit rating agencies responsible vis-à-vis 
investors.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
723 Niamh Moloney (note 675) 651, where it is observed that ‘the CRA III reforms, however, 
represent an attempt to address structural market weaknesses’. 
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Chapter Four 
Mapping the Liability Contours for Credit Rating Agencies  
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines the accountability regime for CRAs, notably the extent 
to which CRAs may be held liable for issuing inaccurate ratings.  
Before discussing in detail the major questions raised CRAs’ liability, it is 
helpful to outline the notion of accountability. Accountability may be usefully 
defined as an obligation to give account of, explain and justify one’s actions.724 In 
the sense of a clear definition of responsibility, accountability comprises four 
elements: (1) a holder of power; (2) an authority to whom accountability is owed; 
(3) the content of the obligation; and (4) criteria of assessment.725 This notion of 
accountability essentially reflects the theory of the division of powers and the 
existing system of checks and balances.726 
Accountability of CRAs in the financial markets may be considered from the 
point of view of private law. Recently, the role of the courts in the private law 
aspects of financial law has been predominantly considered with reference to the 
crisis-era experience. In particular, private-law actions have been widely used to 
contain systemic risk in the case of financial failures, and to address the costs of 
damages in the case of compensation for losses. The relative merits of private 
disciplining techniques are essentially ‘to provide quick solutions in complex and 
time-pressured circumstances’ through contractual clauses or court decisions.727 
For example, in RAB Capital Plc v Lehman Brothers International (Europe), the 
                                                 
724 Rosa M. Lastra, International Financial and Monetary Law (Oxford: OUP 2015) Chapter 2. 
725 Rosa M. Lastra and Fabian Amtenbrink, ‘Securing Democratic Accountability of Financial 
Regulatory Agencies – A Theoretical framework’ in Richard V. de Mulder (ed), Mitigating Risk in 
the Context of Safety and Security. How Relevant is a Rational Approach? (Rotterdam: Erasmus 
School of Law & Research School for Safety and Security (OMV 2008) 115-132; Luis Garicano 
and Rosa M. Lastra, ‘Towards a new Architecture for Financial Stability: Seven Principles’ (2010) 
13 Journal of International Economic Law 3, 616. See also Julia Black, ‘Constructing and 
contesting legitimacy and accountability in polycentric regulatory regimes’ (2008) 2 Regulation & 
Governance 2, 149-152. 
726 ibid. 
727 Michael Bridge and Jo Braithwaite, ‘Private Law and Financial Crises’ (2013) 13(2) Journal of 
Corporate Law Studies, 365, where it is also observed that ‘private law complements the relevant 
regulatory regime; while the role of the latter may be said to keep the plane in the air, private law 
minimizes the damage if it hits the ground’. 
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court considered whether a proprietary claim under a prime brokerage agreement 
against a company in administration could be expedited.728 Discussion of the role 
of private-law remedies has the benefit of analysing the difficulties posed by 
private litigation in different judicial systems and clarifying the legal reasoning by 
which liability might attach to a CRA. It would also have the benefit of explaining 
the link between the systemic impact of CRAs’ activities on financial stability and 
the private-law framework applicable to CRAs.  
In this context, the public interest in maintaining financial stability and the 
enforcement function of a private liability regime are directed to securing 
protection for retail investors. As MacNeil has observed, ‘the emphasis on ex ante 
prevention of systemic risk means that ex post enforcement action cannot play a 
major role in prudential supervision because by that time the regulator will have 
failed to secure the regulatory objective’.729 The flexibility of private law may 
contribute to pressing regulatory objectives for CRAs such as transparency and 
market integrity, and may assist the regulatory authorities in identifying the risks 
of ratings. 
The next section takes into account the liability scenario under the tort law 
regime by considering whether agencies may be regarded as being subject to a 
duty of care with respect to the market and investors. In particular, the analysis 
considers the degree of liability by taking into account the various positions taken 
by the courts. 
 
4.2 The liability regime for CRAs under tort law: a possible duty of care? 
CRAs should provide proper ratings of the debt liability and probability of 
default while owing their duty to market and investors. However, CRAs are 
largely immune from liability and seemingly do not owe any duty of care to 
market participants. As a result, it is difficult to demonstrate the reliance 
necessary to be successful in a fraud or negligence action against a CRA.730 As 
one commentator put it, ‘since the agencies have no contractual relationship with, 
                                                 
728 See RAB Capital Plc & Anor v Lehman Brothers International (Europe) [2008] EWHC 2335 
(Ch). 
729 Iain MacNeil, ‘Enforcement and Sanctioning’ in Niamh Moloney, Eilìs Ferran and Jennifer 
Payne (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Financial Regulation (Oxford: OUP 2015) 293. 
730 Nan S. Ellis, Lisa M. Fairchild and Frank D’Souza, ‘Is Imposing Liability on Credit Rating 
Agencies a Good Idea?: Credit Rating Agency Reform in the Aftermath of the Global Financial 
Crisis’ (2012) 17 Stanford Journal of Law, Business & Finance 2, 183-184. 
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or fiduciary duty to, bond investors, they can publish any opinion without being 
liable’.731 
In order to understand a possible option for holding CRAs liable, due 
consideration should be given to the English tort of negligence732 with particular 
attention to the duty of care and misrepresentation.733 As Chitty and Beale have 
observed, ‘a negligent misrepresentation is one which is made carelessly, or 
without reasonable grounds for believing it to be true’.734 A misrepresentation 
generally involves only one of a number of causes operating on the mind of the 
representee which induced the change of position. For example, in the listing 
particulars, a prospectus may contain a mass of correct information calculated to 
induce a subscription, but a single misrepresentation could support a cause of 
action.735 In this context, prospectus liability is based on negligent misstatements 
and extends to directors and indeed all those who endorse the prospectus.736 
However, depending on the jurisdiction, liability for misstatements in a 
prospectus can fall on any number of entities, including the issuing company and 
its directors and officers.737 
                                                 
731 John Gapper, ‘Rating agencies must beware of the law’ Financial Times (London, 6 February 
2013).   
732 Winfield and Jolowicz, Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort, W.V.H. Rogers (ed.) (18th eds., Sweet 
& Maxwell 2010) para 5.1, where negligence is defined as follows: “negligence as a tort is the 
breach of a legal duty to take care which results in damage to the claimant”. 
733 Misrepresentation can be defined as an ambiguous, false statement of fact or law which is 
addressed to the innocent party and which is possibly material and which induces him or her to 
enter into the contract. The representation would affect the judgement of a reasonable person. 
According to the Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission, there are three main 
requirements for a misrepresentation: it must be (1) false; (2) factual; and (3) not an omission. In 
particular, a misrepresentation only counts if it relates to one of the matters specifically listed 
within it. See Law Commission Consultation Paper No 199 and Scottish Law Commission 
Discussion Paper No 149, ‘Consumer Redress for Misleading and Aggressive Practices’, Joint 
Consultation Paper, April 2011, 59. 
734 Derry v Peek (1889) 14 App. Cas. 337 as cited in Joseph Chitty and Hugh G. Beale, Chitty on 
Contracts, General Principles, Volume 1 (31st eds., London: Sweet & Maxwell 2013) 613. 
735 The Hon. K.R. Handley A.O., Q.C., ‘Causation in misrepresentation’ (2015) 131 Law 
Quarterly Review, 278. 
736 On this discussion see Paul Davies, ‘Liability for Misstatements to the Market: Some 
Reflections’ (2009) 9(2) Journal of Corporate Law Studies, 297. 
737 See Kolassa v Barclays Bank (C-375/13) where the Court of Justice of the European Union 
held that: (1) consumer investors can only bring prospectus liability claims in their home State if 
they have concluded a direct contractual relationship with the issuer, and only if the issuer has 
marketed the securities in their home State; (2) secondary market purchasers cannot invoke Article 
5(1) of Regulation No 44/2001 (Brussels Regulation), which grants jurisdiction to the courts of the 
State where the relevant contractual obligation was to be performed; and (3) tortious or statutory 
claims can be brought in the jurisdiction where damage is suffered, which may be where investors’ 
bank accounts are located. Issuers thus face the prospect of litigating parallel claims in multiple 
jurisdictions. 
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Types of misrepresentation include: (1) fraudulent misrepresentation; (2) 
negligent misrepresentation; and (3) innocent misrepresentation.738 The term 
‘innocent misrepresentation’ means a representation which is neither fraudulent 
nor negligent, and no action for damages lies for a mere innocent 
misrepresentation.739 
In Nocton v Ashburton, the House of Lords held that a duty of care may arise 
(even apart from contract) out of a fiduciary relationship and an action will lie in 
tort for negligent misrepresentation causing loss to the representee where the 
relationship of the parties is such as to give rise to a duty of care.740 This case 
underlined the question of economic losses flowing from a fiduciary relationship 
such as that of principal and agent.  
In Hedley Byrne v Heller Partners, the court affirmed tort liability for 
negligent misstatement causing financial loss.741 In particular, the ruling stated 
that even in absence of contract the success of a claim depends on proofs of a 
special relationship: the party making the representation—for instance, the 
CRA—has or purports to have some special skills or knowledge about the fact 
that the other party—for instance, the investor—would rely on the representation 
made.742 This authority established the principle that giving negligent advice 
outside of a contractual relationship could give rise to liability for pure economic 
loss. 
                                                 
738 Misrepresentation can be defined ‘innocent’ when equity intervenes to protect those who might 
not otherwise have a remedy. Equity’s intervention is based on the idea that no one should be 
allowed to retain a benefit obtained by way of an untrue statement. Equity’s position is that 
misrepresentation is morally unacceptable even if innocent. The Misrepresentation Act 1967 
created statutory liability for negligent misrepresentation which does not rely on a special 
relationship while innocent misrepresentation is now only relevant if made entirely without fault. 
See Heilbut, Symonds & Co v Buckleton [1913] A.C. 30; Gilchester Properties Ltd v Gomm 
[1948] 1 All E.R. 493; Dick Bentley Productions Ltd v Harold Smith (Motors) Ltd [1965] 1 
W.L.R. 623. In doctrine see Mindy Chen-Wishart, Contract Law (4th edn, Oxford: OUP 2012) 
222-223; Ewan McKendrick, Contract Law: Text, Cases, and Materials (5th edn, Oxford: OUP 
2012) 580-581. 
739 Joseph Chitty and Hugh G. Beale (note 734) 627. 
740 Nocton v Ashburton [1914] A.C. 932. It should be noted that a fiduciary relationship arising out 
of a professional relationship supports a duty of care in tort for which ordinary tort damages are 
recoverable. See Arenson v Casson Beckman Rutley & Co [1977] A.C. 405 and Midland Bank 
Trust Co Ltd v Hett Stubbs & Kemp [1979] Ch. 384. 
741 Hedley Byrne v Heller Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465. The case concerned liability in tort to a 
person who suffered pecuniary loss through relying on a misleading statement, made carelessly but 
honestly. The Court of Appeal held that there may be a tortious claim for damages based upon a 
duty to take care, independent of contract or fiduciary obligations. For a commentary on this ruling 
see Douglas Payne, ‘Hedley Byrne & Co. Ltd. v. Heller & Partners, Ltd’ (1964) 6 University of 
Western Australia Law Review 4, 467. 
742 See Lord Reid and Lord Hodson in Hedley Byrne v Heller Partners Ltd [1964] A.C. 465 at 486 
and 509, respectively. 
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If  a CRA’s modus operandi falls within the hypothesis of ‘negligence’, it is 
possible to argue that an implicit representation of existing fact, e.g. ratings, 
provided by CRAs can give rise to liability in tort for incorrect opinions and 
forecasts. This question could be analysed in the context of the business 
relationship between CRAs and issuers requesting the rating and therefore, with 
respect to investors in the case of damages for inaccurate or flawed evaluations.  
On the base of the assumption that the credit rating agency did not take 
reasonable care in making the forecast, it could be held liable for losses caused by 
unreliable ratings produced in haste or when it is beyond its expertise to conduct 
proper ratings.743 Therefore, CRAs as ‘guardians’ of financial markets should owe 
a duty to perform their assessments with a certain degree of care and skill.744 If 
CRAs breach that duty, they commit the tort of negligence.745  
However, liability in the tort of negligence is premised on fault which means it 
must be shown that the defendant was in breach of his duty to take reasonable 
care of the claimant.746 The existence of a duty of care is the primary requirement 
for a successful claim in negligence and it is very difficult to find CRAs owing 
                                                 
743 Esso Petroleum Co v Mardon [1976] Q.B. 801; McNally v Welltrade International Ltd[1978] 
I.R.L.R. 497; Box v Midland Bank Ltd [1979] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 391; FoodCo UK LLP (t/a Muffin 
Break) v Henry Boot Developments Ltd [2010] EWHC 358 (Ch). These cases show that the 
distinction between statements of existing facts and ‘predictions’ is not relevant for the purpose of 
establishing liability in tort. In doctrine see Mohammed B. Hemraj, ‘Tort law and corrective 
justice: compensating investors’ (2013) 34 Company Lawyer 11, 350. The author observes that 
‘investors cannot sue CRAs for breach of contract and any legal remedy they may claim lies in tort 
and specific statutory provisions’ and notes that ‘the regulators should compel CRAs to hold 
compulsory a professional indemnity insurance (PII) policy to compensate the investors for their 
losses arising from relying on inflated ratings being given by CRAs’. 
744 To determine the objective standard of care or the level of care and skill required by the activity 
which the defendant was pursuing it should be noted that for every activity there is a certain 
minimum degree of care and skill that a defendant must exercise on pain of being found guilty of 
negligence. In Glasgow Corporation v Muir [1943] AC 448, the courts determined the standard of 
care in negligence as follow: ‘the standard of foresight of the reasonable man is in one sense an 
impersonal test (…) Some persons are by nature unduly timorous and imagine every path beset 
with lions; others, of more robust temperament, fail to foresee or nonchalantly disregard even the 
most obvious dangers. The reasonable man is presumed to be free both from over-apprehension 
and from over confidence’.  However, professionals are judged by the standard of a reasonable 
member of the profession. 
745 Nicholas J. McBride and Roderick Bagshaw, Tort Law (4th eds., Pearson Education Limited 
2013) 51-52. See also Mark Lunney and Ken Oliphant, Tort Law: Text and Materials (5th eds., 
Oxford: OUP 2013) 183-184. In substance, the measure of damages for a claim by an investor 
where there is no contract will be the damages that would be recoverable if the investor succeeded 
in a claim for negligence (i.e. a claim in tort) against the rating agency. 
746 Mark Lunney and Ken Oliphant, Tort Law: Text and Materials (5th eds., Oxford: OUP 2013) 
152. 
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any duty to the market or to investors because credit rating agencies are presumed 
to act as financial reporters.747 
In this regard, the development of the case law has paid close consideration to 
the role of CRAs with respect to investors. In Cassa di Risparmio della 
Repubblica di San Marino v Barclays Bank, the judge affirmed that ‘a statement 
that an instrument was so rated (or was expected to be so rated) was, in turn, 
merely a statement about what the rating agencies’ opinion was (or about what it 
was expected to be)’.748 
In asserting that the rating was a statement of the rating agencies’ expert 
opinion, the court did not find any advisory and fiduciary duties owed by CRAs to 
investors. This means that credit ratings are not regarded as vehicles that offer 
investment advice but instead merely provide the assessment of the 
creditworthiness of a given financial product. The significance of this case relies 
on the assumption that credit ratings do not provide a representation of fact about 
the default risk of a product since their evaluations, are by their very nature, a 
matter of estimation. 
In JP Morgan Chase Bank v Springwell Navigation Corp, the English court 
made clear the distinction between the giving of advice (‘salesman’) and the 
relationship being such that, by giving advice, a party is accepting responsibility 
for that advice (‘investment adviser’).749 The court argued that it is inevitable 
during the sales process, for a salesman to provide comment, even opinion, on the 
                                                 
747 The English courts have made it clear that the existence of a duty of care is the primary 
requirement for a successful claim in negligence. If there is no duty, the failure to take reasonable 
care cannot give rise to liability. See Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562. This case established 
the liability for negligence as a specific tort in case of failure to exercise a duty of care which the 
circumstances demand. It has been pointed out that ‘the liability for negligence, whether you style 
it as such or treat it as in other systems as a species of ‘culpa’, is no doubt based upon a general 
public sentiment of moral wrongdoing for which the offender must pay. But acts or omissions 
which any moral code would censure cannot in a practical world be treated so as to give a right to 
every person injured by them to demand relief’ (per Atkin J., at 580). See also Caparo v. Dickman 
re proximity. 
748 Cassa di Risparmio della Repubblica di San Marino SpA v Barclays Bank Ltd [2011] EWHC 
484 (Comm) at 263. This authority ruled that ‘if any representation was made it was one of 
opinion and/or expectation and/or belief’ (per Hamblen J., at 267). It has been noted that ‘the 
judgment adds to the established line of cases in which the courts have demonstrated their 
willingness to uphold arranging banks’ no representation and no duty of care disclaimers, where 
they are properly incorporated and drafted, against sophisticated claimants with the consequence 
that the claimant can be contractually estopped from pursing a claim for negligent 
misrepresentation’. See Damien Byrne-Hill, Simon Clarke, Stephen Flaherty, Harry Edwards and 
Eleanor Lamberton, ‘Cassa di Risparmio della Repubblica di San Marino S.p.A. v Barclays Bank 
Ltd: when is a AAA rating more than a AAA rating?’, Herbert Smith Freehills LLP e-bulletin, 31 
March 2011, 2.  
749 JP Morgan Chase Bank v Springwell Navigation Corp [2008] EWHC 1186 (Comm). 
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product he is trying to sell. However, in case of an advisory relationship between 
CRAs and investors, such comments (or opinions) will raise liability if these 
advices are negligent.750 
A similar approach is found in Titan Steel Wheels v RBS where the English 
court placed particular attention on the distinction between giving advice or 
making recommendations and giving advice in an advisory capacity.751 These 
rulings addressed the controversial questions of whether a duty was owed and 
what the scope of that duty should be, an approach that could open the doors for 
successful complaints against ratings agencies. In essence, it seems clear that the 
English courts are reluctant to recognise a liability for CRAs in absence of a duty 
of care to investors and in absence of a contractual relationship. Moreover, it 
would seem that caveat emptor still applies where the investor is a sophisticated 
one (see the Cassa di Risparmio case). 
The following section focuses on the equitable doctrine of ‘estoppel’ as a 
possible solution for negligent misstatements by CRAs. The question is addressed 
as to whether estoppel could act as a deterrent for rating agencies’ misbehaviour 
and as a warning against inaccuracies in valuations.  
 
4.3 The doctrine of estoppel as a possible solution to negligent misstatements by 
CRAs 
In order to design an adequate liability system for CRAs, the doctrine of 
estoppel could be taken into account as an option to avoid negligent misleading 
ratings. In particular due consideration is given to estoppel by representation (or 
estoppel by conduct) in which ‘the mere fact that a person is precluded from 
denying the truth of something he has said does not involve him in any 
liability’.752 In other ways, CRAs could be potentially liable under the doctrine of 
estoppel—the assumption that the statement was true, and where the promise is 
intended to create legal relations giving the promise a cause of action in 
damages.753 If CRAs claim that they issue a simple opinion of the 
                                                 
750 Harry Edwards, ‘Liability for the rating and sale of structured credit products: Australian cases 
and their (much) wider implications’ (2013) 7 Law and Financial Markets Review 2, 93. 
751 Titan Steel Wheels v RBS [2010] EWHC 211 (Comm). 
752 Guenter Treitel, Some Landmarks of Twentieth Century Contract Law (Oxford: OUP 2002) 38. 
753 Pickard v Sears [1837] 6 A. & E. 469 and Freeman v Cooke [1848] 2 Ex. 654. In the literature, 
see Elizabeth Cooke, The Modern Law of Estoppel (Oxford: OUP 2000) 17 and 62. 
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creditworthiness of an issuer, this type of opinion—resulting in a wrong belief—
could be analysed as falling within the doctrine of ‘equitable estoppel’.754 The 
question arises as to whether detrimental reliance on ratings could be dealt with 
under the ‘estoppel rule’ as affording a measure of accountability for inaccurate 
evaluations.  
Also, the question is whether losses suffered by investors could give rise to a 
private right of action and an award of damages because ratings induced the third 
parties reasonably to invest in highly rated securities.  
Estoppel is an equitable doctrine.755 The origin of the ‘estoppel principle’ 
derives from Lord Denman’s judicial opinion in Pickard v Sears in 1837 and 
Freeman v Cooke in 1848 where it was concluded that ‘where one, by his words 
or conduct, wilfully causes another to believe in the existence of a certain state of 
things, and induces him to act on that belief, or to alter his own previous position, 
the former is precluded from averring against the latter a different state of things 
as existing at the same time’.756  
In Jorden v Money, the court held that estoppel can only arise from statements 
of fact and not from promises, so that the estoppel rule cannot be used to enforce 
promises.757 Subsequently, the principle of estoppel was raised in the judgment of 
                                                 
754 Kristofor W. Nelson, ‘Rough Waters for the Ratings Companies: Should the Securities Ratings 
Companies Be Held Liable for Investor Reliance in the Wake of the Real Estate Meltdown of 
2007-2008?’ (2009) 63 University of Miami Law Review 4, 1178 and 1191. The author comments 
on an important judicial opinion (Atlantic Masonry v Miller Construction, 558 So. 2d 433, 434—
Fla. 1st DCA 1990) in which is stated that ‘although the investors do not have a direct contractual 
relationship with the ratings companies, courts have held that third parties are entitled to relief 
under the doctrine of promissory estoppel’. 
755 Jack Beatson, Andrew Burrows and John Cartwright, Anson’s Law of Contract (29th eds., 
Oxford: OUP 2010) 116-117. 
756 Pickard v Sears [1837] 6 A. & E. 469. See also Freeman v Cooke [1848] 2 Ex. 654, 652. In this 
case, the court observed that a representation may be made either by statement or by conduct, and 
conduct may include negligence (at 664). By quoting Lord Denman’s opinion in Pickard v Sears, 
the court held that ‘the term “wilfully” must be understood if not that the party represents that to 
be true which he knows to be untrue, at least, that he means his representation to be acted upon, 
and that it is acted upon accordingly; and if whatever a man’s real intention may be, he so 
conducts himself that a reasonable man would take the representation to be true, and believe that it 
was meant that he should act upon it, and did act upon it as true, the party making the 
representation would be equally precluded from contesting its truth’; Seton, Laing & Co. v Lafone 
(1887) 19 QBD 68, where Lord Esher MR concluded that ‘one ground of estoppel is where a man 
makes a fraudulent representation and another man acts upon it to his detriment. Another may be 
where a man makes a false statement negligently, though without fraud, and another man acts 
upon it. And there may be circumstances under which, where a misrepresentation is made without 
fraud and without negligence, there may be an estoppel’ (at 70). 
757 Jorden v Money (1854) 5 HLC 185. The court held that ‘if a person makes a false 
representation to another and that other acts on it the person who has made it will not afterwards 
be allowed to set up that what he said was false and to assert the truth in place of the falsehood 
which misled the other’. It was made clear that the doctrine of common law estoppel only applies 
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the House of Lords in Hughes v Metropolitan Railway Co,758 where it was ruled 
that estoppel operates as a defence to a claim.  
The doctrine of estoppel was developed prominently in Central London 
Property Trust Ltd v High Trees House where Lord Denning held that parties 
could invoke the principle of promissory estoppel for asserting their legal 
rights.759 As Cooke has observed ‘estoppel is a consequence of someone’s words 
or behaviour, in virtually any context, but only where the words or behaviour have 
had an effect on someone else’.760 It is important to note that estoppel comprises 
several elements namely: (1) the statement to be acted on; (2) action on the faith 
of it; and (3) the detriment to the actor.761 
Generally, estoppel is a shield not a sword.762 To what extent this is true 
depends on the jurisdiction. For example, English law does not permit estoppel to 
be used as cause of action, while jurisdictions such as the US and Australia do 
allow estoppel as a cause of action in certain circumstances.763 
In Combe v Combe, the Court of Appeal affirmed that estoppel cannot act as a 
cause of action.764 Specifically, the Court ruled that promissory estoppel only 
prevents a party from insisting upon his strict legal rights when it would be unjust 
to allow him to enforce them, having regard to the dealings which have taken 
place between the parties. While estoppel by representation is commonly 
                                                 
to statements of existing facts and not to representations of future intention or promises. 
758 Thomas Hughes v The Directors, &C., of the Metropolitan Railway Company (1877) 2 App. 
Cas. 439. 
759 Central London Property Trust Limited v High Trees House Limited [1947] K.B. 130. The 
court held that ‘estoppel applies to promises, not representations of fact’. 
760 Elizabeth Cooke, The Modern Law of Estoppel (Oxford: OUP 2000) 17 and 62. The author 
observes that ‘reliance is a pervasive precondition for estoppel, and this is usually described as 
detrimental reliance’. 
761 Canada and Dominion Sugar Company Ltd. v Canadian National (West Indies) Steamships Ltd 
[1947] AC 47, PC at 56. 
762 Specifically, where the estoppel is by representation, no cause of action arises as a result. See 
Low v Bouverie [1891] 3 Ch. 82. In Derry v Peek [1889] 14 App. Cas. 337, the Court of Appeal 
stated that ‘estoppel is only a rule of evidence; you cannot found an action upon estoppel. Estoppel 
is only important as being one step in the progress towards relief on the hypothesis that the 
defendant is estopped from denying the truth of something which he has said’. 
763 Consequently, English courts are not required to determine the measure of damages for breach 
of an estoppel. See George Spencer-Bower, The Law Relating to Estoppel by Representation (4th 
ed., Lexis Nexis UK 2004) 516-518. See also Grundt v Great Boulder Pty Gold Mines Ltd (1937) 
59 C.L.R. 641 HCA, where the judge noted that sometimes parties to a deed deliberately set out 
what he called a ‘hypothetical state of affairs’ in order to create a ‘mutual estoppel’. See also 
Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher [1988] 164 CLR 387, where the Australian High Court 
pointed out that “equitable estoppel complements the tortious remedies of damages for negligent 
misstatement or fraud and enhances the remedies available to a party who acts or abstains from 
acting in reliance on what another induces him to believe” (at 427). 
764 Combe v Combe [1951] 2 K.B. 215, 219. 
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considered a shield, proprietary estoppel—that arises where there is no actual 
promise at all—can create a cause of action.765 
The doctrine of ‘promissory estoppel’ causes difficulty for parties who have to 
prove that they would have acted differently in the absence of the promise. On 
this view, promissory estoppel cannot be used against credit rating agencies that 
issue a statement of facts (or informed opinions) and not promises. For this 
reason, due consideration should be given to other forms of estoppel namely 
‘estoppel by representation’ or ‘estoppel by conduct’.766  
The next section discusses the relevance of estoppel as a cause of action. It 
also examines how estoppel by representation differs from the tort of 
misrepresentation and how a representation by a CRA meets the requirement that 
estoppel by representation must relate to facts. 
 
4.4 Estoppel by representation and the tort of misrepresentation  
The ‘estoppel’ doctrine, particularly estoppel by representation (or estoppel by 
conduct), generally arises ‘from a misrepresentation of fact made to an innocent 
person upon the faith of which and as a reasonable consequence of which he 
changes his position to his prejudice’.767  
Estoppel by representation refers to an unequivocal representation as to fact or 
a mixture of fact or law, upon which the other party has relied, and changed his 
position so that it would be to his detriment if the representation were incorrect. It 
has been observed that ‘a representation must be of an existing fact, not of a mere 
intention, nor of a mere belief [where] the representation of an existing state of 
things as being of a continuous nature is, however, more than a statement of 
intention, and a person who has made the representation cannot, after ridding 
himself of that state of things, take advantage of its removal to the prejudice of 
another who has acted on the representation’.768 
                                                 
765 Crabb v Arun District Council [1976] Ch. 179, where the court made clear that ‘an estoppel 
may have the effect that a party can enforce a cause of action which, without the estoppel, he 
would not be able to do’.  
766 A first application of the ‘estoppel by conduct’ is found in Lickbarrow v Mason [1787] 2 TR 
63, 100 ER 35. See Lord Halsbury in Henderson v Williams [1895] 1 QB 521; Pickering v Busk 
[1812] 15 East 38; Boyson v Coles [1817] 6 M. & S. 14; Spear v Travers [1815] 4 Camp. 251; 
Martini v Coles [1813] 1 M. & S. 140. 
767 A. L. Pickering, ‘Estoppel by Conduct’ (1939) 55 Law Quarterly Review 3, 407. See also Lord 
Tomlin in Greenwood v Martins Bank [1933] AC 51 and Thompson v Palmer [1933] 49 CLR 507. 
768 See Halsbury’s Laws of England, ‘Estoppel’ (5th eds., LexisNexis 2014) 47(4) para 380. 
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Further, estoppel by representation entails that a person who has given an 
acknowledgement/representation of non-reliance is prevented from subsequently 
asserting against the party to whom the representation was given that it is not true. 
Crucially, there is a need to prove reliance by the party asserting the estoppel. The 
representor is permanently prevented from averring or proving facts which are 
contrary to the representation.  
In Avon County Council v Howlett, the UK courts affirmed that estoppel by 
representation requires satisfaction of the ‘three-limb test’: (a) the statement is 
clear and unambiguous; (b) the plaintiff meant it to be acted upon by the 
defendant, or, at any rate, so conducted himself that a reasonable man in the 
position of the defendant would take the representation to be true and believe that 
it was meant that he should act upon it; and (c) the defendant did in fact believe it 
to be true and was induced by such belief to act upon it—when entering into sale 
and purchase or investment transactions.769  
In tort actions for misrepresentation, it is generally considered that the 
defendant’s liability turns on whether he owed a duty of care to the claimant, and 
that in turn may depend largely upon whether he ought to have foreseen that the 
statement would be acted upon the claimant.770  
What seems important in this discussion is that a person was induced to rely 
on statements or promises made by other parties.771 However, mere statements of 
intention are distinct from promises especially when the representation of fact 
does not cause harm and does not induce detrimental reliance and therefore is not 
suitable for protection.772  
In Amalgamated Investment and Property Co Ltd v Texas Commerce 
International Bank Ltd, the court pointed out that in absence of a contractual 
relationship the representation produced a belief or expectation in the mind of the 
representee or confirmed or strengthened a belief which he already held.773  
                                                 
769 See Avon County Council v Howlett [1983] WLR 603 and Lowe v Lombank Limited [1960] 1 
WLR 196 (CA). 
770 See Yianni v. Edwin Evans & Sons [1982] Q.B. 438; Standard Chartered Bank v. Pakistan 
National Shipping Corp. [1995] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 365. 
771 See Re Lehman Brothers International (Europe) [2011] EWCA Civ 1544, [2012] 2 BCLC 151. 
772 Michael Pratt, ‘Identifying the Harm Done: a Critique of the Reliance Theory of Estoppel’ 
(1999) 21 Adelaide Law Review 2, 209-210.  
773 Amalgamated Investment and Property Co Ltd v Texas Commerce International Bank Ltd 
[1982] QB 84 at 104-105, where the court held that ‘there may be cases where the representee has 
proceeded initially on the basis of a belief derived from some other source independent of the 
representor, but his belief has subsequently been confirmed by the encouragement or 
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The effect of estoppel by representation—as a defence not as a cause of 
action—in credit ratings could prevent the agencies from denying, or going back 
on what they said in their ratings. In other words, estoppel by representation may 
be used as a rule of evidence to demonstrate that the rating represented an 
informed statement of fact based on internal methodologies upon which investors 
relied; and to prevent the CRAs from claiming that rating is a mere opinion about 
the creditworthiness of financial products. In particular, the doctrine of estoppel 
by representation could be invoked against CRAs in order to protect consumers’ 
expectation interest.774 In this way, estoppel by representation is applicable 
because of the detrimental reliance of investors, that is to say, because the 
representees have relied upon the CRAs’ representation to their detriment.775 
At this point the question is whether the disappointed party would be able to 
claim both reliance damages and expectation damages under estoppel by 
representation.776  
Assuming that the CRA has made a representation to investors in the form of 
an assessment of financial products with the result that investors are induced on 
the strength of that representation to change their investment decisions to their 
detriment, the agency could be estopped from making any averment substantially 
at variance with its former representation, if the investors object thereto.777  
If estoppel is used to protect persons who reasonably and detrimentally rely on 
the representations of others, CRAs could be held potentially liable under the 
estoppel by representation (but not if estoppel is only a shield to defend a claim) 
for their inaccurate assessment vis-à-vis investors. The fact that CRAs provide a 
public statement (or ‘mere opinion’) relating to financial products causes legal 
effects to attach to consumers’ expectations.778 For this reason CRAs should owe 
                                                 
representation of the representor’. Lord Brandon stated that ‘a party cannot in terms found a cause 
of action upon an estoppel, but he may, as a result of being able to rely on an estoppel, succeed on 
a cause of action on which, without having been able to rely on that estoppel, he would have 
failed’ (at 86). 
774 M. P. Thomson, ‘From Representation to Expectation: Estoppel as a Cause of Action’ (1983) 
42 Cambridge Law Journal 2, 266-269. See also Elizabeth Cooke, ‘Estoppel and the protection of 
expectations’ (1997) 17 Legal Studies 2, 285.  
775 Alfred T. Denning, ‘Recent Developments in the Doctrine of Consideration’ (1952) 15 The 
Modern Law Review 1, 9. 
776 Andrew Robertson, ‘Reliance and Expectation in Estoppel Remedies’ (1998) 18 Legal Studies 
3, 368. 
777 Michael Spence, Protecting Reliance: The Emergent Doctrine of Equitable Estoppel (Hart 
Publishing 1999) 20.  
778 Supposing that there are two market participants, A and B, that A (for instance, a CRA) 
 
 172 
a duty to take reasonable care that the statement is correct. In this regard, it has 
been noted that ‘before a person can be estopped by a representation inferred from 
negligent conduct, there must be a duty to use due care towards the party misled 
or towards the general public of which he is a member’.779  
It is important that the representation must determine a relevant alteration of 
investors’ decisions. However, it is a difficult task for investors to show that their 
expectations were affected by inaccurate ratings at the time when the investment 
decision was taken. 
In this context, there has been some debate whether estoppel by representation 
requires proof of detriment in the very acts undertaken in reliance upon the 
representation. According to Spencer-Bower and Turner ‘the detriment need not 
to be of a character sounding in damages if it amounts to an unfairness that equity 
would recognise and remedy’.780 Another scholar argues that the detriment 
consists ‘in any loss that the party arguing the estoppel suffered because the 
assumption upon which he had relied proved unjustified’.781 
In National Westminster Bank plc v Somer International (UK) Ltd, the Court 
of Appeal considered estoppel by representation as a rule of evidence ‘the 
consequence of which is simply to preclude the representor from averring facts 
contrary to his own representation’.782 The Court of Appeal made it clear that 
estoppel by representation ‘differs from the position in the case of so-called 
“equitable” or “promissory” estoppel in respect of which a specific promise to 
waive or refrain from enforcing rights may be withdrawn on reasonable notice and 
in “proprietary” estoppel, where when giving effect to the interest or right in 
property which the party raising the estoppel asserts, the court assumes a wide 
discretion as to the terms on which such relief is granted’.  
                                                 
represents to an investor of financial products (B) that those products are of a high quality, when 
they are not. Although A may be estopped from denying the truth of that statement that does not 
make him liable to the investor and in this sense the estoppel does not give rise to a cause of 
action. In this case, rating agency A might, if he were negligent, be liable for misrepresentation; 
but that liability is based on the fact that the statement was false while any liability by estoppel 
would be based on the opposite assumption, i.e. that the statement is true. See on this example 
Guenter Treitel (note 752) 35.  
779 Halsbury’s Laws of England (note 768). 
780 George Spencer-Bower, The Law Relating to Estoppel by Representation (4th eds., Lexis Nexis 
UK 2004) 116. 
781 Michael Spence (note 777) 44-45. 
782 National Westminster Bank plc v Somer International (UK) Ltd [2002] QB 1286. See also the 
arguments of Lord Wright in Canada and Dominion Sugar Co Ltd v Canadian National (West 
Indies) Steam Ships Ltd [1947] AC 46, where estoppel is considered to be a substantive rule of 
law. 
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In other words, ‘once the representation has been acted on to the detriment of 
the transferee the contrary may not be asserted’.783 In this view, estoppel may be 
applied to rating agencies evaluations as a rule of evidence in terms of 
establishing a fact necessary to complete a cause of action or demolishing a 
defence thereto. In substance, estoppel by representation may be applied where 
CRAs might seek to deny their evaluations in case of faulty ratings. 
As just indicated, estoppel is not used for the direct enforcement of promises 
or representation of facts. Consequently, estoppel cannot by itself entitle a 
claimant to a remedy for a factual situation. This means that estoppel cannot be 
used to obtain a remedy for a misstatement.  
Other questions seem relevant in this discussion: (1) to what extent do CRAs 
reasonably foresee that their credit ratings will be relied upon by investors; and 
(2) to what extent would reliance on the part of investors be reasonable.  
It has been noted that ‘reliance is a form of relationship-specific 
investment’.784 Consequently, reliance always involves some risk to the relying 
party. The reliance measure puts the injured party in as good a position as if the 
contract had never been made. Reliance on CRAs’ ratings may turn out to be a 
wise decision, if nothing goes wrong and the transaction is executed, but it will 
turn out to be unwise if the ratings prove to be inaccurate and misleading.785 
Further, reliance on a CRA’s evaluation may bind the CRA only if the evaluation 
is one in respect of which the CRA should induce reliance on the part of the 
issuer. 
In the light of the above considerations, the estoppel rule with its features and 
limitations might not be a feasible way of making CRAs accountable because of 
its limitations as an equitable shield rather than a sword; however, the estoppel 
rule could be treated as a deterrent for CRAs’ misstatements.  
Finally, I submit that to extend liability for misrepresentation under Hedley 
Byrne, etc. so as to make it into an active remedy (a sword and not merely a 
shield) in the limited case of CRAs would be perfectly possible and indeed 
desirable on the basis of the need to implement the UK’s obligations under EU 
law. It is trite law that he who comes to equity must come with clean hands. It can 
                                                 
783 National Westminster Bank plc v Somer International (UK) Ltd [2002] (note 782) at 35. 
784 Richard Craswell, ‘Offer, Acceptance, and Efficient Reliance’ (1996) 48 Stanford Law Review 
3, 490. 
785 ibid 502.  
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therefore be said that this would avoid potentially opening the floodgates by 
extending the scope of the tort of negligence or by creating a new statutory tort 
where the discretionary nature of the action would have to be spelled out, possibly 
tying the courts’ hands in an undesirable way. 
After providing an analysis of the generic grounds of liability such as contract, 
tort, fiduciary duty, estoppel and statutory right of action as a possible option to 
hold CRAs liable for flawed ratings, the next chapter examines the 
implementation of these forms of liability in the US, the UK, the EU and 
Australia. It also discusses recent developments in the case law and the main 
debate about the type of liability which can be attached to them in order to 
enhance their responsibility vis-à-vis investors. 
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Chapter Five  
The liability regime of credit rating agencies in the US, the UK, the 
EU and Australia 
 
 
5.1 The perspective of professional liability for CRAs in the US, the UK and the 
EU regulatory framework  
This chapter discusses the regulatory intervention which has been adopted in 
order to strengthen the accountability regime for CRAs in response to the 
shortcomings which the 2007-2009 financial crisis brought to light. It also 
explores the development of case-law by taking into account the position of courts 
under the US, the UK, the EU and Australian legislation.  
What is crucial for the operation of the legal protection for investors is the 
soundness of CRAs’ actions in interpreting disclosed information and assessing 
the creditworthiness of companies, thereby increasing investor confidence. 
However, the behaviour of rating agencies and issuers may be exacerbated in 
CRAs’ activities where there are different parties with different interests in the 
outcome of transactions.786 
It seems paradoxical that CRAs should be viewed as information 
intermediaries intended to protect public investors when they enjoy a different 
regulatory treatment compared with other financial experts (such as auditors and 
financial analysts).787  
                                                 
786 In King County, Washington et al v IKB Deutsche Industriebank AG et al U.S. District Court, 
Southern District of New York, No 09-08387 [4 May 2012], it was claimed that S&P continued to 
hand out gold-plated triple A credit ratings to debt securities in order to win fees even though they 
were aware that risks were building up in the underlying subprime mortgages. S&P filed a motion 
to dismiss the claim of the US Department of Justice, arguing that the agency’s inability to predict 
‘the most catastrophic meltdown since the Great Depression reveals a lack of prescience but not 
fraud’. The court refused to dismiss claims by two institutional investors against Moody’s, S&P’s 
and Fitch that fraudulently misrepresented the value of the structured investment vehicle by 
assigning high credit ratings to the Senior Notes. After issuing a high grade, the credit rating 
agencies downgraded the Senior Notes to ‘junk’ status and as a result, those holding the notes 
suffered damages. See Stephen Foley, ‘Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s settle US subprime 
lawsuits’ Financial Times (London, 27 April 2013).  
787 Generally, auditors preparing company accounts owe a duty of care to any person whom they 
ought reasonably to have foreseen might rely on the accounts. See JEB Fasteners Ltd v Marks 
Bloom & Co [1981] 3 All E.R. 289. This case showed that in absence of the necessary degree of 
proximity it is difficult to establish a duty of care between the parties. 
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As information gatekeepers, CRAs supply reliable information about the 
riskiness of investments that serves to increase the credibility of issuer disclosure 
and to improve the efficiency of resources allocation in the financial markets. But 
the information provided by rating agencies is only credible if they retain a 
minimum level of independence. As a result, they should have an obligation to 
ensure that the ratings they assign are accurate. CRAs act as professionals in the 
financial markets.788 However, the key question is whether the third party can 
reasonably, and may foreseeably, rely on the opinion or information provided by 
“rating” professionals.789  
It seems contradictory that the CRAs, on the one hand certify the quality of the 
product but, on the other hand are not liable for the quality of their ratings in the 
way that other gatekeepers—such as auditors—are liable for the opinions they 
provide to investors and other stakeholders.790 CRAs should be held to account if 
they are negligent in formulating the ratings as their responsibility comes from the 
information service they provide. However, the disclaimers inserted in the ratings 
report attached by CRAs (see ‘Appendix IV’) create de facto a virtual immunity 
for opinions that are ‘investment advice on which reliance could and should be 
placed’.791   
Unlike auditors, CRAs do not conduct factual verification with respect to the 
information provided to the market.792 CRAs are paid for the initial ratings, but 
not for surveillance and further upgrades or, more importantly, downgrades. 
Unlike auditors, CRAs are not obliged to conduct an internal rotation where their 
services are used by the same client for successive years. In addition, CRAs 
provide their financial assessments to non-clients, i.e. unsolicited ratings, even if 
                                                 
788 Article 3(1)b of the 2009 CRA Regulation that states ‘CRA means a legal person whose 
occupation includes the issuing of credit ratings on a professional basis’. 
789 Where a CRA undertakes to provide opinion or information for an issuer (company) knowing 
that the issuer intends to use that information or evaluation to induce a third party to act in a 
manner which will be to his detriment if the professional is negligent, the professional may owe a 
duty to the third party. See Royal Bank of Scotland Plc v Bannerman Johnstone Maclay [2005] 
CSIH 39; 2005 1 S.C. 437. 
790 Patrick C. Leyens, ‘Auditor’ in Jurgen Basedow, Klaus J. Hopt, Reinhard Zimmermann and 
Andreas Stier (eds.), The Max Planck Encyclopedia of European Private Law, Vol. I (Oxford: 
OUP 2012) 85-88. 
791 ‘Holding the rating agencies to account’ Financial Times (London, 5 November 2012). 
792 However, the corporate scandals of Enron and WorldCom have demonstrated auditors’ failure 
to detect irregularities in companies’ financial statements. See Nicole B. Neuman, ‘A “Sarbanes-
Oxley for Credit Rating Agencies? A Comparison of the Roles Auditors’ and Credit Rating 
Agencies’ Conflicts of Interests Played in Recent Financial Crises’ (2010) 12 University of 
Pennsylvania Journal of Business Law 3, 930.  
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they have no access to the management or to internal due diligence of the firms 
concerned.793  
In common with auditors, CRAs are largely dependent on their reputation and 
reliability gained among market participants. In common with auditors, CRAs 
have technical expertise in understanding the financial profiles of the firms they 
assess and are paid by the clients they evaluate, but their ‘opinions’ are subject to 
different regulatory treatment.794 In this context, one commentator at least 
considers that ‘CRAs “opinions” are no different from the “opinions” of other 
gatekeepers’.795  
CRAs have a powerful role with regard to the access of issuers to capital and it 
seems to be a logical consequence that they should be regulated with due regard to 
this role.796 As indicated, it is paradoxical to consider CRAs’ function as that of 
journalists given their involvement in business operations with issuers. CRAs are 
not simply analysing and rating debt securities for a journalistic function, they are 
being paid to do so by the issuers of debt securities. Debt securities rating is a 
substantial and profitable business and agencies’ ratings are opinions that carry 
commercial weight and are referenced by financial institutions.797 
CRAs generally play an active role in transactions by structuring the debt 
offering and by helping to design and sell a financial product. Generally, investors 
are unaware that the rating agencies help issuers construct the very financial 
instruments they eventually judge.798 CRAs provide ratings as a certification or 
benchmark for investors that enter in the market, but they also play an advisory 
role in securities transactions. In this respect, it would be normal to consider 
professional liability for CRAs in the shape of a ‘strict liability standard under 
                                                 
793 Soku Byoun and Yoon S. Shin, ‘Unsolicited Credit Ratings: Theory and Empirical Analysis’ 
(2002) Financial Management Association Annual Meeting, Working Paper, 3-5.   
794 Iris H-Y Chiu, ‘The role and liabilities of auditors in financial regulation: addressing the 
“expectations gap” (2012) International Business Law Journal 5, 545. 
795 Frank Partnoy, ‘How and Why Credit Rating Agencies Are Not Like Other Gatekeepers’ 
(2006) University of San Diego, Legal Studies Research Paper No 07-46, 96. 
796 Patrick C. Leyens, ‘Rating Agency’ in Jurgen Basedow, Klaus J. Hopt, Reinhard Zimmermann 
and Andreas Stier (eds.), The Max Planck Encyclopedia of European Private Law, Vol. II 
(Oxford: OUP 2012) 1412-1413.  
797 John Gapper, ‘Rating agencies must beware of the law’ Financial Times (London, 6 February 
2013).  
798 Lisbeth Freeman ‘Who’s guarding the gate? Credit-Rating Agency liability as “Control Person” 
in the Subprime Credit Crisis’ (2009) 33 Vermont Law Review 3, 593. 
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which behaviour is assessed according to objective standards, i.e. norms 
developed in the specific sector’.799  
However, the professional liability standard only works where there is a 
contractual relationship between parties: as already discussed, CRAs are able to 
bypass this concern by using the legal impediment that investors are not their 
clients. What is more, it is difficult to prove that a CRA has negligently 
committed an error in applying a given rating methodology rather than another. 
CRAs have a direct impact on the markets and for this reason they should provide 
an appropriate rating of the debt liability and chances of default owing to their 
duty to market, and be liable for any faulty assessment.800  
In the US, the Dodd-Frank Act introduced specific rules (sections 931-939H) 
regulating the position of CRAs.801 In particular, section 931(3) of the Dodd-
Frank Act provides that, by performing evaluative and analytical services on 
behalf of clients (that are fundamentally commercial in character), CRAs should 
be subject to the same standards of liability and oversight as those applying to 
auditors, securities analysts, and investment bankers.802 The Dodd-Frank Act does 
not regard CRAs as ‘investment advisers’, although the value of credit ratings is 
recognized by the reference to liability standards similar to those applicable to 
other information intermediaries.803 
In the EU, the MiFID Directive804 does not regard the services of CRAs as 
‘investment advice’ either, on the basis that a rating is not covered by Article 4(4) 
                                                 
799 Vibe Ulfbeck, ‘Civil liability of Credit Rating Agencies – A professional liability regime?’ in 
Jan Kleineman, Lars Gorton and Aron Verständig (eds), Perspectives on Credit Rating Agencies 
(Stockholm: Författarna, Stockholm Centre for Commercial Law Jure Förlag AB 2013) 310-311. 
The author draws an analogy from accountancy, underlining the similarity of the roles of the 
accountant and the CRA: however, ‘the accountant must—by law—act as a trustworthy 
representative of the public. No similar obligation applies by law to the CRAs’. 
800 Sam Jones, ‘Moody’s error gave top ratings to debt products’ Financial Times (London, 21 
May 2008). 
801 Title IX, Subtitle C of the Dodd-Frank Act “Improvements to the Regulation of Credit Rating 
Agencies”. 
802 Section 931(3) of the Dodd-Frank Act notes that ‘because credit rating agencies perform 
evaluative and analytical services on behalf of clients, much as other financial “gatekeepers” do, 
the activities of credit rating agencies are fundamentally commercial in character and should be 
subject to the same standards of liability and oversight as apply to auditors, securities analysts, and 
investment bankers’. 
803 Allana M. Grinshteyn, ‘Horseshoes and hand grenades: The Dodd-Frank Act’s (Almost) Attack 
on Credit Rating Agencies’ (2011) 39 Hofstra Law Review 4, 972-973. The author observed that 
‘although the statutory provisions creating a cause of action against credit rating agencies are 
likely to meet resistance in the courts, such provisions at the very least enhance the credit rating 
agencies’ exposure to liability’ (at 956).  
804 Directive 2004/39/EC replaced by Directive 2014/65/EU. 
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of MiFID.805 In principle, it seems that CRAs are out of reach of the Directive in 
that respect. Notwithstanding this, CRAs which do offer ‘investment services’, as 
defined by Annex I of that Directive, on a professional basis, need to seek 
authorization from the relevant home state authority.806 
Credit rating is inherently subjective and reflects professional judgement.807 It 
is noteworthy that intermediary duties essentially derive from professional 
standards and from securities regulation. In a contractual relationship, the 
intermediary duties arise from the decision to enter into a contract.  
In Caparo Industries Plc v Dickman, the House of Lords held that the auditor 
owes a duty to the company and not to investors on the ground of its contractual 
relationship with the firm.808 This authority established a legal principle for 
determining the existence of a duty of care: (1) whether the damage is reasonably 
foreseeable; (2) whether there is a relationship of proximity between claimant and 
defendant; and (3) whether it is just and reasonable to impose a duty.   
                                                 
805 According to Article 4(4) of MiFID ‘Investment advice’ means the provision of personal 
recommendations to a client, either upon its request or at the initiative of the investment firm, in 
respect of one or more transactions relating to financial instruments’. See on this matter Harry 
McVea, ‘Credit rating agencies, the subprime mortgage debacle and global governance: the EU 
strikes back’ (2010) 59 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 3, 716. 
806 Section A of Annex I (‘Investment services and activities’) to the MiFID Directive. Closer 
examination of the text suggests that MiFID is applicable only to credit rating agencies 
undertaking investment services and activities over and above their regular credit rating activity. 
For example, if a CRA provides investment services (such as investment advice) to clients that fall 
under MiFID, the provisions on conflicts of interest apply to protect the interest of those who 
receive these services. See the Communication from the Commission on Credit Rating Agencies 
(OJ 2006 C 59, p. 2), Section 3.1 (‘EU Legislation’). 
807 Mark Carl Rom, ‘The Credit Rating Agencies and the Subprime Mess: Greedy, Ignorant, and 
Stressed?’ (2009) 69 Public Administration Review 4, 641. 
808 Caparo Industries Plc v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 831. The court held that there will be no liability 
in tort for negligent misrepresentation unless the maker of the statement knew that the statement 
would be communicated to the person relying on it specifically in connection with a particular 
transaction or a transaction of a particular kind. The limitation of a liability regime in the presence 
of sufficient proximity between the auditors and the shareholder is made clear in Stone & Rolls v 
Moore Stephens [2009] 1 A.C. 1391, where the House of Lords held that a wider remit of care was 
owed to creditors. 
The principle that the auditor can owe the company an implied contractual duty of care for the 
inaccurate performance of the audit or may be accused of negligence and could potentially be 
liable for damages was also underlined in Equitable Life Assurance Society v Ernst & Young 
[2003] EWCA Civ 1114 and Barings Plc v Coopers & Lybrand (No.7) [2003] Lloyd’s Rep I.R. 
566 cases. In academic circles, see Paolo Giudici, ‘Auditors’ multi-layered liability regime’ (2012) 
13 European Business Organization Law Review 4, 523-524; Michael Paterson, ‘Reform of the 
law on auditors’ liability: an assessment’ (2012) 23 International Company and Commercial Law 
Review 2, 55; Alistair Alcock, ‘House of Lords revisits auditors’ liability’ (2010) 5 Journal of 
Business Law, 453-454. 
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CRAs frequently argue that they are not party to any contractual relationship 
with investors but only with issuers.809 As a result, the relationship is between the 
CRAs and the companies that request the security rating. Rating agencies, on the 
one hand, stand in a contractual relationship to the issuer; on the other hand, they 
stand in a relationship to investors which is of a non-contractual nature.  
However, the issuer-CRA relationship raises questions on the part of investors. 
In particular, issuers (principals) without sufficient information or expertise to 
implement their preferences employ agents (rating agencies) which possess such 
expertise. Unless constrained (for example by proper liability) agents may be able 
to exploit their discretion so as to advance their own interests, rather than those of 
their principal. Still, the agent may sacrifice the best interests of both investors 
and issuers for the agent’s own personal self-interest. 
In performing their role of gatekeepers, CRAs may be concerned to further 
their interests in relation not only to issuers, but also to investors. The CRAs 
should act in the public interest and not in their own interest.810 The larger 
problem, however, has to do with the weakness of the incentives that motivate the 
CRAs when playing a gatekeeper role. The weakness concerns reputational 
improvement and investment controls.811  
Most importantly, regulation exempts credit rating agencies from liability and 
courts tend to accept the CRAs’ argument that ratings are financial predictions.812 
However, courts should recognize the active role of credit rating agencies in 
structuring the deal with issuers and should apply the professional liability degree 
                                                 
809 Raymond W. McDaniel, ‘Roundtable on Credit Rating Agencies’, Statement before the United 
States Securities and Exchange Commission, New York, 15 April 2009, 4-5. 
810 The US Department of Justice (DoJ) alleged that S&P’s falsely told investors that its ratings 
were objective when instead they were influenced by a desire to win fees and market share. The 
DoJ charged S&P’s with intentionally making ‘limited, adjusted and delayed updates’ to its rating 
criteria and analytical models during a key period between 2004 and 2007. In this case, S&P 
affirmed that its ratings are ‘predictions about how securities might perform in the future’. The 
agency also argued that the decision-making process was inherently subjective rather than 
intentionally fraudulent and that the decision to invest was ultimately the responsibility of the 
buyer. See Kara Scannell and Stephen Foley, ‘S&P asks court to throw out $5bn lawsuit’ 
Financial Times (London, 22 April 2013); ‘Free speech or knowing misrepresentation?’ 
Economist (New York, 5 February 2013); Stephen Foley and Kara Scannell, ‘S&P moves closer to 
Geithner deposition’ Financial Times (London, 16 April 2014). 
811 Scott J. Boylan, ‘Will credit rating agency reforms be effective?’ (2012) 20 Journal of 
Financial Regulation and Compliance 4, 365. 
812 As discussed, the CRAs frequently argue that their ratings are mere financial opinions protected 
by the First Amendment of US Constitution that provides for freedom of speech. 
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for their ‘professional opinions’.813 Consequently, CRAs should be held liable if 
their professional evaluations are found inaccurate. 
CRAs should improve the incentives to supply complete available information 
to market participants. As has been noted, ‘credit rating agencies should not be 
punished merely because their ratings turn out to be “wrong”, rather, they should 
be held accountable for failure to make a good faith effort to calculate a 
reasonably accurate assessment of default risk using relevant and impartial 
data’.814  
It is possible to argue that CRAs should be treated in the same way as other 
financial intermediaries (auditors and financial analysts) by recasting their 
responsibilities in order to put them under professional duties entailing the 
requisite degree of care vis-à-vis investors.  
After considering the perspective of professional liability by taking into 
account the possibility to consider CRAs subject to professional standards similar 
to those applicable to other information intermediaries such as auditors and 
financial analysts, the next section focuses on CRAs’ civil liability regime under 
US legislation. 
 
5.2 The rating agencies’ First Amendment protection in the United States 
It is generally considered that CRAs successfully escape accountability with 
respect to investors for inaccurate evaluations.815 CRAs have been largely 
insulated from liability in the US for their assessments in part because of the 
protection afforded by the US Constitution—in particular the ‘freedom of speech’ 
enshrined in the First Amendment816—and in part because of the protection given 
by statutes that ensured explicit immunities.817  
                                                 
813 Jonathan W. Heggen, ‘Not Always the World’s Shortest Editorial: Why Credit-Rating-Agency 
Speech Is Sometimes Professional Speech’ (2011) 96 Iowa Law Review 5, 1745. 
814 Benjamin H. Brownlow, ‘Rating Agency Reform: Presenting the Registered Market for Asset-
Backed Securities’ (2011) 15 North Carolina Banking Institute, 137. 
815 In particular, the scholarly debate concentrated on when and whether CRAs should be liable for 
misrepresentations with respect to market participants. See Frank Partnoy, ‘Barbarians at the 
gatekeepers?: a proposal for a modified strict liability regime’ (2001) 79 Washington University 
Law Quarterly 2, 491.  
816 The First Amendment of US Constitution states: ‘Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of 
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the 
government for a redress of grievances’. The First Amendment protects bond ratings because they 
are categorised as ‘editorial communications’ and hence free speech. On this point, it should be 
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The US courts have long been reluctant to impose liability on credit rating 
agencies on the account of the difficulty to prove negligence or recklessness on 
the part of CRAs in making their evaluations (potential evidence of mistaken 
ratings is also problematic on account of the frequent changes in issuer’s 
creditworthiness).818 
In their earlier judgments, courts mainly regarded CRAs as financial 
journalists on the ground of their ability to provide ‘independent statements’.819 In 
New York Times Co. v Sullivan, the US Supreme Court held that the First 
Amendment ‘prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory 
falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was 
made with “actual malice”—that is, with knowledge that it was false or with 
reckless disregard of whether it was false or not’.820  
The US court based its decision on the account that ‘erroneous statement is 
inevitable in free debate, and it must be protected if the freedom of expression is 
to have the “breathing space” that they need (…) to survive’.821 This authority is 
relevant in order to comprehend the ‘actual malice’ standard for journalistic 
liability822, and how courts protect rating agencies (for their opinions) on the 
ground that ratings touch upon matters of public concern. 
The CRAs enjoyed protection on the account of the fact that the First 
Amendment to the US Constitution is interpreted by courts in the sense that rating 
is a ‘free flow of ideas and opinions’. This line of argument was embraced in First 
                                                 
noted that the First Amendment does not protect the case of ‘knowing misrepresentation’. See The 
Constitution of the United States of America as Amended (ordered pursuant to H. Con. Res. 190 
as passed on July 25, 2007, 110th Congress, 1st Session). 
817 Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 (“Civil Liabilities on Account of False Registration 
Statement”) that provides immunity from liability for misstatements in a registration statement if 
their ratings appear in a prospectus for a public offering of a security registered under that Act. 
818 The US courts held that agency ratings constitute protected commercial speech under the First 
Amendment. See County of Orange v McGraw Hill Cos., 245 B.R. 151 (C.D. Cal. 1999); Quinn v 
McGraw Hill Cos., 168 F.3d 331 (7th Cir. 1999); In re Pan Am Corp., 161 B.R. 577, 581-83 
(S.D.N.Y. 1993); In re Scott Paper Co. Sec. Litig., 145 F.R.D. 366, 370 (E.D. Pa. 1992). 
819 Jonathan S. Sack and Stephen M. Juris, ‘Rating Agencies: Civil Liability Past and Future’ 238 
New York Law Journal 88, 5 November 2007. First Amendment protection gave credit rating 
agencies the status of ‘media journalist’ and created the “exemption” to avoid liability among 
market participants. As a result, CRAs enjoyed immunity from negligent misrepresentation suits 
and were exempted from liability for mistakes in their ratings. See In re Enron Corp. Sec., 
Derivative & “ERISA” Litig., 511 F. Supp. 2d 742, 816-17 (S.D. Tex. 2005). 
820 New York Times Co. v Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) at 279-280. 
821 ibid at 280. 
822 The United States Supreme Court defined ‘actual malice’ as the proper standard for claims of 
defamation by public officials.   
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Equity Corp. of Florida v Standard & Poor’s Corp.823, where the court recognised 
First Amendment protection for the rating agency, and Jefferson County School 
District v Moody’s Investor’s Services, Inc.824 where the court affirmed that credit 
rating agencies deserve constitutional protection because their ratings constitute 
the expression of opinions.  
It is paradoxical that ratings obtain such protection even though their content 
does not consist of verifiable facts: the point is that rating agencies escape liability 
for the reliance that regulators place in them. The problem here is that credit 
rating agencies are virtually (legally) immune in the United States for the opinions 
they grant—treated as valuable and profitable statements—that influence the 
investment decisions of investors.825 This virtual immunity has increased the 
reputation of CRAs in the way that their success in civil suits has spread the 
perception of their ratings as infallible, with the result that their opinions are 
treated as reliable benchmarks for securities markets.826  
In Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v Greenmoss Builders, Inc., the US Supreme Court 
established that the ‘actual malice’ standard applies only when the published 
material is a matter of public concern.827 The Court affirmed that speech 
motivated by the desire for profit is less deserving of First Amendment protection 
because ‘in any case the market provides a powerful incentive to a credit reporting 
agency to be accurate, since false credit reporting is of no use to creditors’.828 
It should be noted that some judgments have refused to afford First 
Amendment protection to CRAs: in In re International Business Machines 
                                                 
823 First Equity Corporation of Florida v Standard & Poor’s Corporation, 690 F. Supp 256 
(S.D.N.Y. 1988), affd, 869 F.2d 175 (2d Cir. 1989). 
824 Jefferson County Sch. Dist. v Moody’s Investor services, Inc. [1999] No 97-1157. 
825 Theresa Nagy, ‘Credit Rating Agencies and the First Amendment: Applying Constitutional 
Journalistic Protections to Subprime Mortgage Litigation’ (2009) 94 Minnesota Law Review 1, 
141-142.  
826 Jonathan M. Barnett, ‘Certification Drag: The Opinion Puzzle and Other Transactional 
Curiosities’ (2007) 33 The Journal of Corporation Law 1,139. The author argued that ‘a credit 
rating can be viewed as a certification instrument that is provided by an issuer (through the third 
party rating agency) pursuant to the “constructive request” of the investor population (largely 
represented by agents in the form of money-managers and other investment fiduciaries)’. 
827 Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985), where the court held 
that a mistaken report that a business had filed for bankruptcy—which a credit reporting agency 
had distributed to only five subscribers—did not constitute a ‘matter of public concern’. The court 
stated that ‘when defamation against a private person did not involve a matter of public concern, 
presumed and punitive damages could be awarded even absent a showing of “actual malice”’. See 
in the literature Laura L. Saadeh, ‘Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.: The 
Supreme Court Further Muddies the Defamation Waters’ (1986) 20 Loyola of Los Angeles Law 
Review 1, 211. 
828 Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v Greenmoss Builders, Inc. (note 827) at 762. 
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Corporate Securities Litigation, where the court stated that ‘an opinion may still 
be actionable if the speaker does not genuinely and reasonably believe it or if it is 
without basis in fact’.829 In In re National Century Fin. Enters., Inc., Inv. Litig., 
the court denied the Constitutional protection for credit rating agencies on the 
basis that ratings had been disseminated to a ‘select class of institutional 
investors’.830 
The fact that CRAs have abrogated their responsibility as gatekeepers of credit 
risk should be analysed by understanding the nature of the ‘opinions’ they 
disseminate to financial markets. At first sight, there are two important questions: 
(1) to what extent do ‘simple opinions’ exercise a pervasive influence over the 
investment decisions of investors?; and (2) to what extent can CRAs be 
considered media reporters?  
The relevant point is whether courts consider ratings as a matter of public 
concern. In this light, it can be asked whether ratings represent expressions of 
opinion or whether they constitute qualified evaluations about the 
creditworthiness of financial products.  
As a matter of public concern, ratings involve a public matter on account of 
their function of supplying information to the securities markets by reducing the 
information costs and lowering the cost of capital. However, ratings activities 
concern a private matter on the account of the gatekeeper function performed by 
the CRAs. In other words, whether a rating is a matter of public concern depends 
upon how widely the rating was disseminated. 
In this context, it is important to take into account the role of market discipline 
with respect to judicial oversight. It has been observed that ‘the very value of an 
agency’s ratings, like an accountant’s opinions lies in their independent, reliable 
evaluation of a company’s financial data’.831 Although the reliability of CRAs has 
become the central issue in the recent public inquiry following the 2007-2009 
financial crisis, the real question is: to what extent independent opinions give rise 
to liability vis-à-vis parties that place reliance on those opinions and suffer 
damage as a result? 
                                                 
829 In re International Business Machines Corporate Securities Litigation, 163 F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 
Nov. 17, 1998). 
830 In Re National Century Fin. Enter., Inc., Inv., 580 F. Supp. 2d 630 (S.D. Ohio 2008). 
831 Gregory Husisian, ‘What standard of care should govern the world’s shortest editorials? An 
analysis of bond rating agency liability’ (1990) 75 Cornell Law Review 2, 426. The author 
observed that ‘ratings are editorial opinions, published in letter form’ (at 454). 
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The fact that it is difficult to identify negligent behaviour in the ratings process 
has a bearing on the success of any civil suit. This aspect may encourage CRAs to 
issue inaccurate assessments and constitute a powerful disincentive for rating 
agencies not to make any assertions that investors can rely on. In terms of 
financial information, it may be argued that CRAs’ activities should be regulated 
by attaching civil liability to their practice as result of the fact that investors buy 
products on the basis of the historical credit rating records of issuers.  
The question of the potential civil liability of CRAs arose again following the 
decision in Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank v Morgan Stanley & Co. case where the 
court reaffirmed that rating agencies received robust First Amendment protection 
under ‘typical circumstances’ even though it denied such protection where 
agencies ‘disseminated their ratings to a select group of investors’.832  
In these factual circumstances, the courts treated ratings as commercial 
speeches. As result, they have conferred less protection on agencies’ opinions and 
imposed a duty on rating agencies to investigate their claims conscientiously.833 
Under the commercial speech head ‘rating agencies would face civil liability 
where plaintiffs could show that agencies misled investors by consciously 
disregarding either the inaccuracy of or the methodology underlying their ratings, 
but not where plaintiffs could show only negligence’.834 
In Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v Pub. Serv. Comm’n, the US Supreme 
Court held that a ‘false and misleading commercial speech is not entitled to any 
First Amendment protection’.835 The Court concluded that CRAs do not perform 
normal journalistic functions and do not deserve the constitutional protections that 
are reserved for the press. This case showed that ratings cannot be considered 
mere opinions and CRAs cannot be regarded as traditional journalists on account 
of the remuneration arrangements existing between issuers and rating agencies. 
                                                 
832 Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank et al v Morgan Stanley & Co. et al [2009] 651 F. Supp. 2d 155, 
167 U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York (Manhattan), No. 08-07508. This authority 
ruled that ratings of securities that were distributed to a limited number of investors do not deserve 
the same free-speech protection as more general ratings of corporate bonds that were widely 
disseminated. For an academic commentary see Caleb Deats, ‘Talk that isn’t cheap: does the first 
amendment protect credit rating agencies’ faulty methodologies from regulation?’ (2010) 110 
Columbia Law Review 7, 1819.  
833 This case law changed the judicial perspective on CRAs' liability by opening the way to 
complaints against CRAs.   
834 Caleb Deats (note 832) 1859. 
835 Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. 557 (1980) at 
557. 
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Therefore, the crux of matter is to define the term ‘opinion’ and consequently, 
to identify the nature of ratings. If a rating contains qualified evaluations on the 
creditworthiness of debt securities, it seems difficult to attach the status of ‘free-
speech’ to such a rating. In addition, if ratings drive investment decisions on the 
account of their ‘certification role’ it seems difficult to consider them as being in 
the nature of press services.836 The US judiciary has not limited the latitude of 
ratings, a gap that reveals the uncertainty of decisions and shows the reluctance to 
hold CRAs accountable for their disappointing activities. 
After having provided an overview of the First Amendment protection for 
CRAs in the US, the next section examines how CRAs successfully managed to 
escape civil suits on the base of the ‘financial reporters’ presumption and how the 
US courts are positively inclined to consider the CRAs’ journalistic disclaimers as 
a form of protection with respect to investors. 
 
5.2.1 The presumption of being ‘financial reporters’  
CRAs successfully avoid US lawsuits on the account of the fact that their 
evaluations are considered simple journalistic opinions of financial information 
disseminated to the public.837 These evaluations—as argued by the main CRAs—
are in essence independent, objective opinions and not a guarantee and thus 
protected under the First Amendment of the US Constitution (see ‘Appendix IV’). 
Even though the financial assessments of credit agencies are mostly claimed to 
be a matter of free speech and freedom of the press, their impact on investment 
decisions raises many doubts on the liability standard in case of faulty opinions. 
As already indicated, the US courts relied on the media position of CRAs by 
adopting the ‘actual malice’ standard for journalistic liability in case of inaccurate 
ratings.838 It can be claimed that the courts did not adequately evaluate the effects 
                                                 
836 Dieter Kerwer, ‘Holding Global Regulators Accountable. The Case of Credit Rating Agencies’, 
University of College London, School of Public Policy Working Paper Series No 11, December 
2004, 15-16. 
837 Gregory W. Smith, ‘The Deterioration of Investor Tools and the Resulting Fiduciary 
Challenges’ (2008) 57 Journal of Government Financial Management, 29. 
838 First Equity Corporation of Florida v Standard & Poor’s Corporation, 690 F. Supp 256 
(S.D.N.Y. 1988) (note 12); In re Fitch Inc Fsbv UBS Paine Webber, Inc., 330 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 
2003). In these cases, the US courts recognized the journalist’s professional activity of CRAs by 
affirming that credit rating agencies could not be held liable for negligent misrepresentation 
(Standard & Poor’s case) and by granting the protection of the New York Press Shield Law (In re 
Fitch case). The Shield Law protects journalists from contempt for refusing to comply with a non-
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of CRAs’ assessments for the guidance of investors in their business 
transaction.839  
If ratings are informed opinions about credit risk—resulting in detailed reports 
on the creditworthiness of financial products—it seems difficult to find any 
journalistic or media elements in this activity. The technical analysis, based on 
statistical models, contained in the rating methodologies cannot be compared to 
media information. Moreover, the traditional press would rarely have a close level 
of involvement with the source of its reporting of the sort that a CRA does.840  
The main difference between a journalist and a credit rating agency lies in the 
nature of ratings. Journalists do not provide information to public for business 
purposes, whereas CRAs issue statements that influence investment decisions and 
play a powerful role in the financial markets. However, to be fair, the impact of 
some specialised media is very significant. 
A journalist submits his work to an editor, but the subject of the piece is not 
automatically published if he or she is dissatisfied with the piece’s content.841 In 
the case of solicited ratings, CRAs work together with issuers to structure the 
transaction and receive high revenues for the services provided to clients. Because 
the rating agencies do not perform normal media functions it is paradoxical to 
consider that their evaluations are ‘pure opinions’.842 
Following these arguments, it can be argued that CRAs do not act as financial 
reporters because the service of issuing evaluations is not based on simple 
newsworthy information but is directed to specific clients or comes about because 
                                                 
party subpoena when the subpoena seeks to discover information conveyed to the journalist in 
confidence. It should be noted that in Standard & Poor’s case, the court expressly recognized the 
newspaper publisher position of CRAs and stated that, in the absence of a contract, fiduciary 
relationship, or intent to cause injury, a newspaper publisher is not liable to a member of the public 
for a non-defamatory negligent misstatement of an item of news, “unless he wilfully ... circulates it 
knowing it to be false, and it is calculated to and does ... result in injury to another person”. 
839 In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & “ERISA” Litig., 511 F. Supp. 2d 742, 816-17 (S.D. Tex. 
2005). 
840 Kenneth C. Kettering, ‘Securitization and Its Discontents: The Dynamics of Financial Product 
Development’ (2008) 29 Cardozo Law Review 4, 1690. See also Commercial Financial Services, 
Inc. v Arthur Andersen LLP, 94. P.3d 106, 110 (Okla. Civ. App. 2004). The US court held that the 
professional role of the rating agencies went ‘beyond a relationship between a journalist and 
subject, and [was] more analogous to that of a client and the client’s certified public accountant’. 
On this view, the court affirmed that the First Amendment does not shield the rating agencies from 
potential liability. 
841 Theresa Nagy (note 825) 159. 
842 Thomas J. Pate, ‘Triple A rating stench: may the credit rating agencies be held accountable?’ 
(2010) 14 Barry Law Review 1, 45, where the author observes that ‘if credit rating agencies never 
issued unsolicited ratings, they would appear to be even less like financial publishers and therefore 
even less likely to be protected by free speech principles’.  
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they have been requested to act as a financial advisor by contractual parties. 
Succinctly put, ‘a credit rating is not published primarily for the purposes of 
reporting the news, but is instead issued for the purpose of effectuating financial 
transactions’.843 
Market participants consider credit ratings to be a valuable benchmark for 
financial transactions on the account of their reputational capital derived from 
evaluating the solvency of firms. In this light, it is challenging to consider that 
ratings are mere opinions if they certify the quality of bonds and if that 
information is presented as a ‘stamp of approval’ for investors and so perceived as 
verifiable fact.844 It has been noted that ‘these assessments are not statements of 
mere opinion that deserve First Amendment protections, but are instead carefully 
reasoned representations made for the explicit purpose of industry reliance’.845 
Although the ratings issued by the CRAs cannot be regarded as ‘mere opinions’, 
their principal function is signalling to the market participants about the credit risk 
of financial products. However, this signalling function has become a form of 
reliance for all users of ratings with the result to characterise these evaluations as 
‘carrots in the mouth of donkeys’. 
It is generally considered that the ‘AAA rating’ creates a form of safeguard, 
i.e. confidence, for investors by assuring them that they are investing only in the 
most secure financial product.846 For example, institutional investors (such as 
mutual funds, pension funds, municipal funds) or sophisticated investors (such as 
investment banks, alternative investments and sovereign wealth funds) 
recommend placing money in highly rated bonds. However, the ‘AAA rate’ often 
does not reflect the real risk of security used as a benchmark for retail investors in 
                                                 
843 A. Brooke Murphy, ‘Credit Rating Immunity? How the Hands-Off Approach Toward Credit 
Rating Agencies Led to the Subprime Credit Crisis and the Need for Greater Accountability’ 
(2010) 62 Oklahoma Law Review 4, 776. 
844 Jonathan M. Barnett, ‘Certification Drag: The Opinion Puzzle and Other Transactional 
Curiosities’ (2007) 33 The Journal of Corporation Law 1, 139, where it is observed that ‘a credit 
rating can be viewed as a certification instrument that is provided by an issuer (through the third 
party rating agency) pursuant to the “constructive request” of the investor population (largely 
represented by agents in the form of money-managers and other investment fiduciaries)’. 
845 Christopher Schmitt, ‘Holding the Enablers Responsible: Applying SEC Rule 10B-5 Liability 
to the Credit Rating Institutions’ (2011) 13 University of Pennsylvania Journal of Business Law 4, 
1036. 
846 A. Brooke Murphy (note 843) 742. 
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financial transactions (as, for example, in the case of the collapse of Enron and 
Lehman Brothers).847 
Ratings are regarded as being a reliable source of information in the securities 
market and their flaws may have a catastrophic effect on the creditworthiness of 
firms. On this view, ratings do not warrant being categorised as ‘traditional 
speech’ or ‘commercial speech’ because CRAs not only provide an evaluation of 
the security but also are paid by issuers and are actively involved in the 
negotiations.848 A credit rating is not a mere matter of conveying information to 
the public, the recipient of that information sets out to make profits and most 
importantly, to alter financial operations. CRAs’ evaluations are associated with 
reliability, accuracy and in-depth analysis.  
In this light, the ratings should not be viewed as simple statements but rather 
as certified information. As a result, the credit rating agencies should not be 
entitled to be protected under the US First Amendment shield and the US courts 
should not ignore the different positions of CRAs with respect to traditional 
financial journalists.  
As discussed in the next section, CRAs’ statements should be subject to a 
specific liability standard, such as the tort of negligent misrepresentation in case 
of false information supplied to investors.849 However, inaccurate facts may be 
judged differently depending on whether CRAs knowingly report faulty ratings or 
act with intent or a reckless disregard for the truth.850 If the factual basis of ratings 
is found false owing to a series of errors, omissions and unjustifiable assumptions, 
                                                 
847 John C. Coffee Jr., ‘Understanding Enron: “It’s About the Gatekeepers, Stupid” (2002) 57 The 
Business Lawyer 4, 1405. See also Claire A. Hill, ‘Rating Agencies Behave Badly: The Case of 
Enron’ (2003) 35 Connecticut Law Review 3, 1145. 
848 Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 
96 S. Ct. 1817, 48 L. Ed. 2d 346, 1976 U.S. The court affirmed that commercial speech aims to 
propose a commercial transaction by providing information and advertisement of the 
characteristics of products.   
849 Arthur R. Pinto, ‘Control and Responsibility of Credit Rating Agencies in the United States’ 
(2006) 54 The American Journal of Comparative Law, 353. The author pointed out that ‘the tort of 
negligent misrepresentation could be a possible basis of liability for users of the credit rating 
information. Plaintiffs must justifiably rely on the false information when the agency supplies it 
for the guidance of others in their business transaction and fails to exercise reasonable competence 
in obtaining or communicating the information’. 
850 Quinn v McGraw Hill Cos., 168 F.3d 331 (7th Cir. 1999) (note 856). The US court held that 
‘S&P had no duty to communicate accurate information to investors and thus could not be liable 
for any negligence in the information furnished with the bonds at the time of purchase’. See also 
Mallinckrodt Chemical Works v Goldman, Sachs Co., 420 F. Supp. 231, 244 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), 
where the court affirmed: ‘assuming that the rating was a statement of fact rather than an opinion, 
the prime rating was acceptable and if there was a misstatement of fact, it was an unwitting one’. 
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or if CRAs failed to properly conduct due diligence on underlying facts, the 
liability regime should apply.851  
Investors’ reliance on ratings raises questions about the possible options where 
CRAs act recklessly. If rating agencies could be held accountable for improper 
credit ratings, this could determine positive effects, namely investor confidence 
and market stability. However, it also could have other consequences such as 
increased costs of corporate ratings, a decrease in the number of the companies 
willing to issue ratings, a higher barrier to entry for smaller rating agencies and 
probably, a change in CRAs’ business model (from an ‘issuer-pays’ to a 
‘subscriber-pays’ business model).852  
After providing a critical appraisal of CRAs’ categorisation as financial 
reporters, the next section takes into account the question of ‘proximity’ under the 
UK regime.  
 
5.3 The liability of CRAs under UK law: the question of ‘proximity’ 
Holding CRAs liable with respect to issuers and investors in case of defective 
ratings is the crucial dilemma for regulators and judicial claims. The role played 
by CRAs in the financial markets has caused commentators and policymakers to 
expend considerable energy in considering how the agencies might incur liability 
even in absence of any contractual relationship.  
As has been noted by Manns, ‘the challenges of rating agency accountability 
reflect an inherent conflict posed by interconnections of interest between ratings 
agencies and their commercial clients and the disconnect between rating agencies 
and beneficiaries of their screening roles’.853  
                                                 
851 Genesee County Employees’ Retirement System v Thornburg Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-
3, 825 F. Supp. 2d 1082 (D.N.M. 2011). The court found that: (1) the credit ratings prominently 
displayed in the offering documents were false and misleading; (2) rating agencies used outdated 
and defective models when assigning their ratings; (3) rating agencies failed to conduct reasonable 
due diligence into the underwriters’/servicers’ representations; and (4) rating agencies were not 
sufficiently independent when assigning their ratings. In addition, the judge held that the ‘issuer-
fee’ model under which the rating agencies were employed resulted in conflicts of interest with 
issuers of securities. This undisclosed conflict arose because the rating agencies would only 
receive compensation if they provided the rating that the depositor, the underwriter, and the 
individual demanded. 
852 Kristofor W. Nelson, ‘Rough Waters for the Ratings Companies: Should the Securities Ratings 
Companies Be Held Liable for Investor Reliance in the Wake of the Real Estate Meltdown of 
2007-2008?’ (2009) 63 University of Miami Law Review 4, 1204. 
853 Jeffrey Manns, ‘Rating risk after the subprime mortgage crisis: a user fee approach for rating 
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The challenging task is to hold CRAs accountable for their misconduct or 
inaccurate screening of credit risk and issuers’ disclosure. During the 2007-2009 
financial crisis, credit rating agencies failed to reduce the risk posed by the 
increasing complexity of securities in so far as they underestimated their systemic 
threat in the banking and corporate sector. Issuing ratings has become an activity 
in which CRAs act without control and without any constraints.  
The regulatory reforms at US and EU level—discussed in Chapter three—
established a rigid system of supervision designed to fill the accountability gap 
between credit rating agencies and investors. However, the reforms carried out by 
legislators leave space for CRAs to escape liability. In particular, the regulators 
have not solved the question of what kind of relationship exists with non-rating 
requesting issuers and what duties credit rating agencies should owe to investors. 
The difficulties in dealing with the CRAs’ accountability when third parties 
are involved in the business operations lie in the absence of contract. It is widely 
assumed that without a contractual relationship, i.e. the doctrine of privity in the 
common law of contract854, credit rating agencies generally do not owe any duties 
to investors who rely on ratings.  
In the UK, the common law principle of ‘privity’ of contract may constitute a 
limitation to CRAs’ liability because of the fundamental distinction between the 
positions of third parties that are not involved in a contractual relationship from 
the position of others that conclude an agreement with credit rating agencies.855 
                                                 
agency accountability’ (2009) 87 North Carolina Law Review 4, 1015. The author suggests ‘how 
debt purchasers may shoulder both the burdens and benefits of gatekeeper accountability by 
financing an SEC-administered user fee system as a quid pro quo for enforceable rights, yet shows 
how caps on liability and other safeguards would make gatekeepers’ duties manageable’. 
854 The ‘privity of contract’ doctrine means that a contract does not confer rights on someone who 
is not a party to the contract. Third parties are thus excluded from claiming performance or 
damages for non-performance. See on this discussion Hugh Beale, Chitty on Contracts. General 
Principles (note 769) Chapter one, para 1-194, where it is pointed out that ‘at common law, in 
principle privity of contract prevents any breach by A of a term of a contract made with B from 
giving rise to any contractual liability in A to C, a third party to the contract’. 
The doctrine of ‘privity of contract’ was raised in Winterbottom v Wright (1842) 10 M.W. 109, 
where the court held that a person who is not a party to the contract should not be considered 
capable of starting an action of tort. However, this approach was rejected by the House of Lords in 
Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] and subsequently contested within the doctrine of ‘assumption of 
responsibility’ that recognises the liability in negligence for pure economic loss. See Junior Books 
Ltd v Veitchi Co Ltd [1983] 1 A.C. 520.  
855 Oliver von Schweinitz, Rating Agencies: Their Business, Regulation and Liability Under U.S., 
U.K. and German Law (Unlimited Publishing LLC Bloomington Indiana, 2007) 122-123. 
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The ‘privity’ of contract for the rating of the security is between the ratings 
companies and the companies that initially sell the securities.856 
However, the use of ratings in investment decisions, and its impact on 
financial transactions raise many doubts about the lack of imposition of duties in 
respect of CRAs’ activities in cases of failure to exercise care or diligence.857 
The focus on CRAs’ accountability takes into account their duties in assessing 
risks and overseeing issuer disclosures.858 It is possible to show that there is a 
causal nexus between the lax ratings process and gross damages sustained by the 
investing public (for example, in the bond insurers MBIA, Inc. and Ambac 
Assurance Insurance, Inc. failures).859  
CRAs are intended to provide an accurate assessment of the risk of default so 
if that assessment is found misleading it should raise a degree of liability. By 
providing an outlook on financial products in order to help market participants 
make the right investment choices, the gatekeeping function is a matter of public 
interest and it should be accompanied by a correlative duty of providing reliable 
monitoring to protect investors.860  
CRAs have access to privileged and confidential company information which 
they assess in order to perform their ratings. They provide qualified information 
that should reflect accurate, predictable and transparent knowledge about the 
creditworthiness of firms.861 By issuing informed assessments CRAs provide 
‘expertise’ in the financial market and investors place their confidence in the 
value of disclosures based on their reputational intermediary’s credibility.862 
                                                 
856 Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562 (note 747).   
857 Arguably, in so far as certification and mandatory reporting duties are imposed on them, rating 
agencies have incentives to serve as more proactive watchdogs at a much earlier point in flagging 
the growing risks in order to save their own skins. This proposal includes capped liability exposure 
to creditors limited to cases of gross negligence, a system that should provide a framework for 
accountability, yet pose a manageable burden for rating agencies. See Jeffrey Manns (note 853) 
1088-1089.   
858 Jonathan R. Macey, ‘A Pox on Both of Your Houses: Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley and the Debate 
Concerning the Relative Efficacy of Mandatory Versus Enabling Rules’ (2003) 81 Washington 
University Law Quarterly 2, 342-343. 
859 Aline van Duyn, ‘Ambac and MBIA suffer major losses’ Financial Times (London, 5 
November 2008). See also Christine Richard, ‘Ambac’s Insurance Unit Cut to AA From AAA by 
Fitch Ratings’ Bloomberg (New York, 19 January 2008). 
860 Peter B. Oh, ‘Gatekeeping’ (2004) 29 The Journal of Corporation Law 4, 741. 
861 Paul Robbe and Ronald Mahieu, ‘Are the Standards Too Poor? An Empirical Analysis of the 
Timeliness and Predictability of Credit Rating Changes’ (31 January 2005) 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=648561> accessed 3 March 2014.  
862 David Reiss, ‘Subprime Standardization: How Rating Agencies Allow Predatory Lending to 
Flourish in the Secondary Mortgage Market’ (2006) 33 Florida State University Law Review 4, 
1021. 
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It is generally accepted that confidence is the most important factor in the 
financial market; therefore if there is no proper monitoring system in place to 
ensure the CRAs’ objectivity, this can potentially create a confidence crisis.863 It 
is arguable that whereas the issuer asks for a favourable rating, i.e. the highest 
possible rating, the investor is interested in a lower rating for a cheaper entry-level 
price in the financial market.864 
CRAs represent a ‘pendulum’ in the market because of their powerful role to 
determine the volatility of assets. On the one hand CRAs have an interest in 
making profits by granting ratings, on the other hand there is an evident risk of 
disrupting the market and making issuers insolvent. In both scenarios, credit 
rating agencies do not incur any liability unless intentional misconduct in issuing 
inaccurate evaluations is proved, when tortious liability should apply.865 The 
question turns on investor over-reliance on fallible ratings: a possible solution 
would be to regulate the agencies in such a way that they are paid for by investors 
rather than issuers. In those circumstances, CRAs could not shelter behind the 
arguments of solicited ratings and disclaimed liability.  
The accountability of CRAs should not be considered only a matter of 
investor’s confidence or investor protection, but also a concern for the companies 
that request the ratings.  
As already indicated, in the absence of contract it is difficult to hold rating 
agencies liable for faulty ratings and it is unrealistic to claim damages for a flawed 
rating in the absence of specific legislation addressing this matter. However, the 
same obstacles can be observed in a contractual relationship where the general 
rules of contract law apply in full. In particular, the underlying contracts often 
include a clause of exclusion of liability in favour of the agency that means any 
contractual claim may prove to be unsuccessful and likely to be dismissed.866 
                                                 
863 Emily Lee, ‘Basel III: post-financial crisis international financial regulatory reform’ (2013) 28 
Journal of International Banking Law and Regulation 11, 441. 
864 Imad Moosa, ‘Shelter from the Subprime Financial Crisis’ (2008) 4 Monash Business Review 1, 
31-33. 
865 Victor P. Goldberg, ‘Accountable Accountants: Is Third-Party Liability Necessary?’ (1988) 17 
The Journal of Legal Studies 2, 311-312. The author discussed the scope of tort liability to cover 
third parties not in ‘privity’ with producers of goods or services and argued that ‘where contracts 
can effectively assign responsibility for losses and where it is unlikely that most victims would be 
willing to pay for protection, it would be unwise to rely on tort law’ (at 311).   
866 Brigitte Haar, ‘Civil Liability of Credit Rating Agencies after CRA 3 – Regulatory All-or-
Nothing Approaches between Immunity and Over-Deterrence’, University of Oslo Faculty of Law 
Legal Studies Research Paper Series No 2013-02, 3. 
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The contractual imbalance between CRAs and issuers could reinforce the 
virtually complete immunity of credit agencies, and underlines the need to find a 
means of holding them liable. If investors may claim directly against the rating 
agency for losses suffered during a financial transaction the insolvency risk would 
be shifted to the CRA, which could have more of an incentive to avoid losses as 
result of flawed assessments. This would allow investors to sue CRAs without any 
contractual relationship, a scenario that could change the credit rating agencies’ 
modus operandi and give more chances to investors to sue where necessary. 
In the UK, section 90A and Schedule 10A of the Financial Services and 
Markets Act 2000 (Liability of Issuers) Regulations 2010 make issuers of 
securities liable in connection with published information ‘to persons who have 
suffered loss as a result of (1) a misleading statement or dishonest omission in 
certain published information relating to the securities; or (2) a dishonest delay in 
publishing such information’. 
The UK legislation may be examined in conjunction with the US legislation 
since the US introduced a private cause of action under which investors can sue 
credit rating agencies for knowingly or recklessly failing to conduct a reasonable 
investigation of facts (or for failing to obtain an analysis from an independent 
source). In particular, Rule 436(g) of the Securities Act of 1933—repealed by the 
Dodd-Frank Act867—made rating agencies subject to ‘expert liability’ for 
misleading statements in registration statements under Section 11 of the 1933 
Securities Act.868  
It has been observed that ‘the repeal of Rule 436(g) has created a dilemma in 
the sense that it results in either party’s liability, depending on whether the ratings 
are included or not, without actually clarifying the crucial issues of the liability 
                                                 
867 Baker & McKenzie, ‘The Repeal of Rule 436(g): Effects on the Asset-Backed Securities 
Market’, Legal Alert, July 2010. 
868 Section 11 of the 1933 Securities Act (‘Civil Liabilities on Account of False Registration 
Statement’), under which experts are subject to enhanced liability for untrue and misleading 
statements included in the registration statement. See Lisbeth Freeman (note 798) 612-613 where 
it is noted that CRAs could be held liable through the ‘Control Person liability’ under Section 
20(a) of the 1934 Exchange Act. Section 20(a) provides that ‘every person who, directly or 
indirectly, controls any person liable under any provision of this chapter or of any rule or 
regulation thereunder shall also be liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent as such 
controlled person to any person to whom such controlled person is liable, unless the controlling 
person acted in good faith and did not directly or indirectly induce the act or acts constituting the 
violation or cause of action’. 
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problem’.869 On this view, the US legislator has added a layer of uncertainty by 
introducing a safe harbour for credit rating agencies that can easily avoid liability 
when issuers do not include ratings in their registration statement or when CRAs 
refuse to have their ratings included in registration statements.870 
Recently, there have been court decisions in the US recognizing the 
accountability of credit rating agencies for negligent misrepresentation in 
financial transactions.871 Generally, investors argue that rating agencies 
negligently issued inaccurate ratings, thereby breaching a duty of care owed to 
investors to give accurate information.  
Negligent misrepresentation claims should be based on the following 
elements: (1) a misstatement or omission of a material fact, made scienter872; (2) a 
reasonable investor, i.e. informed person, who conscientiously relied on the 
CRA’s rating; and (3) the proximity between CRAs and investors who suffered 
damages from inaccurate ratings.873 Proximity should establish whether or not 
positive relationships exist between the parties in terms of causal pathways by 
which the defendant’s failure might have caused injury to the claimant.874 
                                                 
869 Brigitte Haar (note 866) 9. 
870 Benjamin H. Brownlow (note 814) 112-113. 
871 California Public Employees’ Retirement Systems (CalPERS) v Moody’s Corp., No. CGC-09-
490241 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. July 9, 2009). The judge held that the pension fund produced 
sufficient evidence that the credit rating agencies had acted fraudulently by making 
misrepresentations without reasonable grounds to believe that they were telling the truth. The US 
court found that Moody’s, S&P’s, and Fitch assigned untrue, inaccurate, and unjustifiably high 
credit ratings to the senior debt of the Structured Investment Vehicles (SIVs). These credit ratings 
were false at the time they were initially assigned, and continued to be false during the existence of 
the SIVs. The court observed that rating agencies knew at all times that their SIV ratings would be 
relied upon by the same qualified institutional buyers and qualified purchasers to which the SIVs 
were marketed. Most importantly, the US courts affirmed that there was a close connection 
between the rating agencies’ negligent rating actions and the plaintiff’s injury. This case showed 
that CRAs may be liable for fraud: however, in this circumstance the plaintiff is required only 
adduce facts from which it may be inferred that the CRA knowingly or recklessly failed to conduct 
reasonable due diligence to verify factual information used in a credit rating. 
872 The term scienter is generally referred to intent or knowledge of wrongdoing of an act 
committed by the offending party. See William H. Kuehnle, ‘On Scienter, Knowledge, and 
Recklessness under the Federal Securities Laws’ (1997) 34 Houston Law Review 1, 159-161. 
873 Timothy M. Sullivan, ‘Federal Preemption and the Rating Agencies: Eliminating State Law 
Liability to Promote Quality Ratings’ (2010) 94 Minnesota Law Review 6, 2148. 
874 Christian Witting, ‘Duty of Care: An Analytical Approach’ (2005) 25 Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies 1, 40-41. The author observes that ‘proximity criteria are unequivocal as indicators of the 
presence or absence of a substantial ability on the part of the defendant to cause injury to the 
claimant. The presence of proximity factors points in the direction of a duty being recognized, 
while the absence of such points away from the recognition of a duty’. See also Christian Witting, 
Liability for negligent misstatements (Oxford: OUP 2004) 26 and 28. On the judicial exposition of 
the function of proximity see Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman (1985) 15 CLR 424, HCA at 
497-498; Jaensch v Coffey (1984) 155 CLR 549, HCA at 578-586. 
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In New Jersey Carpenters Vacation Fund v Harbor View Mortgage Loan 
Trust, the plaintiffs alleged that the rating agencies knowingly issued overly high 
ratings for mortgage-backed products in violation of federal securities law.875  
The element of ‘proximity’ should be solved by the assertion that 
misrepresented material facts disclosed within ratings are designed to be used by 
reasonable investors in the financial markets. In this way, the rating (1) does not 
provide securities information to investors in a cost-effective manner; (2) does not 
reduce transaction costs; and (3) does not reduce information asymmetries 
between market participants.  
In this light, investors cannot claim damages suffered where CRAs’ 
evaluations were the motivating factor in the investment decision. Under this 
approach, any liability seems to be limited to relations between CRAs and issuers 
only, because investors have no chance of being compensated for financial losses 
caused by inaccurate ratings. However, CRAs should owe the highest level of 
diligence, prudence and loyalty in issuing their evaluations not only for the sake 
of market integrity, but also for maintaining confidence among market 
participants.876  
Consequently, the expectations of investors—as receivers of CRAs’ 
evaluations—should be aligned with those of rated firms by giving them the 
possibility to bring a civil suit against CRAs for losses arising from detrimental 
reliance on their ratings.877 In this regard, it has been observed that ‘rating 
agencies should be held liable where the factual basis of their ratings is false or 
where they have failed properly to analyse underlying facts. Where the agency got 
the facts right, but simply drew the wrong conclusion, liability should not apply’. 
The contractual relationship raises a direct liability of CRAs to issuers while in 
the absence of contract an indirect liability or non-contractual liability of CRAs to 
investors should apply in case of negligent ratings. 
                                                 
875 New Jersey Carpenters Vacation Fund v Harbor View Mortgage Loan Trust, 581 F. Supp. 2d 
581 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (No. 08 Civ. 5093). The investors argued that they relied on these alleged 
material misstatements in their decision to purchase Harbor View’s mortgage-backed products and 
suffered damage when the mortgage-backed investment market collapsed and those securities 
dropped precipitously in value. 
876 Graeme Baber, ‘The role and responsibility of credit rating agencies in promoting soundness 
and integrity’ (2014) 17 Journal of Money Laundering Control 1, 35. 
877 Matthias Lehmann, ‘Civil Liability of Rating Agencies: An Insipid Sprout from Brussels’, LSE 
Law, Society and Economy Working Papers 15/2014, 8. 
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After considering the question of ‘proximity’ in finding a degree of liability 
for CRAs, the next section focuses on CRAs’ civil liability regime under EU law 
by looking at some of the strategies regulators should adopt to manage their 
legitimacy.  
 
5.4 The civil liability regime for CRAs under the EU regulatory framework 
Regulation (EU) No 462/2013878 introduced a civil liability regime for CRAs 
at the European level. This change of the EU legislator towards supplementing the 
regime of regulatory sanctions for CRAs by civil liability rules might be 
considered to have long been due.879 
However, the efficiency and effectiveness of the EU provisions depend widely 
on their design in detail and the potential to facilitate their enforcement.880 The 
structure and wording of the civil liability rules for CRAs under the 2013 CRA 
Regulation raise multiple questions. 
Article 35a(1) of the Regulation establishes a statutory cause of action against 
rating agencies. The provision states:  
“Where a credit rating agency has committed, intentionally or with gross 
negligence, any of the infringements listed in Annex III having an impact on a 
credit rating, an investor or issuer may claim damages from that credit rating 
agency for damage caused to it due to that infringement. An investor may claim 
damages under this Article where it establishes that it has reasonably relied in 
accordance with Article 5a(1) or otherwise with due care, on a credit rating for a 
decision to invest into, hold onto or divest from a financial instrument covered by 
that credit rating. An issuer may claim damages under this Article where it 
establishes that it or its financial instruments are covered by that credit rating and 
                                                 
878 Regulation (EU) No 462/2013. Regulation No 462/2013 was accompanied by Directive 
2013/14/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 amending Directive 
2003/41/EC on the activities and supervision of institutions for occupational retirement provision, 
Directive 2009/65/EC on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions 
relating to undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) and Directive 
2011/61/EU on Alternative Investment Fund Managers in respect of over-reliance on credit ratings 
(OJ 2013 L 145 p. 1).  
879 Gudula Deipenbrock, ‘Civil liability of credit rating agencies in the European Union – selected 
international private law issues’, Seminar organised by the University of London, Institute of 
Advanced Legal Studies, 30 January 2014. 
880 Mads Andenas, ‘Selected aspects of civil liability of CRAs in the European Union (EU) – Art. 
35a of the (draft) Second CRA Amending Regulation. The problem of burden of proof’, Seminar 
on the Civil Liability of Credit Rating Agencies in the European Union, Oslo, 3 June 2013.   
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the infringement was not caused by misleading and inaccurate information 
provided by the issuer to the credit rating agency, directly or through information 
publicly available”.881  
The rule introduces the possibility for investors or issuers to claim damages 
where credit rating agencies have deliberately infringed, or acted with gross 
negligence in breach of, any obligations imposed on them by Regulation (EC) No 
1060/2009882, and the infringement had an ‘impact’ on the rating outcome.883  
Recital 33 in the preamble to the 2013 CRA Regulation qualifies this 
somewhat: (1) ‘because the activity of credit rating involves a certain degree of 
assessment of complex economic factors’; and (2) ‘the application of different 
methodologies may lead to different rating results, none of which can be 
considered as incorrect’.884 
The important aspect is that the infringements listed in Annex III of the 2013 
CRA Regulation serve as a foundation for a liability claim.885 The condition for 
liability is the existence of damage caused by the infringement.  
In detail, an investor who does not have a contractual relationship with the 
CRA may claim damages where he/she demonstrates that he/she placed 
reasonable reliance or reliance with due care in a credit rating when entering into 
an investment decision. The investor must have consciously relied (and not 
mechanistically over-relied) or paid due attention to a credit rating before making 
a decision. The investor has to establish reasonable reliance in accordance with 
Article 5a(1), which aims at mitigating over-reliance on credit ratings by financial 
institutions. 
                                                 
881 Article 35a(1) of Regulation (EU) No 462/2013 (amending Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 on 
credit rating agencies). 
882 Recital 33 in the preamble to Regulation (EU) No 462/2013, where it is stated that ‘it is 
appropriate to expose credit rating agencies to potentially unlimited liability only where they 
breach Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 intentionally or with gross negligence’. 
883 Recital 32 in the preamble to Regulation (EU) No 462/2013. 
884 Recital 33 in the preamble to Regulation (EU) No 462/2013. 
885 Annex III to Regulation (EU) No 462/2013 provides a catalogue of infringements upon which 
claimants may rely: some of these concern several duties including requirements concerning the 
CRA’s organization, operation and independence. For instance, infringements by CRAs that may 
form the basis of a claim are: (1) not ensuring rating analysts have appropriate knowledge and 
experience for the duties assigned (para. 1(27) of Annex III); or (2) not adopting adequate 
measures to ensure that credit ratings are based on a thorough analysis of all the information that is 
available (para 1(42) of Annex III). 
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An issuer may claim damages where he/she demonstrates that the 
infringement was caused by a misleading or an inaccurate rating from a CRA that 
it is not based on the issuer’s information. 
From an examination of Article 35a(2) of the 2013 CRA Regulation, it appears 
that the burden of proof is borne by the investor (or issuer) in so far as he has ‘to 
present accurate and detailed information indicating that the credit rating agency 
has committed an infringement of this Regulation, and that infringement had an 
impact on the credit rating issued’.886 The assessment of what constitutes 
‘accurate and detailed information’ is delegated to competent national courts 
‘taking into consideration that the investor or issuer may not have access to 
information which is purely within the sphere of the credit rating agency’ (Article 
35(2) subparagraph 2).  
It should be noted that the regime introduced by Article 35a(2) differs 
significantly from the Commission’s proposal which was more favourable to 
investors because any exclusion or limitation of civil liability stipulated in 
advance by agreement would have been null and void under the original 
proposal.887 
A reasonable question is raised by the regulatory perspective of the burden of 
proof, namely the cross-border investigations and enforcement: it may be difficult 
to ensure the same level of supervision owing to the different approaches taken in 
different jurisdictions. By the same token, it may be difficult for investors to carry 
out sufficient scrutiny (and engage in regular due diligence) over CRAs’ modus 
operandi in order to show that the ratings were potentially inaccurate or in the 
nature of misrepresentations.888 
                                                 
886 Article 35a(2) of Regulation (EU) No 462/2013 (amending Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 on 
credit rating agencies). 
887 European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation amending Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 
on credit rating agencies’ COM (2011) 747 final, 15 November 2011, 33. The Commission’s 
proposal proposed the following rule: ‘where an investor establishes facts from which it may be 
inferred that a credit rating agency has committed any of the infringements listed in Annex III, it 
will be for the credit rating agency to prove that it has not committed that infringement or that 
infringement did not have an impact on the issued credit rating’. The Proposal provided that ‘the 
civil liability referred to in paragraph 1 shall not be excluded or limited in advance by agreement. 
Any clause in such agreements excluding or limiting the civil liability in advance shall be deemed 
null and void’. 
888 Gudula Deipenbrock, ‘Trying or Failing Better Next Time? – The European Legal Framework 
for Credit Rating Agencies after Its Second Reform’ (2014) 25 European Business Law Review 2, 
221. 
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The interesting part of this regulatory approach can be found in Article 35a(3) 
where it is stated that ‘the civil liability of credit rating agencies, as referred to in 
paragraph 1, shall only be limited in advance where that limitation is: (a) 
reasonable and proportionate; and (b) allowed by the applicable national law in 
accordance with paragraph 4’.889   
The EU legislator introduces specific conditions to limit the civil liability 
regime of CRAs: conditions that allow national laws to define the boundaries of 
liability. This rule could open the doors for different legal treatment by national 
courts. The risk that too much may have been left to national laws when it comes 
to the application of civil liability for CRAs becomes even more apparent in the 
light of the wording of Article 35a(4): 
“Terms such as ‘damage’, ‘intention’, ‘gross negligence’, ‘reasonably relied’, 
‘due care’, ‘impact’, ‘reasonable’ and ‘proportionate’ which are referred to in this 
Article but are not defined, shall be interpreted and applied in accordance with the 
applicable national law as determined by the relevant rules of private international 
law. Matters concerning the civil liability of a credit rating agency which are not 
covered by this Regulation shall be governed by the applicable national law as 
determined by the relevant rules of private international law. The court that is 
competent to decide on a claim for civil liability brought by an investor or issuer 
shall be determined by the relevant rules of private international law”.890 
At the UK level, Article 35(a) of Regulation (EU) No 462/2013 has been 
implemented by the Credit Rating Agencies (Civil Liability) Regulations 2013 
(the Regulations).891  
These Regulations require that the infringement must be placed intentionally 
or with gross negligence if the senior management of the CRA: (1) acted 
deliberately to commit the infringement892; and (2) were reckless as to whether the 
infringement occurred.893 In addition, an infringement has an impact on a credit 
rating if it results in a different rating category being assigned to the issuer or the 
                                                 
889 Article 35a(3) of Regulation (EU) No 462/2013 (amending Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 on 
credit rating agencies). 
890 Article 35a(4) of Regulation (EU) No 462/2013 (amending Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 on 
credit rating agencies). 
891 Credit Rating Agencies (Civil Liability) Regulations 2013 (SI 2013/1637). 
892 Section 3 of Regulations. 
893 Section 4 of Regulations. The definition of ‘gross negligence’ is restricted by Section 4(2) of 
the Regulations that states ‘the senior management of a credit rating agency are reckless if they act 
without caring whether an infringement occurs’. 
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financial instrument of the issuer to which the credit rating relates and that the 
infringement caused them to suffer damage.894 
For the purposes of Article 35a(4), the UK law: (1) ascribed to ‘gross 
negligence’ the meaning of recklessness; (2) included indicative factors in the 
instrument to assist the court in considering whether limitations CRAs have 
sought to place on their liability are ‘reasonable and proportionate’895; and (3)  
defined ‘damage’ in line with national law for the equivalent area, namely tort and 
contract (in the case where a rating has been ascribed on a solicited basis, under a 
contract).896 
Regarding the terms ‘reasonably relied’, ‘due care’ and ‘caused’, the Credit 
Rating Agencies (Civil Liability) Regulations 2013 provides the following 
definitions: (1) the test for whether the reliance is reasonable is the same as for 
whether it is reasonable for a person to rely on a statement for the purposes of 
determining whether the statement gives rise to a duty of care in negligence897; (2) 
if the investor took the care a reasonably prudent investor would have exercised in 
the circumstances898; and (3) the test of causation in negligence applies for the 
purposes of determining whether an infringement caused damage.899  
It should be noted that the English courts tend to favour the principle of 
‘caveat emptor’ that means investors have to be responsible for their investment 
decisions.900 In this way, investors are discouraged from passively relying on 
ratings. However, the extent to which the ‘due care’ test requires private investors 
to conduct their own credit risk assessment, and the nature of those risk 
assessments is far from clear.901 
                                                 
894 Section 5 of Regulations. Causation will be established by applying the ‘but for’ test. Claimants 
will need to show that but for the CRA’s relevant infringement they would have been better off. 
For an academic commentary, see Andrew Wanambwa, ‘Civil liability of credit rating agencies’ 
(2014) 29 Journal of International Banking Law and Regulation 8, 520. 
895 Regulation 9b of Credit Rating Agencies (Civil Liability) Regulations 2013, where it is stated 
that limitation on liability is reasonable and proportionate ‘having regard to the factors provided in 
regulations 10, 11 and 12 as the court considers relevant’.  
896 Explanatory Memorandum to the Credit Rating Agencies (Civil Liability) Regulations 2013 
(2013 No 1637) para 7.5.  
897 Section 6(2) of the Credit Rating Agencies (Civil Liability) Regulations 2013. 
898 Section 7 of the Credit Rating Agencies (Civil Liability) Regulations 2013. 
899 Section 8 of the Credit Rating Agencies (Civil Liability) Regulations 2013. 
900 Harry Edwards, ‘CRA 3 and the liability of rating agencies: inconsistent messages from the 
regulation on credit rating agencies in Europe’ (2013) 7 Law and Financial Markets Review 4, 
189. 
901 Andrew Wanambwa (note 894) 521. 
 202 
Regarding the approach to determining damages, Section 14 of the 
Regulations provides that ‘the damages recoverable by an investor under Article 
35a are: (1) contractual damages, where the investor enters into a contract with a 
CRA to provide a credit rating; or (2) where in absence of a contractual 
relationship, the damages that would be recoverable by the investor if the investor 
had succeeded in a claim against the credit rating agency in the tort of 
negligence’. In this regard, UK courts are generally reluctant to consider tort 
remedies such as tort of negligence in the absence of the following elements: (1) a 
duty of care; (2) a breach of that duty; and (3) consequential damages. The duty of 
care implies the existence of some type of relationship between the claimant and 
the defendant prior to the infliction of harm. Further, the UK courts are reluctant 
to consider liability for negligent misrepresentation in the absence of ‘proximity’ 
and to award compensation for pure economic losses in absence of a duty of 
care.902  
At the EU level, the contractual relationship between credit rating agencies 
and issuers is governed by contract law as provided by domestic rules. There is no 
single legislation governing obligations between parties, and contractual claims 
against CRAs are treated differently among Member States.  
The absence of a unique, harmonized regime for regulating contracts with 
credit rating agencies makes the civil liability regime a matter for national 
courts.903 This problem could give rise to serious difficulties in the area of conflict 
of laws and to regulatory arbitrage between States.904 For instance, in case of 
pecuniary loss it could be difficult to find the location of assets affected by 
inaccurate ratings. Further, it might be difficult to identify the location of occurred 
damages, and in particular: (1) the country where the issuer requested to be rated; 
                                                 
902 Spartan Steel and Alloys Ltd v Martin & Co (Contractors) Ltd [1973] QB 27, where Lord 
Davies pointed that ‘where a defendant who owes a duty of care to a plaintiff breaches that duty 
and, as both a direct and a reasonably foreseeable result of that injury, the plaintiff suffers only 
economic loss, he is entitled to recover that loss as damages and, since the plaintiffs’ financial loss 
was both the direct and foreseeable consequence of the defendants’ negligence, they were rightly 
awarded damages for their financial loss’. 
903 Brigitte Haar, ‘Civil Liability of Credit Rating Agencies after CRA 3 – Regulatory All-or-
Nothing Approaches between Immunity and Over-Deterrence’ (2014) 25 European Business Law 
Review 2, 316. The author argues that the civil liability regime as introduced by the 2013 EU 
Regulation is the result of political controversies among EU Institutions and it does not seem 
convincing for its typical spirit of compromise.  
904 Alessandro Scarso, ‘The Liability of Credit Rating Agencies in a Comparative Perspective’ 
(2013) 4 Journal of European Tort Law 2, 163. 
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(2) the country in which the investor is damaged; or (3) the country in which the 
CRA issues the ratings.  
In this scenario private international law questions arise. In case of solicited 
ratings—in presence of contractual obligations—the law applicable is determined 
by Article 3(1) of Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 ‘on the law applicable to 
contractual obligations’ (Rome I).905 In case of unsolicited ratings, the choice of 
law is regulated by Article 4(1) of Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 ‘on the law 
applicable to non-contractual obligations’ (Rome II).906 This rule provides that the 
governing law is “the law of the country in which the damage occurs”: the 
application of this rule may imply different interpretations because of the absence 
of a special rule for financial torts in the Rome II Regulation.907 
Article 35a(5) of Regulation (EU) No 462/2013 provides that ‘this provision 
does not exclude further civil liability claims in accordance with national law’.908 
Having regard to the UK Regulations, the question at stake is whether they leave 
room for the application of other tortious remedies or estoppel.  
CRAs were already subject to civil liability in the United Kingdom under 
domestic common law: pre-existing forms of civil liability in UK common law are 
                                                 
905 Article 3(1) of Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 ‘on the law applicable to contractual obligations’ 
(Rome I) (OJ 2008 L 177 p. 6) that states ‘a contract shall be governed by the law chosen by the 
parties. The choice shall be made expressly or clearly demonstrated by the terms of the contract or 
the circumstances of the case. By their choice the parties can select the law applicable to the whole 
or to part only of the contract’. 
906 Article 4(1) of Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 ‘on the law applicable to non-contractual 
obligations’ (Rome II) (OJ 2007 L 199 p. 140) that states ‘the law applicable to a non-contractual 
obligation arising out of a tort/delict shall be the law of the country in which the damage occurs 
irrespective of the country in which the event giving rise to the damage occurred and irrespective 
of the country or countries in which the indirect consequences of that event occur’. The Regulation 
is of universal application: the law specified is applied whether or not it is the law of a Member 
State. 
For learned commentaries see Giesela Ruehl, ‘German Federal Supreme Court Rules on 
Jurisdiction over US Credit Rating Agency’, 22 January 2013 <http://www.conflictoflaws.net> 
accessed 24 April 2014. The author commented a decision of 13 December 2012 in which the 
German Federal Supreme Court had to deal with the question of whether (and under what 
conditions) German courts have jurisdiction to hear claims of German investors against American 
based US credit rating agencies for losses suffered in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. 
This ruling clearly shows the issue of conflict of laws in the CRAs’ civil liability regime, a 
question that could be problematic if the EU legislator does not intervene to define the procedural 
aspects of liability claims. See also Anatol Dutta, ‘The liability of American credit rating agencies 
in Europe’ (2014) 1 Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts, 33. It is observed 
that ‘it is not necessarily the case that a European liability regime – be it at the Member State level 
or at the European Union level such as the recently introduced Article 35a of the European 
Regulation on Credit Rating Agencies – will adequately encompass the American agencies and 
their ratings’. 
907 Matthias Lehmann (note 877) 24. 
908 Article 35a(5) of Regulation (EU) No 462/2013 (amending Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 on 
credit rating agencies). 
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the tort of negligent misstatement and, in cases where the rating is provided by 
agreement, under contract law.909  
As indicated, negligent misstatement can be defined as a false statement of 
fact which is made honestly but carelessly. In this case, CRAs could be held liable 
if there has been breach of a duty to take care in making the statements that have 
caused damage to the claimant, who reasonably relied on them. Under such 
circumstances, equitable estoppel may be applied to rating agencies’ evaluations 
as a rule of evidence in terms of establishing a fact necessary to complete a cause 
of action—for instance, to overcome the question of ‘proximity’. In this light, it 
seems that the UK Regulations leave room for the application of estoppel as a 
complement to tort liability.  
As indicated, under Article 35a the investor has to show that it reasonably 
relied on the credit rating for an investment decision and to present accurate and 
detailed information indicating that the CRA committed an infringement of the 
regulation, and that infringement had an impact on the credit rating issued. 
However, estoppel may usefully be brought into play as a rule of evidence.  
First, it would seem under Article 35a(2), second subparagraph, that the CRA 
is estopped from relying, as against the investor’s evidential burden to present 
accurate and detailed information, on information which is purely within the 
sphere of the CRA. Secondly, it can be argued that estoppel may be used by the 
investor as a viable argument to defeat a plea by the CRA that there is no 
contractual relationship between it and the investor. Lastly, the courts could hold 
that the CRA is estopped from denying the correlation, and eventually the cause 
of damages, between the time of issuing the rating and time of making the 
investment decision. The fact that Regulation (EU) No 462/2013 on CRAs 
requires Member States to make provision in their national law for third parties to 
sue when they relied on a credit rating by a CRA allows it to be argued that the 
UK and other common law States could base their remedy on estoppel. However, 
it may be questioned whether CRAs would be still willing to rate in a more hostile 
environment (of increased liability). 
                                                 
909 Explanatory Memorandum to the Credit Rating Agencies (Civil Liability) Regulations 2013 
(2013 No 1637) para 7.4. See also House of Lords European Union Committees, Economic and 
Financial Affairs and International Trade (Sub-Committee A), Credit Rating Agencies (17308/11, 
17329/11), Letter from the Chairman to Mark Hoban MP, Financial Secretary, HM Treasury, 13 
where it was affirmed that ‘[CRAs] should be held responsible for negligence or misconduct when 
producing those ratings’. 
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At this point, it is possible to draw some conclusions. In the final analysis, 
Article 35a of Regulation No 462/2013 would seem to boil down to a reference to 
national law as determined by the rules of private international law in so far as it 
provides for the definition of a tort910 but leaves all the relevant ingredients 
(‘damage’, ‘intention’, ‘gross negligence’, ‘reasonably relied’, ‘due care’, 
‘impact’, ‘reasonable’ and ‘proportionate’) to the applicable national law as 
determined by the relevant rules of private international law. 
Moreover, limitation clauses are only allowed where they are reasonable and 
proportionate and allowed by the applicable national law. Consequently, whether 
a CRA is to be held liable depends virtually entirely on national law. There is no 
uniform accountability regime under EU law and what kind of liability to attach to 
CRAs remains somewhat obscure. Indeed, it is possible that the European courts 
will have to apply US law to the CRAs, since the ‘relevant rules of private 
international law’ are those of the Rome II Regulation, Article 3 of which 
provides that ‘any law specified by this Regulation shall be applied whether or not 
it is the law of a Member State’. 
The 2013 CRA Regulation restores credibility surrounding credit ratings by 
enhancing a rules-based approach (and by improving behavioural changes on the 
part of investors) however its success will be tested in actual civil enforcement 
actions against CRAs. It has been noted that ‘the institution of a right for investors 
to sue credit rating agencies may be regarded as a major step that overcomes a key 
impediment to market discipline and fosters a deeper cultural change in the credit 
rating sector as direct accountability is now owed to investors’.911  
The 2013 CRA Regulation attempts to introduce high standards of liability for 
CRAs by establishing a tort law regime although a harmonized European tort law 
system does not exist and there are no plans to introduce such a regime among EU 
Member States.912  
                                                 
910 Namely that where a credit rating agency has committed, intentionally or with gross 
negligence, certain infringements having an impact on a credit rating, an investor or issuer may 
claim damages from that credit rating agency for damage caused to it due to that infringement 
where it has reasonably relied on a credit rating for a decision to invest in, hold onto or divest its 
off of a financial instrument covered by that credit rating. 
911 Iris H-Y Chiu, ‘Regulating Credit Rating Agencies in the EU: In Search of a Coherent 
Regulatory Regime’ (2014) 25 European Business Law Review 2, 279. 
912 Wouter den Hollander, ‘European tort law through the front door: civil liability of credit rating 
agencies’, Leiden Law Blog, 8 July 2013. 
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On the one hand, the EU reform seeks to rebuild financial confidence by 
holding CRAs liable for their inaccurate ratings, on the other, it completely leaves 
to national laws the role of applying and interpreting the rules.913 It would be 
helpful for the courts to understand not only the link between CRAs and investors, 
but also the appropriate amount of liability for credit rating agencies.914 
In the light of the above considerations, despite its shortcomings, EU civil 
liability for CRAs may be considered an important step forward in the regulation 
of credit ratings industry.915 However, the EU legislator missed an opportunity to 
secure a harmonized regime of civil liability among Member States. As Lehmann 
has pointed out, ‘by calling upon each Member State to adopt its own version of 
the cause of action, the Regulation sets the divergences between national laws in 
stone’.916 
After providing an analysis of the EU civil liability regime for credit rating 
agencies introduced by the 2013 CRA Regulation, the ensuing sections examine 
the developments in the case law taking into account the position of Australian 
courts for CRAs’ liability.  
 
5.5 Developments in case law: the Australian decision in Bathurst Regional 
Council v Local Government Financial Services Pty Ltd  
Criticisms of the CRAs’ activities have been generally accompanied by scant 
attention to the credit rating agencies’ accountability. However, the development 
of the case law showed changes in the judgments of the Australian courts, which 
were more prone to recognize rating agencies’ liability for investor losses.  
The relevance of analysing the approach taken by Australian judges to  
liability on the part of CRAs lies in the recent landmark decisions that marked 
unprecedented legal actions against one of the leading credit rating agencies 
(S&P’s) after the 2007-2009 financial crisis and 2010-2012 sovereign debt 
                                                 
913 Aron Verständig, ‘Civil Liability for Credit Ratings Agencies: A Swedish Perspective’ (2014) 
25 European Business Law Review 2, 346. 
914 Cheryl Evans, ‘What Makes You So Special?: Ending the Credit Rating Agencies’ Special 
Status and Access to Confidential Information’ (2012) 46 Valparaiso University Law Review 4, 
1111. 
915 Niamh Moloney, ‘Resetting the location of regulatory and supervisory control over EU 
financial markets: lessons from five years on’ (2013) 62 International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 4, 963. 
916 Matthias Lehmann (note 877) 20. 
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crisis.917 Further, analysis of the arguments followed by the courts in the relevant 
judgments raises the question of the favourable approach for investor protection 
adopted in the Australian legislation.918  
The Australian courts commenced by reducing freedom-of-speech protection 
and freedom of the press in circumstances where the rating is based on incorrect 
facts by holding CRAs liable for negligent misrepresentations relating to the 
creditworthiness of structured financial products.919 In this context, a leading case 
is the first-instance judgment in Bathurst Regional Council v Local Government 
Financial Services Pty Ltd (No 5) (‘Bathurst’), where the Federal Court of 
Australia held that the rating agency owed a duty of care to investors as regards 
complex structured credit products.920  
The court found that S&P’s and ABN Amro were liable for negligent 
misrepresentation (and breach of the Australian consumer protection prohibition 
on misleading or deceptive conduct) to a group of local Councils.921 It is ruled that 
S&P’s deceived and misled local councils in awarding a triple ‘A’ rating to a 
complex derivative product issued by ABN Amro. The difficulty with this case is 
that the particular financial product (the subject of these proceedings) was 
customized by S&P’s using the bank’s own model, and there were a number of 
                                                 
917 Rommel Harding-Farrenberg and Kieran Donovan, ‘Duty of Care, Rating Agencies and the 
‘Grotesquely Complicated’ Rembrandt: Bathurst Regional Council v Local Government Financial 
Services Pty Ltd (No 5) (2013) 14 Business Law International 2, 185.  
918 As a matter of clarity, the Australian system of corporate law is characterized by a centralized 
federal power with national regulators. This federal law system emerges, for example, in The 
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), ‘a result of a constitutional referral by each State of its corporate law 
powers to the Australian Commonwealth government’. See Jennifer G. Hill, ‘Why did Australia 
fare so well in the global financial crisis?’ in Eilís Ferran, Niamh Moloney, Jennifer G. Hill, John 
C. Coffee, Jr (eds), The Regulatory Aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis (Cambridge: CUP 
2012) 216.  
919 See the considerations carried out in the research seminar “The Legal Framework of claims 
against Rating Agencies” hosted by the University of Sydney, 27 March 2013, where Prof. 
McDonald discussed the new frontiers of liability for CRAs in the recent Australian cases 
Wingecarribee Shire Council v Lehman Brothers Australia Ltd (in liquidation) [2012] FCA 1028 
and Bathurst Regional Council v Local Government Financial Services Pty Ltd (No 5) [2012] FCA 
1200. 
920 Bathurst Regional Council v Local Government Financial Services Pty Ltd (No 5) [2012] FCA 
1200. The Court found the rating agency liable for their inaccurate ratings. This case marks the 
first significant victory in a claim against a credit rating agency. The main points affirmed by the 
Federal Court of Australia are: (1) a rating agency may have a duty of care to investors even in the 
absence of a contractual relationship; (2) the duty of care is established to ensure that a rating is 
issued with reasonable basis; (3) where a rating agency issues a rating without reasonable basis, or 
in case of significant flaws in the methodology and model used, this constitutes a breach of that 
duty; (4) a rating agency may be liable for the total loss of an investor’s investment if it has 
breached that duty; and (5) a rating agency may also be liable to investors if its rating is considered 
to be misleading or deceptive or its rating constituted a negligent misrepresentation. 
921 Harry Edwards (note 750) 95. 
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flaws in the model and in the inputs and assumptions adopted by S&P’s to achieve 
its high rating.922 The main question at stake was that the court had to establish 
whether on the basis of evidence there were reasonable grounds for issuing the 
ratings. 
The Australian court found that manifest errors had been committed by the 
CRA in preparing its ratings: S&P’s had relied on false information provided by 
the issuer itself without verifying it independently. S&P also knew or ought to 
have known of the misleading and deceptive nature of S&P’s representations in 
connection with the ‘AAA’ rating.923  
The ruling showed the fraudulent conduct of the CRA in misleading investors 
because of profits gained by the issuer. The CRA did not observe any duty of care 
to potential purchasers and created a potential distortion in the market by 
providing false statements as to the creditworthiness of financial instruments.924 
S&P’s authorized ABN Amro to disseminate an ‘AAA’ rating to market the 
constant proportion debt obligation (‘CPDO’) to potential investors, however ‘no 
reasonable ratings agency exercising reasonable care and skill could have 
committed to the rating’.925 Further, the CRAs’ disclaimers were not effective 
because they were not brought to the attention of investors, a fact that changed the 
position of CRAs liable for intentionally giving the investors a false 
representation of the quality of financial products. 
The rating agency had neither asked sufficient questions nor sufficiently 
stress-tested the product—CPDO; its whole purpose was to have a triple ‘A’ 
rating while paying returns generally offered by a lower-rated product.926  
This case established the false and negligent misrepresentations made by a 
‘reasonably competent’ rating agency on the assessment of ‘grotesquely 
complicated’ securities. S&P’s was paid by an issuer more interested in selling the 
                                                 
922 Lesa Bransgrove, ‘A risk too far: Lehman’s Misseling’ (2013) 87 Law Institute Journal 11, 53. 
923 The court showed that ‘S&P’s knew that the rating was to be provided for the specific purpose 
of inducing potential investors to acquire the notes’. See Bathurst Regional Council v Local 
Government Financial Services Pty Ltd (No 5) [2012] FCA 1200 at 2499. 
924 The Australian Court stressed that the CRA had failed to exercise reasonable care to ensure that 
potential purchasers were provided with accurate information about the community income notes 
to enable them to properly understand the risk of financial losses to which purchasers of the notes 
were exposed. 
925 Bathurst Regional Council v Local Government Financial Services Pty Ltd (No 5) [2012] FCA 
1200 at 2617. 
926 ‘Holding the rating agencies to account’ Financial Times (London, 6 November 2012) 12. See 
also Stephen Foley, ‘Rating agencies clash over standards’ Financial Times (London, 6 November 
2012) 33. 
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securities for the highest price than ensuring that investors had all the information 
they required to evaluate them. It is remarkable that ‘the Australian ruling marks 
the first time a rating agency has faced a full trial over a structured finance 
product’.927 
The judge recognized the imposition of a duty of care on the rating agency 
whose opinion was supposed to be independent and competently reached, 
particularly where it is known that its purpose is to assist in the marketing of 
products to investors. It also recognized that rating agencies can be held liable for 
losses suffered by an investor who claimed that he relied on the rating given to an 
investment product. These considerations placed the litigation in the context of the 
common law tort of negligence as applied under the Australian Civil Liabilities 
Act 2002, rather than on a statutory cause of action.928 
The key point is that a duty of care was owed to investors by the rating agency 
in the absence of privity of contract: a CRA has found to owe and have breached a 
duty to investors with whom it had no direct relationship. Moreover, the court 
established a duty of care for CRAs in a scenario of pure economic loss and 
recognized the ‘weakness’ of a claimant, in the sense that the investor was unable 
to protect itself from the CRAs’ negligence.929 However, this ruling contrasts with 
the orientation of UK and US courts, which are generally reluctant to allow claims 
in pure economic loss in the absence of a contractual relationship.930 
Consequently, the Australian court afforded protection to ‘unaware victims’ of 
the CRAs’ negligent misrepresentation. The relevant point highlighted by Jagot, J. 
is that the CPDO was sold only to selected investors who were required to 
purchase only financial instruments that carried a certain rating, and that there was 
no secondary market for it.  
                                                 
927 Neil Hume, ‘Judge rules S&P misled derivative investors’ Financial Times (London, 6 
November 2012) 17.  
928 Section 5B(1) of the Australian Civil Liability Act 2002 (“General Principles”) under which 
‘a person is not liable for harm caused by that person’s fault in failing to take precautions against a 
risk of harm unless (a) the risk was foreseeable (that is, it is a risk of which the person knew or 
ought to have known); and (b) the risk was not insignificant; and (c) in the circumstances, a 
reasonable person in the person’s position would have taken those precautions’. 
929 Woolcock Street Investments Pty Ltd v CDG Pty Ltd (2004) 216 CLR 515; Caltex Oil 
(Australia) Pty Ltd v The Dredge “Willemstaad” (1976) 136 CLR 529. 
930 Anschutz Corp. v Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., 671 F.3d 120 (2d Cir.2011). The claimant failed to 
state a claim for negligent misrepresentation under New York law because he alleged no 
relationship or contact with the Rating Agencies that could remotely satisfy the New York 
standard. 
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The Australian decision was based on two causes of action: (1) a statutory 
claim for damages alleging that S&P’s had breached Sections 1041E and 1041H 
of the Corporations Act 2001931 and Section 12DA of the Australian Securities 
and Investments Commission Act 2001932 by engaging in misleading and 
deceptive conduct; and (2) a tort claim in negligence.933  In this context, Australia 
launched a vast programme of regulatory reforms, the “Future of Financial Advice 
reforms” (FOFA)934, aiming to enhance retail investor protection after the major 
domestic failures evidenced during the 2007-2009 financial crisis.935  
Closer examination of the Bathurst judgment in terms of the heads on which 
the various parties were held liable shows that S&P’s was sued for 
misrepresentation, negligence and breach of a fiduciary duty. In essence, S&P’s 
failed to observe the duty of care owed to investors in assessing the financial 
products.  
Under the misrepresentation head, the court revealed that S&P’s based its 
rating of ‘AAA’ on assumptions that were substantially more favourable to the 
performance of the CPDOs than the actual economic conditions existing at the 
time. It was showed that S&P knew that councils were unsophisticated investors, 
and that the very reason why S&P was paid by issuers of a financial product to 
assign a rating for that product was because the rating is well known to be highly 
material to the decision of potential investors to invest. 
Under the negligence and breach of fiduciary duty heads, the court found that 
S&P owed a duty of care to potential investors in the CPDOs. Specifically, the 
reason why ABN Amro obtained the rating was for distributing it to potential 
investors so that they could rely on the rating as an expert’s opinion in respect to 
the creditworthiness of the CPDO notes. The court demonstrated that there was a 
breach of duty because S&P’s did not have a reasonable basis to conclude that the 
notes fulfilled its own criterion for ‘AAA’ rating. 
                                                 
931 Sections 1041E and 1041H of the Corporations Act 2001 (Act No. 50 of 2001 as amended). 
932 Section 12DA of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Act No. 51 
of 2001 as amended). 
933 Barbara McDonald, ‘The legal framework of claims against ratings agencies in Australia’ 
(2013) 28 Journal of International Banking and Financial Law 6, 383. 
934 The FOFA legislation was passed by Parliament on 25 June 2012 and entered into force on 1 
July 2012. See <http://www.asic.gov.au/regulatory-resources/financial-services/future-of-
financial-advice-reforms/fofa-background-and-implementation/> accessed 26 November 2013.  
935 ‘Consumer protection became a prominent issue in Australia during the global financial crisis, 
due to a string of corporate collapses involving financial product and services providers, which 
resulted in large retail investor losses’. See Jennifer G. Hill (note 918) 271. 
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For the first time, the validity of CRAs’ internal models by which credit rating 
agencies developed their reputation in the capital markets and also their legal 
immunity against investors was successfully contested and condemned.936 
 
5.6 Implications of the Australian legislation for CRAs’ liability 
The Bathurst case brought to light the vulnerability of CRAs’ activities, 
showing a remarkable understanding of the fact that credit rating agencies could 
be not considered a trusty benchmark of the quality of financial products.937 What 
is more, Bathurst represents a landmark case because it redefines credit ratings as 
advice rather than opinion. As Jagot, J. affirmed, ‘[the rating] was a record of an 
opinion of Standard & Poor’s, which held itself out as having specialist expertise 
in assessing the creditworthiness of financial products and was intended to be 
understood as such’.938 This authority clearly constitutes a significant precedent 
against CRAs as it may open the door to further legal actions under negligent 
misrepresentation claims.939 
The first instance judgment was upheld by the Federal Court of Australia 
confirming the existence of a duty of care for CRAs with respect to investors for a 
flawed triple ‘AAA’ rating given to a structured financial instrument.940 This 
judgment was mainly based on the assumption that it was reasonable for the 
                                                 
936 Fait v Regions Financial, 655 F.3d 105 (2d Cir. 2011) at 112. The US Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit held that statements in offering documents about goodwill and loan loss reserves 
constituted ‘opinions’ and that, as such, plaintiffs needed to show that the statements were both 
objectively false and subjectively disbelieved. By considering the position of credit rating 
agencies, the US court concluded that the ratings are ‘fact-based opinions’ and affirmed that the 
‘plaintiff is required to allege a speaker’s disbelief in, and the falsity of, the opinions or beliefs 
expressed, ensures that their allegations concern the factual components of those statements’. 
Therefore, investors suing in federal courts are required to show that CRAs did not believe their 
own ratings at the time they issued them. For a commentary on this case, see Javier Bleichmar and 
Cynthia Hanawalt, ‘The Evolving Legacy of ‘Fait v. Regions Financial’ (2013) 249 New York Law 
Journal 85. 
937 Lisa McKenna, ‘An Uncertain Forecast for Credit Rating Agencies: Liability for Negligent 
Misrepresentation after Bathurst’ Columbia Business Law Review Online, 27 November 2012. 
938 Bathurst Regional Council v Local Government Financial Services Pty Ltd (No 5) [2012] FCA 
1200 at 1277. 
939 Nadine Schimroszik, ‘S&P guilty of misleading investors. Landmark ruling by Australian court 
could pave way for flood of cases against ratings agencies’ The Guardian, 5 November 2012. 
940 ABN Amro Bank NV v Bathurst Regional Council [2014] FCAFC 65. The Federal Court of 
Australia rejected S&P’s and ABN Amro’s appeal against the 2012 ruling of the lower court. The 
decision on appeal delivered by Jacobson, J. confirmed that the rating agency was ‘misleading’ 
and ‘deceptive’ when it awarded an ‘AAA’ credit rating to a complex debt instrument. It should be 
noted that S&P’s accepted on appeal that the rating was flawed. 
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investors to rely on the rating.941 In particular, the Court of Appeal held that the 
rating agency knew that potential investors in a structured credit product would 
rely on its opinion as to the creditworthiness of the notes in making their decisions 
to invest.  
The duty of care essentially flowed from a presumption that the councils fully 
depended on S&P’s, the issuer ABN Amro and their financial services provider 
(Local Government Financial Services) in deciding whether to buy the products. 
The appeal judgment made it clear that a duty to exercise reasonable care and skill 
can be owed to third parties in circumstances where the precise identity of the 
recipient of advice is not necessarily known.942  
Another relevant aspect considered by the Australian Federal Court was 
whether the damages awarded to the successful parties could be apportioned. On 
this point, the judges affirmed that ‘the various claims pursuant to Section 1041E 
of the Corporations Act were apportionable under Section 1041L of Corporations 
Act because they arose out of the same facts as the claim under Section 
1041H’.943 
Although the Australian appeal decision confirmed the CRA’s liability for 
negligent misrepresentation in the absence of a contractual relationship, the 
question of the best option to reduce investors’ reliance on ratings is still far from 
                                                 
941 Danielle Myles, ‘Investors: curb your enthusiasm over S&P ruling’ (2014) 33 International 
Financial Law Review 6. 
942 ABN Amro Bank NV v Bathurst Regional Council [2014] FCAFC 65, at 573 and 577. The 
Federal Court of Australia made it clear that ‘to be a duty to exercise reasonable care in making a 
statement or giving advice: (1) the speaker must realise, or the circumstances must be such that the 
speaker ought to have realised, that the recipient of the information or advice intends to act on that 
information or advice in connexion with some matter of business or serious consequence; and (2) 
the circumstances must be such that it is reasonable in all the circumstances for the recipient to 
seek, or to accept, and to rely upon the utterance of the speaker’. The judge stated that ‘it is not 
necessary that the person making the statement know the identity of the persons who may rely on 
it and suffer loss’. 
943 ibid at 1245 and 1589-1590. In Wealthsure Pty Ltd v Selig [2014] FCAFC 64, the Federal Court 
of Australia considered the question as to whether the proportionate liability provisions in the 
Australian legislation apply in circumstances where a plaintiff has a number of causes of action 
against two or more defendants for the same loss or damage—notwithstanding that not all of the 
plaintiff’s causes of action are apportionable claims. In this case, the Court held that the whole of 
the claim against Wealthsure should be apportioned, notwithstanding that the Selig’s claim had 
succeeded in other causes of action which were non-apportionable claims. In Bathurst and 
Wealthsure cases, the interpretation of Section 1041L(2) of the Corporations Act 2001 (‘Division 
2A--Proportionate liability for misleading and deceptive conduct’) was determinant to affirm the 
proportionate liability regime under the Australian legislation. As a matter of clarity, Section 
1041L(2) states that ‘(…) there is a single apportionable claim in the proceedings in respect of the 
same loss or damage even if the claim for the loss or damage is based on more than one cause of 
action (whether or not of the same or a different kind)’. 
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clear.944 By recognizing that investors were not able to ‘second guess’ the rating 
(nor undertake their own analysis of the notes’ default risk), this decision may 
encourage them to place greater reliance on credit ratings. This means that 
investors may be not stimulated to scrutinize the credit risk of the products they 
wish to buy.945 
The role of CRAs with respect to investors was also explained in another 
Australian case where the judges contrasted the approach of English courts in 
Cassa di Risparmio della Repubblica di San Marino v Barclays Bank by taking 
into account the regulatory regime adopted in the Australian legislation.  
In Wingecarribee Shire Council v Lehman Brothers Australia Ltd (in 
liquidation), the court held that the CRA had breached the fiduciary duties it owed 
with respect to local councils—as their investment adviser—by recommending 
products from which agency would receive significant fees and profits and that its 
conduct amounted to a breach of an Australian-specific consumer protection 
prohibition on misleading or deceptive conduct.946 
The court found that the CRA engaged in misleading and deceptive conduct in 
breach of Section 12DA(1) of the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission Act 2001 when it promoted that products to the councils as suitable 
investments.947 The case showed that rating agency was liable to compensate the 
councils for their losses incurred as a result of their investments. In particular, the 
relationship of Lehman Brothers with the investor was judged as being that of the 
                                                 
944 Harry Edwards, ‘S&P ruling: are CRA concerns justified?’ (2014) 33 International Financial 
Law Review 6. It is not entirely clear if this ruling incentivizes good ratings practice and how the 
decision addresses the main issues of CRAs’ activities. 
945 ibid. The author points out that the better approach of making CRAs accountable for the role 
they play in financial markets is ‘to let the rating agencies’ reputational concerns (and therefore the 
credibility and value of their product) act to incentivize the maintenance of their standards’. 
946 Wingecarribee Shire Council v Lehman Brothers Australia Ltd (in liquidation) [2012] FCA 
1028. In particular, the Federal Court of Australia held that Lehman Brothers Australia, which was 
called Grange Securities Ltd (Grange), was an investment adviser that owed to the councils 
fiduciary duties. The credit rating agency represented that its products—synthetic collateralized 
debt obligations (‘SCDOs’)—were prudent, capital protective investments and that they complied 
with statutory and council policy requirements. Also, the Court found that the SCDOs did not have 
the characteristics that Grange promised to the Councils they would have in their individual 
contracts: that is, the SCDOs did not have a high level of security for the invested capital, were not 
easily tradeable on an established secondary market or able to be readily liquidated for cash and 
were not suitable investments for risk-averse councils.   
947 Section 12BAB of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 defines 
‘financial service’ as ‘a recommendation or a statement of opinion, or a report of either of those 
things, that: (a) is intended to influence a person or persons in making a decision in relation to a 
particular financial product or class of financial products, or an interest in a particular financial 
product or class of financial products; or (b) could reasonably be regarded as being intended to 
have such an influence’. 
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councils’ trusted adviser, so the court found that the councils acted on the 
adviser’s recommendations and not on the documents containing the 
disclaimers.948 The significance of the decision is that the court focused on the 
mis-selling by Lehman Brothers in finding it liable for misleading and deceptive 
conduct, negligence, breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty.949 Further, 
the Wingecarribee case underlined ‘the potential limits of disclosure as a 
regulatory technique in the face of increased complexity of financial products’.950  
The Australian legislation contains provisions that are intended to strengthen 
quality and integrity in the rating process, although the relevant rules are not 
specifically addressed to CRAs.951 For example, Section 912A of the Corporations 
Act 2001 requires that credit rating agencies must act with due care, diligence and 
competence when preparing their ratings952. In addition, the Australian Securities 
and Investments Commission (ASIC) removed the exemption held by CRAs of 
holding an Australian Financial Services License (AFSL) in order to improve 
controls on ratings industry.953 
In this respect, CRAs issuing ratings without reasonable grounds may be 
subject to sanctions for engaging in misleading or deceptive conduct, or making 
false or misleading statements, in relation to financial services and products.954 
These obligations are consistent with the existing principles and guidelines that 
require a CRA to employ analysts that are professional, competent, and of high 
integrity, via the general requirement for a financial services licensee to ensure 
that its representatives are sufficiently trained, and competent to provide the 
relevant financial services.955 
                                                 
948 Jennifer G. Hill (note 918) 275-276. 
949 Lesa Bransgrove, ‘A risk too far: Lehman’s Misseling’ (2013) 87 Law Institute Journal 11, 50. 
The author argues that ‘this decision has serious ramifications for investors globally, both 
sophisticated and unsophisticated, and also for banks in terms of their potential liability and the 
need to redefine their capital-markets selling procedures’. 
950 Jennifer G. Hill (note 918) 276 quoting Tony D’Aloisio, ‘Regulatory Response to the Financial 
Crisis’, Presentation delivered to the Asia Securities Forum, Sydney, 12 October 2009, 11-12.  
951 Graeme Baber, ‘The role and responsibility of credit rating agencies in promoting soundness 
and integrity’ (2014) 17 Journal of Money Laundering Control 1, 38. 
952 Section 912A(1)(b) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). 
953 Nick Sherry, ‘Improved Australian Controls for Credit Rating Agencies and Research Houses’, 
Press Release No 077, 13 November 2008. 
954 Sections 1041E and 1041H of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), and Sections 12DA and 12DB 
of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth). On this matter see also 
IOSCO, ‘Regulatory Implementation of the Statement of Principles Regarding the Activities of 
Credit Rating Agencies: Final Report’, FR04/11, February 2011, 24.  
955 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Outlines improvements to regulation of 
credit rating agencies in Australia, 12 November 2009. 
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At this point, a relevant question is whether there is room for subsequent 
actions in which investors may run arguments similar to those which were 
successful under Australia law.956 For instance, it might be difficult to apply the 
Bathurst case under the new statutory cause of action established by the 2013 
CRA Regulation. The Australian cases make rating agencies more aware of their 
accountability by affirming the principle that they are not legally immune for their 
opinions.957 
In addition, the Australian judgments provide a means of dealing with the 
labyrinth of cases as decided over the past years in the US in which CRAs have 
not been held to account for their ratings in part because of the assumption that 
they are independent financial reporters.958 It can be claimed that rating agencies 
who have previously been unaccountable to investors may no longer be able to 
hide behind their disclaimers to protect them from liability.959 However, it 
remains to be seen whether such a claim would succeed in other common law 
jurisdictions generally less prone to accept the existence of the necessary 
relationship between the investor and rating agency (for example, the courts are 
unsympathetic to the idea that the rating agency owes a duty of care in issuing 
ratings even if in the absence of any contractual relationship).960 These claims 
could be decided on their individual facts with the risk of different judgments 
being given on the basis of the attitude, i.e. discretion, of the courts with respect 
of CRAs’ business activities.961 
                                                 
956 Jamie Smyth and Sam Fleming, ‘S&P loses Australian appeal over misleading investors’ 
Financial Times (London, 6 June 2014). 
957 John Gapper, ‘Safe harbour for ratings agencies gets smaller’ Financial Times (London, 5 
November 2012).  
958 In particular, civil suits against rating agencies have been not successful and claims have been 
generally dismissed. 
959 Oddo Asset Management v Barclays Bank, New York State Supreme Court, New York County 
(No 08-109547). The New York Court of Appeals dismissed a lawsuit against S&P’s affirming 
that no fiduciary duty existed with respect to investors. See also Boca Raton Firefighters & Police 
Pension Fund v Bahash, et al (12-cv-1776) (US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit) where 
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed a class action against McGraw-Hill concerning 
S&P’s credit ratings for toxic mortgage-backed securities before the financial collapse. The US 
court found that S&P’s statements regarding its independent and objective ratings were ‘mere 
commercial puffery’ and could not form the basis of a securities fraud claim. 
960 By the same token, the courts could be unsympathetic to investors who make their investment 
decisions by placing sole or mechanistic reliance on the rating.   
961 See the case filed on 4 December 2013 in the District Court of Amsterdam by Stichting Ratings 
Redress (a Dutch foundation funded by Australian-based litigation funder, Bentham IMF Limited) 
where a group of 16 European institutional investors jointly sued Royal Bank of Scotland and 
S&P’s for damages suffered as a result of investments made in complex financial derivatives 
known as Constant Proportion Debt Obligations (‘CPDOs’). The investors allege that S&P’s 
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The Bathurst case may be attractive for courts because of the re-
characterization of ratings as factual representations rather than opinions, which 
would make it much easier to impose liability on credit rating agencies for 
negligent misrepresentation. However, this unprecedented decision may be 
undermined by CRAs’ extensive explicit disclaimers of liability that could be an 
obstacle for changing the definition of a rating from an opinion to a representation 
(see ‘Appendix IV’).  
In the Bathurst case, the judge made it clear that ‘the disclaimers [of S&P’s] 
were not effective in this instance because those disclaimers were not brought to 
the attention of investors. Where appropriate disclaimers are brought to the 
attention of investors, the position may be different’.962 What is more, the 
different classes of investors (for instance if they are relatively sophisticated) may 
determine whether or not courts are willing to impose liability for negligent 
misrepresentation on ratings agencies.963  
Lastly, the Bathurst case raises several questions about CRAs’ modus 
operandi and increases the scrutiny of the credit rating agencies’ gatekeeper role. 
However, the beneficial outcomes of this ruling will be determinable only after 
significant judicial review and rule-making.  
Although this chapter has focused on CRAs accountability, the question of 
how regulators can tailor a proper responsibility to rating agencies remains 
unanswered. The developments in the case law under the Australian legislation 
have lifted the immunity that CRAs hitherto enjoyed (and elsewhere still enjoy) 
with respect to investors.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
negligently assigned the highest ‘AAA’ rating to CPDOs, while heavily relying on misinformation 
supplied by RBS, the legal successor of the Dutch bank ABN Amro. The legal arguments and 
evidence raised in this case mainly follow the successful considerations established by the 
Australian Court judgment in Bathurst case.  
962 Bathurst Regional Council v Local Government Financial Services Pty Ltd (No 5) [2012] FCA 
1200 at 2541. 
963 See the arguments of Jagot, J. based on the consideration that the municipal councils 
in Bathurst were relatively unsophisticated investors. 
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Chapter Six  
Concluding Remarks 
 
 
As stated by the one of the leading CRAs, ‘credit ratings are designed 
primarily to be our forward-looking opinions about creditworthiness and unlike 
other types of opinions, such as, for example, those provided by doctors or 
lawyers, credit ratings opinions are not intended to be a prognosis or 
recommendation’.964 On this view, CRAs are primarily intended to provide 
investors and market participants with information about the relative credit risk of 
issuers and individual debt issues that the agency rates.965  
However, recital 8 in the preamble to Regulation No 462/2013 states that 
‘credit ratings, unlike investment research, are not mere opinions about a value or 
a price for a financial instrument or a financial obligation. Credit rating agencies 
are not mere financial analysts or investment advisors. Credit ratings have 
regulatory value for regulated investors, such as credit institutions, insurance 
companies and other institutional investors’. 
By summarizing the outcomes of research, this study analyses the liability of 
CRAs in the financial markets and the implications of CRAs’ modus operandi for 
regulators and market participants.  
Chapter one explored the main features of the ratings industry taking into 
consideration the major problems involving the CRAs in the aftermath of 2007-
2009 financial crisis. In considering the CRAs’ failures and remedies, the chapter 
provided tentative proposals for strengthening the legal framework of CRAs. 
Chapter two provided a thoroughly discussion about the governance of CRAs 
with particular emphasis on their business model, underlying the potential 
collusive behaviour between issuers and raters. Further, the focus on ratings 
methodologies, conflicts of interest and CRAs’ ownership raised concerns about 
the lack of transparency and limited competition in the ratings industry. To 
                                                 
964 S&P’s, ‘Guide to Credit Rating Essentials. What are credit ratings and how do they work?’ 
(2011) <www.standardandpoors.com> accessed 1 March 2012, 3. 
965 See Comments of Moody’s Investors Service to the Securities and Exchange Commission 
following the Credit Ratings Roundtable held on 14 May 2013, 3 June 2013, where it is stated that 
‘ratings should be treated as opinions forecasts on credit risk, and should not be used by regulators 
to oversee other industries or sectors’. 
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address these problems a viable solution lies in the establishment of independent 
controllers, i.e. compliance bodies, with tasks of verifying the information used in 
the rating process. 
The use of rating triggers in the financial transactions, the role of sovereign 
ratings and the question of over-reliance on CRA ratings has been analysed. The 
results evidenced the presence of wrong incentives in the CRAs market namely 
‘reputational capital’ and ‘regulatory licenses’: these incentives favour the 
phenomena of ‘rating shopping’ and ‘rating inflation’.  
Chapter three examined the regulatory structure of CRAs with regard to the 
international approach and the legislative reforms adopted in the US and the EU. 
This analysis showed a persistent gap in the supervision and enforcement of 
CRAs’ activities: although the legislators have improved the monitoring system 
and increased the disclosure regime, the conduct of the main CRAs has remained 
intact.  
Chapter four dealt with the accountability of CRAs: the central idea is to hold 
the credit agencies liable for their erroneous ratings. It is argued that to bridge this 
gap a viable solution lies in the application of estoppel doctrine, i.e. estoppel by 
representation, as a rule of evidence in demonstrating a fact necessary to prove a 
cause of action.  
Chapter five discussed the fact that the expert liability established in the Dodd-
Frank Act 2010 and the civil liability regime introduced in the 2013 EU 
Regulation did not resolve the lack of a unique, single system of responsibility for 
CRAs. Further, the tort liability regime put in place at the EU level differs from 
the UK tort law, which is essentially based on the existence of a duty of care and 
the causal link between the wrongful act or omission and the damage.  
The story of CRAs is a curious one. Over the last decade, CRAs have given 
rise to a heated debate among academics, practitioners and their designated users 
(i.e. issuers and investors) about both the very idea of having a strong regulatory 
framework and how this would work in practice.966 
This thesis sets out to show that market participants did not understand either 
the powerful role played by CRAs in the capital markets or how the ratings 
industry affects the legal and economic aspects of financial regulation. CRAs’ 
                                                 
966 Charlotte Eborall, ‘Credit Rating Agencies’ in Michael Blair, George Walker and Stuart Willey 
(eds), Financial Markets and Exchanges Law (2nd edn, Oxford: OUP 2012) 549-550. 
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activities influence not only investor behaviour but also the stability, i.e. integrity, 
of the securities sector.  
The 2007-2009 financial crisis revealed glaring shortcomings of CRAs in 
providing independent and accurate evaluations of the creditworthiness of firms 
and structured finance products (e.g., the Lehman Brothers and subprime 
mortgages cases).967 For instance, CRAs failed to anticipate the seriousness of the 
bursting of the housing bubble in the US or to recognize the poor quality of the 
subprime loans packaged into securities.968 In this regard, the research underlines 
the need to address the main problems in connection with the CRAs’ modus 
operandi namely: (1) the ‘issuer-pays’ business model; (2) over-reliance on 
ratings for regulatory purposes and on the part of investors; (3) limited 
competition; and (4) lack of responsibility. 
In academic circles, it is commonly observed that the main CRAs have been 
elevated to the centre of the international financial architecture by lawmakers and 
regulators. These NRSROs have the power to label bonds for issuance firms. They 
act as gatekeepers by regulating the flow of market-sensitive information. As a 
result, credit ratings became a crucial reference for the banking and financial 
system, playing a ‘certification’ role that has created conflicts of interest between 
CRAs and issuers and high barriers to entry to additional competitors, while the 
CRAs enjoyed immunity from liability. Fair competition could reduce the 
phenomenon of ratings shopping and may reduce monopolistic or oligopolistic 
rents, and add information to financial markets since raters sometimes give 
different ratings. 
In this regard, the research shows that the CRAs are to be blamed for 
misjudging the safety of securities products which ultimately proved toxic for 
banks and investors. CRAs need to be held accountable but the present regulatory 
framework does not secure adequate protection for market participants. Although 
several legislative reforms have been adopted, there is a strong argument that lack 
of rules of the game is the major factor in the accountability regime of CRAs. 
                                                 
967 Rating agencies have been criticised because of their failure properly to evaluate the risks 
embedded in mortgage bonds during and following the 2007-2009 financial crisis. See Kara 
Scannell, ‘S&P faces securities fraud charges over mortgage ratings’ Financial Times (London, 23 
July 2014). 
968 S&P’s faced a US Department of Justice lawsuit over ‘rosy’ ratings. In particular, the leading 
credit rating agency has come under scrutiny for allegedly giving over-generous ratings to 
structured credit products, including collateralized debt obligations, in order to win fees. 
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Further, CRAs were responsible for delaying downgrades of sovereign default 
risks (for example, in the 2011-2012 Greek debt crisis).969 
The problem is made worse by the fact that investors find it difficult to choose 
the right financial product because there is no appropriate system of disclosure 
and the internal control rules are inadequate. Market participants mechanistically 
rely on ratings, thus causing hazardous behaviour such as sell-offs of securities 
when they are downgraded, so-called ‘cliff effects’, that can determine 
procyclicality and systemic risk.  
All this underscores the failings of the ‘issuer-agency’ relationship that 
characterizes the ratings business model.970 This relationship is fraught with major 
conflicts of interest because, when it comes to ratings, the issuers’ purposes often 
do not square with investors’ need to receive reliable ratings information.971 
However, it is not entirely clear why professional intermediaries favour this 
payment structure when their main task is to assess publicly available 
information—through independent opinions—in order to help investors in making 
their own investment decisions.972 
The research identifies the potential conflicts of interest exhibited by CRAs 
because they have a financial incentive to accommodate the preferences of bond 
issuers, owing to the fact that the agencies are selected and paid by the issuers. 
This heavy dependence gives rise to ratings inflation and inaccuracy.  
To address the question of conflicts of interest, disclosure of each rating grade 
should be verified by independent bodies and not by the raters themselves. This 
                                                 
969 Article 8(5) of Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009. What is more, Regulation (EU) No 513/2011 
added in Article 8(5) the following paragraph: ‘sovereign ratings shall be reviewed at least every 
six months’. See also Sophia Grene, ‘Big three credit rating agencies under fire’ Financial Times 
(London, 4 May 2014). 
970 Francesca Gennari and Luisa Bosetti, ‘The Governance of Credit Rating Agencies in the 
European Regulation: The Right Way to Enhance Market Competition?’ (2011) 2 International 
Journal of Contemporary Business Studies 7, 17. 
971 Tracy Alloway, ‘Moody’s in new conflict of interest claim’ Financial Times (London, 30 July 
2014), where it is noted, according to academic studies, that in the years following the financial 
crisis Moody’s showed ‘favouritism towards its top shareholders when rating the bonds of 
companies’.  
972 Lawrence J. White, ‘A New Law for the Bond Rating Industry -- For Better or For Worse?’ 
(2007) New York University School of Law, Law & Economics Research Paper Series Working 
Paper No 07-09 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=961391> accessed 26 November 2013, 7-8. The author 
argues that ‘the bond ratings help lenders (bond investors) pierce the fog of asymmetric 
information so as better to determine the creditworthiness of potential borrowers (bond issuers), 
while also providing the opportunity for the more creditworthy borrowers to stand out from (and 
pay lower interest rates than) their less creditworthy peers’. 
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means that independent controllers should manage publicly available information 
before it is used in a rating assessment.  
CRAs have acknowledged the existence of the ‘issuer-pays’ conflict of 
interests and the more benign risk of error, but have typically downplayed their 
significance, stating that their reputations are far too valuable to the success of 
their businesses for them either to succumb to the biases inherent in the issuer-
pays revenue model or to issue inaccurate ratings. Individual investors rely on the 
ratings because of their perceived authority, while institutional investors rely on 
them because of their market authority. 
The fact that public regulators are apt to delegate regulatory authority to credit 
rating agencies—in order to improve market efficiency by making use of their 
informational advantage—could determine a potential cause of distortion in the 
financial sector.973 Rating conflicts of interest, if not adequately addressed, 
constitute an evident ‘market failure’ of securities regulation. Since issuers pay 
the bills and still get to pick which agency rates their debt, attempts to strip credit 
ratings of their central role in financial regulation will prove to be complicated. 
In examining the normative framework for CRAs, this research raises an 
important question: whether the paradoxical position of credit rating agencies as 
financial arbiters can be regarded as being a lack of market discipline or a 
regulatory failure. In order to respond to this question, the analysis sets out 
tentative suggestions for implementing the present accountability regime by 
making CRAs liable for issuing inaccurate ratings. The fact that CRAs 
successfully escape responsibility can determine an inefficiency of resource 
allocation. Such inefficiency may be correlated with the risks of incomplete 
information being supplied to investors. 
The critical problem is that credit ratings affect market confidence and 
influence both investment decisions and expectations. As intermediaries, credit 
ratings should profit from protecting investors because they manage ‘market 
information’, which is generally considered to be a public good. Through their 
trustworthy reputation they constitute suppliers of independent information for 
investors. Investors—as market participants—should be made aware of the 
                                                 
973 Tracy Alloway, ‘MBS deal shelved after rift over ratings’ Financial Times (London, 12 May 
2014). The author observes that ‘since the financial crisis, regulators have encouraged credit rating 
agencies to give “unsolicited” opinions on deals that they are not hired to evaluate, as part of an 
effort to avoid the ratings shopping that proliferated before 2008’. 
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uncertainties surrounding future predictions of default events. So there is a public 
interest in achieving accountability for this publication of results.  
CRAs wield great power to influence market fluctuations in securities and 
investors’ decisions through their evaluations. The risk of such influence should 
be addressed by a regulatory framework guaranteeing responsibility and 
accountability for CRAs’ evaluations.  
Although the role played by CRAs is considered to be valuable by issuers and 
investors their involvement in debt securities’ regulation has generated a demand 
for ratings that is associated with the need to comply with such regulation and not 
necessarily with the quality of ratings.974 The fact that financial products need to 
be labelled in order to ensure that substantial revenues accrue to companies goes 
hand-in-hand with a high demand for CRAs.  
As a result, the regulatory use of ratings may give rise to a systemic risk, 
namely the risk of market and regulatory failures. This research supports the 
argument that CRAs should be regulated having due regard to their potential 
systemic threat and should be subject to professional standards similar to those 
applicable to other information intermediaries, such as auditors and financial 
analysts.  
Adequate investor protection against market distortions requires 
trustworthiness and reliability. Consequently, CRAs should encourage ‘market 
efficiency’ through their gatekeeper role. There is large consensus among 
policymakers to the effect that references to CRAs in securities regulation should 
be reduced and ‘to make sure there is less damage the next time that the agencies 
miss, for example, a whopping crisis in the making’.975  
The research has sought to demonstrate that ‘reputational capital’ and 
reputation alone are not a workable constraint on the gatekeeper function. On the 
one hand, market incentives alone seem to be inadequate to foster the accuracy of 
ratings and to keep the effectiveness of CRAs’ action aligned with investor 
                                                 
974 John Authers, ‘Rules shake-up and the law of unintended consequences’ Financial Times 
(London, 1 June 2014). It is observed that ‘the all due diligence to credit rating agencies was 
effectively outsourced by rules such as the Basel II bank regulatory regime. The agencies, unready 
to play the large role allotted to them, were swamped and fatefully allowed the bubble in 
structured mortgage debt’. 
975 Stephen Foley, ‘Issuer payment: model resistant to reform’ Financial Times (London, 14 
January 2013). 
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protection. On the other hand, regulation has increased the incentives to shop for 
ratings by allowing agencies to be used for regulatory purposes.  
For this reason, securities regulation can be considered a victim of market 
failure and regulatory failure in the ratings industry. In particular, the question of 
CRAs’ conflicts of interest and the over-reliance on ratings highlight what kind of 
regulatory tools are needed in order to enhance rating agencies’ activities.  
The CRAs not only should put proper arrangements in place to ensure high 
standards of disclosure, but should also enable investors, by means of financial 
knowledge, to comprehend their internal procedures (e.g. ‘investment grade’).976 
In other terms, CRAs should improve the incentives to supply complete available 
information to market participants.  
A major task for CRAs is to improve investor protection by requiring greater 
transparency.977 In this regard, the recent case law closely considered the role of 
CRAs with respect to investors (for example, the recent Australian decision in the 
Bathurst case). These rulings found that CRAs should be made responsible for 
their investment certification because of their fundamental role in evaluating 
credit risk and influencing investors’ confidence. 
At the institutional level, the government initiatives—the adoption of 
Regulation (EU) No 462/2013 and Dodd-Frank Act—have improved transparency 
and fairness of CRAs by creating a challenging system of regulation and 
supervision. This system enables the rating industry to deliver services considered 
indispensable but, as far as possible, prevents them from pursuing activities that 
are deemed detrimental to consumers.978  
More disclosure and transparency of CRAs activities make important sense in 
the current regulatory framework. A regulatory environment that enforces 
accurate financial disclosure by firms wishing to issue securities also helps to 
enhance the flow of reliable information to investors. Transparency should 
improve rating reliability, facilitate investor diversification and decrease market 
                                                 
976 Marilyn Blumberg Cane, Adam Shamir and Tomas Jodar, ‘Below Investment Grade and Above 
the Law: A Past, Present and Future Look at the Accountability of Credit Rating Agencies’ (2012) 
17 Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law 4, 1090-1091. 
977 Maurice Mullard, ‘The Credit Rating Agencies and Their Contribution to the Financial Crisis’ 
(2012) 83 The Political Quarterly 1, 93. 
978 Stefanie Hiss and Sebastian Nagel, ‘Credit Rating Agencies’ in Daniel Mügge (ed.), Europe 
and the Governance of Global Finance (Oxford: OUP 2014) 140. 
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uncertainty. CRAs provide influential information to market participants and need 
to be pressurized to provide adequate disclosure about their own methodology. 
The research shows that these regulatory measures could prove to be 
ineffectual because rating methods necessarily evolve over time to reflect 
innovations by underwriters, new legislation and changes in the financial market. 
The CRAs’ watchdog would have the difficult task of enforcing ratings 
uniformly, potentially preventing laxer jurisdictions from undermining common 
standards and limiting the ability of certain jurisdictions to add additional 
requirements.979 As for the scope, the on-going discussion as regards regulatory 
choices (i.e. civil liability) will need further attention. A number of technical 
adaptations appear useful even against the background of the current choices 
made. 
It is important that market discipline should detect the potential distortions of 
CRAs’ activities and provide the right incentives to stimulate the rating agencies 
to perform objective and accurate evaluations. What is crucial for the operation of 
the legal protection for investors is the soundness of CRAs’ actions in interpreting 
disclosed information and assessing the creditworthiness of companies, thereby 
increasing investor confidence.  
In other words, investors should be ensured of the appropriate level of 
information on which to make decisions. For this reason, a possible solution is to 
reduce the importance of CRAs by eliminating the ‘references’ to credit ratings in 
the regulations980: this means letting CRAs do their job without giving them the 
‘certification role’ of the quality of financial products.   
It is evident that some individual investors are unskilled and make poor 
decisions about risk even when they have obtained full information about the 
products. In order to avoid failures on the part of CRAs, it is necessary that these 
agencies perform their role of promoting financial awareness while being 
accountable for their opinions, since they are more than simple opinion providers. 
As has been noted, ‘agencies are not just analysing and rating bonds for the sake 
                                                 
979 Brooke Masters, ‘Rating agencies fall under EU supervision’ Financial Times (London, 31 
October 2011). 
980 FSB, ‘Thematic Review on FSB Principles for Reducing Reliance on CRA Ratings. Peer 
Review Report’, 12 May 2014.   
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of self-expression and because they enjoy it. They are being paid to do so by the 
issuers of bonds’.981  
Bonds need ratings in order to be sold: in the case of structured bonds, the 
pools of debt could be arranged or modified in order to obtain a favourable rating, 
a sort of game to get the approval of a leading CRA.982 In this way, ratings have 
become the arbiter of any securities transaction as well as an essential service for 
clients: the global financial markets have credit ratings hard-wired into them, and 
it seems difficult for regulators to push for changing the ‘ratings game’. 
With these considerations in mind, it is possible to conclude that although the 
recent failures showed the potential lucrative purposes of CRAs business, their 
output remains central to the functioning of the financial system.983 By being the 
ones that allow an entity to be able to meet the requirements imposed by 
regulators, their role is vital since they are required in order to access the capital 
markets. 
 
                                                 
981 John Gapper, ‘Rating agencies must beware of the law’ Financial Times (London, 6 February 
2013. 
982 Sam Jones, ‘From AAA to AAAaaarrghhhh. How the credit rating agencies’ triple-A scores 
went bad – and took the financial system with them’ Financial Times Weekend Magazine 
(London, 18/19 October 2008) 19. 
983 FSB, ‘Credit Rating Agencies. Reducing reliance and strengthening oversight’, Progress Report 
to the St Petersburg G20 Summit, 29 August 2013, 2. The Report affirms that ‘CRAs play an 
important role and their ratings can appropriately be used as an input to firms’ own judgement as 
part of internal credit assessment processes’. 
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Appendix I 
Long-Term Rating Scale 
  
S&P’s  Moody’s Fitch 
AAA 
 
Highest ratings         
Aaa 
 
Highest quality ratings 
AAA 
 
Highest credit quality 
AA 
 
High Rating 
Aa 
 
High quality ratings 
AA 
 
Very High Credit 
A 
 
Strong Rating 
A 
 
Upper-medium Ratings 
A 
 
High Credit Quality 
BBB 
 
Adequate Rating 
Baa  
 
Medium-grade ratings 
BBB  
 
Good credit quality 
BB  
 
Vulnerable Rating 
Ba  
 
Speculative ratings 
BB  
 
Speculative 
B  
 
More vulnerable Rating 
B  
 
Speculative ratings 
B  
 
Highly speculative 
CCC  
 
Currently Vulnerable Rating 
Caa  
 
Speculative of poor standing 
ratings 
CCC  
 
Substantial credit risk 
CC  
 
Currently High Vulnerable 
Rating 
Ca  
 
Highly speculative 
CC  
 
Very high levels of credit 
risk 
R  
 
Under regulatory supervision 
Rating 
C  
 
Lowest ratings 
C  
 
Exceptionally high levels of 
credit risk 
SD/D 
  
Selective default/default Rating 
 RD  
 
Restricted Default 
NR  
 
Issuer not rated 
 D 
  
Default Ratings 
Source: Compiled by the author using data from Moody’s Investors Service, ‘Rating Symbols and 
Definitions’, August 2014, 5; Fitch Ratings, ‘Definition of Ratings and Other Forms of Opinion’, 
January 2014, 9-10; Standard & Poor’s, ‘Standard & Poor’s Ratings Definitions’, 22 September 
2014 <www.standardandpoors.com> accessed 1 October 2014. S&P’s makes clear that the ratings 
from ‘aa’ to ‘ccc’ may be subject to a plus (+) or minus (-) sign to show relative standing within 
the major rating categories. 
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Appendix II 
Definitions of Ratings 
Short-term credit ratings A short-term issuer or obligation rating is based, in all cases, on 
the short-term vulnerability to default of the rated entity or 
security stream and relates to the capacity to meet financial 
obligations in accordance with the documentation governing the 
relevant obligation. 
Medium-term credit ratings Long-term credit rating is designed to evaluate the up-to-one-
year expiration obligations 
Long-term credit ratings Ratings of individual securities or financial obligations of a 
corporate issuer address relative vulnerability to default on an 
ordinal scale.  
Default ratings Assessment the default risk of an issuer 
Recovery ratings Measure of the expected recovery rate when default has 
occurred 
Credit conversion factor ratings Provide an ordinal opinion on the exposures prospects 
Expected loss ratings Measure of the average losses occurred due to default in a 
portfolio 
Local currency ratings Local currency rating evaluates an obligor’s capability of 
generating sufficient local currency in order to meet its 
domestic currency financial obligations 
Foreign currency ratings Foreign currency rating evaluates an obligor’s ability to service 
foreign debt commitments taking into account the access to 
foreign exchange 
National scale ratings Denote the quality of the issuer/issue relative to others within a 
specific home market 
Stand-alone ratings Reflect the issuer’s financial strength and creditworthiness 
without any intervention from the state, shareholders or 
stakeholders 
Claims payability and deposit ratings Provide a view on the ability of an insurance organisation to 
fulfil its insurance policies and contracts under the agreed terms 
Municipal ratings Express an opinion on the investment quality of US and EU 
municipal and tax-exempt issuers and issues 
Support ratings Indicate a judgement of a potential supporter’s propensity and 
ability to support a bank facing difficulties 
Country and country ceiling ratings Represent a country’s relative credit risk and serve as an 
important guideline for foreign investments and final decisions 
Source: Compiled by the author using data from Fitch, ‘Definitions of Ratings and Other Forms of 
Opinion’ (December 2011) <www.fitchratings.com> accessed 6 March 2012, 18; Tony Van Gestel 
and Bart Baesens, Credit Risk Management (Oxford: OUP 2009) 137. 
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Appendix III 
Rating qualifiers 
 
“pi” ratings Ratings based only on published financial information. 
“q” ratings Ratings based on a statistical rating model that is fed 
with ratios and variables derived from the financial 
statements. 
“p” ratings Ratings based on the likelihood of repayment of the 
principal portion of the obligation only. 
“i” ratings Ratings based on the likelihood of repayment of the 
interest. 
“pr” ratings Provisional ratings based on the credit quality 
assuming that the rated project is successfully 
completed. 
“t” ratings Ratings based on the termination structures that are 
designed to honour their contracts at maturity or 
before. 
“*” ratings Ratings based on a shadow opinion or conditional 
rating that are not intended for publication. 
Source: Compiled by the author using data from Tony Van Gestel and Bart Baesens, Credit Risk 
Management (Oxford: OUP 2009) 119-120. 
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Appendix IV 
Credit Rating Agencies Disclaimers 
 
Standard & Poor’s  
No content (including ratings, credit-related analyses and data, valuations, model, 
software or other application or output therefrom) or any part thereof (Content) may be 
modified, reverse engineered, reproduced or distributed in any form by any means, or 
stored in a database or retrieval system, without the prior written permission of Standard 
& Poor’s Financial Services LLC or its affiliates (collectively, S&P). The Content shall 
not be used for any unlawful or unauthorized purposes. S&P and any third-party 
providers, as well as their directors, officers, shareholders, employees or agents 
(collectively S&P Parties) do not guarantee the accuracy, completeness, timeliness or 
availability of the Content. S&P Parties are not responsible for any errors or omissions 
(negligent or otherwise), regardless of the cause, for the results obtained from the use of 
the Content, or for the security or maintenance of any data input by the user. The Content 
is provided on an “as is” basis. S&P PARTIES DISCLAIM ANY AND ALL EXPRESS 
OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, ANY 
WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR 
PURPOSE OR USE, FREEDOM FROM BUGS, SOFTWARE ERRORS OR DEFECTS, 
THAT THE CONTENT'S FUNCTIONING WILL BE UNINTERRUPTED OR THAT 
THE CONTENT WILL OPERATE WITH ANY SOFTWARE OR HARDWARE 
CONFIGURATION. In no event shall S&P Parties be liable to any party for any direct, 
indirect, incidental, exemplary, compensatory, punitive, special or consequential 
damages, costs, expenses, legal fees, or losses (including, without limitation, lost income 
or lost profits and opportunity costs or losses caused by negligence) in connection with 
any use of the Content even if advised of the possibility of such damages. Credit-related 
and other analyses, including ratings, and statements in the Content are statements of 
opinion as of the date they are expressed and not statements of fact. S&P’s opinions, 
analyses and rating acknowledgment decisions (described below) are not 
recommendations to purchase, hold, or sell any securities or to make any investment 
decisions, and do not address the suitability of any security. S&P assumes no obligation 
to update the Content following publication in any form or format. The Content should 
not be relied on and is not a substitute for the skill, judgment and experience of the user, 
its management, employees, advisors and/or clients when making investment and other 
business decisions. S&P does not act as a fiduciary or an investment advisor except 
where registered as such. While S&P has obtained information from sources it believes to 
be reliable, S&P does not perform an audit and undertakes no duty of due diligence or 
independent verification of any information it receives. To the extent that regulatory 
authorities allow a rating agency to acknowledge in one jurisdiction a rating issued in 
another jurisdiction for certain regulatory purposes, S&P reserves the right to assign, 
withdraw or suspend such acknowledgement at any time and in its sole discretion. S&P 
Parties disclaim any duty whatsoever arising out of the assignment, withdrawal or 
suspension of an acknowledgment as well as any liability for any damage alleged to have 
been suffered on account thereof. S&P keeps certain activities of its business units 
separate from each other in order to preserve the independence and objectivity of their 
respective activities. As a result, certain business units of S&P may have information that 
is not available to other S&P business units. S&P has established policies and procedures 
to maintain the confidentiality of certain non-public information received in connection 
with each analytical process. S&P may receive compensation for its ratings and certain 
analyses, normally from issuers or underwriters of securities or from obligors. S&P 
reserves the right to disseminate its opinions and analyses. S&P's public ratings and 
analyses are made available on its Web sites, www.standardandpoors.com (free of 
charge), and www.ratingsdirect.com and www.globalcreditportal.com (subscription), and 
 230 
may be distributed through other means, including via S&P publications and third-party 
redistributors. Additional information about our ratings fees is available at 
www.standardandpoors.com/usratingsfees. 
 
Australia 
Ratings are statements of opinion, not statements of fact or recommendations to buy, 
hold, or sell any securities or make any other investment decisions. Standard & Poor’s 
(Australia) Pty. Ltd. holds Australian financial services license number 337565 under the 
Corporations Act 2001. Standard & Poor’s credit ratings and related research are not 
intended for and must not be distributed to any person in Australia other than a wholesale 
client (as defined in Chapter 7 of the Corporations Act).  
Australian users should only access information about Standard & Poor’s products and 
services from www.standardandpoors.com.au. Other Standard & Poor’s Websites are not 
intended for Australian users. 
 
Source: The text reproduces the disclaimer published by Standard & Poor’s Financial Services 
LLC, ‘Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services Disclaimers and Regulatory Disclosures’, 
http://www.standardandpoors.com/en_US/web/guest/regulatory/legal-disclaimers. 
 
Moody’s 
Credit ratings issued by Moody’s Investors Service, Inc. and its ratings affiliates (“mis”) 
are Moody’s current opinions of the relative future credit risk of entities, credit 
commitments, or debt or debt-like securities, and credit ratings and research publications 
published by Moody’s (“Moody’s publications”) may include Moody’s current opinions 
of the relative future credit risk of entities, credit commitments, or debt or debt-like 
securities. Moody’s defines credit risk as the risk that an entity may not meet its 
contractual, financial obligations as they come due and any estimated financial loss in the 
event of default. Credit ratings do not address any other risk, including but not limited to: 
liquidity risk, market value risk, or price volatility. Credit ratings and Moody’s opinions 
included in Moody’s publications are not statements of current or historical fact. Moody’s 
publications may also include quantitative model based estimates of credit risk and 
related opinions or commentary published by Moody’s Analytics, Inc. credit ratings and 
Moody’s publications do not constitute or provide investment or financial advice, and 
credit ratings and Moody’s publications are not and do not provide recommendations to 
purchase, sell, or hold particular securities. Neither credit ratings nor Moody’s 
publications comment on the suitability of an investment for any particular investor. 
Moody’s issues its credit ratings and publishes Moody’s publications with the expectation 
and understanding that each investor will, with due care, make its own study and 
evaluation of each security that is under consideration for purchase, holding, or sale. 
Moody’s credit ratings and Moody’s publications are not intended for use by retail 
investors and it would be reckless for retail investors to consider Moody’s credit ratings 
or Moody’s publications in making any investment decision. If in doubt you should 
contact your financial or other professional adviser. All information contained herein is 
protected by law, including but not limited to, copyright law, and none of such 
information may be copied or otherwise reproduced, repackaged, further transmitted, 
transferred, disseminated, redistributed or resold, or stored for subsequent use for any 
such purpose, in whole or in part, in any form or manner or by any means whatsoever, by 
any person without Moody’s prior written consent. 
All information contained herein is obtained by Moody’s from sources believed by it to 
be accurate and reliable. Because of the possibility of human or mechanical error as well 
as other factors, however, all information contained herein is provided “AS IS” without 
warranty of any kind. Moody’s adopts all necessary measures so that the information it 
uses in assigning a credit rating is of sufficient quality and from sources Moody’s 
considers to be reliable including, when appropriate, independent third-party sources. 
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However, Moody’s is not an auditor and cannot in every instance independently verify or 
validate information received in the rating process or in preparing the Moody’s 
Publications. To the extent permitted by law, Moody’s and its directors, officers, 
employees, agents, representatives, licensors and suppliers disclaim liability to any 
person or entity for any indirect, special, consequential, or incidental losses or damages 
whatsoever arising from or in connection with the information contained herein or the use 
of or inability to use any such information, even if Moody’s or any of its directors, 
officers, employees, agents, representatives, licensors or suppliers is advised in advance 
of the possibility of such losses or damages, including but not limited to: (a) any loss of 
present or prospective profits or (b) any loss or damage arising where the relevant 
financial instrument is not the subject of a particular credit rating assigned by Moody’s. 
To the extent permitted by law, Moody’s and its directors, officers, employees, agents, 
representatives, licensors and suppliers disclaim liability for any direct or compensatory 
losses or damages caused to any person or entity, including but not limited to by any 
negligence (but excluding fraud, willful misconduct or any other type of liability that, for 
the avoidance of doubt, by law cannot be excluded) on the part of, or any contingency 
within or beyond the control of, Moody’s or any of its directors, officers, employees, 
agents, representatives, licensors or suppliers, arising from or in connection with the 
information contained herein or the use of or inability to use any such information. 
No warranty, express or implied, as to the accuracy, timeliness, completeness, 
merchantability or fitness for any particular purpose of any such rating or other opinion or 
information is given or made by Moody’s in any form or manner whatsoever. Moody’s 
Investors Service, Inc., a wholly-owned credit rating agency subsidiary of Moody’s 
Corporation (“MCO”), hereby discloses that most issuers of debt securities (including 
corporate and municipal bonds, debentures, notes and commercial paper) and preferred 
stock rated by Moody’s Investors Service, Inc. have, prior to assignment of any rating, 
agreed to pay to Moody’s Investors Service, Inc. for appraisal and rating services 
rendered by it fees ranging from $1,500 to approximately $2,500,000. MCO and MIS 
also maintain policies and procedures to address the independence of MIS’s ratings and 
rating processes. Information regarding certain affiliations that may exist between 
directors of MCO and rated entities, and between entities who hold ratings from MIS and 
have also publicly reported to the SEC an ownership interest in MCO of more than 5%, is 
posted annually at www.moodys.com under the heading “Investor Relations — Corporate 
Governance — Director and Shareholder Affiliation Policy.” 
 
Source: The text reproduces the disclaimer published by Moody’s Investors Service, ‘2015 
Outlook - Australian RMBS, ABS and Covered Bonds. All Asset Classes to Perform Well’, 
Outlook, 19 November 2014, 18-19. 
 
Fitch Ratings 
Ratings, including Rating Watches and Outlooks, assigned by Fitch are opinions based on 
established criteria and methodologies that Fitch is continuously evaluating and updating. 
Therefore, ratings are the collective work product of Fitch and no individual, or group of 
individuals, is solely responsible for a rating. Ratings are not facts, and therefore cannot 
be described as being “accurate” or “inaccurate”. Users should refer to the definition of 
each individual rating for guidance on the dimensions of risk covered by such rating.  
Fitch’s opinions are forward looking and include analysts' views of future performance. 
In many cases, these views on future performance may include forecasts, which may in 
turn (i) be informed by non-disclosable management projections, (ii) be based on a trend 
(sector or wider economic cycle) at a certain stage in the cycle, or (iii) be based on 
historical performance. As a result, while ratings may include cyclical considerations and 
typically attempt to assess the likelihood of repayment at “ultimate/final maturity”, 
material changes in economic conditions and expectations (for a particular issuer) may 
result in a rating change.  
 232 
Credit ratings do not directly address any risk other than credit risk. Credit ratings do not 
comment on the adequacy of market price or market liquidity for rated instruments, 
although such considerations may affect Fitch’s view on credit risk, such as access to 
capital or likelihood of refinancing.  
Ratings are relative measures of risk; as a result, the assignment of ratings in the same 
category to entities and obligations may not fully reflect small differences in the degrees 
of risk. Credit ratings, as opinions on relative ranking of vulnerability to default, do not 
imply or convey a specific statistical probability of default, notwithstanding the agency’s 
published default histories that may be measured against ratings at the time of default. 
Credit ratings are opinions on relative credit quality and not a predictive measure of 
specific default probability.  
Ratings are opinions based on all information known to Fitch, including publicly 
available information and/or non-public documents and information provided to the 
agency by an issuer and other parties. Publication and maintenance of all ratings are 
subject to there being sufficient information, consistent with the relevant criteria and 
methodology, to form a rating opinion.  
In issuing and maintaining its ratings, Fitch relies on factual information it receives from 
issuers and underwriters and from other sources Fitch believes to be credible. Fitch 
conducts a reasonable investigation of the factual information relied upon by it in 
accordance with its rating methodology, and obtains reasonable verification of that 
information from independent sources, to the extent such sources are available for a given 
security or in a given jurisdiction.  
The manner of Fitch’s factual investigation and the scope of the third-party verification it 
obtains will vary depending on the nature of the rated security and its issuer, the 
requirements and practices in the jurisdiction in which the rated security is offered and 
sold and/or the issuer is located, the availability and nature of relevant public information, 
access to the management of the issuer and its advisers, the availability of pre-existing 
third-party verifications such as audit reports, agreed-upon procedures letters, appraisals, 
actuarial reports, engineering reports, legal opinions and other reports provided by third 
parties, the availability of independent and competent third-party verification sources 
with respect to the particular security or in the particular jurisdiction of the issuer, and a 
variety of other factors.  
Users of Fitch’s ratings should understand that neither an enhanced factual investigation 
nor any third-party verification can ensure that all of the information Fitch relies on in 
connection with a rating will be accurate and complete. Ultimately, the issuer and its 
advisers are responsible for the accuracy of the information they provide to Fitch and to 
the market in offering documents and other reports. In issuing its ratings Fitch must rely 
on the work of experts, including independent auditors with respect to financial 
statements and attorneys with respect to legal and tax matters. Further, ratings are 
inherently forward-looking and embody assumptions and predictions about future events 
that by their nature cannot be verified as facts. As a result, despite any verification of 
current facts, ratings can be affected by future events or conditions that were not 
anticipated at the time a rating was issued or affirmed. If any such information should 
turn out to contain misrepresentations or to be otherwise misleading, the rating associated 
with that information may not be appropriate. The assignment of a rating to any issuer or 
any security should not be viewed as a guarantee of the accuracy, completeness, or 
timeliness of the information relied on in connection with the rating or the results 
obtained from the use of such information.  
If a rating does not benefit from the participation of the issuer/originator, but Fitch is 
satisfied that “minimum threshold” information for the given criteria is available from 
public information and other sources available to Fitch, then the non-participatory issuer, 
as with all issuers, will be afforded the opportunity to comment on the rating opinion and 
supporting research prior to it being published. 
Ratings do not constitute recommendations to buy, sell, or hold any security, nor do they 
comment on the adequacy of market price, the suitability of any security for a particular 
investor, or the tax-exempt nature or taxability of any payments of any security. Fitch 
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Ratings does not have a fiduciary relationship with any issuer, subscriber or any other 
individual. Nothing is intended to or should be construed as creating a fiduciary 
relationship between Fitch Ratings and any issuer or between the agency and any user of 
its ratings. Fitch Ratings does not provide to any party any financial advice, or legal, 
auditing, accounting, appraisal, valuation or actuarial services. A rating should not be 
viewed as a replacement for such advice or services.  
Ratings may be changed, qualified, placed on Rating Watch, Outlooks assigned, modified 
or withdrawn as a result of changes in, additions to, accuracy of, unavailability of or 
inadequacy of information or for any reason Fitch Ratings deems sufficient.  
The assignment of a rating by Fitch Ratings shall not constitute consent by the agency to 
use its name as an expert in connection with any registration statement, offering 
document or other filings under any relevant securities laws. 
 
Source: The text reproduces the disclaimer published by Fitch Ratings, ‘Definitions of Ratings and 
Other Forms of Opinion’, January 2014, 4-5. 
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